8 Feb. 1539.
To the worthy Mr. Johann Lübeck, preacher of the church at Cotbus, my beloved friend.
Grace and peace in Christ. My dear Johann, the honorable, truly noble gentleman Caspar von Kokritz has asked me to write you my opinion in this case: whether our people would defend themselves and protect themselves if the emperor were to make a stand against them with force and tyranny and start a war.
2. although I had long before expressed my mei
As I wrote about this question in Duke John's time and especially in the warning to my fellow Germans, it is now almost too late to advise and ask about the matter, because it is now decided among our people that they want to protect themselves and defend themselves, and that they are also justified in doing so. And even if I advise much in this matter anew, they still do not follow me; therefore, it is unnecessary that I and you take great pains in the matter.
3. though I am of a good confidence,
Our dear Lord Christ will see to it that there will be no need for such counsel, nor will he allow His Imperial Majesty to start such a cruel and miserable war; and with this thought I console myself, for He has also hitherto shown His divine power in this way.
(4) However, I also have great and important reasons for putting up with our intention and advice; and this is one of the same reasons: that Imperial Majesty is not, nor can be, the man who will arouse or want to arouse such a war against us; but the pope and bishops, who want to use the emperor as their warrior to defend and maintain their cruel abomination and exceedingly tyrannical nature against the obvious, clear and recognized truth. For the Emperor's Majesty, as Emperor and Lord, has no cause at all against our princes and lords, but the Pope makes a cause where there is none, so that he may lead and involve the Emperor's Majesty in such a dangerous war.
5 If it is right to fight against the Turk and to protect and defend oneself, how much more is it right and praiseworthy to fight against the pope and his people, who are much worse than the Turk.
(6) But if the Imperial Majesty should mingle with the Papal or Turkish warriors, he may also wait for the reward that such infamy would bring and give. For this reason, ours have decided that in this case the Imperial Majesty is not the emperor, but a man of war, servant and robber of the pope, who is the rightful captain and emperor in such a war. This is now the opinion of ours.
I have previously given my advice and opinion on the part of the Emperor's Majesty and not on the part of the one who surrenders to the service of the Pope. I am also moved by the examples, both of the pope and of the Cardinal of Halle, who, like the apostate Julianus, have a desire to coerce and force Christians who surrender to the gospel, to endure and suffer all their willfulness and rage without ceasing, and to do so under the name of Christ, whom they shamefully blaspheme, mock and persecute.
(8) And therefore, either the pope, cardinals, bishops, and emperors renounce and lay aside the name of Christ, and publicly confess that they are they, as they certainly are, who walk in the service of the devil, and are his own: then I will counsel, as before, that they be given place and suffer as heathen authorities, who will not suffer the gospel. Or if, under Christ's name, they knowingly do something against the true Christians as anti-Christians and throw the stone at them, they may also wait for the stone to fall on their heads and receive the punishment of the other commandment.
9. Although this is not all that moves me, and I do not want to give it all away, so that it does not one day come to the despairing boys and devil servants, for whom it is good and necessary that they are thus punished with Cain's punishment, that is, with fear and trembling; as then happens to all murderers, blasphemers and church robbers; It is not necessary for you to know everything about the matter, but only that you do not encourage the ungodly boys against our rulers in their intentions, but leave room for the wrath and judgment of God, which they have so far aroused and sought with rage, mockery and rejoicing against the poor Christians.
(10) However, scare them with the example that the Maccabees did not want to obey those who advised them not to resist Antiochus, but to let themselves be killed in the simplicity of their hearts. But our Lord God praised, helped and promoted the Maccabees' counsel. Item 1 Kings 14: When Saul wanted to kill his son Jonathan, the people controlled and resisted him by force. Jer. 38, 39, 40, when King Jehoiakim wanted to kill Jeremiah, the princes of Ahikam and others defended him.
Now the princes of Germany have more right against the emperor than the people had against Saul and Ahikam against Jehoiakim, than those who rule from a common council of the Holy Roman Empire together with the emperor. Roman Empire together with the emperor. And the emperor is not an autocrat: so it is also not in his power to depose the electors and to deprive the empire of its power.
The form and glory of the Lord are not to be changed, nor is it to be suffered where he subjected himself to such things.
12 Since this cannot and must not be tolerated in any way for the sake of worldly affairs, how much less should it be suffered if the imperial majesty were to make or start war for the sake of a foreign cause and the devil. But if the imperial majesty does not know that things are so evil, then it is enough for us that we know and are certain. Has Antiochus
Nor did they know that he served the devil and promoted his things; but the Maccabees knew it well.
6. Luther's response from the opposition.
He said that he had left this question to the lawyers: Whether the emperor should be resisted? When he was asked again the same time, whether it was not also his office and due to him to judge and pass judgment on the same rights and laws, he said, "No; a theologian is only to teach to believe in the Lord Christ and to trust in him; after that he is to admonish everyone in general to carry out and do faithfully and diligently his office and what he is commanded to do. That a cobbler makes shoes etc. but how he should make or sell shoes, that is not to be taught in my office, since he otherwise has worldly laws and order; otherwise a theologian would have to teach all the
Knowing and actually being able to understand things would be an infinite profession. So a theologian also teaches about worldly affairs, but he teaches in general and says: Thou shalt not steal. But the jurists teach how thievery should be done. So I admonish a physician and doctor in general to perform his office, which he is commanded to do, diligently and faithfully; according to this it behooves him, not me, how the dose is, what kind of medicine and how much he should give the sick person. So I also teach in general in this quaestion and question from the emperor, namely, that one should follow described rights. But which and what these rights are, I do not know, nor do I want to know. For it is not my office, nor is it due to me.
f. Some legal scholars in Wittenberg expressed their opinion on the question of whether one should resist a judge who is proceeding unlawfully.
1 The text in papal law says: No. But Doctor Abbas says: If a judge, after having appealed, proceeds, he may be resisted by force. He also says that the teacher Innocentius says: "If a judge does wrong to a person by not keeping the order of the law, he may be resisted by force. Therefore you make this common rule, namely: To a
Judges should not be resisted. See what the law teacher Felinus writes about this.
(2) But this rule falls (fails) and does not hold: First, when an appeal is made; as Innocentius and Baldus say. Let Felinus speak of this, who says that Bartolus held the contradiction. But he answers and says that this is true, if the harm and damage is insurmountable and
is not to be brought in again; otherwise, where it can be brought in again, it has a different opinion.
3. secondly, this rule does not apply if a judge proceeds outside the court and complains against the party; in that case he may be resisted by force, if no appeal is made, and that if the damage is irreparable, as Abbas says.
(4) Thirdly, this rule shall not apply if a judge proceeds in a court of law, but against the law, and the appeal or gravamen is irretrievable. In that case, it may be resisted without distinction, since it is not appealed; as the teachers of law Cynus and Abbas say.
5) Fourthly, it falls if the gravamen and thus the judge's sentence is publicly and notoriously unjust and contrary to the law; then one may well resist him, the judge, by force, according to the law teachers Abbas, the glosses of Archidiaconus and Felinus.
Now, however, the princes and estates have appealed to a free, general and Christian council; therefore, their jurisdiction and authority is suspended. To be obedient to the emperor in his mandates and commandments against the word of God would be an insurmountable and irretrievable harm: so also in matters of faith one must be more obedient to God and the evangelical truth than to men. Moreover, the emperor has no jurisdiction in matters of faith; but he has the power to call a council and to assemble it, if the pope is negligent and in default. But he has neither the power, nor the authority, nor the right to decree anything; but what a council has decided and decreed, that he may administer and execute.
(7) And since it would be said that our articles and doctrine were condemned in the previous concilia, therefore it is also due to him, as an advocate, bailiff, and patron of the church, to handle what is determined and decided etc. To this we answer and say no, that our articles should be condemned, and add that some should be condemned in the Concilium at Cost.
nitz may be condemned for wickedness, but by the decree of the kingdom, with the consent of the bishops and princes, they are again permitted and allowed to be tried at the next concilium. For in private matters it is thus held: if the part for which the judgment has been pronounced allows an appeal to the opposite part to dispute the justice or injustice of the pronounced judgment, it loses its right to appeal. If the court does not decide on the merits of the verdict, the verdict loses its force. How much more and more strongly does this take place in matters of faith, because of the great danger to the soul's salvation, as well as in matrimonial matters. Therefore, the emperor is not a judge in the matter of our Christian faith, but is only a private person as far as the cognition (investigation) and statution (determination) are concerned; that is, he does not have the power to recognize and make order about what one should believe and hold; neither is execution due to him, if the matter has not first been heard, discussed and determined in a concilium.
(8) But a judge, who is a judge and has jurisdiction and power over the matter, may be resisted if he proceeds and acts contrary to law, or if he is appealed from; how much more to one who is not a judge in the matter and has no jurisdiction and authority in this matter? And even if he had, it would still be suspended and annulled by the appeal. For one who judges beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and outside of his compulsory jurisdiction may not be parried and disobeyed without any penalty. Thus the pope cannot command or give the emperor the power and authority to speak or order anything in matters of faith, and especially because a right, free, general and Christian concilium is appealed to. Moreover, injustice is undeniable, evident and notorious to the emperor and to those whose service, counsel and help he needs in his administration, even more than notorious, because in matters of faith, our adversaries and favorables are public, notorious enemies etc.
A. D. Luther's, D. Jonas', Melanchthon's, Spalatin's and other theologians' concerns on the foregoing of the lawyers' instruction of the counter-defense.
We have received a note from which we find that the doctors of law conclude on the question: In which cases should one resist the authorities? Since this is based on the same legal doctors or experts, and we certainly stand in such cases in which, as they indicate, one should resist the authorities; and we have always taught that one should let worldly rights go, apply and keep what they are able, because the gospel does not teach against worldly rights; then we cannot dispute with Scripture where one would have to resist in this case, be it the emperor in his own person, or whoever does it under his name.
Also, because it is now so dangerous everywhere that other things may occur daily, where one would have to defend oneself immediately, not only out of worldly law, but out of duty and necessity of conscience; it is nevertheless fitting that one should prepare oneself and be ready for a force that might ultimately arise; as can easily happen according to the form and course of the matter. For what we have hitherto taught not to resist the authorities, we have not known that such is the right of the authorities themselves, which we have diligently taught to obey everywhere etc.
h. Third concern of the theologians at Wittenberg about the opposition.
(1) This article has been often and much discussed among us, and today we have unanimously decided thus: Since the gospel is a doctrine of the spiritual and eternal kingdom in the heart, and does not outwardly reject bodily government, but rather confirms and highly praises it; it follows that the gospel admits all natural and reasonable protection and defense, as ordered by natural law or otherwise by bodily government. This reason is of great importance, so that one must also conclude from all kinds of worldly ordinances that they are pleasing to God and that a Christian may use them. Therefore, as St. Paul speaks, 1 Tim. I, 9: Lex est injustis, profanis posita (The law is given to the unrighteous, worldly); thus we say: Evangelium non tollit politica seu leges politicas (The Gospel does not abolish the state order or the state laws).
2 Therefore, in this matter there is no question of the preachers. They have their command, they are to teach and not to wield the sword; the gospel also does not give Paul authority, that he by virtue of his
The question here is of the secular authorities, which otherwise wield the sword in an orderly manner. But here is the question of the secular authorities, who otherwise properly wield the sword, what they owe to do? For example, if Constantine became a Christian and knew that Christian doctrine is right worship, would it be proper for him to watch if Licinius or someone else wanted to use violence against his Christians and kill them?
3 In this case we conclude that every prince is obliged to protect and handle Christians and outward right worship against all unrighteous violence; just as in other worldly matters a prince is obliged to protect a pious subject against unrighteous violence. Yes, this protection is commanded to princes much more and higher, as Scripture often reports, and commands the secular rulers that they should protect right preachers and teachers, as Ps. 82, 4.Eripite pauperem et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate (Save the lowly and the poor and deliver them from the power of the wicked); and 2 Kings 9:7 says that God wants to avenge the blood of His prophets on the Jezabel; item Christ says, Matt. 10:42, whoever has a
If he gives a drink of water to his disciples, he will reward him. Item, of these good works, the high holy kings are all highly praised, as: Ezechias, Josias, Cyrus, Maccabaeus and others. Therefore, there is no doubt that it is the duty of princes to protect and manage Christian subjects, as well as Christian doctrine and proper external worship.
4 This also teaches the other commandment, which commands the rulers to prevent God's name from being blasphemed. Item Deut. 24:6 states: "Whoever blasphemes the name of God shall be put to death. Therefore, princes are obliged to plant and maintain right doctrine in their territories; and as God forbids those who blaspheme God's name, so He will also help all those who reject idolatry and protect devout Christians; as He says, 1 Sam. 2:30: "Those who praise Me, I will again make glorious." Now it is clear that every authority is obliged to protect its Christians and doctrine against other authorities of the same kind or against private individuals.
(5) Here is the further question: What is a prince to do against his lord, as the emperor, in such a case? The answer to this is the same: First, because the gospel confirms temporal and corporal rulers, every prince should behave toward his lord or emperor according to the same natural and temporal rulers and orders. If the emperor is not a judge, and nevertheless wants to inflict punishment as a pendente appellatione (while the appeal is still pending), then such his offence is called injuria notoria (manifest, notorious injustice). Now this is the natural order of the regiments, that one may protect oneself and use the counter-defense against such notoriam injuriam. Therefore, if the Emperor does something in front of the Concilium, pending appeal, in matters concerning religion and the promised peace, truly and without sophistry, he is to be considered as a private person, and such injuria, done against the appeal and the promised peace, is a public notoris, injuria.
6th And this case, before the Concilium, is easy to understand and judge; for all the
Those with understanding know that the Emperor is obliged to grant this appeal and that he is not the judge. Nor do we doubt that the princes and estates of this part will consider what matters this appeal and the promised peace may or may not involve; so that we nevertheless do not start anything without just and great causes.
(7) But how, after the concilium, if the emperor has had it duly pronounced according to ordinary ecclesiastical laws, and we have been condemned, can this part then also, with a good conscience, take a stand against their lord by force? Answer: If we have duly offered and shown that we desire that these matters be heard and dealt with in a Christian manner: If, however, the concilium continues and holds unjust proceedings, though they pretend that their jus canonicum gives them such power, yet the proceedings are in principle contrary to natural equity, and contrary to the order publicly commanded and laid down in Scripture, namely, that not the adversaries but the church should be judges, such proceedings are void, and there is no concilium, and the appeal remains strong. Therefore, what is done in such proceedings is, in truth and in reason, public authority and notoria injuria.
(8) And to suppose that the pope, even though he had been lenient with the trial, still wanted to confirm in the sentence public idolatry and idolatry and public injurias, we nevertheless consider that the princes have the right to oppose this and to protect their own in this. Example: If a Christian prince were under the Turk, and the Turk wanted to establish Mahomet or other idolatry in the prince's territories, the Christian prince would have the power and right to oppose the Turk; he would also be obligated, by virtue of the other commandment, to resist this and to keep his own in right worship; as Maccabeus, 2 Macc. 3, opposed Antiochus. But this may be discussed further, when all these things are spoken of.
(9) The other case is easier: when it is said that priestly marriages are unlawful and should be forbidden and torn apart. This is a notoria injuria, and are worldly matters, in which natural reason, as God's order, is itself judge. Against such public injuriam is the protection and the counter defense allowed. As if one defended himself against a murderer in the street, or a husband killed the adulterer, understood in fact; such injuria are exempt in all duties and covenants. As an example: Constantinus and Licinius were both co-rulers and emperors, bound by oaths; but Licinius persecuted the Christians cruelly, so that Orient sought help from Constantinus. Now Constantinus and Licinius were connected with each other; equally
Well, after Licinius, when often admonished, would not refrain from persecution, Constantinus moved against him, regardless of their alliance. For in all alliances and obligations, public iniquities should be excluded.
(10) This is only to make it clearer that princes and all authorities are obligated to prevent public violence and fornication, as marriage-breaking etc.
Martinus Luther, D. Justus Jonas, D.
Johan. Bugenhagen, D. Nicolaus Amsdorf.
Philip Melanchthon.