December 1525.
Newly translated from the Latin.
In the editions of the German translation of Justus Jonas, there is the following attribution:
From the translator, Justi Jona, letter to Count Albrecht, Lord of Mansfeld.
To the noble and well-born Lord, Lord Albrechten, Count and Lord of Mansfeld 2c My gracious Lord.
Grace and peace of God. Noble, well-born count, gracious lord. This booklet D. Mar
I have therefore translated the letter of Luther, our dear Father in Christ, to our dear friend, the highly famous Erasmus of Rotterdam, so that everyone, and especially the papists, who until now have been highly praised as if the doctrine of works had been preserved by Erasmus' booklet, may realize from this clear answer how their doctrine does not exist at all, even if Demosthenes protected it. For although Erasmus is otherwise a noble high man, such writing about free will is annoying,
*The first edition of this writing was published in Latin at Wittenberg by Hans Lust in December 1525 under the title: Ds 8srvo ^rlürrio Älnr. Istwert aä O. Lrasrnuro RotsroäarnUin. Another edition with an index by the same in April 1526. Likewise at Augsburg in March 1526. Similarly iy the same year another
and Against the Gospel. This booklet, however, thus translated, I have therefore first sent and attributed to D. Martini by order of E. G., so that we know how E. G. has long desired to know this answer, and is otherwise so inclined to the Gospel, that E. G. has recently given a particularly good example to other sovereigns with proof of the right Christian way, namely by re-establishing Christian schools and preaching stands; in addition
E. G. henceforth may God the Lord strengthen. Given Wittemberg, Saturday after Martinmas, [Nov. 17] Anno 1526.
E. G.
1) W[illiger] Justus Jonas.
1) In the asten Walch edition "M.", but in the Wittenberg "W.", which is probably to be resolved with "willing".
Martin Luther wishes the venerable man, Mr. Erasmus of Rotterdam, grace and peace in Christ.
That I am so late in answering your diatribe (treatise) on free will, venerable Erasmus, has happened against everyone's expectation and against my way, since one has seen that up to now I have not only gladly seized such opportunities to write, but have even sought them out of my own free will. Some will perhaps be surprised at this new and unusual patience or even fear on Luther's part, that he was not incited even by so many boastful speeches and writings of his opponents, who wished Erasmus luck on his victory and sang a song of triumph, namely: "Has this Maccabee, who held so firmly to his doctrine, finally found a worthy opponent, against whom he also does not dare to make a fuss? But not only do I not reproach these people, but I even concede to you the prize that I have never conceded to anyone before, not only because you far surpass me in gifts of eloquence and intellect (this prize we all rightly concede to you, all the more
I, uneducated in the ancient languages, have always associated with people of my own kind), but also because you have restrained my spirit and impetuosity and have made me limp before the battle, and that in two ways. First, by art, namely, that you handled this matter in which you confronted me with wonderful and constant restraint, so that I could not be provoked against you; second, by an accident, whether by chance or by fate, that you said nothing in such a great matter, which has not been said before, and even say less and ascribe more to free will than the sophists have hitherto said and ascribed (of which I shall say more hereafter), that it also seemed to me quite superfluous to reply to your trivial reasons. For they have also been refuted by me so often, but have been completely overthrown and destroyed by the insurmountable booklet of Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes, which, in my judgment, is worth not only that it remain eternal, but also that it be regarded as a guideline in the church. As I have herewith read your
Edition at Wittenberg, without indication of the printer; another in the same year at Nuremberg by Johannes Petrejus. In addition to these editions listed in the Erlangen edition, Walch mentions the following individual editions that were in his hands: An edition by Jacob Rimedoncius in Heidelberg in 1591 and reissued in 1M3, which had the purpose of making people believe that Luther agrees in this book with the Reformed doctrine of grace and the unconditional counsel of God, which is asserted in the preface. Furthermore, the Lutheran theologian Sebastian Schmid published an edition in 1664 in which explanatory and apologetic notes are added to the passages of this book clo 8orvo urditrio, which seem hard and are therefore misused. All the editions mentioned so far are in octavo. Another in quarto appeared in 1707 at Strasbourg with Joh. Joachim Zentgrav's apologetic preface against Petrus Avon. This register of separate editions is far from complete. In the collections it is found: in the Latin Jenaer of 1557, Dom. Ill, col. 165; in the Wittenberg one, Dom. II, col. 457; in the Erlanger, opp. vur. urZ., vol. VII, 113. In 1526 a German translation was made by Justus Jonas, which is found in the following collections: in the Wittenberger of 1553, vol. VI, tot. 462; in the Altenburger, vol. Ill, p. 160; in the Leipziger, vol. XIX, p. 1. According to the latter edition, a separate print has appeared at Milwaukee, Wis. in the printing office of the "Herold," without indication of the year. (We received this edition in 1886.) We make special mention of this edition here because those who would like to possess the translation of Jonas in addition to our edition have the opportunity to view this work individually. Our translation is based on the Erlangen edition, to which the first edition was available.
I felt so contemptuous and small about it that I felt very sorry for you, because you sullied your very beautiful and skilful way of speaking with such dirt, and I became indignant about the matter, which is quite unworthy of being presented in such delicious ornaments, as if filth or dung were carried in gold or silver vessels. You seem to have felt this yourself, since you went about writing in this matter with such difficulty. For your conscience has warned you that it would come about in such a way that you would not be able to put a dazzle on me, with however great power of eloquence you might attack the matter, and I would see the dregs myself quite clearly after the removal of the word decoration. For "though I am foolish in speech, yet am I," by God's grace, "not foolish in knowledge" [2 Cor. 11:6], for so I dare with Paul to attribute knowledge to myself and confidently deny it to you, though I attribute eloquence and great gifts to you, and willingly and approvingly deny them to myself. Accordingly, I have thought thus: if there are people who have not grasped our doctrine, which we have proved so firmly and powerfully from Scripture, and do not hold it more firmly than to be moved by the trifling and trivial reasons of Erasmus, however dainty they may be, they are not worthy to be helped by my answer, for for such people one could not speak or write sufficiently, even if many thousand books were repeated a thousand times. For that would be such work as if one were plowing the sea shore and scattering seed in the sand, or filling a barrel full of holes with water. For those who have received the Holy Spirit as a teacher in our books have been served by us abundantly, and they will easily despise what you bring up. But those who read without the Spirit, of them it is not to be wondered at if they are moved like a reed by every wind. For them also God could not speak enough, if also all creatures were made tongues. Therefore, it would almost have been my intention to let go of those who are
I have been annoyed by your booklet, along with those who boast and give you credit for the triumph. Therefore, I am deprived of the desire to answer you, not by the amount of my business, not by the difficulty of the matter, not by the greatness of your eloquence, not by the fear of you, but only by the disgust, the displeasure and the contempt, or (that I say it) by my judgment on the diatribe; not to mention that you, as is your way, are quite persistently bent on being slippery and using fickle words, and more cautiously than Odysseus think you are sailing between the Scylla and the Charybdis. Since you do not want to have claimed anything and yet again want to be regarded as claiming, what, I pray you, can be brought to a settlement or settled with such a kind of people, if someone does not understand the art of catching Proteus? What I am able to do in this matter and what it has helped you, I will show afterwards and that through the assistance of Christ.
That I now reply is not without good reason; faithful brothers in Christ urge me to do so and say that everyone expects it, that the great reputation of Erasmus is not to be despised, that the truth of Christian doctrine is in danger in the hearts of many. And I have really come to the conclusion that my silence has not been entirely godly, that I have been seduced by the cleverness or rather the malice of my flesh, that I have not been sufficiently mindful of my office, according to which "I am a debtor to the wise and the unwise" [Rom. 1:14], especially since I am called to it by the pleas of so many brethren. For although our cause is of such a kind that it is not done enough by an external teacher, but also requires, apart from the one who plants and waters externally, the Spirit of God, who gives prosperity and, as the Living One, teaches living things internally [in the heart] (and this thought has led me astray), yet, because this Spirit is free and blows, not where we will, but where He wills, I should have judged you according to Paul's rule [2 Tim. 4:2]: "Stop,
Whether at the right time or at the wrong time", because we do not know at which hour the Lord will come [Matth. 24, 42]. Now there may be people who have not yet noted the spirit as teacher in my writings and are misled by the diatribe. Perhaps their hour has not yet come, and who knows whether God will not deign to visit you too, dearest Erasmus, through me, his wretched and frail vessel, so that I may come to you with this booklet at a happy hour (which is why I heartily pray to the Father of mercy through Jesus Christ, our Lord) and gain a very dear brother. For although you think ill of me and write about free will, I owe you no small debt of gratitude for making me much firmer in my opinion, since I saw that the cause of free will was being pushed with all its might by such a highly gifted man, and yet nothing at all has been accomplished that the cause is worse than before. This is a tangible proof that free will is a mere lie, which is like that woman in the Gospel [Luc. 8, 43]: the more the doctors heal it, the worse it is. Therefore, I will thank you even more if you come to greater certainty through me, as I have gained greater firmness through you; but both are a gift of the Holy Spirit, not a work that we can do. Therefore, God must be asked to open my mouth, but to open your heart and the hearts of all, and to be present in the midst of us as the Master, so that He may speak and hear in us. Dear Erasmus, let me obtain this from you, that as I credit you with your ignorance in these things, so you in turn will credit me with my childlike nature. The Lord does not give all things to one, nor can we all do all things, or, as Paul says [1 Cor. 12:4], "There are many gifts, but there is one Spirit." Therefore it only remains that the gifts serve each other and that one bears the other's burden and poverty with his gift, so we will fulfill the law of Christ [Gal. 6:2].
To begin, I want to briefly review a few pieces of your preface in which you describe our
You rather belittle the matter and embellish your cause. First of all, that in other writings you also reproach me for my persistence in asserting things, and in this booklet you say 1): "You have no pleasure at all in firm assertions, that you would easily go over to the opinion of the skeptics, where it concerns the inviolable prestige of Scripture and the decisions of the church, to which you gladly submit your reason, may you understand or not what it prescribes; such a mind pleases you. I take this (how fair) as if you had spoken it in a benevolent sense and as one who loves peace. But if someone else said this, I would be upset against him in my own way, but I must not suffer, even if you have such good will, that you remain mistaken in this opinion. For it is not fitting for a Christian heart not to take pleasure in firm assertions; indeed, it must take pleasure in firm assertions, or it cannot be a Christian. But I call firm assertion (assertio) (so that we do not play with words), constant adherence, confirmation, confession, defense, and insurmountable persistence, and I believe that this word does not mean anything else either with the Latins and according to the linguistic usage of our time. Furthermore, I am talking about the fact that things must be firmly asserted which have been handed down to us by God in the holy Scriptures, otherwise we would have no need of Erasmus or any other teacher who would first have to teach us that in doubtful or useless or unnecessary things, firm assertions are not only foolish, but also ungodly, even quarrels and disputes, which Paul condemns in many places. Even you, I believe, do not speak of such things in this passage, unless you wanted to take one thing and treat another in the manner of a ridiculous speaker, like the one about the sea-butt, 2) or that you want to
2) luvenaiis, 8utiru IV, v. 39-144. At the time of the emperor Domitian, an immensely large sea-but had been caught and given to the emperor as a gift. Since there was no vessel of sufficient size to cook the fish in, the emperor hurriedly summoned the great men of the empire for consultation.
After the folly of a godless writer you wanted to advocate that the article of free will is doubtful or unnecessary. Far be from us Christians the skeptics and academics, but there may be with us firm assertions, which are twice more obstinate than even the stoics. How often, I ask you, does the apostle Paul demand plerophoria [certainty of faith], that is, the most certain and firm assertion of conscience? Rom. 10:10, ninth, confession: "and if one confesses with his mouth, he will be saved." And Christ says [Matt. 10:32], "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my heavenly Father." Peter [1 Ep. 3, 15? commands that we give an account of the hope that is in us. What need is there to make many words? Nothing is more familiar and common among Christians than firm assertion. Take away the firm assertions and you have taken away Christianity. Yes, the Holy Spirit is given to them from heaven, that he may glorify Christ, and that he [Christ] may be known unto death. 1) Isn't this firmly claiming to die because of the confession and the firm claim? Finally, the Holy Spirit also asserts to such a degree that He also freely attacks and accuses the world because of sin, like one who challenges to battle, and Paul commands Timothy [2 Tim. 4, 2.] to rebuke and also to stop at the wrong time. But what a fine reprover this would be to me, who neither believed for sure nor steadfastly asserted even what he scolded! I would certainly send him to Anticyra 2).
The decision was made whether the fish should remain whole or be cut into pieces. Since it was extremely dangerous to say something he did not like, even in the most trivial matters, none of the assembled dared to express his opinion, but one after the other flattered the emperor, especially I'udriaius Vesento, who is probably meant here, who said that the enormous fish was the foreshadowing of some great, glorious victory and the capture of some king, such as Arviragus of Britain. But about what he should have said, whether the fish should remain whole or be cut into pieces, he did not say a word.
1) confiteubur is passive here.
2) Anticyra, an island of the Aegean Sea, where much hellebore grew. Luther means: he should use hellebore to cleanse the sick brain.
But I am a great Thor to lose words and time in a matter that is clearer than the sun. What Christian would suffer that firm assertions should be despised? That would be nothing else than to deny the whole religion and godliness at once, or to claim that the whole religion, or godliness, or some doctrine (dogma) is nothing. Why then do you also claim: "I have no pleasure in firm assertions" and you would rather have such a mind than one of a different kind?
But I am rightly reminded that you do not want to say anything here about the confession of Christ and his doctrines. And I will, as a favor to you, refrain from my right and my custom, and will not judge your heart, but save this for another time, or even leave it to others; in the meantime, I admonish you to improve your speech and writing and henceforth refrain from such words, for however righteous and sincere your heart may be, the speech that is said to show what is in the heart (character animi) [Matth. 12, 34.] is not of such a nature. For if you think that it is not necessary to know the matter of free will, and that it has nothing to do with Christ, then you are right, but then your opinion is ungodly. But if you think it is necessary, then you are speaking ungodly, but you have a correct opinion. But it was not the place to complain and exaggerate so much about useless assertions and quarrels, because what does that have to do with the matter?
But what do you mean by these words of yours, where you speak not only of the matter of free will, but generally of all the doctrines of the whole religion: "If it were a matter of the inviolable prestige of Scripture and the decisions of the church, you would depart from the opinion of the skeptics, so much so that you have no pleasure in firm assertions"?
What kind of proteus lies in the words "the inviolable reputation" and "the decisions of the church"? Namely, as if you would hold the Holy Scripture and the church in very high esteem.
You have always held your beliefs in high esteem, and yet you say that you want the freedom to be a skeptic. What Christian would talk like that? When you speak this of useless and indifferent doctrines, what new thing do you bring forward? Who would not desire in this the liberty of professing to be a skeptic? Yes, which Christian does not really make unlimited use of this freedom and condemn those who are slaves and prisoners of someone's opinion? if you do not consider Christians as a whole to be such people (as the words really are), whose doctrines are useless, about which they foolishly quarrel and argue with assertions. But when you speak of necessary things, what could anyone say that is more impious than that he would like to have the freedom to say nothing in such matters? A Christian rather speaks like this: I have no pleasure at all in the opinion of the skeptics, that if it were only always a matter of the weakness of the flesh, I would not only adhere to the holy Scriptures constantly, everywhere, and in all things, and assert them firmly, but I would also wish to be as certain as possible in things that are not necessary and lie outside the holy Scriptures; for what is more miserable than uncertainty?
What shall we also say to the fact that you add: "To them I gladly submit my reason everywhere; I may comprehend what they prescribe, or not"? What do you say, Erasmus? Is it not enough for you to subject the mind to Scripture? Do you also subject it to the decisions of the church? What can she decide if it is not decided in Scripture? Furthermore, where is the freedom and power to judge those who have made those decisions? As Paul says, 1 Cor. 14:29: "Let others judge." Do you not like that a judge should be over the decisions of the church, which Paul commands? What kind of new religion and humility is this, that you take away from us by your example the power to judge the decisions of men, and subject us to men without judgment? Where does God's word command us? Furthermore, which Christian so throws to the wind the precepts of Scripture and the Church that he would say: "Whether I
understand it or not understand it"? You submit, and yet you don't care whether you understand it or not? But let a Christian be accursed if he is not certain and does not understand what is prescribed for him. For how can he believe what he does not understand? For you will call this "comprehending" (assequi) what someone has certainly grasped and does not doubt after the manner of the skeptics, for what else is there in any creature that any man could comprehend, if comprehending is the same as knowing perfectly and seeing through? For then it would not have taken place that someone could comprehend some things and at the same time not comprehend others, but he who comprehended only one thing would have comprehended all, namely in God; he who does not comprehend him never comprehends any part of the creature.
In short, these words of yours are as if you do not care about what is believed by anyone anywhere, if only world peace remains, and as if, because of the danger to life, reputation, fortune and favor, you are free to imitate the one who said: If they say yes, I also say yes; if they say no, I also say no. According to your words, you seem to think that the Christian teachings are no better than those of the philosophers and the opinions of men. To quarrel about them, to argue and to assert them firmly is extremely foolish, because nothing but quarrels and disturbance of the external peace would come from it, because these are things about us that do not concern us. So you want to end our quarrel and come as a mediator, that you leave both of them in abeyance and persuade us that we are arguing about foolish and useless things; so, I say, are your words. And I think, dear Erasmus, you understand what I am emphasizing here. But, as I said, I will let the words go and excuse your heart for the time being, only that you do not go further out, and fear the Spirit of God, who searches hearts and kidneys and cannot be deceived with clever words. For I have said this, that thou mayest henceforth cease to accuse our cause of stubbornness and obstinacy. For with this
You do not say anything other than that you show that in your heart you cherish Lucian or another pig of the Epicurian herd, who, because he himself does not believe that there is a God, secretly ridicules all those who believe and confess. Let us be firm assertors, make firm assertions and take pleasure in them: you keep it with the skeptics and academics until Christ has called you too. But the Holy Spirit is not a skeptic, and has not written in our hearts doubtful things or opinions, but firm assertions, which are more certain and firm than even life and all experience.
I come to the second main point, 1) which is related to this one. Where you distinguish Christian doctrines, you invent that some are necessary to know, others are unnecessary; some are hidden, you say, others clearly stated. Thus you either play a game with the words of others by which you have allowed yourself to be deceived, or you yourself practice a kind of oratorical trick. But you cite for this opinion the saying of Paul, Rom. 11, 33: "O what depth of riches, both of wisdom and knowledge of God", likewise the saying of Isaiah 40, 13: "Who instructs the spirit of the Lord, and what counselor instructs him?" You could easily have said this, since you knew that you were not writing to Luther, but for the people, or did not think that you were writing against Luther, to whom I hope you concede some diligence and judgment in the holy Scriptures; if you do not concede this, what does it matter, then I will also force it from you. So it stands with my discernment, in order also to do a little of my art of speech and conclusion. God and the writing of God are two things, no less than the Creator and the creature of God are two things. No one doubts that in God there are many hidden things that we cannot know, as He Himself says of the Last Day: "Of that day no one knows, but the Father alone" [Matth. 24, 36. Marc. 43, 32.]; and Apost. 1, 7.: "It behooves you not to
1) Diatribe § 2.
to know time or hour"; and again [John 13:18], "I know which I have chosen"; and Paul [2 Timothy 2:19], "The Lord knoweth them that are his" and the like.
That some things are said to be hidden in the holy scriptures has been proclaimed to the world by the godless sophists, with whose words you also speak here, Erasmus, but they have not yet brought forward a single article, nor could they bring forward one, by which they would like to prove this mad delusion of theirs. By such pretenses the devil has discouraged the reading of the divine word and made the holy scriptures contemptible, so that he might bring his pernicious doctrines of philosophy to dominion in the church. I freely admit that many passages in Scripture are obscure and hidden, not because of the majesty of things, but because we do not know the words and the art of language, but these do not at all prevent the knowledge of all things in Scripture. For what can be left in Scripture that is still deeply hidden, after the seals have been broken and the stone has been rolled away from the door of the tomb, and the supreme mystery has been revealed, that Christ, the Son of God, became man, that God is triune and united, that Christ suffered for us and will reign forever? Is this not also the most well-known thing in the world (in biviis nota) and is sung everywhere? Take Christ out of the Scriptures, what else can you find in them?
Therefore, the things contained in the holy scriptures are all clearly revealed, although some passages may be dark because the words are not yet known. But if one knows that all things of the holy scripture are set in the brightest light, then it is certainly foolish and ungodly to call the things dark because of a few dark words. If the words are dark in one place, but clear in another, but one and the same thing, set forth most clearly to the whole world, is spoken of in the Scriptures with light words on one occasion, but is still hidden by dark words on another occasion, there is nothing more to be said, if the thing is clear, whether any sign in it is dark, while yet many
other signs of the same thing are clear. Who will say that a public fountain is not in daylight, because those who are in a side street do not see it, since all who are in the market see it?
Therefore it is nothing that you bring from the Corycian cave; 1) it is not so with the Scriptures and the most hidden secrets of the highest majesty are no longer in seclusion, but brought before the doors and on the open plan and exposed to all gaze, because Christ has opened our minds so that we can understand the Scriptures. And "the gospel is preached to every creature" [Marc. 16, 15.], and "its sound has gone out into all the earth" [Ps. 19, 5.], and "everything that is written is written for our learning" [Rom. 15, 4.], likewise [2 Tim. 3, 16.]: "All Scripture inspired by God is useful for teaching." Therefore you and all the sophists, set to work and bring forward only one secret, which is still hidden in the holy Scriptures; but the fact that many things remain hidden to many does not come from the darkness of the Scriptures, but from their blindness or sloth, because they do not set to see the brightest truth, as Paul says of the Jews, 2 Cor. 3, 15. "The covering hangs before their hearts," and again ^2 Cor. 4, 3. 4.], "If therefore our gospel is covered, it is covered in them that are perishing; in whom the god of this world hath blinded the senses." With the same audacity would he accuse the sun and the day of darkness who blinds his own eyes, or goes from the light into the darkness and grows stubborn. So, let the wretched people stop blaming the darkness and gloom of their hearts with blasphemous falsehood on the exceedingly bright Scripture of God.
Therefore, when you cite Paul who says [Rom. 11, 33]: "How incomprehensible are his judgments", you seem to have referred the pronoun "his" to the word of God [Scripturam]. But Paul does not say: incomprehensible are the judgments of the Word, but of God. So Isaiah 40, 13. does not say: Who has known the meaning of the Scripture,
1) Diatribe § 2.
but "the mind of the Lord," although Paul asserts that the mind of the Lord is known to Christians, but in the things that are given to us, as he says the same, 1 Cor. 2:16. You see, then, how drowsily you have looked at the passages of sacred Scripture, and how you have adduced them just as suitably as you adduce almost everything that you put forward in favor of free will. So also your examples which you adduce, and indeed they are not without suspicion and not without sharp sting, serve nothing to the point, as that of the distinction of persons, of the union of the divine and human natures, of sin which cannot be forgiven, the ambiguity of which, as you say, has not yet been removed. If you understand this from the questions which the sophists have raised about these things, what have you done to the wholly unpunishable Scriptures, that you accuse their purity of the abuse of wicked men? Scripture simply confesses the Trinity of God, and the humanity of Christ, and sin, which is unpardonable. There is nothing of darkness or ambiguity here. But how this is done, the Scripture does not say, as you pretend, nor is it necessary to know. The sophists treat their dreams here; blame and condemn them, and absolve the sacred Scriptures. But if you understand the essence of the matter itself, then again do not blame the Scriptures, but the Arians and those to whom the gospel is obscured, that they do not recognize the clearest testimonies of the Trinity of God and the humanity of Christ through the action of the devil, their god.
And that I say it briefly, there is a twofold clarity of the Scriptures, as well as a twofold darkness; one, the outward, lies in the service of the Word, the other lies in the knowledge of the heart. When you speak of the inner clarity, no man understands even a single point in the Scriptures unless he has the Spirit of God, for all have a darkened heart, so that even though they speak and know how to recite everything from the Scriptures, they do not notice or truly recognize anything of it. For they also do not believe that there is a God and that they are creatures of God, nor do they believe in any of the things of God.
Another, as the fourteenth Psalm [v. 1] says, "The foolish say in their heart, There is no God." For the Holy Spirit is necessary to understand the whole of Scripture and any part of it. When you speak of the outward [clarity], nothing at all has remained dark or doubtful, but everything has been brought forth by the Word to the brightest light and made known to the whole world, whatever is contained in the Scriptures.
But it is even more intolerable that you count this trade of free will among the things that are useless and unnecessary, and propose to us instead what you think is sufficient for Christian godliness. Such a way [of life] could certainly be easily indicated by any Jew or pagan who knew nothing at all about Christ, for you do not mention Christ even with a single dot, as if your opinion were that Christian godliness could be without Christ, if only the by nature most kind God is served with all one's strength. What shall I say to this, Erasmus? Lucian speaks from you completely and you smell to me the great intoxication of Epicurus. If you do not consider this matter necessary for the Christians, then I ask you to leave the battlefield, you and we have nothing to do with each other; we hate this matter as necessary.
If it is unchristian, if it is presumptuous, if it is superfluous, as you say, 1) to know "whether God foreknows something in such a way that it may or may not happen (continZgontsr pi-Leseiat), whether our will works something in the things that concern eternal blessedness, or only suffers from the working grace, whether all good or evil that we do is accomplished by us through mere necessity, or whether we rather suffer it": what then, I ask, will be Christian? What is of great importance? What is useful to know? That is no good at all, Erasmus, that is too much! It is difficult to attribute this to your ignorance, for you are already an old man and have lived among Christians and have long pondered the holy Scriptures-.
1) Diatribe § 2.
and leaves us no opportunity to excuse you or to think good of you. And yet the papists credit you with these monstrosities and bear them for the sake of it, because you write against Luther, otherwise they would tear you apart with their teeth if Luther were not there and you wrote such things. Plato is a friend, Socrates is a friend, but [friend this way, friend that way] the truth must be given honor above all things. For no matter how little you may understand of Scripture and of Christian godliness, surely even an enemy of the Christians should have known what the Christians must consider necessary and useful and what they must not. But you are a theologian and teacher of Christians and want to prescribe a form of Christianity for them, and you no longer even doubt in your skeptical way what is necessary and useful for them, but fall completely on the opposite side, and even judge, by making an outrageous, firm assertion, completely contrary to your way of thinking, that this is not necessary, without whose necessity and certain knowledge neither God, nor Christ, nor the gospel, nor faith, nor even anything of Judaism remains, much less of Christianity. Help God, Erasmus, how large a window, yes, how large a field you open to act and write against yourself! What good or right could you possibly write about free will, since you confess such a great ignorance of Scripture and godliness in your words? But I will pull down the blanket and deal with you here not with my words (which I may do below), but with your words. The form of Christianity that you describe also contains, among other things, this: "that we should make every effort, resort to the means of repentance, seek God's mercy in every way, without which neither human will nor effort is able to do anything"; likewise: "Let no one despair of forgiveness from God, who by His nature is exceedingly gracious.
These words of yours are without Christ, without the Holy Spirit, even colder than ice, so that
even the beauty of your speech suffers from it, because the fear of the popes and tyrants has perhaps hardly been able to wring it from you poor man, so that you would not appear completely as a God-denier. But this they nevertheless assert, that there are powers in us, that there is an effort with all powers, that there is a mercy of God, that there are various ways to strive for God's mercy, that God is just by nature, exceedingly merciful by nature. 2c So if someone does not know what these powers are, what they are able to do, what they suffer, what their effort is, what their effectiveness is, what their ineffectiveness is, what should he do? What will you teach him to do?
You say: "It is unchristian, presumptuous and superfluous to want to know whether our will works something in matters concerning eternal blessedness; whether it behaves only sufferingly in relation to the working grace. But against this you say here, 1) it is Christian godliness "that one exerts oneself with all one's strength, and without the mercy of God the will is unable to do anything." Here you assert quite clearly that the will works something in the things that concern eternal blessedness, since you invent that it strives; but again, it is suffering, since you say that it is not able to do anything without the mercy of God. Of course, you do not explain how far this working and suffering is to be understood, and you take pains to make people ignorant of what divine mercy is able to do and what our will is able to do, precisely by what you teach about what our will does and what God's mercy does. Thus your prudence, according to which you have decided not to adhere to any party and to get away safely between Scylla and Charybdis, rolls you, that in the middle of the sea, overwhelmed by curses and disgraced, you assert everything you deny and deny what you assert.
I want to put your theology before you with some parables: He who wants to make a good poem or a speech should not "consider" nor investigate what facilities he has, what he is able to do, what he is able to do, what he is able to do.
1) Diatribe § 2.
not be able to do what the thing he has undertaken requires, and quite set aside Horace's rule 2): "What the shoulders are able and what they refuse to bear," but only go impetuously to work and think: one must make an effort so that the thing comes about; but the question is rash and superfluous, whether I am learned and eloquent enough and up to the task. Or if someone wants to obtain a lot of fruit from the field, he should not be forward and investigate the nature of the soil with superfluous care, as Virgil teaches forwardly and in vain in his agricultural poems (Georgicis), but rather proceed boldly, think of nothing but the work, plow the sea shore, scatter the seed, and do what is necessary. Plow the sea shore, scatter the seed where it is only passable, may it be sand or mud. Or if someone wants to wage a war and desires a glorious victory, or is to perform some other service in the state, he does not have to be forward and consider what he is able to do, whether the treasury is sufficiently filled, whether the soldiers are ready, whether there is a sufficient number for the enterprise, and he absolutely despises the word of the historian 3): "Before you act, deliberation is necessary; once you have deliberated, act quickly," but he rushes in with blind eyes and closed ears, cries nothing but war, war! and goes to work. I ask you, Erasmus, what will you think of such poets, countrymen, commanders and princes? I will add the word of the Gospel [Luc. 14:28]: "Who is there among you that would build a tower, and sitteth not down first, and considereth the cost, whether he may carry it out?" What does Christ judge of him?
Thus, you, too, only allow us to perform, but forbid that we should first investigate, measure and get to know our abilities, what we are able and not able to do, as if this would be rash, superfluous and unchristian. Thus, by abhorring temerity out of excessive prudence, and pretending prudence, you get to the point of
2) ä.1-8 poötioa 39. 40.
3) Sallust in LsIIo Oatilinario.
teach even the greatest audacity. For even though the sophists are foolish and senseless, in that they are presumptuous, they do not do so as much harm as you do, since you also teach and prescribe to be senseless and to act foolishly. And in order that the nonsense may be all the greater, you persuade us that it is the most beautiful Christian godliness, prudence, Christian seriousness, and that it serves salvation; if we did not do so, you claim that we are unchristian, rash, and sacrilegious, and you have very finely escaped the Scylla by avoiding the Charybdis. But this is what your confidence in your gifts has driven you to do, because you believe that you can deceive all other people of high intellect by your eloquence, so that no one will be aware of what you are up to and what you intend to do with your slippery writings, but God will not be mocked, and it is not good to go against Him.
Furthermore, if you had taught us this presumptuousness in writing poems, in harvesting fruits, in undertaking wars and businesses, or in building houses, although it is unbearable, especially for such a great man, you would still have been worthy of some indulgence, at least for Christians who despise temporal things. But since you yourself prescribe to the Christians to become daring plodders and command them to create their eternal bliss, if they do not want to know what they are capable of or not capable of, then this is in truth the sin that cannot be forgiven. For they will not know what they ought to do, since they do not know what and how much they are able; but since they do not know what they ought to do, they cannot (if they err) repent, but impenitence is a sin that cannot be forgiven. And that is where your moderate, doubtful theology leads us.
So it is not unchristian, rash or superfluous, but above all wholesome and necessary for a Christian to know whether the will works something or nothing in the things that concern blessedness; yes, that you know, here is the pivot of our disputation, here the whole business of the matter between me and you turns. For this is how we deal with it, that we investigate what
free will is capable of what it suffers, how it relates to the grace of God. If we do not know this, we will know nothing at all about Christian things, and we will be worse than all the heathen. Whoever does not understand this, let him only confess that he is not a Christian, but whoever reproves or despises it, let him know that he is the supreme enemy of Christians. For if I do not know what, how far and how much I am able and able to do against God, then it will be equally uncertain and unknown to me what, how far and how much God is able and able to do in me, since God works everything in everyone. But if I do not know God's works and power, I do not know God Himself, but if I do not know God, I cannot worship Him, praise Him, thank Him; I cannot serve God, because I do not know how much I must attribute to myself, how much I must attribute to God. We must therefore have the most certain difference between God's power and ours, between God's works and ours, if we want to live godly.
So you see that this question is the one main part of the epitome of the whole Christian doctrine, on which the knowledge of ourselves, as well as the knowledge and glory of God, depends and by which it stands and falls; therefore it is not for you to suffer, dear Erasmus, that you say that wanting to know this is unchristian, forward and useless. We owe you much, but we owe everything to godliness. Yes, even you yourself think that we must ascribe all the good things we have to God, and you assert this in your instruction for the Christian life. But since you assert this, you certainly assert at the same time that God's mercy alone works everything, and that our will works nothing, but rather behaves in a suffering manner, otherwise everything would not be attributed to God. But shortly afterwards you say that to assert this and want to know it is not Christian, godly and salutary; but this is how a mind must necessarily speak that is not at one with itself, and is uncertain and inexperienced in matters of godliness.
The other main part of the epitome of Christian doctrine is to know whether God foreknows something in such a way that it may or may not happen, and whether we can
do everything out of necessity. And you also consider this part to be useless, foolish and futile, as do all the wicked; indeed, all devils and the damned hate and curse it. And you are not foolish to abstain from these questions, if only one could do so. But you are only a very poor orator and theologian if you presume to speak and teach about free will without these parts. I want to serve as a whetstone and, although I am not an orator myself, remind an excellent orator of his office. If Quintilian wanted to write about the art of oratory and said thus: "In my judgment, one must leave aside the foolish and superfluous things, namely: the determination of what one wants to talk about, the arrangement, the lecture, so that it is impressed on the memory, the delivery of the speech, it must be enough that one knows that the art of oratory is the knowledge of how one should speak well; would you not laugh at such an artist? But you do not do it differently either; you want to write about free will and first push away from yourself the whole body and all parts of art about which you want to write, and throw them away. For it is impossible for you to know what free will is if you do not first know what the human will is capable of doing, whether God foreknows it in such a way that it happens by necessity (an necessario praesciat).
Do not your teachers of oratory also teach that if someone wants to speak about a thing, he must first say whether it is, then what it is, what its parts are, what is opposite to it, what is related, what is similar 2c? But you deprive this free will, which is already so poor in itself, of all these things; you give no explanation about any question concerning it, except about the first, namely, whether it is, and that with such grounds of proof as we shall now see, so that I have not yet seen a more paltry book about free will, except for the daintiness of the way it is written. The sophists at least apply their art of reasoning better here, since they do not understand the art of oration; where they have tackled free will, they discuss all questions concerning it, whether it is, what it is, what it does, what it is like, etc..,
although they also do not accomplish what they have set out to do. Therefore, with this booklet I will corner you and all the sophists until you show me the powers and works of free will, and (with Christ's help) I will so corner you that I hope to bring you to be sorry for having published your diatribe.
Therefore, it is especially necessary and salutary for a Christian to know that God does not foreknow anything in such a way that it happens by chance, but that He foresees everything, takes it upon Himself and does it according to an unchangeable, eternal and infallible will. By this thunderclap, free will is completely laid low and destroyed from the bottom up. Therefore, those who want to assert free will must either deny this thunderclap, or pass it over with silence, or push it away from them in some other way. But before I confirm this point by my exposition and by the prestige of the holy scripture, I want to treat it first with your own words. Is it not you, dear Erasmus, who shortly before asserted that God is just by nature, the most kind by nature? If this is true, does it not follow that he is unchangeably just and kind? For, as his nature does not change for eternity, neither does his justice and goodness. But what is said of justice and goodness must also be said of his knowledge, wisdom, righteous nature, will, and all other divine things. If, therefore, this is asserted of God in a Christian, godly and wholesome way, as you write, what has come over you that you now claim, in contradiction with yourself, that it is unchristian, impertinent and sacrilegious to say that God knows in advance in such a way that it happens by necessity? Namely, you teach that one must learn the unchangeable will of God and forbid to know His unchangeable foreknowledge. Or do you think that he foreknows without wanting to, or wants something that he does not know? But if he foreknows what he wills, his will is eternal and unchangeable (because his nature is such); if he wills what he foreknows, his will is eternal and unchangeable.
knows, his knowledge is eternal and unchangeable (because his nature is like that).
From this follows irrefutably: everything that we do and everything that happens, although it seems to us to happen changeably and accidentally, happens in truth necessarily and unchangeably, if one looks at God's will. For the will of God is powerful and cannot be hindered, since it is the essential power of God Himself, and also wise, so that it cannot be deceived; but since the will is not hindered, neither can His work be hindered, so that it happens in the place, at the time, in the manner, to the extent according to which He Himself foresees and wills it. If the will of God were such a will, which ceases after the work is done and remains so, like the human will, where the will ceases after the house is built, which they want, like the will ceases in death, then it could be said with truth that something happens randomly and variably. But here it happens that the work ceases, and the will remains; therefore it is far from true that its work, since it happens and remains, can be or exist by chance. To happen by chance (contingenter fieri) means in Latin (so that we do not use the expressions incorrectly), not that the work itself happens by chance, but that it happens according to a chance and variable will, such as is not in God. Furthermore, a work can only be called accidental if it happens to us by chance and, as it were, by an accident, and unawares, because our will or our hand seizes it, in that it was presented, as it were, by chance, but we did not think of it at all beforehand, nor did we want it. 1)
1) The following is not found in the translation of Justus Jonas, nor in the oldest separate editions of 1525 and 1526, but in the Wittenberg collection of Luther's works, as well as in the Jena collection, in the Latin volumes. Witt. Vol. II. and Jen. Vol. III: In truth, I wish there were another, better word in this disputation than this common "necessity," which is not properly said of either the divine or the human will. For it has a meaning that is quite unpleasant and inappropriate for this doctrine, because it gives us the idea, as it were, of a certain compulsion and, in general, of that which is mt.
Here the sophists have struggled for many years now, and convincingly they have had to admit that everything happens with necessity, out of necessity of the consequence (as they say), but not out of necessity of what follows (necessitate consequentiae, sed non necessitate consequentis). Thus they have wanted to avoid this so formidable question, but have thereby only deceived themselves. For it will not be difficult for me to prove how void this is. They call the necessity of the consequence that I speak roughly of it: If God wills something, then it is necessary that it happen, but it is not necessary that that be what happens. For God alone is with necessity, everything else cannot be either if God wills. Thus they say that the effect of God is necessary if he wills, but that what has come about is not necessary. But what do they accomplish with this playfulness in words? This is it: the thing that has become is not necessary, that is, it has no necessary essence; this is nothing other than saying that the thing that has become is not God Himself. Nevertheless, it remains that every thing happens with necessity if the effect of God is necessary, or necessity of the consequence, although the thing, when it has happened, does not exist with necessity at all, that is, it is not God, or does not have a necessary essence. For if I become with necessity, I care little that my being or becoming is changeable; nevertheless, I become as an accidental and changeable one who is not the necessary God. Hence their play is that everything happens out of necessity of consequence, but not out of being against it, which does not at all fit the matter that is dealt with here. For the will, both the divine and the human, does not do out of compulsion, but only out of pleasure or discretion ("oupiditut"), as it were as a truly free one, what it does, be it good or evil. But God's will is nevertheless unchangeable "nd infallible, which governs our changeable will, as Boöthius sings: Unchangeable you remain, give everything movement. And our will, especially the evil one, cannot do good in and of itself. Therefore, what the word does not express, the mind of the reader must complete and understand by "necessity" what one wanted to say, namely the immutable will of God and the inability of our evil will, as some have called it: Nothwendigkeit der Unveränderlichkeit; but this is neither according to the art of language nor to theology.
Necessity of what follows, nothing else but this: Everything happens with necessity, but what has thus become is not God Himself. But why was it necessary to tell us this? As if it were to be feared that we would claim that the things that have become are God or have a divine and necessary essence. So this proposition stands and remains unchallenged, that everything happens by necessity. 1) For there is no darkness or ambiguity here. In Isaiah it is said [Cap. 46, 10.], "My counsel shall stand, and my will be done." For what child does not understand what these words mean: Rath, Wille, geschehen, bestehen?
But why should these things be so hidden to us Christians that it should be unchristian, cheeky and useless to treat them and to want to know them, since the pagan poets and even the common people constantly bring such things in the most unusual use in their mouths? How often does Virgil alone mention fate (kutum)? Osrtu staut omnia leZs (Everything exists according to a certain law); likewise. 2): 8tat sua cuicsus äiss (Every man's day of death is determined); likewise 3): 8i ts Lata vacant (When fate calls you); likewise 4): 8i yua Lata aspsra ruinpas (If you can break through the rough fate). And this poet assumes nothing else than that he shows by the destruction of Troy and the rise of the Roman Empire that fate is capable of more than all human efforts, even that necessity commands events and people 5) (imponsre). Finally, he also subjects his immortal gods to fate, to which also Jupiter and Juno have to give way with necessity. Therefore they have invented the three Parzen, how they are unchangeable, unforgiving and inexorable.
Those wise people have perceived what the thing itself together with the experience be-
1) Instead of the words: that everything happens with necessity, the Jena edition has the following: that everything happens from an unchangeable will of God, which they call the necessity of the consequence.
2) lid. X, 467.
3) ^6Q618, Ud. XI, 97 quoted from memory.
4) ^6N6i8, lid. VII, 882.
5) In the Jena edition the words are missing: yes even - gebiete.
The word "fist" shows that no man has ever lost his plot, but that with all of them the matter has turned out differently than they had thought. If Troy could have been defended with a fist, mine would have been able to do so as well, says Hector in Virgil. 6) Therefore, the most unusual word in everyone's mouth is: What God wills, let it be done; likewise: If God wills it, we will do it; likewise: God has willed it so. Thus have the gods decreed; thus have you [gods] willed, says Virgil, so that we may see that among the people the knowledge of the predestination and foreknowledge of God has not remained less than the knowledge of God Himself. 7) And those who wanted to appear wise have come to the point through their disputations that they have become fools with darkened hearts, Rom. 1, and denied or passed over with silence what the poets and the people and their own conscience consider to be the most extraordinary, certain and true.
Furthermore, I do not only say how true this is - about this we will speak in more detail later on the basis of the holy scriptures - but also how Christian, godly and necessary it is to know this. For if one does not know this, neither faith nor any kind of worship can exist. For that would indeed mean not knowing God; but if one does not know Him, then there is also no salvation, as is known. For if you doubt or despise to know that God foreknows and wills everything, not by chance, but by necessity and immutably, how could you believe His promises, trust in them with certainty, and rely on them? For if he promises, you must be sure that he knows what he promises, and can and will give it; otherwise you will not believe him to be true and faithful: but this is unbelief and the greatest impiety and denial of the most high God.
But in what way can you be sure and certain if you do not know that he is certain,
6) A6N618, lid. II, 291.
7) In the Jena edition it is added here: Although St. Augustine does not reject the word "fate" (katums without cause, because he speaks of the "fate" of the Stoics.
and infallibly, and unchangeably, and with necessity know and will and will do what He promises? For we must not only be certain that God will and will not change, but also boast of it, as Paul says in Rom. 3, 4: "that God is true and all men liars"; and again: "Not that God's word can fail [Rom. 4, 21. 1 Sam. 3, 19.]; and elsewhere [1 Tim. 2, 19.]: "The firm foundation of God exists and has this seal: The Lord knows His own"; and Tit. 1, 2.: "Which He who does not lie promised, God, before the ages of the world"; and Hebr. 11, 6.: "He who would come to God must believe that He is, and will be a rewarder of those who seek Him."
Therefore, the Christian faith is completely extinguished, the promises of God and the entire Gospel fall away completely, if we are taught and believe that we do not need to know the necessary foreknowledge of God and the necessity of what must be put into effect. For this is the only and highest consolation of Christians in all adversities, to know that God does not lie, but does everything unchangeably, that no one can resist His will, no one can change it or hinder it. See now, dear Erasmus, where your extremely moderate, peace-loving theology leads us. You hold us back and forbid us to deal with learning to recognize the foreknowledge of God and the necessity in things and people; rather, you advise us to abandon such things, to avoid and despise them. With this thoughtless beginning of yours, you teach us at the same time that we should seek ignorance of God, which comes naturally and is innate to us, that we should despise faith, that we should abandon the promises of God, that we should regard all the consolations of the spirit and the certainty of conscience as nothing: such things would hardly be taught by Epicurus himself.
Further, not content with this, you call 1) the unchristian, forward and vain one who be
1) Diatribe § 2.
but Christian, godly and sober, who despises them. What else can you achieve with these words than that Christians are presumptuous, vain and not God-fearing? that Christianity is a thing of no importance at all, vain, foolish and godless? So it happens again that while you want to deter us from presumption to the highest degree, you have fallen into the opposite, after the manner of the fools, and teach nothing but the highest presumption, godlessness and corruption. Do you not feel that your booklet is so ungodly, blasphemous, and piratical in this part that it has no equal anywhere?
I am not speaking of your heart, as I said above, for I do not consider you so depraved that you would teach or have done this from the heart, but to show you what strange things he who has taken it upon himself to lead a bad cause must chat about without meaning to; furthermore, what it means to go against God's works and words, while we act to please others and serve a foreign cause against our conscience. It is neither a game nor a joke to teach the holy Scriptures and godliness, for here one very easily falls into the trap, as Jacobus [2, 10.] says: "He who sins against one is wholly guilty of it." For so it happens that if we think it but a small thing to want to play our game, and do not hold the holy Scriptures in due honor, we soon become entangled in ungodliness and fall into blasphemies, as has happened to you here, Erasmus. God forgive you and have mercy on you.
But that the sophists have raised and investigated so many questions in this matter, and have mixed in many other useless things, many of which you cite, we know and confess with you, and have contested it more vehemently and more than you. But thou doest most unwisely and imprudently, mixing the purity of holy things with the unholy and foolish questions of the wicked, and making them like them. They have defiled the gold and changed the good color, as Jeremiah says [Lam. 4, 1.], but it is
the gold must not be compared to the fireplace and thrown away with it, as you do. The gold must be freed from them and the pure scripture must be separated from its filth and dirt. I have always been eager to do this, so that the holy scriptures may be considered something other than their antics. And we must not be misled that nothing is gained by these questions, but that we show less love to the great detriment of harmony, while we want to be overwise. We do not now treat the question of what the sophists-questioners 1) have directed, but how we become good and Christians, and you must not lay it to the charge of Christian doctrine what the ungodly do evil. For that serves nothing to the point and you could have said that on another occasion and saved the paper.
In the third part, you continue to make us modest and calm Epicureans, by another kind of advice, which, however, is no more intelligible than the previous two, namely 2): "that there are some things which are of such a nature that, even if they were true, and one could know them, it would not be advisable to reveal them to the ears of all kinds of people."
And here again you throw everything together and mix it up in your own way, making holy things equal to worldly things without any distinction, and have again fallen into contempt and dishonor of God and the Scriptures. I have said above that what is either taught or proved in the holy Scriptures is not only clear but also wholesome, and that therefore one can, indeed must, with certainty publicly proclaim, learn, and know that what you say is false, that it should not be revealed to the ears of all kinds of people when you speak of what is in the holy Scriptures; for if you want to have spoken of other things, that is none of our business, and you have then not spoken to the matter but corrupted paper.
1) Here in the word huusstionuriuZ is a play on words which cannot be rendered well in German. Huutzstionurius is one who deals with questions. It means about also a torturer and executioner; therefore it could have been rendered: SophistenSchinderknechte.
2) Diatrive § 2.
and time with your words. Furthermore, you know that I do not agree with the sophists on any point, so that you should rightly have spared me and not reproached me for their abuses, for in your writing you should have spoken against me. I know in what the sophists err, and do not need you as a teacher; they are sufficiently refuted by me. This I want to have said once and for all, as often as you throw me together with the sophists and charge my cause with their foolishness. For in this you do wrong, which you know very well.
Now let us look at the reasons of your council 3): "God is in His essence in a dung beetle's den or even in a cloaca (which you shy away from saying and accuse the sophists of blathering) as well as in heaven; although this would be true, yet you consider that it is unintelligent to dispute about it before the great multitude."
First of all, let those who are talking talk; we are not talking here about what people do, but about right and law, not how we live, but how we should live. For who among us lives and acts in the right way everywhere? But for this reason law and doctrine are not condemned, but rather they condemn us. But you deal with those quite strange things and scrape together many things from all sides, because the One Article of the foreknowledge of God grievously vexes you. Since you cannot defeat it in any way, you try to tire the reader with a lot of empty talk. But this may pass, we want to get back to the point. To what end, then, do you think that some things should not be taught in public? Do you include the matter of free will? Then everything that I said above will apply to you, that it is necessary to learn free will; furthermore, why do you not follow your own advice and do not keep your diatribe in line? If you do well to treat free will, why do you reprove it? if it is evil, why do you do it? But if you do not count it among these things, then you again go to the
3) Diatribe § 2.
thing at issue and, as a verbose speaker, sprinkle extraneous things that do not belong to the matter at hand.
But you do not treat the example right either and condemn it as something useless, that in front of the crowd it is disputed whether God is in a cave or in a cloaca, because you have too human thoughts of God. I confess that there are some frivolous preachers who, without reverence and godliness, either out of a desire for fame or an effort to advance something new, or because they just want to talk, blabber and postulate quite frivolously: but such people please neither God nor people, even if they would claim that God is in the highest heaven. But where there are serious and godly preachers, who teach with modest, pure and reasonable words, it is without danger, indeed of great benefit, if they teach such things before the great multitude. Must we not all teach that the Son of God was in the womb of the Virgin and that he was born from her womb? But what great difference is there between the human body and any other unclean place? And who could not speak shamefully and indecently of it? But such people we rightly condemn, since pure words abound to speak of this necessary process with propriety and pleasantness. Christ's body was also a human body, like ours; what is more nasty than that? Shall we not therefore say that God dwelt in him bodily, as Paul said? What is more horrible than death? What is more abominable than hell? But the prophet boasts that God is with him in death and assists him in hell.
Therefore, a godly heart is not afraid to hear that God is in death or in hell, both of which are more dreadful and horrible than a hole or a cloaca. Indeed, since the Scriptures testify that God is everywhere and fills everything, they not only say that He is in those places, but also that one must necessarily learn and know that He is there; for one would say that if I were imprisoned by a tyrant, placed in a prison or in a secret chamber, I would not be able to find Him.
which has happened to many saints, that I may not call upon God there, nor believe that He is there with me, until I have entered a decorated church. If you teach us to engage in such antics with regard to God, and take offense at the places where He is present, then in the end you will not let Him dwell in Heaven, for even the highest heavens do not contain Him and are not worthy of Him. But, as I have said, according to your custom you sting so spitefully, so that you put down our cause and make it hateful, because you realize that you cannot overcome it and that it will probably remain unconquered by you.
Of the other example, that there are three gods, I confess that it is annoying when it is taught; it is also not true, and the holy scriptures do not teach it, but the sophists speak so and have invented a new art of inference. But what is that to us?
Furthermore, it is to be marveled at how excellently you conduct your cause with regard to confession and satisfaction, and everywhere, as you are wont to do, you walk on eggshells, lest it appear as if you were simply condemning our doctrine, nor even as if you were attacking the tyranny of the pope. You must not dare to do that. Therefore, you put God and conscience aside for a while (for what does Erasmus care about what God's will is in these matters and what is pleasing to the conscience?), make a fuss about outward appearances, and accuse the common people of abusing the preaching that confession and satisfaction should be free, according to their wickedness for the freedom of the flesh, but "are kept completely in check by "the necessity to confess (as you say). O what an excellent and glorious reason! Is this then teaching theology, if one binds souls with laws and, as Ezekiel says [13, 19.], kills those who are not bound by God? Of course, with this reason you bring up the whole tyranny of the papal laws again, as useful and salutary, because by them the wickedness of the great crowd is kept in check.
But I don't want to drive off, as this article deserves; I want to say the thing briefly.
A good theologian teaches like this: The people must be held in check by the outward force of the sword when they have done evil, as Paul teaches Rom. 13:4, but their consciences must not be entangled with false laws, so that they are tormented with sins where God intended that there should be no sin. For the consciences are to be bound by God's command alone, so that the tyranny of the popes, which has forced itself in between, and falsely frightens and kills the souls inwardly, and outwardly torments the body in vain, is completely removed from the remedy; for although it outwardly compels to confession and other burdens, the heart is not thereby kept in check, but it is only more strongly provoked to hatred against God and man. And in vain it torments the body in external things and makes mere hypocrites, so that those who tyrannize with such laws are nothing but ravening wolves, thieves and murderers of souls. And these you commend to us again, you good pastor, that is, you are the instigator of the cruelest murderers of souls, that they should fill the world with hypocrites, with blasphemers, and with such people as despise him in their hearts, that they may be kept in check a little outwardly, as if there were no other way to keep in check that makes no hypocrites and is practiced without harming consciences, as I have said.
Here you introduce parables, in which you want to be rich and to be respected for using them appropriately, 1) namely: "there are diseases which are borne with less harm than they are driven out, like leprosy" 2c; likewise you also add the example of Paul, "who knows how to make a difference between what one has power to do and what is pious; it is in our power (you say) to speak the truth, but it is not pious with all and sundry, nor at all times, nor in any way."
As an eloquent speaker, and yet not understanding what you speak, you act in brevity this thing as if our trade about it is
1) Diatribe § 2.
If a sum of easily replaceable money were at stake, or some other quite insignificant thing, by the loss of which, since it was far less than the external peace, no one should be moved so much that he would not rather yield, do something or suffer, depending on the circumstances, so that the world would not have to be brought into such turmoil. So you clearly state that this peace and the tranquility of the flesh seem to you far more excellent than faith, than conscience, than blessedness, than the word of God, than the honor of Christ, even than God Himself. Therefore I tell you, and I beg you to take it to heart, that in this business I am dealing with a serious, necessary and eternal cause, with such a cause and such a great one that it must be asserted and defended even with death, even if the whole world should not only be thrown into battle and turmoil, but should even fall into a heap and become nothing again. If you do not understand this, or are not moved by it, then do your thing and let those understand it and be moved by it to whom God has given it.
For I am not, by the grace of God, so foolish and senseless that for the sake of money, which I neither have nor desire, or for the sake of fame, which I could not obtain in the world that is so hostile to me even if I wanted to, or for the sake of the life of my body, of which I cannot be sure for a moment, with such great courage, with such great constancy, which you call stubbornness, through so many dangers of life, through so much hatred, through so many persecutions, in short, through the rage of men and devils, I wanted to lead and maintain this cause for so long. Or do you think that you alone have a heart that is moved by this discord? We are also not made of stone or of panic blocks. But if it cannot be otherwise, we choose rather to be afflicted by temporal strife, rejoicing in the grace of God, for the sake of the word of God, which must be firmly asserted with a brave and unbending heart, than to be tormented by eternal strife, under the wrath of God, in unbearable torment.
Christ grant, as I wish and hope, that your heart will not stand thus; but your words certainly read as if you were to argue with the epicurus that the word of God and the life to come are fables, since you want to induce us by your teaching that we should abandon the most certain word of God and give in to it for the sake of popes and princes, or for the sake of temporal peace. If we give it, we also give God, faith, blessedness and everything that is called Christianity to it. How much more correctly Christ admonishes us that we should rather despise the whole world.
But you say such things, because you do not read, or rather do not pay attention, that this is the most certain destiny of the word of God, that because of it the world will be aroused. And this Christ asserts publicly [Matth. 10, 34.]: "I did not come to send peace, but the sword", and in Lucas (12, 49.], "I am come to kindle a fire upon the earth"; and Paul in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians 6, 5: "In riots" 2c; and also the prophet in the second Psalm abundantly testifies and assures that the heathen rage, that the nations make a noise, that the kings rebel, that the princes plot against the Lord and against His anointed, as if to say, the great multitude, the mighty, the rich, the powerful, the wise, the righteous, and all that is high in the world, rebel against God's word. See in the Acts of the Apostles what happens in the world, only because of the preaching of Paul (that I do not mention the other apostles), how this one man arouses both Gentiles and Jews, or how there [Apost. 24, 5.] the enemies themselves say: "the uproar arouses on the whole face of the earth". Under Elijah the kingdom of Israel is confused, as King Ahab [1 Kings 18:17] complains. How great an uproar was there among the other prophets when all were killed or stoned, when Israel was led captive into Assyria, and likewise when Judah was led into Babylon? Has this been peace? The world and its God cannot and will not suffer the word of the true God; the true God will not and cannot keep silent: how could
Since these two gods are at war with each other, will there not be turmoil throughout the world?
Therefore, wanting to quell this turmoil is nothing other than taking away and forbidding the Word of God. For as often as God's word comes, it comes to transform and renew the world. But also pagan writers testify that changes in the circumstances cannot take place without movement and turmoil, yes, without blood. It is now up to the Christians to expect and bear this with presence of mind, as Christ says [Matth. 24, 6.]: "You will hear wars and cries of wars; watch and do not be afraid. This must first all come to pass; but it is not yet the end." And I would say, if I did not see this turmoil, that God's word would not be in the world; now that I see it, I rejoice with all my heart and do not respect it, for I am quite certain that the kingdom of the Pope with his followers will fall, for it is mainly this that has attacked God's word, which is now going forth. I see well, dear Erasmus, that you complain in many books about this turmoil, that peace and harmony are now lost; furthermore, you try many things to heal this, and (as I believe) of good opinion, but this disease (podagra) mocks your attempts to help, because here it is true what you say, you go against the current, yes, you extinguish the fire with straw, stop complaining, stop wanting to heal; This rebellion has its beginning and progress from the Lord and will not cease until he makes all the opponents of the word like dung in the street, although it is regrettable that you, such a great theologian, must be remembered as a disciple, since you should be a teacher of others.
Now here belongs your very pretty saying that some diseases are borne with less harm than they are driven away, but you do not apply it rightly; for you should say that these diseases, which could be borne with less harm, would be those commotions, movements, confusions, uprisings, mobs, discords, wars, and the like, by which, for the sake of the Word of God, the whole world is shaken and
is branched off. This, I say, because it is temporal, is borne with less harm than the old and evil habits by which all souls must necessarily be lost unless they are changed by God's Word; if this were taken away, the eternal goods, God, Christ and the Holy Spirit would be taken away. But how much better is it to lose the world than to lose God, the Creator of the world, who can create countless worlds anew and is better than immeasurable wagers? How can temporal and eternal things be compared to each other? This leprosy of temporal evils must therefore rather be endured than that by the murder and eternal damnation of all souls the race be healed of this turmoil and pacified at the cost of its blood and its ruin, since at the price of the whole world not even one soul can be bought. You have beautiful and excellent parables and sayings, but when you deal with holy things, you apply them childishly, yes, wrongly, because you crawl on the earth and consider nothing that goes beyond human comprehension. For that which God works is not childish, nor civil, nor human, but divine and higher than all human reason. For example, you do not realize that this turmoil and mobs are going through the world out of God's counsel and action, and fear that the heavens are falling in; but I, by God's grace, recognize this very well, because I see other greater troubles in the time after this life, in comparison with which this one seems to be, as it were, a faint whisper of a breeze or a gentle murmur of water.
But the doctrine that confession and satisfaction should be free, you either deny or you do not know that it is God's word.
This is another question, but we know and are certain that it is God's word by which Christian freedom is firmly asserted, so that we do not allow ourselves to be ensnared in bondage by human traditions and laws. We have abundantly taught this elsewhere, and if you wish to dispute it, we are prepared to tell you so, too, or to dispute it. There are quite a number of our books on this subject.
But [you might say] at the same time the laws of the popes should also be carried and kept in love, if in this way, perhaps, both the eternal blessedness through the Word of God and the peace of the world could exist without turmoil.
I have already said above that this is impossible. The prince of this world does not allow the pope and his bishops to keep their laws freely, but he has it in mind to capture and bind the consciences; the true God cannot stand that. Thus, the Word of God and the traditions of men quarrel in irreconcilable discord, not unlike how God Himself and Satan oppose each other, and one destroys the other's works and overthrows the other's teachings, just as when two kings devastate each other's kingdoms. "He that is not with me," saith Christ [Matt. 12:30], "is against me."
But that it is to be feared that many who are inclined to vices will abuse this freedom, belongs to the above-mentioned turmoil as a part of the temporal leprosy that one must endure and the evil that one must suffer, and is not to be considered so great that one should take away the word of God in order to prevent their abuse. If not all can be saved, yet some will be preserved for whose sake God's word has come; these have all the more fervent love and all the more firm unity. For what evil did not ungodly men do before God's word came? Yes, what good have they done? Has not the race always been full of war, deceit, violence, discord and all crimes'? so that Micah [7:4] compares the best of them to a thorn; what do you think he would call the others? But now they begin to accuse the gospel, which has again come to light, of the wickedness of the race, when it is rather revealed by the good gospel how wicked it was when it lived in its darkness without the gospel. In the same way, the unlearned blame the sciences, because their ignorance comes to light through their flourishing. This is the gratitude with which we thank God for His
Word of life and blessedness. But how great, do you think, will have been the fear among the Jews when the gospel absolved all from the law of Moses? What did not seem to allow such a great salvation to evil men? But because of this, the gospel was not refrained from preaching; rather, the unbelievers were let go, but the godly were told not to abuse this freedom for the licentiousness of the flesh.
But even that part of your counsel, or rather remedy, is no good, since you say, "To speak the truth is in our power, but it is not pious with all and sundry, nor at all times, nor in any manner"; and incongruously enough you introduce Paul, since he says [1 Cor. 6:12.], "I have it all power, but it is not all pious."
For Paul does not speak of the doctrine or teaching of the truth, as you pervert his words and arbitrarily point to it. Rather, he wants the truth to be spoken everywhere, at all times, in every way, so that he also rejoices that only Christ is proclaimed, accidentally or for the sake of hate and hatred, and testifies to this publicly in these words [Phil. 1:18]: "That only Christ is proclaimed in every way.... I rejoice in this." Paul speaks of the doing and use of doctrine, namely of those who boasted of Christian liberty, but sought their own, and took no heed of offense and offence to the weak. The truth and doctrine must be preached to all lines, publicly and persistently; it must never be bent or concealed, for there is no offense in it, for it is "a straight scepter." [And who gave you power or right to bind the Christian doctrine to place, persons, time or occasion of things, since Christ wants it to be proclaimed and to reign most freely in the whole world? For "God's word is not bound," says Paul [2 Tim. 2, 9], and Erasmus wants to bind the word? Nor has God given us a word which chooses places, persons and times, since Christ says: "Go into all the world"; He has given us a word which is not bound.
does not say: Go here, but do not go there, like Erasmus; likewise: "Preach the gospel to all creatures"; he does not say: With some, with some not. In short, in the service of the Word of God you lay upon us respect of person, respect of place, respect of manner, respect of time, since this alone is a great part of the glory of the Word, that (as Paul says [Eph. 6:9. Col. 3:25.]) "with Him there is no respect of person," and [Gal. 2:6.] "God respecteth not the respect of men." Again, you see how sacrilegiously you go against God's word, as if you were far ahead of it with your thoughts and advice.
Now, if we were to ask you to show us the right times, persons and ways of preaching the truth, when would you finish your instruction? "First the world and time have long since come to an end, 1) before you have been able to establish a certain rule. Where, however, would the ministry of teaching remain? Where are the souls to be taught? And how could you, since you do not know one circumstance of the persons, times, manner? And even if you know this in the best way, you do not know the hearts of men; if not for you this is the manner, this is the time, and this is the person, that we should teach the truth in such a way that the pope will not be displeased, that the emperor will not be angry, that the bishops and princes will not be agitated, and that there will be no turmoil and movement in the world, so that many will not be offended and become angry. What this advice is, you have seen above, but you liked to show your eloquence with useless words, so that you could only present something at all.
How much better, then, that we wretched people should give this honor to GOtte, who knows the hearts of men, that he himself should prescribe the manner, the persons, and the times. For he knows what, when and how it is good for a man.
1) Latin:
suuna elauso aoinxoQst tsnaxors ünsm Munäus.
An allusion to Virgil, I, 375:
äisna elauso aoraxonet vesxsr Ol^naxo.
must be told to everyone. But now he has so prescribed that his gospel, which is necessary for all, should not be prescribed for a certain place, not for a certain time, but it should be preached to all, at all times, in every place. And above I have proved that that which is distinguished in Scripture is of such a nature that it is necessary and wholesome to expound it to all and to proclaim it freely in public, as you yourself advised and taught better then than now in your writing "Paraclesis. Those who do not want souls to be redeemed, as the pope did with his own, may have to bind the word of God and keep people from life and the kingdom of heaven, so that they themselves do not enter and do not let others enter: you serve their rage, Erasmus, with your pernicious advice.
With equal wisdom you advise 1): "It should not be said publicly if something is wrongly decided or determined in the concilia, lest an occasion be given to despise the reputation of the fathers."
Of course, the pope wanted you to say this and prefers to hear it rather than the gospel; he would be very ungrateful if he did not honor you again with the cardinal's title and great wealth. But still, Erasmus, what will the souls do who are bound and killed by that unjust decree? Is that none of your business? But you constantly think that it is, or rather, you act as if it were your opinion that human statutes can be kept without danger next to the pure word of God. If that were the case, I would soon agree with this opinion of yours. Therefore, if you do not know it, I say again: Human statutes cannot be kept at the same time as the word of God, because those bind the consciences, this makes them loose, and they fight against each other like water and fire, if they are not kept free, that is, as such, which do not bind. This is precisely what the pope does not want and cannot want, if he does not
1) Diatribe § 2.
wants his kingdom to be destroyed and an end to it to be put to it, which only exists through ropes and fetters of the conscience, of which the gospel assures that they are free. Therefore, the reputation of the fathers is to be regarded as nothing, and their statutes, which are unjustly established, like everything that is established without the Word of God, must be overturned and rejected. In short, if you hold thus of God's word, your opinion is ungodly; but if you hold thus of other things, the eloquent exposition [dispu
tatio] of your counsel, we are arguing about God's word.
In the last part of your preface, where you seriously discourage us from this kind of teaching, you think you have almost won the victory.
2) "What could be more useless (you say) than to spread this strange thing (paradox) in the world: What we do does not happen by our free will, but' by mere necessity? And the saying of Augustine: God works the good and the evil in us; he rewards in us his good works and punishes in us his evil works". There you give or rather demand an account with many words: "What great door (you say) would this publicly spread speech open to men to ungodliness? What wicked man would want to improve his life? Who would believe that he is loved by God? Who would fight with his flesh?"
I am surprised that you, with so much vehemence and effort in speaking, have not also thought of the present matter and said: Where would then free will remain? Dear Erasmus, again I also say: If you consider these seemingly strange things (paradoxa) to be man's inventions, what do you argue about? what do you get excited about? against whom do you speak? Or is there a man in the whole world today who has attacked the doctrine of man more vehemently than Luther? Therefore, your admonition is none of our business. But if you believe that these strange things are God's words, where is your decency? where is shame? where is, I will not even say, shame?
2) Diatribe § 3.
no longer say the well-known modesty of Erasmus, but where is the fear and reverence that one owes to the true God? How can you say that nothing more useless can be spoken than this word of God? Of course, your Creator will learn from you, his creature, what is useful and useless to preach, and this foolish or unwise God will not have known until now what must be preached, until you, as his teacher, prescribed to him the way to have right insight and to command; just as if he himself, without your instruction, would not have known that from this strange sentence would follow what you conclude from it. If, then, God willed that such things should be spoken and expounded publicly, and that one should not see what follows from them, who are you to forbid it?
The apostle Paul, in the letter to the Romans, discusses, not in the corner, but publicly before the whole world, in free speech, the same things also with very hard words before the people, saying [Rom. 9, 18.]: "He hardens whom he will"; and again [V. 22]: "God would show His wrath" 2c- What is harder (for the flesh) than Christ's word [Matth. 21, 16]: "Many are called, but few are chosen"? and again [Joh. 13, 18]: "I know which I have chosen." Of course, all this is of such a nature, if you have your way, that nothing more useless can be said, because through it godless people fall into despair, hatred and blasphemy.
Here, as I see, the truth and the usefulness of Scripture, as you consider it, must be weighed and judged according to the sense of men, and that only according to that of the most godless, so that what they like or what seems tolerable must first be true, divine, wholesome; what is contrary must immediately be useless, false and corrupt. What else can you aim at with this advice than that God's word remains in abeyance, standing or falling according to the arbitrariness and reputation of men? since, on the other hand, Scripture says that everything stands and falls according to the will and judgment of God and [Hab. 3, 20.]: "Let all the earth be still before the Lord." Thus
He who imagined that the living God was nothing other than a frivolous, thoughtless tongue-thruster making a speech on some rostrum, whose words one could, of course, interpret, accept, or reject as one pleased, depending on whether one saw that the godless people would be aroused or moved by them.
Here you clearly show, dear Erasmus, how heartily you advised above that one should honor the majesty of the divine judgments. For where the teachings of Scripture were dealt with, and it was not at all necessary to worship mysterious and hidden things, because there are no such things there, you threatened us in very serious words with the Corycian cave, so that we would not enter rashly, so that you would have almost completely deterred us from reading Scripture through fear, which Christ and the apostles so urge and advise us to read, and also you yourself elsewhere. Here, however, where one has not come to the teachings of Scripture, nor merely to the Corycian cave, but in truth to the mysteries of the divine majesty that are to be reverently honored, namely, why God works as He has said, there you break the bars and rush in. Only that you do not blaspheme, but you show all possible indignation against God, because he does not want the intention and the cause of his judgment to be seen. Why don't you also avoid darkness and ambiguity here? Why do you yourself not abstain from investigating those things and deter others, since God intended them to be hidden from us and did not reveal them in Scripture? Here it would have befitted you to put your finger on your mouth, to stand still in awe before what should remain hidden, to worship the hidden counsel of the Majesty, and to exclaim with Paul [Rom. 9:20.], "Yea, dear man, who art thou that thou wouldest be right with God?"
Who (speak you) will strive to make his life better? I answer: No one, nor will anyone be able to, for God does not ask for your better without the Holy Spirit, since they are hypocrites.
The good deeds of the elect and the blessed will be corrected by the Holy Spirit, the others will be lost without being corrected. For even Augustine does not say that none or all men's good works will be crowned, but some. Therefore there will be some who mend their lives.
Who will believe (you say) that he is loved by God? I answer, No man shall believe, neither can he; but the elect shall believe, and the rest shall be lost as unbelievers, unwilling and blaspheming, as thou doest here. Therefore there will be some who will believe.
But that a door to ungodliness is opened by this teaching, that may be; that belongs to the leprosy, of which I said above that one must suffer the evil. On the other hand, through the same teaching the door to righteousness is opened and the entrance to heaven and the way to God for the godly and elect. But if, according to your advice, we abstained from this teaching and hid this word of God from people, so that everyone, deceived by a false idea of blessedness, would not fear God and would learn to humble himself, so that through fear he would finally come to grace and love, then we would have closed the door, but instead, for us and for everyone, we would have opened great gates, yes, chasms and abysses, not only to godlessness, but to the depths of hell. In this way, we ourselves would not enter heaven and would also prevent others from entering.
"What, then, is the use or necessity of spreading such things, since so many evils seem to arise from them?" I answer: It would be sufficient to say: God has willed that it be taught publicly, but one must not ask about the cause of the divine will, but simply worship God and give him the honor that, because he alone is just and wise, he does no wrong to anyone, nor can he do anything foolish or sacrilegious, even if it might seem quite different to us. With this answer the godly are satisfied. But to top it all off, I will add this-
1) Diatribe § 3.
Two causes require that this be preached. The first is so that our pride may be humbled and God's grace may be rightly recognized; the other is the Christian faith itself. First, God has surely promised His grace to the humbled, that is, to those who lament their sin and despair of themselves. But a man cannot thoroughly humble himself until he knows that without his powers, counsel, endeavor, will, and works, his blessedness depends entirely on another's good will [arbitrio]. Council, will and works, namely God's alone. For as long as a man has the conviction that he is able, even if only a very little, with regard to his blessedness, he remains confident in himself and does not completely despair of himself, therefore he does not humble himself before God, but sets his sights on place, time or some work, by which he hopes, or at least desires, to finally attain blessedness. But he who does not doubt that everything is in the will of God, who despairs completely of himself, chooses nothing, but expects God to work on him, is closest to the grace that he can become blessed. Therefore, for the sake of the elect, these things are taught publicly, so that they, thus humbled and brought to nothing, may be saved; the others resist this humiliation, indeed, they reject that this despairing of themselves be taught, and want something, even if only a very small thing, to be left for them, which they are able to do. These remain proud in secret and adversaries of God's grace. This, I say, is the one reason so that the humbled godly may come to know the promise of grace, call upon it and accept it.
The other reason is that faith deals with things that are not seen [Heb 11:1]. So that faith may take place, it is necessary that everything that is believed be hidden; but it cannot be hidden more deeply than when it is just opposite to how it appears to us, how we feel it and have experienced it. Thus, when God makes alive, He does it by killing; when He justifies, He does it by making guilty; when He brings to heaven, He does it by bringing to heaven.
Hell leads, as the Scripture says, 1 Sam. 2, 6: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive, leadeth into hell and out again." It is not the place here to go into more detail about this. This is well known to those who have read our scriptures. Thus he hides his eternal goodness and mercy under eternal wrath, his justice under unreasonableness.
This is the highest level of faith, to believe that he is kind, who makes so few blessed and condemns so many, to believe that he is just, who by his will necessarily condemns us, so that it appears, as Erasmus depicts it, as if he takes pleasure in the torment of the wretched and is more worthy of hatred than of love. Therefore, if I could in any way understand how God is merciful and just, who shows such anger and inequity, then faith would not be necessary. But now, since this cannot be comprehended, one should have the opportunity to exercise faith when such things are preached and proclaimed, as when God kills, faith is exercised in life in death. That is enough for the preface.
In this way, those who deal with these strange things (paradoxis) will be advised more correctly than by your counsel, since you want to find counsel by keeping silent and letting their impiety stand, by which you do nothing. For if you either believe or suspect that it is true (for these strange things are of great importance), then, in view of the insatiable desire to investigate secret things, you will most of all, if we want them to be deeply hidden, bring it about by the publication of this warning of yours that rather now all want to know whether these strange things are true, since they are provoked to it by your refutation. None of ours has so far given so strong an occasion to spread it out as you have by this vehement reminder, which is full of misgivings. You would have done much wiser if you had kept silent altogether about the fact that one should not concern oneself with these strange sentences, if you had wanted this to really happen. Now this is over; since you have not entirely
If you deny that they are true, they cannot be kept hidden, but everyone will be provoked to investigate them by the suspicion that they do contain the truth. Therefore, if you want others to be silent, either deny that they are true or be silent yourself first.
Let us briefly consider the other strange proposition: What is done by us is done by us not by free will but by mere necessity, so that we do not have to be told that this is an entirely harmful doctrine. Here I say thus: if it is proven that our salvation, quite independent of our powers and counsel, depends solely on God's work, which I hope to prove hereafter in the main part of this treatise, then does it not clearly follow, if God is not there in us with His work, that everything we do is evil, and that we work by necessity, which is good for nothing for salvation? For if it is not we, but God who works salvation in us, then we do not work anything salvific before His work, whether we want to or not. By necessity, I say, not compulsion, but, as those say, by necessity of immutability, not compulsion, that is, if a man does not have the spirit of God, he is certainly not forcibly taken by the throat, as it were, and does evil against his will, as a thief or robber is led to punishment against his will, but he does it voluntarily and gladly. But this desire and will to do [evil] he cannot refrain from, keep in check or change out of his strength, but continues willingly and gladly. Even if it should be forced outwardly by force to do otherwise, the will remains inwardly averse and is unwilling to the one who forces it or resists it. But it would not become unwilling if it were changed and willingly followed the force. This is what we call the necessity of immutability, that is, that the will cannot change and turn elsewhere, but is only more provoked to will when it is resisted; this proves its unwillingness. This would not happen if he were free, or had a free will.
Experience shows that those who are attached to a cause with affection cannot be dissuaded from it; or if they give way, they give way only by force, or if a greater advantage accrues to them from another cause, never voluntarily. But if they have no such inclination, they let everything go and happen as it goes and happens.
Again, on the other hand, when God works in us, the changed will, gently breathed upon by the Spirit of God, again wills and acts out of mere desire and inclination and voluntarily, not forced, so that it cannot be turned away from it by any repugnance, nor can it be overpowered or forced through the gates of hell, but it continues to will, gladly do, and love the good, just as it had previously willed, gladly had, and loved the evil. This again is proved by experience, how invincible and persistent holy men are, when one wants to force them to do something else by force, that they are thereby only more provoked to want [the good], as the fire is rather fanned by the wind than extinguished, so that also here there is no freedom or free will to turn elsewhere, or to want something else, as long as the Holy Spirit and the grace of God last in man.
In short, when we are under the God of this world, without the work and spirit of the true God, we are held captive to His will, as Paul to Timothy [2 Ep. 2, 26.Paul says to Timothy [2 Ep 2:26] that we can only will what he wills, for he is the strong armed one who keeps his court in such a way that those whom he possesses are at peace, that they make no move or stirring against him, otherwise the kingdom of Satan, if it were divided among itself, would not stand, of which Christ assures us that it will stand. And this we do willingly and gladly, after the manner of the will; for if it were compelled, it would not be a will, for the compulsion is rather, I say, a non-will (noluntas). But if a stronger one comes over him, defeats him and takes us away as his robbery, we are again his servants and captives through the Holy Spirit (but this is a royal
freedom), that we want and like to do what he wants. Thus the human will is placed in the middle, like a draught animal; when God sits on it, it wills and goes as God wills, as the Psalm [73, 22.] says: "I must be like a beast before you. Yet I always remain with you." When the devil sits on it, he wills and goes as the devil wills, and it is not at his pleasure to run to one of the two horsemen (sessorem), or to seek him, but the two horsemen contend to obtain and possess him.
But how, if I could prove from your own words, with which you assert the free will, that there is no free will. If I cannot do this, I swear that everything I write against you in this whole book shall be revoked and everything your diatribe claims and seeks against me shall be confirmed.
You make the power of the free will quite small and such that it is absolutely not able to do anything without the grace of God.
Don't you have to admit that? Now I ask and demand: If the grace of God is not there, or is separated from that very small power, what can it do? It can do nothing (you say), and does nothing good; consequently, it will not do what God or His grace wants. For we have set the case above that God's grace is divorced from it; but what God's grace does not do, that is not good. From this it follows that free will without God's grace is not free at all, but is unalterably a prisoner and servant of evil, since it cannot turn to good by itself. If this is certain, I will allow you not only to make the power of free will a very small one, but also to make it an angelic one (angel63m), to make it, if you can, an entirely divine one; but if you add this unpleasant addition, that you say it can do nothing without the grace of God, you will at once have taken away all its power; for what is a power that can do nothing but absolutely no power at all?
Therefore to say that there is a free will, and that it has a power, but that it has no power, is what the sophists call oppositum in adjecto, as if one were to say: Free will is that which is not free; as if I were to call the fire cold and the earth warm. For let fire alike have the faculty of heat, yea, of infernal heat, if it be not hot, nor burn, but be cold, and make cold, let it not even be called a fire to me, much less warm, unless thou wilt have a painted or fancied fire. But if we were to call this the power of free will, according to which man is fit (aptus) to be seized by the Spirit and endowed with God's grace, since he is created for [eternal] life or for eternal death, this would be rightly spoken. For this ability, that is, fitness or, as the Sophists speak, a dispositional nature (dispositivam qualitatem) and suffering skill (passivam aptitudinem) we also concede. For who does not know that it is not given to trees and animals? For (as, one says) for the geese he has not created the sky.
So it is certain, even according to your own testimony, that we do everything by necessity, nothing by free will, since the power of free will is nothing, and neither does nor is able to do good if grace is not there; unless you want to call the word efficacy (efficacia) a perfect accomplishment (perfectionem) in a new meaning, as if free will could indeed begin and will, but not accomplish, which I do not believe, and later I will speak about this matter in more detail.
From this it follows that free will is an entirely divine name, which can belong to no one else but to the divine majesty alone, for it can and does everything, as the Psalm sings [115:3], "whatever he wills" in heaven and on earth. If this is imputed to men, it is imputed to them with as much injustice as if the divinity itself were imputed to them: there could not be a greater blasphemy. Accordingly, it would have been proper for the theologians to have been
They should have abstained from this word, since they wanted to speak of human power, and leave it to God alone; but then they should have taken it away from the mouths and speech of men and claimed it as a sacred and venerable expression for their God. And if they wanted to ascribe any property to men at all, they should have taught them to call it by another word, especially since it is known to us and before our eyes that the people are miserably deceived and seduced by this word. For they hear and understand this word quite differently than the theologians mean and want to have understood it. For the word "free will" is an exceedingly glorious, world-embracing and important one (plena,) by which, as the people think, is expressed the faculty (as the meaning and nature of the word also require) which can freely turn to both sides, and this faculty is dependent on no one or subject to no one. Now if it knew that this was otherwise, and that scarcely a very small spark was signified by it, and that it [free will] by itself was quite incapable of anything, and was a prisoner and servant of the devil, it would be surprising if they did not stone us as deceivers and impostors who spoke quite differently from what they themselves meant; indeed, it would not even be certain, nor would there be agreement, as to what we wanted to express. For he who speaks lies (sophistico) (says the wise man [Prov. 6, 17]) is hateful, especially if he does so in matters of faith (pietatis), where eternal bliss is in danger.
Since we have lost, indeed never had, the meaning and the cause of such a splendid word (which the Pelagians wanted to have, who were also deceived by this word), what then do we still so stubbornly retain an empty word, to the danger and deception of the believing people? this is no other wisdom than how now kings and princes also either retain empty titles of kingdoms and regions, or claim them for themselves and boast, since in this they are almost beggars and have nothing less than these kingdoms and countries. But this is bearable, because
they do not deceive or defraud anyone, but delight themselves in the empty appearance, admittedly without any profit. But here is danger for the blessedness and the most harmful deception.
Who would not laugh at such a clumsy innovator of words, or rather find him obnoxious, who, against the general usage of language, tried to introduce such a way of speaking that he would call a beggar a rich man, not because he had some wealth, but because perhaps some king could give him his, and he would do this, as it were, in earnest, not in a figure of speech, namely either of antiphrasis 1) or of irony: So too, if he were to call a terminally ill person perfectly healthy, namely, because another might give him his health; likewise, if he were to call a completely unlearned, coarse person very learned, because another might give him his science. So it is also here: man has a free will, namely, if God would cede him his. Through this abuse in speech, everyone could boast of every thing, such as: he is the Lord of heaven and earth, if God would give it to him. But such things do not belong to theologians, but to comedians and impostors. Our words must be genuine, pure and sober and, as Paul says, wholesome and blameless [Titus 2:8].
If we do not want to abandon this word [free will] altogether, which would be the safest and most Christian, we should teach that it is used with true honesty (bona fide) only in such a way that man is to be granted a free will, not with reference to things that are above him, but only in such things as are beneath him, that is, he should know that in his temporal property and possessions he has the right to use, do and leave according to his free will, although even this is governed solely by God's free will, as it pleases him; but with respect to God, or in things pertaining to salvation and damnation, he has no free will.
1) Antiphrasis, a figure of speech where the word has the opposite meaning, e.g., LumsiMss, the benevolent, for the vengeful goddesses.
The will of God or the will of the devil is the will of the people who are captive, subject and servant.
I have said this about the main things in your preface, which also comprehend almost the whole trade in themselves, almost more than the following book itself. But the short epitome of these pieces has been such that it could have been quite briefly covered by this double sentence (dilemma,) 2): Either your preface complains about the words of God, or about the words of men. If about the words of men, it is written in vain and does not concern us; if about the words of God, it is ungodly from beginning to end. Accordingly, it would have been more useful to speak of whether it is the words of God or the words of men that we are discussing. But perhaps the following entrance and my exposition will deal with this.
But what you say again at the end of your preface 3) moves me nothing but: "that you call our teachings fables and useless, one must rather teach Christ crucified according to the example of Paul, wisdom is to be taught among the strong, Scripture arranges its language differently according to the kind of listeners, so that you hold that it is to be left to the wisdom and love of the teacher who is to teach what is pious to the neighbor."
You speak all this clumsily and ignorantly. For we also teach nothing but Jesus Christ crucified. But Christ crucified also brings all this with him, even the wisdom that is to be taught among the perfect. For there is no other wisdom to be taught among Christians than that which is hidden in mystery and belongs to the perfect, not to the children of the Jewish people and the people of the law, who boast of their works without faith. They boast of their works without faith, as Paul says in 1 Cor. 2, 6. Unless you want nothing else to be understood by "teaching Christ crucified" than to let us hear these words: Christ is crucified.
2) äilsmiNÄ, a type of conclusion in logic, with which one catches the opponent on both sides, he may concede which one he wants.
3) Diatribe § 3.
Further [that you say] 1): "that God is angry, "hates, is grieved, "causes himself to wail, that it grieves him, yet actually "none of these are acceptable to God":
That is, to look for knots in the rush. 2) For these things do not make the writing dark, nor do they make it necessary that it be adapted to the different audiences, but you take pleasure in making darkness where there is none. These are common phrases and are composed of word pictures that even children know. But we are dealing in this matter with beliefs, not with grammatical figures.
Refutation of the introductory remarks of the diatribe. 3)
Now in the beginning of your presentation you promise that you will lead the matter with the canonical writings, because Luther does not want to be bound by the reputation of any other writer except them.
This pleases me well, and I accept the promise, although you do not agree to this in the opinion that these writers are not useful for the matter, but so that you do not take on a vain work, because you do not particularly like my boldness, or by what name this my undertaking [to let only the holy scripture be valid] may be called.
For it moves you quite significantly 4) "the so numerous series of the most learned men, whose opinion has been unanimously approved for so many hundreds of years, among whom have been those who have had a special insight into the sacred Scriptures, also some very holy martyrs, many who are famous for miraculous deeds, in addition the newer theologians, so many high schools, conciliarities, bishops and popes", in short, on the side stands the erudition, high talent, quantity, greatness, height, bravery, holiness, miracles, and the greatness of the people.
1) Diatribe § 3.
2) This saying is from Terence and means: seek trouble where there is none.
3) This heading is set by us.
4) Diatribe § 4.
and what else? On my side, however, there is one: Wiclef and the other: Laurentius Valla (although Augustine, whom you pass over, is also entirely mine), but these have no weight at all in comparison with those; there remains Luther alone, a single man without high office (privativ), who has only recently arisen (natus), with his friends, with whom there is neither such great learning, nor such high intellect, nor quantity, nor greatness, nor holiness, nor miracles, so 5) "that they cannot even heal a lame horse. They boast of the Scriptures, which they, like their opponents, have as a twofold one, then they boast of the spirit, which they show nowhere" and other things, most of which you can only list by hearsay. Therefore with us there is nothing but what the wolf said to the nightingale after he had devoured it: You are a voice, nothing more. For they speak (you say), and for that alone they want to be believed.
I confess, dear Erasmus, that you are not unjustly moved by all these things; I have been so moved by them for over ten years that I believe there is no one else who has been equally moved by them. It was unbelievable to me that this Troy of ours, which had remained undefeated for so long, in so many wars, should ever be conquered. And I call God to witness, who knows my heart, that I would have stayed with it and would still be so moved today, if my conscience and clear experience did not force me to the other side. You can really think that even I do not have a heart of stone, and if it were of stone, it could have melted, challenged and pressed by such great floods and waves, when I undertook what I knew that, if it had happened, the reputation of all those you have mentioned would come over my head like a flood of sin. But this is not the place to tell the story of my life and my works, nor has this been started to praise myself, but in order to
5) Diatribe § 5.
to praise the grace of God. Who I am and from what spirit and counsel I have been drawn into this matter, I command him who knows that all this has been done according to his, not my free will, although the world should have noticed this long ago. By your preface, however, you put me in the unpleasant position that I cannot easily wriggle out of it if I do not boast myself and reproach so many fathers, but I will briefly say: in learning, in intellect, in quantity, in reputation and everything else, I am inferior to them, as you also judge.
But if I were to ask you about these three things, which are proof of the Spirit, which are miraculous works, which are righteous holiness, you would, as far as I know you from your letters and books, be revealed as too inexperienced and ignorant to be able to indicate this even with a syllable. Or if I stopped hard and wanted to know in which of all those you praise it could certainly be proved by you that he was or still is holy, or that he had the Holy Spirit, or performed true miracles, I believe that you would struggle a lot, but in vain. You speak many things that are accepted in use and in common speech, but do not believe how much this loses in credibility and prestige when it is placed before the judgment seat of conscience. This is a true saying, that on earth many are taken for saints, whose souls are in hell.
But we will grant you, if you want, that all of them have been holy, that all of them have had the spirit, that all of them have done miraculous works (which you do not desire), tell me this, whether in the name and power of free will, or for the confirmation of the doctrine of free will, any of them have been holy, have received the spirit and have done miraculous works? That is far away! (you will say), but in the name and power of JESUS Christ and for the doctrine of CHRIST all this has happened. Why then do you cite their holiness, the Spirit, the miracles for the doctrine of free will, for which they were not given nor done?
Therefore, their miracles, spirit and holiness belong to our side, which we preach Jesus Christ, but not the powers or works of men. What is there to wonder if those who have been holy, spiritual and miracle-workers have sometimes, unawares hurried by the flesh, spoken and acted according to the flesh, as happened more than once to the apostles who were under Christ himself? For even you do not deny, but assert, that free will is not a matter of the Spirit or of Christ, but of man, so that the Spirit, who is promised to transfigure Christ, cannot preach free will at all. Therefore, if the fathers sometimes preached free will, they certainly spoke from the flesh (since they were men), not from the spirit; much less did they confirm it with miracles. Therefore, what you refer to the holiness, the spirit, and the miracles of the fathers does not rhyme at all here, because it does not prove free will, but the doctrine of Jesus Christ against the doctrine of free will.
But come now still, you who stand on the side of free will and claim that such a teaching is true, that is, that it comes from the spirit of God: now still, I say, prove the spirit, perform miraculous works, let your holiness be seen; for certainly you who claim this, owe it to us who deny it. From us, who say no, spirit, holiness and miracles must not be demanded [as proof, but from you, who say yes, such must be demanded. For the denying part establishes nothing, is nothing, is not required to prove anything, the proof need not be laid upon it; the asserting part must be burdened with the proof. You claim the power of free will and a human thing, but until now it has never been seen or heard that God has made a miracle happen for the confirmation of any teaching about a human thing, but only for the confirmation of a teaching in divine things. But now we are commanded that we should by all means not admit any doctrine that has not first been proven with divine signs, Deut. 18, 22.
Yes, the Scripture calls man vanity and lies, which means nothing else than that everything human is vain lies. Therefore, get to it, come here, I say, prove that your doctrine of human vanity and lies is the truth. Where is the proof of the spirit here? where the holiness? where the miracles? I see high gifts, learning, prestige, but God has also given these to the Gentiles.
But we do not want to force you to perform great miracles, not even to heal a lame horse, so that you may not complain that it is a carnal time, although God tends to confirm his teachings with miracles without regard to the carnal time, because he is not moved by the merit or lack of merit of a carnal time, but only by mercy, grace and love towards the souls, which are to be made firm for his glory by the tangible truth. I leave you the choice to do any miracle, no matter how small. Yes, I want to provoke your Baal, I mock him and challenge him that you create even one frog in the name and in the power of free will, of which the pagan and godless sorcerers in Egypt could produce many. For I will spare you the task of making lice, because even they could not produce them. I will say a still lesser thing: Catch only one flea or one louse (for you tempt and mock our God with the healing of the lame horse) and if you, with the uniting of all forces and the exertion of all efforts, both of your God and of all of you, can kill this little animal in the name and in the power of free will, then you shall have won and your cause shall be preserved and we will come immediately and worship that God, the wonderful slayer of a louse; Not as if I wanted to deny that you can also move mountains, but because it is something quite different to say that something is done by the power of free will, and something different to prove it.
But what I have said of miraculous works, the same I say of holiness. If in such a great series of years you have been able to
Hundreds, of men, and of all that you have mentioned, can show even One Work (be it only picking up a straw from the earth), or One Word (be it only the syllable My), or even One Thought (be it only the slightest sigh), by the power of free will, wherewith they have prepared themselves for grace, or wherewith they have merited the Spirit, or wherewith they have obtained forgiveness of sin, or wherewith they have dealt with God, however little (I am silent, wherewith they shall be sanctified), you shall have regained, and we shall have lost. I say, by the power and in the name of free will, for what is done by men by the power of creation, of this the holy Scripture has superfluous testimony. And surely you owe it to yourselves to show this, lest you be found to be ridiculous teachers, since with such great pride and prestige you propagate doctrines in the world, of which you can give no reason at all. For they will be called dreams, from which nothing will come, which would be the greatest shame for the most learned and holy and miraculous people of so many centuries. Then we will also prefer the Stoics to you, who admittedly also described such a sage as they had never seen, but still tried to prove a part. You can prove absolutely nothing, not even a shadow of your teaching.
Of the spirit I say thus: If you can show only one of all those who claim free will, who had so much mental power or inclination that he could have despised even one penny in the name and in the power of free will, to spare one morsel. Endure one word or sign of insult (for I do not want to say anything about contempt of wealth, of life, of the good name), then again you shall have the victory, and we will gladly give ourselves captive. And just this you, who praise the power of free will with such great verbiage, must show us, or it will again become apparent that you are fighting over the emperor's beard (de lana caprina), or you do it like the one who watched the games in the empty theater.
But I can easily show you the opposite
For such holy men as you praise, as often as they come before God to pray to Him or to act with Him, go along in complete forgetfulness of their free will, despair of themselves, and ask for nothing else for themselves than mere grace, since they would have deserved much else. This is what Augustine often did, and this is what Bernard did when he said when he was dying: I have lost my time, for I have lived damnably. I do not see that here any fortune is asserted which prepares itself for grace, but that all fortune is accused because it was only turned away [from God]. But even those saints sometimes spoke differently about free will in the disputation, as I see that it is the case with all of them that they are completely different people when they are intent on words and disputation than when they have to do with inner movements and works; there they speak differently than they were minded before [in the challenge], here they are minded differently than they spoke before. But people must be judged much more by what moves them inwardly than by their speech, both godly and godless.
But we indulge you even more. We do not require miracles, the spirit and holiness. We come back to the doctrine itself; this alone we desire, that you should at least show us what work, what word, what thought that power of free will sets in motion, or undertakes, or does, to prepare itself for grace. For it is not enough to say, It is a power, it is a power, it is a certain power of free will; for what is easier than to say that? Nor is this proper for the most learned and holy men, who have been applauded for so many centuries, but the child must be given a name (as they say in the German proverb), it must be explained what kind of power it is, what it does, what it suffers, what happens to it; that is an example, for I will speak very roughly of it: It is asked whether this power either prays, or fasts, or works, or exerts the body, or alms.
or to do or undertake something else of the kind; for if it is a force, it must have to do with some work. But here you are more mute than the frogs on Seriphos 1) and than the fishes, and how could you give an explanation, since according to your own testimony you are still uncertain about the power itself, disagree among yourselves and do not remain equal to yourselves: what should become of the explanation, if just what is explained does not remain equal?
But suppose that, after the course of Plato's time, you should once and for all agree among yourselves about the power itself, and then the declaration should be made by it that its work is praying, fasting, or something like that, which is perhaps still hidden in the Platonic ideas: who will make us certain that this is true, that it pleases God, and that we are certainly doing the right thing? especially since you yourselves confess that it is a human thing which does not have the testimony of the Spirit, since it was extolled by the philosophers and was in the world before Christ came and the Holy Spirit was sent from heaven, so that it is quite certain that this doctrine is not sent from heaven, but has had an earthly origin before. Therefore, great testimony is needed to confirm it as a certain and true one.
Therefore, even if we are only private persons and few, but you are persons in public office 3) and many, we unlearned, you the most learned, we stupid, you the most gifted, we only arose yesterday, you older than Deucalion, we never accepted, you approved by so many centuries, finally we sinners, carnal, indolent, you by holiness, spirit and miracles to fear even the evil spirits: so the right of the
1) Seriphos, a small island in the Aegean Sea belonging to the Cyclades. It is only one German square mile in size. Probably there were no frogs on it.
2) I.e. after many thousand years.
3) In the fact that here in the original pudlieuni and not pudliei is put, probably an allusion is to be expressed that the Pabstthum is mainly concerned with the collection of money and incomes, because xudlieauus is a general tenant of the "Roman" incomes. In the church language it means: tax collector.
Turks and Jews at least that we can demand an account of your teaching, which your Peter [1 Ep. 3, 15] commands you. But we demand very modestly, because we do not demand holiness, spirit and miracles for their confirmation, which we could certainly do according to your own right, because you yourselves demand this from others. Yes, we also want to leave this to you, that you should not give an example of any deed, word or thought in your teaching, but only teach it, only give the teaching itself, what you want to be understood by it? If you do not want to or cannot do it in this way, let us at least try to give an example.
At least do as the pope and his followers say: What we say, that do, but after our works you shall not do; so you also say: Whatever work that power requires to do, we will set about it and leave you alone. Will we not at least get this from you? The more you are, the older, the greater and the more excellent than we are in every respect, the more shameful it is for you that you do not teach us, who are in every way nothing compared to you, and who want to learn and do your teaching, by a miracle as small as the killing of a louse, or even by the slightest stirring of the spirit, or by any work of holiness, or even by an example of any deed or word, and furthermore, which is quite unheard of, do not indicate the formam and how this doctrine is to be understood, so that at least we might follow it. O what fine teachers of free will! What are you but a voice and nothing more? Who then are they, Erasmus, who praise the spirit and prove nothing, who only speak and immediately want to be believed? Are these not the people on your side who are so highly idolized? who do not even speak and yet boast so highly and make such high claims.
Therefore, for the sake of Christ, dear Erasmus, we pray that you and yours will at least allow us this, that we, through the spirits of
If we are frightened by our consciences, we may tremble with fear, or at least postpone our consent to this doctrine, because you yourself see that it is nothing but an empty sound and a sounding of syllables, namely: There is a power of free will, there is a power of free will, even if you come to the highest and all your cause would be proven and firm. Furthermore, it is still uncertain among yourselves whether there is such a word or not, since even among yourselves they have different opinions and do not remain the same. It is very wrong, indeed by far the most miserable thing, that through the illusion of a word, and an uncertain one at that, our consciences should be tormented, which Christ has purchased by his blood; and if we do not want to be tormented, we are accused of being guilty of outrageous pride, because we despised so many fathers in so many centuries who have asserted free will; On the other hand, this is the truth, as is clear from what I have already said, that they have given absolutely no explanation of free will, but they are put forward and set up under their name the doctrine of free will, of which, however, they can indicate neither form nor name, and thus deceive the whole world with a lying word.
And here, Erasmus, we refer to your own advice, which you gave above, that one should refrain from such questions and rather teach Christ, the crucified, and what is conducive to Christian godliness. For this we have long been seeking and dealing with. For what do we desire but that the Christian doctrine should reign in its simplicity and purity, and that everything should be abandoned and despised which is invented and introduced by men? But you, who advise us to do this, do not do it yourself; indeed, you do the opposite; you write treatises (diatribas), you celebrate the decrees of the popes, you praise the appearance of men, and you try everything to lead us into a field that is far from the holy Scriptures and foreign to them, and to consider unworldly things back and forth, so that we may reject the simplicity and purity of Christian godliness with human additions.
1734 L. v. L. vii, i69-i7i. XII. Luther's dispute with Erasmus. W. xviii; 2145-2148. 1735
and bring them to disgrace. From this we easily see that you have not advised us this from the heart either, that you do not write anything in the right earnest either, but you rely on the fact that you could lead the whole world wherever you want with your empty, pompous words (bullis verborum), and yet you lead it nowhere, since you say nothing at all but mere contradictions in all things and everywhere, so that he has spoken very rightly who called you a right Proteus or Vertumnus, or as Christ says: "Physician, help thyself" [Luc. 4, 23.]. It is shameful for the teacher to do himself what he reproves.
Therefore, until you have proved your yes, we stand firm on our no, and even if the whole crowd of saints, whom you praise, rather, even if the whole world should be judges here, we defy and boast that we do not owe to admit that which is nothing, and of which it cannot be proved with certainty what it is, and that you all show an incredible presumption, or rather nonsense, in that you demand that this very thing should be admitted by us, for no other reason than because it seems good to you, who are many, great, old, to assert that which you yourselves profess to be nothing, as if it were proper for Christian teachers to deceive the poor people in matters of godliness with that which is nothing, as if it were of great importance for the attainment of blessedness. Where then is that penetrating intellect of the Greeks, which hitherto admittedly invented lies with a certain beautiful appearance, but here lies in open, naked speech? Where is the vaunted diligence of the Latins, which equals that of the Greeks, which thus deceives and is deceived with a quite empty word? But so it goes with the careless or malicious readers of books, when they exalt all that in which the fathers and saints have stumbled, as if it deserved the highest esteem; so that the blame falls not on the authors, but on the readers. As if someone wanted to rely on the holiness and prestige of St. Peter and insist that everything St. Peter ever said was the truth, so that he would give us
He wanted to persuade him that this was also right, that he advised Christ out of weakness of the flesh that he should not suffer; or that he told Christ to leave the ship [Luc. 5:8], and many other things in which he is punished by Christ Himself.
Those who behave in this way are like those who, in order to arouse laughter, chatter that not everything in the Gospel is true, and pick out the passage John 8:48, where the Jews say to Christ, "Do we not say that you are a Samaritan and have the devil?" or the passage [Matth. 26, 66.], "He is guilty of death"; or the passage [Luc. 23, 2.], "This one we find turning away the people, and forbidding to give the womb to Caesar." The same thing is done, admittedly with a different intention, and not with will, as those do, but out of blindness and ignorance, by those who assert free will. From the fathers they pick out what the same fathers, stumbling from weakness of the flesh, have spoken in favor of free will, in such a way that they even oppose it to what the same fathers elsewhere have spoken against free will in the power of the spirit; then they immediately insist on it and force that what is better must give way to what is worse. Thus it comes about that they ascribe the [greatest] credit to the worse sayings, because they agree with their carnal thoughts, and deprive the better [sayings] of this [credit], because the same go against their carnal thoughts.
Why do we not rather choose the better? For such things are many in the fathers. And, that I may give an example, what is more carnal, nay, what can be said more impious, more robber of God, and more blasphemous, than that which Jerome is wont to say? The virgin state fills heaven, the married state fills earth? as if the patriarchs and apostles and Christian spouses were entitled to earth but not to heaven, or the vestal virgins among the heathen were entitled to heaven. And yet the sophists gather these and similar things from the Fathers, arguing more with the great number [of passages brought in] than with sound judgment, in order to give credit to those things.
The first step is to create something like the tasteless Faber von Costnitz, who recently gave the world his margaritum [i.e. pearl], that is, an Augean stable, so that there would be something that would arouse disgust and abomination in the godly and learned.
Hereby I want to answer that you say 1): "it is unbelievable that God should not have cared about the error of His church for so many centuries, nor should He have revealed to any of His saints what we claim to be the main part of the evangelical doctrine."
For now, we do not say that God allowed this error in His Church or in any of His saints, because the Church is governed by the Spirit of God, the saints are driven by the Spirit of God, Rom. 8, 14, and Christ with His Church remains until the end of the world [Matth. 28, 20], and the Church of God is a pillar and foundation of truth [1 Tim. 3, 15]. This, I say, we know, for so it is also written in the Creed of all of us: I believe a holy, universal Church, so that it is impossible for it to err even in the smallest article. Even if we admit that some of the elect would be in error all their lives, it is necessary that they return to the right way before they die, because Christ says John 10:28: "No one will snatch them out of my hand." But here is the difficulty, that it is necessary to determine for certain whether those whom you call the church are the church, or rather, whether they who have erred all their lives have finally come right again before their death. For this does not follow by a long shot: If God has let all those whom you cite, in however long a series of centuries, the most learned men, err, consequently He has let His Church err.
Look at the people of God Israel, where among such a great number of kings and in such a long time, not even one king is listed who did not err. And under the prophet Elijah all, and all the people, as far as could be seen, were so immersed in idolatry that he thought he was
1) Diatribe § 5, to end.
alone remained. But while kings, princes, priests, prophets, and all that could be called God's people or God's Church fell into error, God still had seven thousand. Who saw or knew that these were God's people? Therefore, who would dare to deny even now that God had preserved His church among those ruling men (sub istis principibus viris) (for you only list people who were in public office and had famous names) among the people and had let all of them fall, following the example of the kingdom of Israel? For this is God's special way to oppose the best in Israel and to kill their fat ones, Ps. 78, 31, but to preserve the yeasts and the rest in Israel, as Isaiah [10, 22] says.
What happened among Christ himself, when all the apostles were angry, and he himself was denied and condemned by the whole people, and hardly one or the other, a Nicodemus and a Joseph, then also the thief on the cross remained? But were these called the people of God at that time? They were indeed the rest of the people of God, but they did not have the name; the one who had the name was not. Who knows whether throughout the whole course of the world, from its beginning, the condition of the Church of God may not have been such that some were called the people of God and the saints of God who were not, but others were among them as the rest, and were not called people nor saints, as the history of Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, Esau and Jacob shows?
Behold the time of the Arians, when scarcely five bishops in the whole world were preserved orthodox (catholici), and moreover expelled from their episcopal sees, as the Arians ruled everywhere under the public name and office of the Church: nevertheless Christ preserved His Church among these heretics, but in such a manner that it was not at all respected and held for the Church.
Show only One Bishop who has administered his office under the rule of the Pope, show One Concilium at which matters of godliness have been dealt with and not rather bishops' robes, of rank, of
Interest and other worldly petty things, which only a nonsensical person could attribute to the Holy Spirit. And in spite of all this, they are called the church, although all those who lived like that are lost and were nothing less than the church. But among them, God preserved His Church, yet in such a way that it was not called the Church. How many saints, do you think, have been burned and killed by the heretic judges (inquisitores haereticae pravitatis) in several centuries alone, e.g. John Hus and his like, at whose time, no doubt, many holy people lived in the same spirit?
Why do you not rather wonder, Erasmus, that from the beginning of the world there have always been among the pagans more gifted people, a greater erudition, a more strenuous diligence, than among the Christians or the people of God, as Christ himself confesses [Luc. 16, 8.], "that the children of this world are wiser than the children of light"? Who among the Christians can be compared to Cicero alone, let alone to the Greeks, in talent, in learning, in diligence? What shall we say, then, that in the way none of them could have attained to grace, since they certainly exercised free will to the utmost of their powers? But who could dare to say that there was no one among them who strove for the truth with the greatest effort? And yet it must be asserted that no one has attained it. Or do you also want to say here that it is unbelievable that God should have left so many and such great men in the whole course of the world and allowed them to strive in vain? Surely, if free will were or could be something, it should have been in these people and should have been able to do something, at least in some case that would serve as an example. But it has not been able to do anything, indeed, on the contrary, it has always proved to be strong, so that with this one reason it can be proved sufficiently that free will is nothing, because from the beginning of the world to the end of it nothing can be shown in which it can be felt.
But I'll go back to the point. What would be
it wonder if God would let all the great people in the Church go their own ways, since He has thus permitted all the Gentiles to go their own ways, as Paul says in the Acts of the Apostles [14, 16.]? For the Church of God is not so mean a thing, dear Erasmus, as the name: Church of God; nor do the saints of God meet with one so frequently as the name: saints of God; they are pearls and precious gems, which the Holy Spirit does not cast before swine, but, as the Scripture calls it, He keeps them hidden, that the ungodly may not see the glory of God. Otherwise, if they were publicly known by all, how would it be possible for them to be thus afflicted and afflicted in the world? As Paul says [1 Cor. 2:8.], "If they had known them, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory."
I do not say this because I want to deny that those whom you cite are saints or the Church of God, but because this cannot be proven if someone denies that they are saints [and says] that this rather remains quite uncertain: therefore, the doctrine of their holiness is not reliable enough to confirm any doctrine of faith with it. I call them saints and consider them so; I give them the name Church of God and consider them so, according to the rule of love, not according to the guideline of faith; that is, love, which thinks all the best of everyone, which is not suspicious, which believes everything and assumes good from the neighbor, calls every baptized person a saint, and there is no danger if it errs. For the nature of love is that it is deceived, being exposed to the use and abuse of all; it is the general servant of the good, the bad, the believing, the unbelieving, the true and the false. But faith calls no one a saint who is not declared so by divine judgment, because it is the nature of faith not to be deceived. Therefore, although we should all consider each other saints according to the right of love, no one may be considered a saint according to the right of faith, as if it were an article of faith that he or she were a saint, like the pope, that adversary of God, who sets himself up in the place of God,
canonizes [that is, declares holy] his saints, whom he does not know.
I only say this about these your saints, or rather our saints, that since they themselves do not agree among themselves, one should rather have followed those who have spoken the best, that is, against free will for grace. But those should have been left aside who, according to the weakness of their flesh, have rather testified to the flesh than to the Spirit. Therefore, a selection should have been made among those who do not remain the same, and the part should have been accepted where they speak from the spirit, but that should have been left out where the flesh manifests itself in them. This would have been fitting for a Christian reader, as for a pure animal that has cloven hooves and chews the cud. But now we make no distinction and eat up the whole mess, or, what is still worse, by judging quite wrongly, we reject the better and approve the worse in the writings of one and the same author, and then we still attach to just these worse things the name and prestige of their holiness, which they have earned because of the best and only because of the spirit, but not because of the free will or because of the flesh.
What are we supposed to do? The church is hidden, the saints are unknown. What and whom shall we believe? or, as you very shrewdly disputes, 1) who will make us certain? "How shall we test the spirits? If we look at learning, there are masters on both sides; but if we look at life, there are sinners on both sides; if we look at Scripture, both sides appeal to it; and the dispute is not about Scripture, because it is not yet clear enough, but about the understanding of Scripture. On both sides, however, there are also men; as their quantity, learning, and high dignity do nothing to the matter, so much less their small number, ignorance, and lowliness." The matter is thus left in doubt, and the controversy remains undecided, so that we seem to act wisely when we agree with the opinion of the skeptics.
1) Diatribe § 5.
The best way to do this is to say that you are in doubt in such a way that you testify that you want to search for and learn the truth, leaning toward the side that claims free will until the truth comes to light.
Here I answer: You say something, and yet nothing. For we cannot test the spirits on the grounds of scholarship, life, high intellect, multitude, high dignity, ignorance, lack of education, small number, or low estate. Nor do I agree with those who put all their strength into boasting about the spirit. For in this year and still now, the fight against the swarming spirits, who want to subjugate the holy scriptures to their spirit and interpret them accordingly, has been sour enough for me. For this very reason I have so far attacked the pope, in whose realm nothing is more common or better suffered than this speech, that the holy scripture is dark and doubtful, that one must ask the spirit as an interpreter from the apostolic see at Rome, since nothing more pernicious can be said, because godless men have thereby exalted themselves above the scripture and made of it whatever they pleased, until the holy scripture has been completely trampled underfoot, and we have believed and taught nothing but the dreams of mad men. In short, this speech is not a human invention, but a poison sent into the world by the incredible wickedness of the prince of all evil spirits himself.
We say thus: The spirits are searched or tested by a twofold judgment; the one is an inward one, by which each one, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, or by a special gift of God, for himself and only for his salvation, judges in the most certain way and decides about the teachings and the sense of all, of which it is said in 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual judgeth all things, and is judged of none." This belongs to faith and is also necessary for every Christian, even though he is not in public office. This is what we called above the inner clarity of the Scriptures. Perhaps this is what those who answered you meant, that everything is decided according to the judgment of the spirit.
must be made. But this judgment is of no use to anyone else, and one does not ask for it in this matter, and I believe that no one doubts that it is so.
Therefore, the other is an external judgment by which we judge the spirits and the teachings of all in the most certain way, not only for ourselves but also for others and for the sake of the salvation of others. This judgment belongs to the service of the word and the external ministry, and it is mainly due to the leaders and preachers of the word, and we use it when we strengthen the weak in faith and refute the adversaries. This we have called above the external clarity of the holy Scriptures. Thus we say that the Scriptures are to be judges, to test all spirits according to them in view of the church. For this must be established among Christians and be the most certain thing, that the holy Scriptures are a spiritual light, far brighter than even the sun, especially in those things which concern eternal blessedness, or which a Christian must necessarily know.
But since we have long since been persuaded to the contrary by the above-mentioned pernicious speech of the sophists, that the Scriptures are obscure and doubtful, we are compelled first of all to prove ourselves just this our main foundation (primum principium), from which everything else must be proved. Among the philosophers one would think that this would be something quite inconsistent and impossible to do.
First Moses says in the fifth book Cap. 17, 8-11: If a serious matter should occur, then one should go to the place, which the Lord has chosen for His name, and there ask the priests for advice, who are to judge it according to the law of the Lord.
According to the law of the Lord (he says), but how could they judge if the law of the Lord was not outwardly quite clear, thereby giving them satisfaction? Otherwise it would have been enough to say that they should judge according to their spirit. Yes, this is how it is in the government of all nations, that all disputes of all people are settled by laws. But how could they be settled, if there were not certain laws, which are also a light in the people?
For if the laws were ambiguous and uncertain, not only could no controversial matters be settled, but there could be no firm moral way of life. For laws are given in order that the way of life may be established according to a certain rule and that disputed questions in matters may be decided. Therefore, that which is the measure and guide for other things must be by far the most certain and clear; of this kind is the law. Since this light and certainty of laws in unholy worldly matters, where temporal goods are involved, is both necessary and given freely by God's gift of grace to the whole world, how should he not give his Christians, namely the elect, many more bright and certain laws and rules, according to which they could judge themselves and all things and settle everything, since he wants his own to despise temporal things? For since God so clothes the grass that stands today and is thrown into the oven tomorrow, how much more us? But let us go on and overthrow that pernicious word of the sophists with Scripture.
In the 19th Psalm it says [v. 9.], "The commandment of the Lord is bright or pure, and enlightens the eyes." I believe that which enlightens the eyes is not dark or doubtful.
Likewise Psalm 119:130:. "The door of your words enlightens and gives understanding to the simple." Here he says of the words of God that they are a door and something revealed, which is clearly set forth to all and enlightens even the simple.
Isa. 8, 20. He directs all questions to "the law and testimony", and if we will not do this, he threatens us that we shall not have the light of dawn.
In the 2nd chapter Malachi [v. 7.] he commands, "that one should seek the law out of the mouth of the priest, because he is an angel of the Lord of hosts". This, of course, would be a very angel of his, or messenger of the Lord, bringing forth such things as would not only be ambiguous to himself, but also obscure to the people, so that he himself would not know what he spoke, and the people would not know what they heard.
And what is said throughout the Old Testament, especially in the 119th Psalm, in praise of the Scripture
said more often than that it is the most certain and obvious light? For thus he praises its clearness [Ps. 119, 105.]: "Thy word is a lamp unto my foot, and a light unto my path." He does not say, your spirit alone is my foot's lamp, although he also assigns its office to it and says [Ps. 143, 10.]: "Your good spirit leads me on a level path." Thus, God's word is also called a way and a path, naturally because of its exuberant certainty.
Now let us move on to the New Testament. Paul says Rom. 1, 2, "the gospel is promised through the prophets in the holy scriptures", and Cap. 3, 21, "the righteousness of faith is testified by the law and the prophets". What kind of testimony would this be if it were dark? Yes, in all his epistles he calls the gospel the word of light, the gospel of clarity, but then he also speaks of it in particular with rich words 2 Cor. 3, 7. ff. and Cap. 4, where he speaks gloriously of the clarity of Moses and Christ.
Peter also says 2 Petr. 1, 19: "We have a very certain 1) prophetic word; if you pay attention to it as to a light shining in a dark place, you do well." Here Peter calls the word of God a bright light, but everything else darkness; and we make darkness and gloom out of the word?
Christ [John 8:12] so often calls himself the light of the world and John the Baptist [John 5:35] a burning and shining light, no doubt not because of the holiness of life, but for the sake of the word, as Paul calls the Philippians [2:15] bright lights of the world, "because ye (he says) hold fast because of the word of life"; for life without the word is uncertain and dark.
And what do the apostles do when they prove their sermons with the Scriptures? Do they darken their dark things with even greater darkness, or do they prove what is known with what is unknown? What does Christ do when he teaches the Jews Joh. 5, 39, "that they should search the Scriptures,
1) In Latin valcts esrtnm, in the Vulgate ürrnlorsili.
which would bear witness about him"? Did he do this to make them doubt their faith in him? What do they do, Apost. 17:11, who, after hearing Paul, read the Scriptures day and night to see if it was true? Does not all this prove that the apostles, like Christ, refer to the Scriptures as the brightest testimony of their speeches? How, then, can we presume to say that the Scriptures are dark?
I ask you, are these words of Scripture also obscure or ambiguous: "God created the heavens and the earth"; "the Word became flesh", and all that the whole world has accepted as articles of faith? From where did it accept it? Did it not get it from the Scriptures? And what do those who still preach today, interpret and explain the Scriptures? But if the Scriptures they expound are obscure, who can make us sure that their explanation is reliable? Another, new explanation. Who will explain this one? So it will go on ad infinitum.
In short, if the Scriptures are dark or ambiguous, what need would there have been for God to give them to us? Would we not have been dark and doubtful enough if darkness and ambiguity and darkness had not been increased for us from heaven? Where then will the apostle's saying remain [2 Tim. 3, 16.]: "All Scripture inspired by God is useful for teaching, for punishment, for chastening"? Yes, dear Paul, it is quite useless; with the fathers, accepted by a long series of centuries, and with the Roman see, one must fetch such things as you attach to the holy Scriptures. Therefore your statement must be revoked, since you write to Titus [1, 9.]: "Let a bishop be mighty to exhort by wholesome doctrine, and to punish the gainsayers, and to shut up the useless babblers and seducers of souls." How can he be powerful if you leave him only the dark scriptures, that is, weapons made of tow and light straws instead of a sword? Then Christ would also have to revoke his statement, which would give us a false confidence in him.
saying [Luc. 21:15], "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to withstand." How shall they not be able to resist us, since we contend against them with dark and uncertain things? And how can you also, Erasmus, prescribe for us a way of Christian living, since the Scriptures are dark to you?
But I believe that I am even burdensome to the unintelligent here, because I lose so many words in such an exceedingly clear matter and dwell on it so long. But I have had to pour over the impertinent speech that the holy scripture is dark, so that you too, dear Erasmus, might see what you are saying when you deny that the scripture is clear. For in doing so, you must necessarily also assert to me at the same time that all your saints, whom you attract, are much less clear. For who makes us certain of their light, if you have made the Scriptures dark for us? Therefore, those who deny that the Scriptures are entirely bright and clear make us nothing but darkness.
But here you will say, All this does not concern me; I do not say that the Scripture is dark everywhere (for who should be so nonsensical?), but only in this piece and similar things. I answer: Neither do I speak against thee alone, but against all who hold the same opinion. Furthermore, I say against you of the whole Scripture that I do not want any part of it to be called dark, for there it says what we have quoted from Peter [2 Ep. 2:19]: "that the word of God is to us a bright light shining in a dark place". Now if a part of this light does not shine, it will rather be a part of the dark place than of the light. For Christ did not so enlighten us that he willed that any part of his word should be left dark to us, when he commands us to take heed; for in vain does he command us to take heed, if it shine not.
Accordingly, if the doctrine of free will is obscure or uncertain, it does not concern Christians and the Scriptures, but is to be abandoned altogether, and definitely to be reckoned among the fables of which Paul forbids that the
Christians should not quarrel about it. But if it belongs to Christians and to the Scriptures, it must be clear, manifest, and distinct, and quite similar to all other perfectly distinct articles. For all the articles of Christians must be of such a nature that they are not only quite certain to themselves, but also corroborated against others with passages of Scripture so manifest and bright that they can shut the mouths of all, that they cannot speak anything against it, as Christ promises us, saying [Luc. 21:15.], "I will give you mouths and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist." Therefore, if our mouth is weak in this piece, so that the adversaries can resist, what he says, that no adversary can resist our mouth, is false. So, either we will have no adversaries in the doctrine of free will, which will be the case if it is none of our business, or if it is ours, we will have adversaries, but ones who cannot resist.
But that the adversaries are not able to resist (because we have come to it here), this is so, not that they are forced to give up their opinion, or that they allow themselves to be persuaded [to confess their error] and to remain silent. For who can force them against their will to believe, to confess their error or to keep silent? For what is more talkative than empty delusion? says Augustine. But their mouths are shut in such a way that they cannot raise anything against it, and although they say many things against it, common sense judges that they say nothing. This is better shown with examples. When Christ shut the Sadducees' mouths in Matth. 22, 34. by citing Scripture and proving the resurrection of the dead from the second book of Moses, Cap. 3, 6: "I am the God of Abraham." 2c "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." They could not resist, nor could they say anything against it; but did they let go of their opinion for the sake of it? And how often did he convict the Pharisees with the clearest scriptures and reasons, so that the people saw publicly that they were overcome?
and they themselves felt it! Nevertheless, they remained stubborn opponents. Stephen, Apost. 7, 51 ff., spoke in such a way, as Lucas testifies, that they could not resist the wisdom and the spirit that spoke in him. But what did they do? Did they give in? Rather, because they were ashamed to be overcome and could not resist, they became foolish, covered their ears and eyes and brought false witness against him, Acts 7:56. 7, 56. Likewise, when he stood before the council, see how he refutes the opponents, as he lists the benefits that God had bestowed on the people from the beginning, and proves that God never commanded that a temple be built for him (because he was accused of the question, and that is what the matter was about). Finally he admits that a temple had been built under Solomon, but from this, he concludes in this way [v. 48.]: "But the Most High does not dwell in temples made with hands", and for its proof he cites the prophet Isaiah Cap. 66, 1.: "What is this house which you have built for me?" Say, what could they say against such a revealed scripture? But they were not moved by it and stood firm on their opinion. Therefore he also attacks them and says [v. 51], "You uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit. "2c He says they resisted, since they could not resist.
But we want to come to our time. Since John Hus disputes against the pope from Matth. 16, 18: "The gates of hell shall not prevail against my church", is there any darkness or uncertainty in this? But the gates of hell have the supreme power against the pope and his people, because they are notorious (nobiles) in the whole world through obvious ungodliness and crimes. Is this also dark? So the pope and his people are not the church Christ is talking about. What could they have contradicted here? or how could they have resisted your mouth that Christ had given him? But they still resisted and firmly insisted on their opinion, so that they also burned him, so completely would they not leave their opinion.
And Christ does not conceal this either, since he says: "Your resisters shall not be able to resist"; they are resisters (he says), therefore they will resist, otherwise they would not be resisters, but would become friends, and yet they shall not be able to resist. What is this but to say, though they resist, yet shall they not be able to resist?
If, therefore, we too can refute free will in such a way that the opponents are not able to resist, although they insist on their opinion and resist their conscience, then we have done enough. For I have sufficiently learned that no one wants to be called overcome, and (as Quintilian says) there is no one who would not rather be regarded as knowing than as learning; although with us all have this saying in their mouths, more habitually than from the heart, so that they misuse it: I desire to learn, I am ready to be instructed, and if I am instructed, to follow the better; I am a man, I can err. (This is spoken,] so that under this pretense, as it were under a beautiful semblance of humility, one may be at liberty to speak confidently: I am not satisfied with it; I do not understand it; he does violence to the Scriptures; he stubbornly asserts: of course they are convinced that no one can fall into suspicion, that a man of such great humility stubbornly resists and fiercely fights even the recognized truth. Thus it is not to be ascribed to their malice that they do not dissent from their opinion, but to the obscurity and uncertainty of the reasons.
So did the philosophers of the Greeks; so that it would not seem as if one had given way to the other, even though it was evidently overcome, they began to deny the fundamentals (prima principia), as Aristotle relates. Meanwhile, we gently persuade ourselves and others that there are many good people on earth who would gladly accept the truth if only there were one to teach it clearly, and it is not to be supposed that so many learned people have erred in so great a series of centuries.
or have not recognized [the truth], as if we did not know that the world is the devil's kingdom, where, in addition to the natural blindness that is innate in us from the flesh, we are still hardened in this blindness by the most ungodly spirits that rule over us, and we are held by diabolical, no longer human darkness.
If, then, you will say, the Scriptures are bright, why, in this piece, have men who have excelled in high intellect been so blind for so many centuries?
I answer: They have been so blind to praise and honor of the free will, so that that gloriously praised power would be presented, by which man can prepare himself for what belongs to eternal bliss, namely that he does not see what is seen, does not hear what is heard, much less understands or desires it. For here belongs what Christ from Isaiah [6, 9.) and the evangelists [Matth. 13, 14. Luc. 8, 10.] so often assert: "With hearing ears ye shall not hear, neither shall ye understand; and with seeing eyes ye shall not see." What is this but that the free will or the human heart is so oppressed by Satan's power that, unless it is miraculously awakened by the Spirit of God, it cannot even see in itself, nor hear, what apparently falls into the eyes and resounds in the ears, so that it would like to be grasped with hands? so great is the misery and blindness of the human race. The evangelists also wondered how it came about that the Jews did not accept the works and words of Christ, which were quite irrefutable and undeniable. They answer themselves with that passage of the Scriptures, namely, that man, when left to himself, does not see with seeing eyes and does not hear with hearing ears. Which is more strange? "The light," he says [John 1:5], "shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not." Who should believe this? Who has ever heard such a thing? That a light shines in the darkness and the darkness nevertheless remains darkness and is not illuminated?
Accordingly, in divine matters it is not
to wonder that in so many centuries the people distinguished by high intellect have been blind. In human things it would be a miracle, in divine things it would be much more miraculous if one or the other were not blind, but no miracle at all if all were blind. For what is the whole human race without the Spirit but the kingdom of the devil (as I have said), a confused mass (chaos) of darkness? Therefore Paul calls [Eph. 6, 12.] the evil spirits the rulers in this darkness. And 1 Cor. 2, 8. he says, "that none of the rulers of this world has known the wisdom of God". What do you think he will think of the others, since he claims that the rulers of the world are servants of darkness? For by the chiefs he understands the first and highest in the world, whom you call people who are distinguished by high talent (excellentos ingenio). Why have all the Arians been blind? Were there not also people of high talent? Why is Christ a foolishness to the Gentiles? Were there no people of high talent among the Gentiles? Why is he an offense to the Jews? Have there been no people of high ability among the Jews? "God knows (says Paul [1 Cor. 3, 20]) the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain"; he did not want to say "of men", as the text [Ps. 94, 11] has it, and designates the first and highest among men, so that we estimate the other men according to them.
But we will perhaps speak about this in more detail later; it is sufficient that we have sent this in advance at the beginning, that the Scriptures are quite clear, so that we are able to defend our cause through them in such a way that the adversaries cannot resist. But what cannot be defended in this way is far away and does not concern Christians. But if there are people who cannot see this clarity and are blind in the bright light of the sun and bump into it, they show, if they are godless, how great the majesty and power of the devil is over the children of men, that they neither hear nor understand the very clear words of God, as if one, deceived by a spell, believed that the sun was
a cold coal or a stone for gold. But if they are godly, they must be counted among the elect who are led astray for a time, so that God's power may be revealed in us, without which we can neither see nor be able to do anything at all. For it is not sluggishness of mind (as you pretend) that God's word is not grasped, indeed, no one is more skilled in grasping God's word than those who have a weak mind; for for the sake of the weak and to the weak Christ came and sent them his word. But it is the wickedness of the devil that sits in our weakness, reigns and resists the word of God; if the devil did not do this, then by one sermon of God, if it were heard only once, all men in the whole world would be converted, and nothing more would be needed.
But what need is there of many words? Why do we not put an end to the whole thing with this entry and judge you from your own words according to the words of Christ [Matth. 12, 37.]: "From your words you will be justified and from your words you will be condemned"? For you say that the Scriptures are not bright here. Then you leave the matter undecided and dispute on both sides what can be said for and what can be said against; you do nothing else in your whole book, which for its sake you would rather have called a treatise (äiatribon) than a firm explanation (apopüasin) or something else, because you wanted to put everything together (ooilaturus), but still nothing so written that you assert it as certain. If therefore the Scripture is not bright, why are those people here, whom you praise so highly, not only blind, but also declare and assert free will sacrilegiously and foolishly, as if this happened from the certain and bright Scripture? I mean 1) "the so numerous series of the most learned men, whose opinion has been unanimously approved for so many hundreds of years up to the present day, most of whom, apart from their admiration for free will, have been the only ones who have been able to explain it.
1) Diatribe § 4.
The same applies to a godly way of life that is recommended by a worthy insight into the holy scriptures. Some have confirmed the Christian doctrine, which they have defended in their writings, with their blood." If you speak this from the heart, then it is certain with you that free will had such people as its defenders (assertoros), who were gifted with an admirable knowledge of the holy Scriptures, so that they also testified to this doctrine with their blood. If this is true, then they considered the Scriptures to be clear. Otherwise, what would have been their admirable insight into the holy scriptures, indeed, what recklessness and sacrilege to shed one's blood for an uncertain and obscure cause? For this would not befit the martyrs of Christ, but the devils.
Now you, too, consider and ponder whether you think that more should be placed on the judgment of so many scholars, so many saints, so many martyrs, so many old and new theologians, so many high schools, so many councils, so many bishops and popes who have held that the holy scriptures are clear, who have believed that the holy Scriptures are clear, and have confirmed this both with their writings and with their blood, than on your, a single man's, private part, since you deny that the holy Scriptures are clear, and perhaps have never lost even one tear or sigh for the teaching of Christ. If you believe that they have judged rightly, why do you not follow them? If you do not believe it, why do you boast with full cheeks, with such a great torrent of words, as if you wanted to overwhelm me with a storm and with a kind of deluge of speech, which, however, floods much more strongly over your own head, but my ark swims above in safety. For you attribute to so many and so great men at the same time the greatest folly and the greatest sacrilege, since you write that they had great knowledge in the holy Scriptures, and had firmly testified to it with their pen, with their life, with their death, and yet you claim that it is dark and uncertain. This is nothing else than to represent those men as if they were quite inexperienced in knowledge and quite foolish in their firm testimony. So I would not have
honored, who I despise for my person, as you do, her public eulogist.
So I hold you here, as they say, with a reasoning that has horns (cornuto syllogismo); for one of the two must be false: either what you say, that those were admirable because of their knowledge of the holy Scriptures, because of their life and martyrdom; or what you say, that the Scriptures are not bright. But because you rather let yourself be carried away to believe that the Scriptures are not bright (for you do this in the whole book), nothing else remains but that you have said, either in jest or out of flattery, but by no means seriously, that they had a great knowledge of the Scriptures and were martyrs of Christ, in order to make a pretense before the eyes of the ignorant people, but to give Luther a hard time, so that you would burden his cause with hatred and contempt by such empty words. But I say that neither is true, but that both are false; [I maintain] first that the holy Scriptures are all light, further that those people, in so far as they assert free will, have no knowledge at all of the holy Scriptures, and finally that they have confirmed this doctrine neither by their life nor by their death, but only with the pen, but in such a way that their spirit has stumbled in it.
Resolution of the response to the introductory remarks of the diatribe. 1)
Therefore I conclude this little discussion thus: By Scripture, as dark [in this piece], nothing certain about free will has been established so far, nor could anything be established, as you yourself testify; but by the life of all men from the beginning of the world nothing is shown for free will either, as has been said above. Therefore, to teach something that is not indicated by any word in Scripture and that is not proven by any fact outside of Scripture does not concern the teachings of Christians, but belongs to the truthful narratives.
1) This heading is set by us, instead of the not quite correct one of Jonas: "Resolution of the answer to the preface.
[i.e. fables] of Lucian. Only that Lucian plays with amusing things in jest and with insight and neither deceives nor harms anyone, but these people, with whom we are dealing, act nonsensically in a serious matter, which moreover concerns eternal bliss, to the ruin of countless souls.
Division of this book. 2)
So I could close the whole question of free will here, since the testimony of the opponents also speaks for me and argues against them, since there is no stronger proof than the own confession and testimony of the one who is accused against himself. But since Paul commands to shut up the useless talkers, let us proceed to the matter itself and treat it in the order that the diatribe keeps. First we want to refute the reasons given for free will. Then we will defend what is supposed to be refuted by our reasons. Finally, we will argue against free will for the grace of God.
First part of this book.
a. Against the first part of the diatribe, by which it seeks to establish free will. 3)
And first, as is proper, let us begin with the explanation of free will, which you give as follows: 4)
"Further: by free will we understand here the faculty of the human will, according to which man is able either to turn to that which leads to eternal bliss, or to turn away from it."
Truly cleverly you set up the bare explanation without making even a bit of it clear (as others are wont to do), because you perhaps feared that you would suffer shipwreck more than once. Therefore, I am forced to make the one-
2) This superscription is found in the translation of Justus Jonas, but not in Latin.
3) This heading is inserted by us.
4) Diatribe § 8.
The first part of the text is the "definition". If one listens carefully, one finds that the thing about which the declaration is made (definitum) certainly has a much broader meaning than the declaration (definitio). Of such a definition the sophists would say that it is not long, because the declaration does not cover what is declared; for above we have shown that free will belongs to no one but GOtte. You could perhaps ascribe a will to man with some justification, but that is too much to ascribe to him a will in divine things, because the word free will is said, according to the judgment of everyone who hears it, by him who is able and does against God whatever he pleases, bound by no law, by no rule. For a servant who acts under the rule of a lord could not be called free, but how much less can this be said in truth of a man or an angel, who live their lives under the most unlimited rule of God (let alone sin and death) in such a way that they cannot exist for even a moment by their own strength.
Therefore, the explanation of the word and the explanation of the thing quarrel against each other already here in the entrance, because the word designates something different than one imagines under the thing itself. It would have been more correct to call it a fickle will or a changeable will. For thus Augustine, and after him the Sophists, detract from the honor and power of this word "free," and make that diminishing addition, that they call it a changeable free will. And so it behooves us to speak, lest with pompous and splendid words, since there is nothing behind, we deceive the hearts of men, as Augustine also holds that we must speak with sober and proper words according to a certain rule. For in teaching, simplicity and the rational choice of proper expressions (proprietas dialectica) are necessary, not high-sounding words and figures of speech in order to persuade.
But lest it seem as if we had a desire to quarrel over words, let us in all this yield to abuse, as
It is a great and dangerous abuse to say that free will is the same as the will of Wankel. We also want to let Erasmus off the hook that he makes of the power of free will a power of the human will only, as if the angels had no free will, because in this booklet he has set himself the task of dealing only with the free will of men; otherwise the explanation in this piece would also be narrower than what is explained.
Now we want to come to the pieces around which the main matter revolves. Some of them are clear enough, others flee the light, as if they had an evil conscience and feared everything, since nothing should be made clearer and more certain than the explanation (definitione); for to explain something darkly is just as much as to explain nothing. These pieces are evident: "the faculty of the human will," likewise: "according to which man is able," likewise: "to eternal blessedness"; but these pieces are blind strokes: "to turn," likewise: "to that which leads," likewise: "to turn away. To what then shall I turn to understand what this "turning" is? likewise, "turning away"? likewise, what are these things "that lead to eternal blessedness"? To what do these things extend? I have to do, as I see, with a right Scotus or Heraclitus, so that I am wearied by double work; first, that I must (which is a daring and dangerous undertaking) seek my opponent groping and groping in pitfalls and darkness, and, if I do not find him, fight in vain and with ghosts, and do aerial strokes in the darkness, but only then, when I have drawn him out into the light, can I at last, already wearied by the search, fight him with equal advantage.
Now I believe that you call the power of the human will the power, or ability, or skill, or fitness, to will or not to will, to choose or to despise, to accept or to reject, and other such acts of the will. But what this should be, that this power turns and turns away, I do not understand, unless the wanting and not wanting itself, the choosing and despising, the accepting.
We must therefore imagine that this force is a kind of middle thing between the will and its activity, so that the will itself produces the activity of wanting and not wanting, and thus the action of wanting and not wanting is brought about. Something else can neither be imagined nor thought here. If I am wrong, the blame falls on the author who has given the explanation, not on me who tries to investigate it with diligence. For it is a right word among the jurists: The words of him who speaks darkly, when he could have spoken more clearly, are to be interpreted against himself. And here I do not want to know anything about my new theologians (Modernos) with their subtleties, because one must talk roughly out of it in order to be able to teach and understand. But that which leads to eternal blessedness, I believe, are the words and works of God, which are offered to the human will, so that he turns to them or turns away from them. But I call God's words both the law and the gospel; by the law works are required, by the gospel faith. For there are no other things that lead both to the grace of God and to eternal blessedness than God's word and work. For grace or the Spirit is life itself, to which we are led by God's word and work.
But this life, or eternal blessedness, is a thing beyond human comprehension, as Paul introduces the saying of Isaiah [64, 4.] in the First Epistle to the Corinthians Cap. 2, 9. introduces: "Which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, which God hath prepared for them that love Him." For this is also one of the highest articles of our faith, since we confess, "And life eternal." But what free will is able to do in this article, Paul testifies in 1 Cor. 2:10: "God (saith he) hath revealed it unto us by his Spirit," that is, if the Spirit had not revealed it, no man's heart could know or think anything of it, so little is it able to turn to it or desire it.
Look at the experience, what the most excellent, most gifted people among the pagans have thought of the future life and of the resurrection. Is it not so, that the more splendid understanding they have had, the more ridiculous has been to them the resurrection and eternal life? Were they not also highly intelligent philosophers and Greeks, who in Athens had heard Paul (Apost. 17, 18], who taught this, a fool and a proclaimer of new gods? Porcius Festus, Apost. 26, 24. called Paul a frenzy because of the preaching of eternal life... What does Pliny blaspheme (latrat) about these things in the seventh book? What Lucian, who had such a high mind? Have they all been fools? So it goes also still today with very many. The higher their intellect and erudition, the more they ridicule this article and consider it a fairy tale, and that publicly. For secretly (in the heart, because he is permeated by the Holy Spirit) no man knows, believes or desires eternal life, although he boasts of it in word and scripture. And, would God that you and I were free from this leaven, dear Erasmus, so rare is a truly believing heart in this article. Have I now not met the meaning of your explanation?
Thus, according to Erasmus, free will is a power of the will which can will and not will God's word and work from itself, whereby it is led to that which exceeds all its grasp and understanding. But if he can will and not will, he can also love and hate. But if he can love and hate, he can also fulfill the law to some extent and believe the gospel. For it is impossible, if I can will or not will something, that I should not be able to perform at least something of a work by this will, even if I could not perform it completely, because another prevents it. Yes, since death, the cross and all the evils in the world are to be counted among the works of God that lead to salvation, the human will can also want death and its own destruction. Yes, it can want everything, since it
the word and work of God; for what can there be under or but, within or without the word and work of God, but God Himself? But what is left here for grace and the Holy Spirit? That is to say, to completely attribute deity to free will, because wanting the law and the gospel, not wanting sin, and having a desire for death, belongs to divine power alone, as Paul says in many places.
Accordingly, after the time of the Pelagians, no one has written more correctly about free will than Erasmus. For we have said above that free will is a divine name and denotes a divine power. But this no one has yet attached to it [free will] than the Pelagians, for the Sophists, whatever opinions they may have had, certainly speak quite differently. Yes, Erasmus even surpasses the Pelagians by far, because they attach this deity to the whole free will, but Erasmus to half of it. For those make two parts of the free will, the power to distinguish and the power to choose; those attach it to the understanding, but these to the will, which is also done by the Sophists. But Erasmus sets aside the power to discriminate and exalts only the power to choose, thus making a lame and half-free will a god. What do you think he would have done if he had described the whole free will?
But not satisfied with this, he also goes beyond the philosophers. For with them it is not yet decided whether a thing can move by itself, and about this the whole body of philosophers, the Platonists and Peripatetics, are still in agreement, but with Erasmus free will not only moves by its own power, but it also turns to that which is eternal, that is, to that which is incomprehensible to it: a quite new and unheard-of explainer of free will, who leaves the philosophers, the Pelagians, the Sophists and all far behind .leaves behind. And even this is not enough for him; he does not spare himself either and is more at odds with himself and argues more against himself than against all others. For
Previously he had said that the human will is completely incapable of anything without grace (but he may have been joking), but here, where he gives his explanation in all seriousness, he says that the human will has such a power that it is able to send itself to that which serves eternal bliss, that is, to things that are immeasurably higher than that power; so Erasmus also goes beyond himself in this piece.
Do you see now, dear Erasmus, that you reveal yourself by this statement (I think, unawares), that you do not understand anything at all about these things, but rather write about them quite carelessly and indifferently, and do not know what you are talking about or asserting? And, as I said above, you apply less to free will and yet attach more to it than all others; since you do not even describe the whole of free will, you nevertheless attach everything to it. Much more to suffer is what the Sophists teach, at least their father Peter Longobardus, who say that free will is the ability to distinguish, then also to choose, namely the good when grace is there, but evil when grace is gone. And he completely agrees with Augustine, who says that free will can do nothing of its own power but fall, and that it has no other power than to sin. Therefore, in the second book against Julianus, Augustine calls it a servile will (servum arbitrium) rather than a free will.
But you make the power of free will equal on both sides, so that it can both turn to the good and turn away from the good out of its own ability without grace. For you do not consider how great a thing you attach to him by the pronoun "himself" or "himself". Since you said, "He can turn away," you completely exclude the Holy Spirit with all his power, as it were as superfluous and not necessary. Therefore your explanation is also reprehensible according to the judgment of the sophists. If they were not so nonsensical, blinded by their hatred of me, they would rather rage against your book. Now, however, because you attack Luther, everything you say is holy and Christian, even if you are
speak against yourself and against them; so great is the patience of the holy people.
I say this not because I approve of the Sophists' opinion of free will, but because I believe it to be more tolerable than that of Erasmus, for they come closer to the truth. For they do not say, as I do, that free will is nothing; however, since they say that it can do nothing without grace, especially the Magister Sententiarum, 1) they argue against Erasmus; indeed, they also seem to argue against themselves and to labor in mere verbal quarrels, and are more eager for argument than for truth, as this seems to the sophists. For suppose that a sophist, who is not at all malicious, were to be procured for me, with whom I could secretly discuss these matters in confidence and demand a sincere and free judgment in this way: If someone said to you, that is free, which by its power is able to do something only to one side, namely to evil, but to the other side, namely to good, it is able to do something, but not by its own power, but only with the help of another, could you then suppress your laughter, dear friend? For in this way I would easily prove that a stone or a block also has free will, for they can turn downward and upward, but by their own strength only downward, but only upward with the help of another. And as I said above, at last we would like to reverse the use of all languages and words: None is all; nothing is all; in that we refer the one word to the thing itself, but the other to a thing not belonging to it, which could be there and come to it.
Thus, through too much bickering about free will, they finally came to the point of making it free by something that happens to be added (per accidens), because it could well be made free once by another. But the question is what free will is capable of in and for itself, and of the essence of free will. If this question is to be solved, nothing remains.
1) Petrus Lombardus, died 1164.
They leave nothing but the empty word "free will", whether they want it or not. The sophists also fail to attribute to free will the ability to distinguish good from evil; likewise, they also omit the rebirth and renewal of the Holy Spirit and attribute to it, as it were, only quite externally that foreign help of which I will speak later. But this is enough of the explanation (definitione). Now let us look at the reasons with which they wanted to blow out this empty little word.
First is the passage Sirach 15:14-17: 2) "God created man from the beginning and gave him the choice. If thou wilt, keep the commandments, and do that which pleaseth him in right trust. He has set before thee fire and water, whichever thou wilt. Man has life and death before him; whichever he wills, that shall be given him."
I could, of course, justifiably reject this book, but I accept it for the time being, so that I am not drawn into the question and lose time over which books are included in the Canon of the Hebrews, against which you are quite biting and mocking, comparing the Proverbs of Solomon and the Song of Songs (as you call it with ambiguous teasing), a love song, with the two [last] books Ezra; Judith, the history of Susanna and the dragon, and Esther. Although they have this in the canon, it would, in my judgment, be worth more than all of them not to be considered canonical.
But I could briefly answer with your own words: The scripture is dark and ambiguous at this point, therefore it proves nothing certain. But since we are on the negative side, we demand of you that a passage be produced which convincingly demonstrates in clear words what free will is and what it can do. This you will perhaps do when roses grow on the ice, 3) although you, for the sake of this un-
2) Diatribe § 8.
3) In Latin: nck Oalenckus ^i.e. never. As Suetonius reports, this is an expression, which the emperor Augustus often used, because the Greeks have keim Galsnäus.
You are also inventing a fourfold grace, so that you can also attach some faith and love to the philosophers; likewise a threefold law, nature, works, and faith, free. Likewise you invent a fourfold grace, so that you can also attribute a certain faith and love to the philosophers; likewise a threefold law, of nature, of works and of faith, admittedly a new fable, in order to be able to claim stiffly and firmly that the precepts of the philosophers agree with the precepts of the gospel. Then the passage, Psalm 4:7: "Lord, lift up the light of your countenance upon us," which actually speaks of the knowledge of God's countenance, that is, of faith, which you attribute to reason, which is completely blind. If a Christian holds all this against each other, he will have to suspect you of mocking and ridiculing the teachings and religion of Christians. For that I should ascribe so great an ignorance to him who has investigated all our matters with such great care and has kept them so well in his memory, is something that I do not want to succeed in at all. Now, however, I will let this go and be content with the fact that I have hinted at it until a more suitable opportunity presents itself. But I beg you, dear Erasmus, do not put us to the test as if you were one of those who say: Who sees us? because it is dangerous to joke in such a great matter in front of all kinds of people and constantly with wobbly words. But to the point.
You turn one opinion about free will into a threefold one 1): "Hard seems to you the opinion of those, but still quite probable, who deny that man can will the good without special grace, deny that he can begin, deny that he can continue and accomplish 2c" You approve of this opinion "because it leaves man an effort and endeavor and yet does not admit that he should attribute the least to his own powers. Harder is the opinion of those who maintain that free will can do nothing but sin, that grace alone can do nothing but sin.
1) Diatribe § 9, at the end.
2c The hardest opinion, however, is that of those who say that free will is an empty name, but that God works both good and evil in us, and that everything that happens happens out of pure necessity. Against these last two opinions you intend to write."
Do you also know what you are talking about, dear Erasmus? You make three opinions here, as if they were three sects, because you do not understand that one and the same thing is stated in different ways, sometimes with these words, sometimes with those words, by us who profess one and the same thing. But we want to reproach you and prove the carelessness or rather the weakness of your judgment.
I ask: how does the explanation of free will which you gave above agree with this first quite probable opinion? For you said that "free will is the faculty of the human will according to which man can turn to the good"; but here you say, and approve of it, that man cannot will the good without grace. The explanation affirms what the example given for it denies. In your free will you find "yes" and "no" at the same time, so that you agree with us and reject us at the same time, yes, you also condemn yourself and let yourself be right in one and the same doctrine and article. Or do you think that it is not a good thing to turn to what concerns eternal blessedness, which your declaration attributes to free will? For no grace would be necessary if only the good were also in free will, by which it could turn to the good. Therefore, this is a different free will, which you declare, than the free will, which you defend. Thus, Erasmus has two free wills before all other people, which completely contradict each other.
But let us leave aside what your explanation has invented and look at what, on the contrary, that first opinion establishes. You admit that man cannot want the good without special grace (for we are not dealing now with what God's grace is able to do, but what man can do without grace).
You admit, then, that free will cannot will the good; this is nothing else than that it could not turn: to that which concerns eternal blessedness, as your explanation has been. Even, just before, you say, "that the human will, after sin, was corrupted to such a degree that, having lost its freedom, it had to be a servant of sin and was not able to improve itself. And if I am not mistaken, you say that the Pelagians had this opinion. I believe that here at last no escape is possible for Proteus; he is held fast, imprisoned in plain words, namely, that the will, having lost freedom, is under constraint and held in the bondage of sin. O a perfectly free will, of which Erasmus himself says that it has lost its freedom and is subservient to sin! If Luther said this, nothing more inconsistent could have been heard and nothing more useless could have been spread than this strange saying, so that one would have had to write diatribes against him.
But perhaps no one will believe me that Erasmus said this; one only reads his diatribe at this point and is surprised. But I am not very surprised about it, because whoever does not consider this matter to be a list, and does not take the matter to some extent to heart, but is not at all in it with his mind, has a disgust for it, or is cold, or strangles himself with it: how should he not say here and there inconsistent, tasteless and contradictory things, since he, as it were, acts drunkenly or dreamily about the matter, and belches it out under his snoring: Yes, No, depending on the different voices rushing before his ears? That is why speakers demand from the one who leads a matter that his heart be in it; rather, theology requires such a participation in the matter that makes [the administrator] watchful, exact, careful, cautious and courageous.
If, therefore, free will, without grace, having lost freedom, is forced to serve sin, cannot will good either, I should like to know what that endeavor is? what be
What effort does that first and acceptable opinion leave? It cannot be a good endeavor, a good effort, because free will cannot want the good, as the first opinion says, and as it is admitted. So only an evil endeavor, an evil effort remains, which, after freedom is lost, is forced to serve sin. Yes, what is also said with this, I ask you? This opinion leaves an aspiration and an effort and yet leaves nothing that can be attributed to one's own powers? Who can understand this? If an endeavor and effort is left for the powers of free will, why should it not also be attributed to them? But if it is not to be attributed to them, how can it be left? Or should this endeavor and effort before grace also be left to the future grace and not to the free will, so that it is at the same time left and not left for the same free will? If these are not strange propositions, or rather monstrosities, what are monstrosities?
But the diatribe perhaps dreams this, that between the two things, being able to will the good and not being able to will the good, there still lies a middle thing, namely the will in and for itself (absolute velle), where no consideration is taken; neither for good, nor for evil, so that we thus escape the cliffs by a dialectical subtlety and say: In the will of man there is a certain willing, which without grace is not capable of anything good, but without grace does not immediately want only evil, but it is a pure and mere willing, which through grace can turn upward to good, through sin downward to evil. But where then remains what is said [above]: After freedom is lost, the will must serve sin? Where then remains that endeavor which is left, and the effort? where the power to turn to that which belongs to eternal blessedness? For the ability to prepare oneself for blessedness cannot be a mere willing, if one does not want to say that blessedness itself is nothing. Furthermore, the effort and endeavor cannot be a mere will either, because
The endeavor must be directed to something (namely to the good) and strive for it and cannot be turned to nothing or rest on nothing. In short, wherever the diatribe turns, it cannot escape the contradictions and contradictory statements, lest the very free will which it defends be a captive one just as much as it itself is captive. For in freeing the will, it becomes so entangled that it is held together with free will in indissoluble bonds.
Furthermore, it is a completely dialectical myth that in man there is a mere will standing in the middle, and those who assert it cannot prove it; it has arisen from ignorance of things and reverence for words, as if it were in reality always as it is stated in words; such things are without number among the sophists. The matter is rather as Christ says [Luc. 11, 23.], "He that is not with me is against me"; he does not say, He that is not with me, nor against me, but is in the midst. For when God is in us, the devil is gone, and only the will of good is there. When God is gone, the devil is there, and only the will of evil is in us. Neither God nor the devil allow a pure and mere willing in us, but, as you rightly said, after freedom is lost, we are forced to serve sin, that is, we want sin and evil, we speak sin and evil, we do sin and evil.
Behold, the insurmountable and exceedingly powerful truth has driven your diatribe quite unawares, and made its wisdom foolishness, that it had to speak against itself and for us, since it wanted to speak against us: just as free will does something good; for then, when it does something against evil, it does most evil against good, so that the diatribe is just in speaking as free will is in doing. But diatribe, too, is nothing at all but an excellent work of free will, for by defending it rejects, and by rejecting it defends,
that is, it is doubly foolish when it wants to seem wise.
So it is with the first opinion, if one considers it for itself, that it denies that man can want something good, and yet an aspiration is left, which, however, is also not his own. Now let us hold it against the other two. For the one is harsher, which holds that free will has no other faculty than to sin. This is the opinion of Augustine, which he expresses in many other places, but especially in the book "Of the Spirit and the Letter", if I am not mistaken, in the fourth or fifth chapter, where he uses these very words.
The third, hardest opinion is that of Wyclef and Luther, that free will is an empty name, and everything that happens, happens out of pure necessity. With these two opinions the diatribe contends. Here I say that perhaps we do not understand enough Latin or German, so that we have not been able to fully indicate the thing itself with words. But I call God to witness that I did not want to say anything else with the words of the last two opinions, nor did I want anything else to be understood than what is expressed in the first opinion. I also do not believe that Augustine intended anything else, I also do not understand anything from his words other than what the first opinion says, so that the three opinions cited by the Diatribe are nothing to me than that my One Opinion. For since it is admitted and accepted that free will, after losing its freedom, is forced under the bondage of sin and cannot will anything good, I can hear nothing else from these words than that free will is an empty word whose content is lost. My German (Grammatica) calls a lost freedom no Freiheil. But if one attaches the title of freedom to that which has no freedom, this is called attaching an empty word. If I am mistaken here, let whoever can rebuke me; if this is dark and uncertain, let whoever can make it light and certain. I cannot call a lost health health, and if I am not healthy, I am not healthy.
If I were to attach the same to a sick person, I believe that I have attached nothing but an empty name to him.
But away with these abuses of words ! For who could suffer such an abuse in speech as to say at the same time that man has a free will, and yet at the same time firmly maintain that, having lost freedom, he is forced under the bondage of sin, and cannot will anything good? This is contrary to sound reason and completely nullifies the use of language. Rather, the diatribe must be accused, which sleepily babbles its words and pays no attention to other people's words. I say that she does not consider what it is and how much it holds when one says: Man has lost freedom, he is forced to serve sin, and he cannot want anything good. For if she would watch and pay attention, she would see clearly that the three opinions have only one meaning; but she makes of them different, conflicting opinions. For he who has lost his freedom and is forced to serve sin, what can be more correctly concluded about him than that he sins (of necessity) or wants evil? For so would also the sophists conclude in their final speeches. Therefore, the Diatribe unhappily argues against the last two opinions, while it approves of the first, which is one and the same with them, rejecting itself according to its way and proving our case in one and the same article.
Now let us come to the passage from Jesus Sirach and compare with it that first acceptable opinion. The opinion says: Free will cannot will the good; but the passage from Sirach is taken to prove: Free will is and is able to do something. Thus the opinion which is to be proved from Sirach conceives something else in itself than the other for which Sirach is taken to confirm it; just as if someone wanted to prove that Christ was the Messiah, and wanted to cite a passage which proved that Pilate was governor in Syria.
1) Reesssario-von Noth is missing in the Jena edition.
or anything else that would agree with two octaves at the same time. In this way, too, free will is proved here; not to mention what I demanded above, that nothing is said or proved in a clear and certain way what free will is and what it is capable of. But it is worth the effort to look closely at the whole passage.
First, he says, "God created man from the beginning." Here he talks about the creation of man, but says nothing yet, neither about free will, nor about the commandments.
It follows: "And gave him the choice." What does it say here? Is free will claimed here? But here the commandments are not even thought for which the free will is demanded, nor is anything read about it at the creation of man. What is therefore understood here (by choice) must rather be interpreted according to what is said in the first and second chapters of the first book of Moses [Cap. 1, 26.]: Man is set as lord of all creatures, that he should rule over them freely, as Moses says: "Let us make men to rule over the fishes of the sea." And from these words nothing else can be proved. For then man could deal with the creatures according to his will, as such things as were subject to him. Finally, he calls this man's counsel, 2) as it were, another than God's counsel. But after he has said that the choice is given and left to him, he continues:
"He added his laws and his commandments. 3) To what did he add them? Certainly to the counsel and will of man and to the establishment of man's dominion over other things. By these commandments he took from man the dominion over a part of the creatures (namely, over the tree of the knowledge of good and evil), and rather intended that he should not be free. After the commandments were added, however, there could be talk of a will of man against God and what God is.
2) Consilium according to the Vulgate; "election" in Luther's translation.
3) According to the Vulgate.
"If you will keep the commandments, they will keep you" 1) 2c So from this passage: "Will you" begins the question of free will, so that we can understand from Sirach that man is divided into two kingdoms, one in which he is governed by his will and counsel, without God's commandments and orders, namely in matters that are under him. Here he rules and is lord, since his choice is released to him. Not that God left him in such a way that he did not participate in all things, but that he granted him the free use of things according to his will and did not prevent him by any laws or commandments, as if to say in the same way: the gospel left it in our choice that we may rule over things and use them as we wish. But Moses and the pope did not leave us in this choice, but kept us in constraint with laws and rather subjected us to their will. But in the other kingdom, he is not left to choose, but is led and guided by the will and counsel of God, so that just as he is guided in his kingdom by his will without the commandments of another, so in the kingdom of God he is guided by the commandments of another without his will. And this is what Sirach says: "He added commandments and laws"; "Will you" etc.
If this is now clear enough, we have contended that this passage of Sirach does not apply to free will, but against free will, because thereby man is subjected to the commandments and will of God and is deprived of his will. If this is not clear enough, we have nevertheless established that this passage cannot apply to free will, because it can be understood in a sense other than its own, namely, in ours, which we have just given, which is also not incoherent, but quite appropriate and in agreement with the whole of Scripture, while the sense which those put into it disputes with the whole of Scripture and is drawn only from this One passage, against the whole of Scripture. Therefore, we stand securely on the good sense which is the
1) According to the Vulgate.
free will until those have proven their affirmative, difficult and forced mind.
Therefore, when Sirach says, "If thou wilt keep the commandments, they will keep thee, and [wilt thou] keep the pleasing faith," I do not see how free will can be proved from these words. For it is a word in dependent form (conjunctivi modi), "If thou wilt," which asserts nothing, as the dialecticians say: that the conditional speech asserts nothing but: If the devil is God, he is rightly worshipped; if the ass flies, the ass has wings; if there is free will, grace is nothing. Sirach, however, would have had to speak in this way if he had wanted to assert free will: Man can keep the commandments of God, or man has the ability to keep the commandments.
But here the diatribe will raise quibbles: By saying, "If thou wilt hold," Sirach indicates that in man there is the will to hold and not to hold, for what else should this mean, that one should say to him who has not the will, "If thou wilt"? Is it not ridiculous if someone wanted to say to a blind man: If thou wilt see, thou shalt find treasure; or to a deaf man, If thou wilt hear, I will tell thee a good story? That would be laughing at their misery.
I answer: These are reasons of human reason, which tends to give such wisdom. Therefore, we no longer have to argue with Sirach, but with human reason about the conclusion, because it [reason] interprets the Scripture of God with its conclusions and final speeches and pulls it wherever it wants; and we will do this gladly and confidently, because we know that it only babbles foolish and unruly things, especially when it begins to show its wisdom in holy things.
And first of all, when I ask how it is proved that this is the opinion or that this follows from it, that there is a free will in man, every time it is said: If you will. If you do. If you hear? then it [reason] will say: Because it seems so, that it is the kind of the words and
The use of language among men requires. Thus it [reason] measures divine things and words according to the use and things of men. What is more wrong than this? For the former is divine, the latter human. Thus it proves itself to be foolish, as it can have no other than human thoughts of God.
But how, if I prove that the kind of words and the use of language also among men do not always bring it with them that those are laughed at who are not able, as often as one says to them: If you want. If you do. If you hear? How often do parents play with their children when they entice them either to come to them or to do this or that, just for the sake of it, so that it may become apparent how incapable they are, and they are forced to call upon the father's assistance? How often does a dutiful physician tell a stubborn sick person to do or not to do something that is either impossible or harmful to him, in order to make him realize through experience his illness or his incapacity, which he could not make him realize through any other reason? And what is more common and frequent than to offer and challenge defiance with words, when we want to show either enemies or friends what they can and cannot do? I only mention this to show reason its conclusions, how foolishly it imputes them to Scripture, then also how blind it is that it does not see that the same does not always hold true even in human things and words. But when it sees that this sometimes happens, it is immediately carried away hastily, and judges that it happens quite generally in all the words of God and of men, and makes a general out of the particular, as its wisdom is wont to do.
Now if God wanted to act like a father with us as with his children, in order to show us, who do not know it, our inability, or like a faithful physician to make our illness known to us, or to offer us as his enemies, who hopefully resist his advice. To offer us defiance and, for our sake, to hold up his commandments to us (by which he can most conveniently accomplish this).
and said: Do, listen, keep, or: If you want to hear, if you want to do, if you do, would it be possible to conclude from this in a correct conclusion: So we can do it freely, or God mocks us? Why should this not rather be the conclusion: So God is tempting us, in order to bring us to the knowledge of our inability through the law, if we are friends; or then, in truth and rightly, would He offer us defiance and mock us, if we are trustworthy enemies? For this is the cause why God gave the law, as Paul teaches. For human nature is blind, that it does not know its own powers or rather illnesses, in addition it is proud and lets itself think that it understands and can do everything. God has not been able to counter this pride and ignorance with a more effective remedy than by giving His law. We will say more about this in the proper place; here it is enough that a small sample is given to refute the conclusion of carnal and foolish wisdom: If thou wilt, therefore thou mayest freely will. The diatribe dreams that man is intact and healthy, as he is according to human reputation in his affairs; therefore it cleverly concludes that with these words: If thou wilt. If you do. If you hear, man would be mocked if his will were not free. But the Scripture paints man as depraved and captive, so that he despises and does not recognize his depravity and captivity. Therefore it stings him with these words and wakes him up, so that he may at least be brought to the realization by tangible experience how nothing of these things he is able to do.
But I want to tackle the diatribe itself: If you really think, O wise woman of reason, that those conclusions are certain: "If you will, therefore you have the free faculty," why do you yourself not comply with them? For you say in that assumable opinion that free will cannot want anything good. By what inference, then, from this passage: "If thou wilt hold," may this origin be, since thou sayest that it follows from this that man freely wills and does not will?
could? Does sweet and bitter flow from the same source? Or do you rather mock man here, saying that he can hold what he can neither want nor desire? Therefore you too do not heartily hold that it is a good conclusion, "If you will, then you have a free faculty," although you raise so great a dispute about it; or you do not heartily say that that opinion is acceptable which holds that man cannot will the good. Thus reason is caught by inferences and words of its wisdom, that it knows not what or whereof it speaks. But it is very appropriate that the free will is defended by such reasons, which consume each other and close against each other, just as the Midianites corrupted themselves by strangling each other, when they fought against Gideon and the people of God [Judges 7:22].
Yes, I want to make a further complaint against this wisdom of the diatribe. Sirach does not say, If you have the endeavor or effort to keep, which yet is not to be ascribed to your powers, as you conclude, but he says thus, "If you will keep the commandments, they will keep you." Now if we want to draw conclusions according to the use of your wisdom, we will conclude thus: So man can keep the commandments. But in this way we would not place a very small effort or a very small endeavor in man, but the whole fullness and abundant keeping of the commandments would be attributed to him; otherwise Sirach would mock man by commanding him to keep what he knew he could not keep. And it would not be enough that he had the effort and endeavor, for even so he would not escape the suspicion of mockery if he did not show that he had the strength to keep it.
But let us assume that this effort and endeavor of free will is something; what shall we say to those, namely the Pelagians, who on the basis of this passage denied grace altogether and attributed everything to free will? The Pelagians would have won completely, if the conclusion of the Diatribe was certain. For the words of Sirach are of holding, not of endeavoring or of
Effort. If you now want to deny the Pelagians the conclusion of holding, they will again deny you the conclusion of endeavor with much greater right. And if you want to take away the whole free will from them, they will also take away the remaining little piece, since you cannot claim from a little piece what you deny to the whole. What you therefore also want to say against the Pelagians, who on the basis of this passage attribute everything to free will, we can say much more conclusively against the quite small effort of your free will. And the Pelagians agree with us insofar that if their opinion cannot be proved from this passage, much less any other could be proved from it. For if the matter must be dealt with by inference, Sirach proves most strongly for the Pelagians, since he speaks in clear words of the whole keeping: "Wilt thou keep the commandments." Yes, he also says of faith: "Will you keep the faith that is pleasing", so that, according to the same conclusion, keeping faith should also be in our ability, which is God's special and rare gift, as Paul says.
In short, since so many opinions are put forward in favor of free will, and there is none that does not claim this passage for itself, and they are different and contradictory among themselves, therefore they can prove nothing from it. But if that inference is admitted, it alone proves for the Pelagians against all others; therefore it proves also against the Diatribe, which at this point is strangled with its own sword.
But we say, as in the beginning, that this passage of Siruch is by no means favorable to any of those who assert free will, but that it is opposed to all. For that conclusion must not be admitted: If thou wilt, therefore shalt thou also be able; but it must be understood in such a way that by this and similar words man is reminded of his incapacity, which without these divine admonitions he would neither recognize nor feel out of ignorance and arrogance.
But we are not talking about the first
L. r.". vn, sor-ras.
XII. Luther's dispute with Erasmus.
W. xvin, Aio-srir.
The commandment is not to be understood of man alone, but of any man, although it matters little whether it is understood of the first man or of any man. For although the first man was not incapable, since grace assisted him, God sufficiently shows him in this commandment how incapable he would be if grace were not present. Since this man, while the Spirit was still with him, was not able to will with a new will the good that was presented to him anew, that is, obedience, because the Holy Spirit did not add it, what would we be able to do without the Spirit in the good that we have lost? Therefore, we have been shown in this man, with a terrible example to break our pride, what our free will is capable of when it is left to itself and is not constantly driven and strengthened more and more by the Spirit of God. Adam was not able to come to a stronger spirit, whose firstfruits he had, but fell from the firstfruits of the spirit: how then should we be able to come to the firstfruits of the spirit, after they are taken away, since I have fallen, especially since the devil already rules in us with full power, who overthrew him, since he did not yet rule in him, through the One Challenge? Nothing stronger could be brought against free will than if this passage of Sirach were treated together with the case of Adam; but now it is not in the place, and perhaps elsewhere the opportunity will present itself. For now it is enough that it has been shown that Sirach speaks absolutely nothing in favor of free will in this passage, which they nevertheless consider to be the main passage, and that this passage and similar ones: If thou wilt, If thou hear, If thou do, show not what man is able to do, but what he owes.
Another passage is referred to by our diatribe?) Gen. 4, 7. where the Lord says to Cain: "But do not let sin have its way, but rule over it." "Here it is stated (says the diatribe) that the desire for evil could easily be overcome and that there is no need to sin.
1) Diatribe § 10.
would bring with it." This "the desire for evil could be overcome," although it is spoken ambiguously, must nevertheless, according to the context and what follows, and according to the matter itself, be understood in such a way that free will is able to overcome its impulses to evil, and that those impulses do not entail the necessity to sin. What is omitted here that is not attributed to free will? What is the spirit needed for? what is Christ needed for? what is God needed for? if free will can overcome the impulses of the heart to evil? Where is now again the acceptable opinion which says that free will cannot even will the good? Here, however, the victory over evil is attributed to [free will], which neither wants nor desires the good. The carelessness of our diatribe is all too great!
Take the matter simply, as I have said. By such sayings, man is shown what he owes to do, not what he can do. Therefore it is said to Cain that he should rule over sin and keep its will under him. But this he did not do, nor could he do, since he was already under the foreign rule of the devil. For it is known that the Hebrews often speak of a thing that is to come to pass in such a way that they say it will come to pass (indicativo fu- turo uti pro imperativs), as Ex. 20: "Thou shalt not have other gods," "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not commit adultery," and innumerable such sayings. Otherwise, if they were taken in the manner of a statement (indicative) (as they read), they would be promises of God, and since He cannot lie, it would happen that no man sinned, and the commandments would be given without need. Thus our interpreter should have translated more correctly in this place thus: "But her desire shall be under thee, and thou shalt rule over her:" As it should also have been said of the woman [Gen. 3, 16.): "Thou shalt be under thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." For the fact that it was not said in the manner of a statement to Cain proves it, because then it would have been a divine promise; but it was not a promise, because the opposite occurred and happened through Cain.
The third passage 1) is from Moses (5 Mos. 30,15.19.): "I have set before you the way "to life and the way to death, choose the good etc. What (says it [the diatribe]) can be said more clearly? He leaves the freedom of choice to man."
I answer: What is more manifest than that you are blind here? Where, I ask you, has he left the freedom of choice? In that he says: Choose? So immediately, as Moses says "choose", it happens that they choose? So again, the spirit is not necessary. And since you repeat and inculcate the same thing so often, I will also be permitted to say the same thing again more often. If there is freedom of choice, why has the acceptable opinion said that free will cannot will the good? can it choose without willing or when it does not will? But we want to hear the same thing: 2)
"It would be ridiculous to say to someone who is standing still at a crossroads: here you see two paths, go whichever one you want, since only one would be open to him."
This falls under what I said above about the reasons of carnal reason, that it thinks man is mocked by an impossible commandment, of which we say that he is to be admonished and awakened by it, so that he recognizes his inability. So, in truth, we are at the crossroads, but only one way is open, indeed, none is open; but it is shown by the law how the one to good is impossible unless God gives the Spirit, but the other how broad and easy it is if God allows it. Therefore, it would not be ridiculous, but the one standing still at a crossroads would be told with a necessary seriousness: go whichever way you want, if he, although weak, wanted to think himself strong, or if he claimed that neither of the two ways was blocked.
Therefore the words of the law are spoken, not that they should confirm the power of the will, but that they should confirm the blind ver-.
1) Diatribe § 10.
2) Diatribe § 10.
The law enlightens the will, so that it may know how its light is nothing and how the power of the will is nothing. "Through the law (says Paul [Rom. 3, 20.]) comes knowledge of sin"; he does not say, to do away with or avoid sin. The whole cause and power of the law lies solely in the knowledge, and that only of sin, in order to bring it about, but not in the display or transmission of any power. For knowledge is not power, nor does it give power, but teaches and shows that there is no power, and how great is the weakness. For the knowledge of sin, what can it be but the knowledge of our weakness and wickedness? For he does not say that through the law comes knowledge of power or of good; but all that the law does (as Paul testifies) is to bring us to the knowledge of sin.
And this is the passage from which I have taken this answer, that man is admonished and taught by the words of the law what he ought to do, not what he can do, that is, that he may know sin, not that he may think he has any power. Accordingly, dear Erasmus, as often as you hold the words of the law against me, I will hold against you that saying of Paul: "By the law comes knowledge of sin," not power of the will. If, therefore, from the greatest collections of biblical passages (ex Concordantiis magoribus), all the words which are spoken in a commandment-like manner are brought together in one heap, only that they are not promises, but demands and words of the law, I will soon say that by them it is always indicated what men should do, not what they can do or really do. And this is also known by the teachers of language and the children in the gaffes, that by words in the form of command nothing more is signified than what is to happen. But what happens or can happen must be said by words that express reality (idicativis).
How is it, then, that you theologians are so foolish, as if you were two-fold children, that when you find a word in the form of a command, you immediately conclude from it the reality, as if immediately, as only commanded, it is also
How often does it happen that what you command, no matter how possible, is not done? How often does it happen that someone does not get the morsel that he thinks he already has in his mouth? 1) How often does it happen that what you command, however possible, does not happen? So far are commanding words and words indicating reality from each other, even in ordinary and quite easy things. And you make us in these things, which are farther apart than heaven and earth, and which are even impossible, so suddenly words of reality from commanding words, that you want them to be immediately kept, done, chosen and fulfilled, so much so that they become such from our powers as soon as you hear the voice of him who commands: Do, keep, choose.
Fourth, from the fifth book of Moses in the third and thirtieth chapters, you contribute many similar words of choosing, turning away, and keeping, 2) such as, "If you keep, if you turn away, if you choose 2c This, you say, would all be spoken in vain if man's will were not free "for good."
I answer: And you, dear Diatribe, take from these words quite clumsily the freedom of the will. For you only wanted to prove the effort and endeavor of free will, but you do not cite any passage that proves such an effort. But you cite such passages which, if your conclusion were true, attribute everything to free will. Here, therefore, we must again distinguish between the words of Scripture cited and the inference of the diatribe attached to them. The words quoted are commanding, they only say what is to happen, for Moses does not say: You have power or ability to choose, but: Choose, keep, do. He gives commands what to do, but he does not describe the ability of man. The conclusion, however, which the wise diatribe has attached to it, concludes: So man can do such things, otherwise they would be commanded in vain. To this is answered: Mrs. Diatribe, you conclude badly, you also do not prove the conclusion, but your blindness and drowsiness are the reason for it.
1) Intsr 08 6t oKam, a saying in Cato.
2) Diatribe 10.
This seems to follow and to be proved by the greatness of the command. But it is not commanded clumsily and in vain, but that the haughty and blind man may thereby learn the disease of his inability when he tries to do what is commanded. So also your similitude is useless, since you say: 3)
"Otherwise, it would be just like saying to a man who was tied in such a way that he could only stretch out his arm to his left side, 'Behold, there you have the most delicious wine on your right and poison on your left; stretch out your hand to whichever one you wish."
I believe that these parables of yours particularly tickle you, but at the same time you do not see that, if your parables stand, they prove much more than you have undertaken to prove, yes, that they prove what you deny and want to be rejected, namely, that free will is able to do everything. For you have constantly forgotten in this business that you said that free will can do nothing without grace, and prove that free will can do everything without grace. For this is implied by your conclusions and similes, that either free will is able of itself to do what is said and commanded, or that it must be commanded in vain, ridiculously and clumsily. But these are the old songs of the Pelagians, which are also rejected by the Sophists, and which you yourself have condemned. But in the meantime you show by this forgetfulness and your bad memory how you do not understand this matter at all and how you do not care about it. For what is more disgraceful for a speaker than to constantly treat and prove other things that have nothing to do with his cause, yes, than that he always speaks against his cause and himself?
I therefore say anew: The words of Scripture which you cite are commanding and prove nothing, teach nothing in regard to human powers, but prescribe what one should do and refrain from doing. But the inferences or additions and your parables, if they prove anything at all, prove this, that free will is able to do everything without the-
3) Diatribe § 10.
Grace. But this you have not undertaken to prove, nay, you have denied it; therefore proofs of this kind are nothing else than the strongest counter-proofs. For if I conclude (whether I can perhaps rouse the diatribe from its drowsiness): If Moses says, Choose life and keep the commandment, but man could not choose life and keep the commandment, Moses would have ridiculously commanded man to do so; would I then have proved by this reason that free will can do no good, or that it can strive without its own powers? No, rather I have proved with a very strong reason that man can either choose life and keep the commandment as he is commanded, or Moses would be a ridiculous lawgiver; but who would dare to say that Moses was a ridiculous lawgiver? So it follows that man is able to do what is commanded. In this way, the diatribe argues against what it itself has established, of which it promised that it would not act in such a way, but that it would demonstrate a certain effort of free will. But she does not remember this much in the whole series of reasons, much less does she prove it, yes, she even proves the opposite, so that she rather says and acts everything mockingly.
It may be ridiculous, according to the above equation, that one who is tied with his right arm is asked to stretch out his hand to the right side, since he is only able to do so to the left side: Is it ridiculous, then, if he himself, bound by both arms, should arrogantly claim, or from ignorance presume, that he is able to do everything on both sides, and is then ordered to stretch out his hand on both sides, not to mock his captivity, but so that the false delusion of freedom and his own ability might be taken away from him? What is the reason for this? Is it so that the false illusion of freedom and his own fortune would be taken away from him, or so that the ignorance of his captivity and his misery would be made known to him? The diatribe constantly presents us with such a man, who either is able to do what is commanded, or at least recognizes that he is not able to do it.
But such a person is nowhere. And if there were such a one, then in truth either impossible things would be commanded to us, or the spirit of Christ would be in vain.
But the Scriptures hold before us such a man, who is not only bound, miserable, imprisoned, sick and dead, but who, through the action of his prince, the devil, adds to all his misery the misery of blindness, so that he believes he is free, blissful, unbound, strong, healthy and alive. For the devil knows that if man would recognize his misery, he would not be able to keep anyone in his kingdom, because God could not help but immediately have mercy on and help those who recognize their misery and call upon Him. For in the whole Scripture it is preached with great praise that God is near to those who have broken hearts, so that also Christ testifies, Is. 61, 1. 2. that he was sent to preach the Gospel to the poor and to heal the brokenhearted. Accordingly, it is the work of the devil to keep people from acknowledging their misery, but to presume that they can do everything that is said. But the work of Moses and of a lawgiver is opposed to this, that through the law he should make man's misery manifest, so that when he is thus broken and has become a disgrace through the knowledge of himself, he may prepare him for grace and bring him to Christ, and so make him blessed. Therefore, what is done by the law is not ridiculous, but very serious and necessary.
Those who now understand this also easily understand at the same time that the diatribe with the whole series of reasons does absolutely nothing, since it only brings together commanding words from Scripture, of which it does not understand what they mean and why they are said; But then, by adding its inferences and carnal parables, it makes such a great mash that it asserts and proves more than it intended, and argues against itself, so that it would not be necessary to go through the details further, for by One Solution everything is solved, since everything is based on One Ground. But so that the great multitude with which it has overwhelmed me-
I will continue and quote a few more sayings.
1) "Is. 1, 19: 'If you will and hear me, you will eat the goods of the land where it would have been better,' according to the judgment of the Diatribe, 'if there were no freedom of will, that it should say: If I want, if I do not want."
According to the above, the answer is clear. Furthermore, what kind of speech would be appropriate if it were said: If I will, you will eat the goods of the land? Or does the diatribe, with excessive wisdom, hold that the goods of the land can be eaten against the will of God, or that this is something strange and new, that we do not receive the goods otherwise, except when God wills?
"So also is the passage Isa. 21:12: 'Though you ask, ask, repent, and come again.' What is the use of exhorting them when they are not at all capable of themselves? As if one would say to one who is in chains, 'Get thee hence,'" says the Diatribe. 2)
Yes, what is the use (I say) of citing passages which by themselves prove nothing, and which, if one appends conclusions, that is, twists their sense, attribute everything to free will, since only a certain effort, which, however, must not be attributed to free will either, should have been proven?
3) "The same can be said about the passage Is. 45, 22: 'Gather yourselves together and come near; turn to me, and you will be saved'; and Cap. 52:1, 2: 'Arise, arise, get thee out of the dust, loose thyself from the bands of thy neck'; likewise Jer. 15:19: 'Where thou cleavest to me, I will cleave to thee; where thou teachest the pious, but from the wicked, thou shalt be my teacher.' More clearly, however, Zechariah indicates the effort of the free will, and the grace which is ready to him that striveth [Zech. 1:3.], 'Turn ye (saith he) unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn unto you, saith the Lord.'"
In these passages our diatribe makes no distinction at all between words of the law and of the gospel, for so blind and ignorant is she that she does not see what is law and what is gospel. For out of the whole of Isaiah she cites no word of the law, except the one passage, "If ye will"; all the rest are gospel sayings, by which the brokenhearted and afflicted are called to comfort by the word of the grace offered. But the diatribe makes them words of the law. But I ask you, what can he do in a theological matter or in the holy scriptures who has not yet come so far as to know what is law and what is gospel, or, if he knows, yet despises to take it into consideration? He must mix everything up, heaven and hell, life and death, and will not make any effort to know anything about Christ. I will talk more about this below with the diatribe.
See the Proverbs of Jeremiah and Zechariah, "Where you cleave unto me, I will cleave unto you," and, "Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you." Does it then follow that: Turn ye, and ye shall be converted? Does it follow: Love the Lord your God with all your heart, so you can love Him with all your heart? What, then, do reasons of this kind prove other than that free will does not need the grace of God, but is able to do everything by its own power? How much more right, therefore, are the words taken as they are put? "If thou shalt repent, I also will repent unto thee," that is, if thou shalt cease to sin, I also will cease to punish thee, and if thou shalt repent and live aright, I also will do good, and turn away thy captivity and thy evil. But it does not follow from them that man can convert by his own power, nor do the words themselves say this, but they simply say, If thou wilt convert; whereby man is reminded of what he owes to do. But when he has recognized and realized that he cannot do it, he will seek where he can get the strength, if not the leviathan of the diatribe.
(that is, the addition and its conclusion), which said: Otherwise it would be spoken in vain: "Convert yourselves", if man could not convert himself by his own strength. Enough has been said about what this means and what it is worth.
It is a kind of obtuseness or drowsiness that one believes that by those words: Convert, If you convert, and the like, the power of free will is confirmed, and does not pay attention that for the same reason it would also be confirmed by this word: Thou shalt love God thy Lord with all thy heart, since in both passages there is an equal expression of beseeching and demanding. But love for God is not demanded less than our conversion and the keeping of all commandments, since love for God is our true conversion. And yet no one infers free will from that commandment of love, but from those words: If thou wilt. If you hear. Convert, and the like, all infer it. If, then, it does not follow from the words "Thou shalt love God thy Lord with all thy heart" that free will is or can be anything, it is certain that it does not follow from this either: If thou wilt. If thou hear. Convert, and similar ones, which either demand less or demand less strictly than this: Love God, love the Lord.
Everything that one therefore answers to that word "love God", that it does not prove free will, the same can be said with regard to all other words by which something is commanded or demanded, that they prove nothing for free will. Namely, by the word "love" the form of the law is shown, what we owe, but not the power of the will or what we are able to do; rather, what we are not able to do. The same is indicated by all other words which require something. For it is known that even the scholastics maintain, with the exception of the Scotists and the Modernists, that man cannot love God with all his heart. Thus, he cannot keep any of the other commandments, since in this One Commandment all the others hang, as Christ testifies. Thus, only remains, also according to the testimony of the scholastic
Doctors, that the words of the law do not show the power of the free will, but that they show what we owe and what we are not able to do.
But our diatribe concludes from the saying of Zechariah [1, 3.]: "Convert yourselves", not only the reality of conversion (indicativum), but claims to prove from it also the effort of free will and the grace which is prepared for him who makes the effort.
And here she finally remembers her effort. And according to the new linguistic doctrine, in her "to turn" means the same, which means to strive, that the meaning should be: "Turn to me", that is, strive that you turn, and: "I will turn to you", that is, I will strive to turn to you, so that she also once ascribes a striving to God and perhaps also wants to prepare grace for his [God's] striving; for if in one place "to turn" means to strive, why not everywhere?
Again, by the passage Jer. 15, 19: "When you shall separate the precious from the unworthy," 1) she says, the freedom to choose, not only the effort, is proven, since she had previously taught that it was lost and turned into the necessity to serve sin. You see, then, that the diatribe in truth has free will in its treatment of sacred Scripture, so that words in the same form must prove effort in one place and freedom in another, as it pleases.
But I want to let go of these trivial things. The word "convert" [convertere] is used in two ways in Scripture, in legal usage and in evangelical usage. In the legal use it is a word of a driver and a bidder, which requires not an effort, but the change of the whole life, as Jeremiah often uses it when he says [35:15], "Turn every man from his wicked ways"; [4:1], "Turn to the Lord." For there he includes the requirement that all the commandments should be kept as is sufficient in the day. According to the evangelical spirit
1) According to the Vulgate.
If we do not need it, it is a word of comfort and promise from God, whereby nothing is required of us, but the grace of God is offered to us. As the word, Ps. 126, 1.: "When the Lord shall w.end the captivity of Zion," and Ps. 116, 7.; "Return, my soul, unto thy rest." Zechariah, therefore, in the greatest brevity, makes the twofold sermon, both that of the law and that of grace. The whole law and summa of the law is where he says, "Turn ye unto me"; grace is where he says, "And I will turn unto you." Now, no more than free will is proved from this word, "Love the Lord," or from any word of a single law, no more is it proved from this word, which is a brief epitome of the law, "Turn ye." Therefore, it behooves a discerning reader of Scripture to be careful which are words of law and which are words of grace, lest he confound them according to the manner of impure sophists and our drowsy diatribes.
For see how they treat the glorious passage Ezek. 18:23 [33:11]: "As surely as I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that he should repent and live." "First (it says) is repeated many times in this chapter: Where he turneth, where he doeth, where he committeth [Ezek. 18:22], both in good and in evil: and where is there any that said, Man doeth nothing?"
Please, look at the excellent conclusion. It wanted to prove the effort and endeavor of the free will, and proves that the whole is done, that everything is fulfilled by the free will. Dear, where are now those who need grace and the Holy Spirit? For so they reason and say: Ezekiel says [18, 21.]: "Where the wicked turneth and keepeth all my statutes, and doeth right and well, he shall live," so the wicked doeth so immediately, and can do so. Ezekiel indicates what is to be done, but the Diatribe understands that this is done and is done, and wants to teach us again with its new linguistic doctrine that it is one and the same, to owe and to have, to demand and to perform, to ask and to give.
Furthermore, this word of the sweetest gospel 1) [Ezek. 18,23]: "I do not want the death of the sinner" 2c, turns it around in this way: Does the holy God complain here about the death of his people, which he* himself works on them? If he does not want death, then it is certainly to be attributed to our will if we are lost. But what can be attributed to him who can do nothing, neither good nor evil?"
Pelagius also sang the same little song when he attributed to free will not the endeavor and effort, but the whole power to fulfill and do everything. For these conclusions (as we have said) prove this power, if they prove anything at all, so that they contend as strongly, and still more strongly, against the diatribe itself, which denies that power of free will and asserts only effort, as they contend against us, who deny the whole of free will. But we want to leave their ignorance and speak of the matter itself.
It is a gospel word and the sweetest consolation for wretched sinners, since Ezekiel [18, 23.] says: "I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that he should repent and live", in every way, as also the passage Ps. 30, 6.: "For his wrath endureth for a moment, and he delighteth unto life"; and Ps. 69:17: "How sweet is thy mercy, O Lord"; likewise, "Because I am merciful"; and the word of Christ Matt. 11:28: "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you"; likewise the saying Ex. 20:6: "I do mercy unto many thousands that love me." And what is almost more than half of the holy Scriptures but pure promises of mercy, by which mercy, life, peace and blessedness are offered to men by God? For what do the words of the promise have in them but this: "I do not want the death of the sinner"? Is it not the same when he says [Jer. 3, 12]: "I am merciful", as when he said: "I am not angry, I will not punish, I will not let you die, I will forgive, I will spare"?
1) Diatribe § 10.
And if these promises of God were not firm, by which the shattered consciences, frightened by the feeling of sin and the fear of death and judgment, could be raised up, how could forgiveness or hope take place? What sinner would not despair? But as free will is not proven from other words of mercy, or promise, or comfort, neither is it proven from this: "I will not the sinner's death. "2c
But our diatribe again does not distinguish between words of the law and the promise, makes this passage of Ezekiel a word of the law and interprets it like this: "I do not want the death of the sinner", that is, I do not want him to sin mortally or to become a sinner guilty of death, but rather that he turns from the sin he may have committed and thus lives. For if it were not so interpreted, it would serve no purpose. But this is to utterly overthrow and take away the very sweetest word of Ezekiel, "I will not death." If we want to read and understand the Scripture in this way according to our blindness, what wonder if it is then dark and ambiguous? For he does not say, I do not want the sin of man, but, "I do not want the death of the sinner," clearly indicating that he is speaking of the punishment of sin which the sinner will have to feel for his sin, namely, the fear of death. And the sinner, who is in this misery and despair, he raises up and comforts him, so that he "does not extinguish the smoldering wick or break the crushed reed" [Is. 42:3], but gives hope of forgiveness and blessedness, so that he may convert the sooner, namely, by turning to blessedness from the punishment of death, and live, that is, that he may be of good courage and gain a firm and cheerful conscience.
For this is also to be noted: As the word of the law only comes to those who neither feel nor recognize their sin, as Haulus says, Rom. 3, 20: "Through the law comes the knowledge of sin," so the word of grace only comes to those who feel their sin, are crushed, and are filled with guilt.
will be challenged by doubts. Therefore you see that in all the words of the law sin is indicated, since it is shown what we are to do. On the other hand, as you see, in all the words of the promise the evil is indicated from which sinners suffer, or those who are to be raised up, as here: "I do not want the death of the sinner"; there he clearly names death and the sinner; both the very evil that is felt and the very man who feels it. But in the "Love God with all your heart" it is indicated what good we owe to do, not what evil we feel, so that we recognize how we are not able to do this good.
Therefore, nothing more clumsy could be cited in favor of free will than this saying of Hefekiel; indeed, it argues most strongly against free will. For it is shown here how free will behaves when it recognizes sin or in conversion and what it can do there, namely, that it would only fall deeper and add despair and impenitence to its sins if God did not soon come to its aid and call it back and raise it up through the word of promise. For the fact that God, who promises grace, takes such pains to call the sinner back and to raise him up, is a very great and reliable reason why free will can only get worse for itself and (as the Scripture says) sink to hell, if you do not believe that God is so frivolous that He pours out the words of the promise so abundantly, without it being necessary for our salvation, but for the pleasure of chattering; that you can see from this that not only are all the words of the law against free will, but also that all the words of the promise completely refute it, that is, that the whole of Scripture is against it. Therefore you see that nothing else is intended by this word "I do not want the death of the sinner" than that the divine mercy be preached and offered in the world, which only the afflicted and those tormented by death receive with joy and gratitude, since in them the law has already accomplished its office, that is, the knowledge of sin. But those who have not yet experienced the ministry of the law
and do not recognize their sin, nor feel death, they despise the mercy promised by this word.
By the way, why some are struck by the law and others are not, that some accept the offered mercy and others despise it, that is another question and is not dealt with here by Ezekiel, because he speaks of the preached and offered mercy of God, not of that hidden will of God, which is to be regarded with reverence, which decrees according to his counsel which and what kind of people are to be capable of and partakers of the preached and offered mercy according to his will. This will may not be investigated, but it is to be worshipped with reverence as the most profound holy secret of the divine majesty, which it alone has reserved and forbidden to us, and which is to be held in much greater reverence than Corycian caves in infinite quantity.
If now the diatribe smiles: "Does the holy God lament the death of His people, which He Himself works on them?" for this seems too inconsistent to her:
Thus we answer, as we have already said: One must speak differently of God or the will of God, which is preached to us, which is revealed to us, which is offered to us, with which we concern ourselves, than of the God who is not preached, not revealed, not offered, with which we have nothing to do. Therefore, as far as God hides Himself and does not want to be known by us, He is none of our business. For here belongs in truth the word: What is above us is not for us. And lest anyone think that this is my distinction, I follow Paul, who writes to the Thessalonians of the Antichrist [2 Ep. 2, 4.] that he will rise above every GOt preached and worshipped, and clearly indicates that someone can rise above GOt provided he is preached and served, that is, above the word and service according to which GOt is known to us and has intercourse with us. But above the God who is not worshipped nor preached, as He is in His essence and majesty, nothing can exalt itself, but everything is under His mighty hand.
We must therefore leave God in his majesty and in his essence unresearched, for in this we have nothing to do with him, nor does he want us to have anything to do with him in this way, but, insofar as he is clothed in his word and has given himself through it to the day, through which he has offered himself to us, we act with him. This is his adornment and his glory, wherewith, as the Psalmist [Ps. 21:6] boasts, he is clothed. Thus we say, the holy God does not lament the death of the people which he works in them, but he laments the death which he finds in the people and endeavors to put away. For this is how the preached God deals with it, that he might take away sin and death and that we might be blessed. For [Ps. 107:20], "He has sent His word and made them whole." Whereas God, as He is hidden in majesty, mourns not, neither taketh away death, but worketh life, death, and all things in all. For there GOtt has tightly confined Himself by His word, but has kept Himself free over all.
The diatribe, however, makes a mockery of itself through its ignorance by making no distinction between the preached and the hidden God, that is, between the word of God and God Himself. God does many things that he does not indicate to us in his word; he also wills many things that he does not indicate to us in his word that he wills. In this way he does not will the death of the sinner, namely according to his word; but he wills it according to that inscrutable will. But now we must look at the word and let that inscrutable will stand; for we must be guided by the word. Not by that inscrutable will. Yes, who could be guided by the absolutely inscrutable and unknowable will? It is enough that we know only that there is a certain inscrutable will in God; but what, why, and how far it wills, that is not for us to ask, to want to know, to care about, or to concern ourselves with, but only to worship with fear and trembling.
Therefore, you are right in saying, "If God does not will death, it is, however, to our will if we are lost." Right,
say I, if thou shouldst speak of the preached GOtte, for he wills that all men be saved, because he cometh with the word of salvation unto all, and it is the fault of the will which suffereth him not, as it is said Matt. 23:37, "How often have I willed to gather thy children together, and thou hast not willed." But why the [divine] majesty does not take away this infirmity of our will, or does not change it in all [men], since it is not in man's power, or why God imputes it to him, since man cannot be without it? this must "not be inquired into, and though thou wouldest inquire much, yet thou couldst never find it, as Paul says Rom. 9:20: "Who then art thou, that thou wilt be right with God?" This may be enough concerning this passage of Ezekiel; now let us proceed to the following.
On this, the diatribe 1) pretends: "so many exhortations in Scripture would necessarily lose their force, likewise so many promises, threats, exhortations, reproaches, prayers, blessings and curses, such a great number of commandments, if it were not in anyone's power to keep what is commanded."
Constantly the diatribe forgets what it is about, and deals with something different from what it had intended, nor does it see how everything contends more strongly against it than against us. For from all these passages she proves freedom and the ability to hold everything, as also the conclusion from the words which she puts under them, while she had wanted to prove that free will is such that it cannot will anything good without grace, and that any effort cannot be attributed to its powers. I do not see that such an effort is proved in any of these sayings, but that they only demand what should be done, as has already been said many times. But it must be repeated so many times, because the diatribe fiddles so much on one string and stalls the reader with useless verbiage.
As one of the last sayings from the Old
1) § 10.
The commandment that I command thee this day is not hidden from thee, nor is it far off, nor is it in heaven, that thou shouldest say: Who shall take us up to heaven, and fetch us to hear and do it? But the word is almost near thee in thy mouth and in thine heart, that thou shouldest do it." The Diatribe asserts, 2) that in this passage it is declared that "what is commanded is not in us alone, but it even falls to us (in proclivi esse)," that is, it is easy or at least not difficult.
Thank you for such great scholarship! So, if Moses states so clearly that in us there is not only the ability to keep all the commandments, but even that this is quite easy for us, why do we struggle so much? Why did we not bring this passage forward at once and assert free will unhindered (libero campo - in the open field)? What more do we need of Christ? What need have we of the [Holy] Spirit? For now we have found the saying that shuts everyone's mouth and asserts in a very clear way not only the freedom of the will, but also teaches that the commandments can be easily kept. How foolishly Christ acted that he also shed his blood to acquire for us the spirit that we do not need, so that keeping the commandments would be easy for us, because we are already such people by nature. Yes, even the diatribe must revoke her words by which she said that the free will without grace could not will anything good; on the contrary, she now says that the free will has such great power that it not only wills what is good, but can also keep the highest and all commandments with ease. Behold, I beseech thee, what such a man does who has not his heart in the matter, as he cannot but make himself known. Is it still necessary to refute the diatribe? Or who can refute it more strongly than it refutes itself? This is the animal that ate itself up; how true it is: A liar must have a good memory.
We have from this place in the 5th book
2) § 10.
Now let us briefly discuss them without reference to Paul, who treats them powerfully in Romans 10. You see that nothing at all is said here, and not the slightest syllable says that it is easy or difficult, that free will or man can or cannot keep it or not keep it: only that those who take the Scriptures captive by their conclusions and thoughts make them obscure and uncertain to themselves, so that they can make anything they like out of them. Now if you cannot see, at least hear, or grasp it with your hands. Moses says: "It is not over you, 1) nor too far, nor in heaven, nor beyond the sea." What do you mean: over you? What: afar off? What: in heaven? What: beyond the sea? Do they also want to obscure the linguistic doctrine and the most common words, so that we cannot speak anything certain, just so that they maintain that the Scripture is dark?
Our linguistic doctrine does not designate by these words the quality or greatness of human powers, but a spatial distance. For "above thee" does not mean a certain power of the will, but a place which is above us. Thus, "afar off, beyond the sea, in heaven" is not a power in man, but a place which is upward, toward the right, toward the left, backward or forward from us. Someone might laugh at me that I disputire so roughly and, as it were, present to such great men what one chews to children who do not yet know the ABC, and teach them to put the syllables together. What should I do? Since I see that one seeks darkness in such a bright light, and those want to be deliberately blind, who enumerate for us such a long series of centuries, so many wise heads, so many saints, so many martyrs, so many teachers and with such great prestige raise this saying of Mosi and yet do not allow themselves to look at the syllables properly or to control their thoughts only so far that they think about the passage, which they praise highly, only once. Now let the diatribe go and say how it may be....
1) According to the Vulgate.
should be possible that a single unknown man (privatus) could see what so many all-known people (publici), the greatest in many centuries, have not seen? Surely this saying convicts them, that even a small child recognizes that they have been not rarely blind.
What else does Moses want to say with these extremely clear and plain words than that he has directed his office as a faithful lawgiver in the best way? That it was not up to him if they did not know everything and if all the commandments had not been laid before their eyes, and they could no longer excuse themselves by saying that they did not know or have the commandments, or that they had to get them from somewhere else: so that if they did not keep them, the fault was neither with the law nor with the lawgiver, but with them. For the law is there, the lawgiver has taught it, so that there is no excuse for ignorance, but only accusation of negligence and disobedience. It is not necessary, he says, to fetch laws from heaven or from regions beyond the sea or from far away, nor can you plead that you have not heard them and do not have them: you have them close at hand. For God has commanded them to you, and through my ministry you have heard them; with your heart you have grasped them and so received them that they should be preached continually through the Levites in your midst. My word and my book are witnesses to this; only this is lacking: that you do them. I ask you, what is attributed to free will here? It is only demanded that he do the laws which he has, and the excuse is taken away from him that he does not know the laws and that there are no laws.
This is approximately what the diatribe from the Old Testament cites for free will. Since this is refuted, nothing remains that is not refuted in the same way, be it that it cites still more, be it that it wants to cite still more, since it can bring nothing else than words that express either a command or an obligation (verba conjunctiva) or a desire, by which is signified, not what we can or do (what we do to the so often
They prove what we are guilty of and what is required of us, so that our inability may be made known to us and the knowledge of sin may be wrought. Or, if they prove something by added inferences and parables invented by human reason, they prove this, namely: that the free will has not only an effort, or a certain very small effort, but complete power and the freest ability to do anything without the grace of God, without the Holy Spirit.
And so, by all this verbose, repeated, and broadly trodden discussion, nothing less is proved than what should be proved, namely, that acceptable opinion by which the declaration is made about free will that it is so incapable that without grace it cannot will anything good, is forced under the bondage of sin, and has an effort which cannot be attributed to its powers. Namely, that undoing [comes out of it] that he at the same time is unable to do anything out of his powers and yet has an effort out of his own powers, which [undoing] consists in a quite obvious contradiction.
Response to the testimonies from the New Testament. 1)
Now [the diatribe] goes over to the New Testament. There again an army of commanding words is put into the field for that miserable bondage of the free will, and the auxiliaries of carnal reason are brought in, namely conclusions and parables, as if you were seeing or dreaming, as the king's (stipatum regem) densely packed warband of flies with straw lances and shields of hay [moved out] against a true and real battle array of human warriors, so the human dreams of the diatribe fight against the hosts of divine words.
At the top 2) goes the word Matth. 23, 37. as it were the Aechilles 3) of the flies: "Je-
1) This superscription is in the translation of Justus Jonas, but not in Latin.
2) § 12 of the Diatribe.
3) The greatest hero before Troy.
rusalem, Jerusalem, how often have I wanted to gather your children, and you have not wanted." "If everything (she says) is done by necessity, Jerusalem could not have answered the Lord with "right: Why do you torment yourself with vain tears? If it was not your will that we should give ear to the prophets, why did you send them? Why do you impute to us that which was done according to your will and out of necessity that compels us (nostra necessitate)?" Thus speaks that one [the diatribe].
But we answer: We want to admit for the time being that this conclusion and argument of the diatribe is true and good; what, I ask you, is proved by it? Is it the acceptable opinion which says that free will cannot will the good? Rather, it proves that the will is free, healthy and completely powerful (potens) in relation to all that the prophets have spoken. But to prove such a will, the diatribe did not undertake. Yes, let the diatribe answer here itself: Because the free will cannot will the good, what is it credited to him that he did not hear the prophets, whom, although they taught good, he could not hear because of his strength? What does Christ lament with vain tears, as if those could have willed, of whom he knew for certain that they could not will? Let, I say, the diatribe absolve Christ from nonsensical behavior (insania) in favor of their own acceptable opinion, then also our opinion is immediately freed from this fly-Achilles. So this passage in Matthew either proves the whole free will, or it argues just as strongly against the diatribe itself and destroys it with its own weapons.
We say, as we have said before, that the secret will of the (divine) Majesty must not be disputed, and that human presumption, which, as it is always wrong and leaves the necessary pending, always sets about and strives to investigate (tentat), must be prevented and drawn away from it, so that it does not occupy itself with the investigation of those secrets of the Majesty which are impossible to attain,
since it "dwells in a light that no one can approach", as Paul testifies [1 Tim. 6, 16]. [But let man occupy himself with the incarnate God, or (as Paul speaks [Col. 2, 3]) with Jesus crucified, "in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," but "hidden," for through Him he has abundantly that which he should know and not know. The incarnate God thus speaks here: I have willed and you have not willed. The incarnate God, I say, is sent to will, to speak, to do, to suffer, to offer to all what is necessary for salvation, although he gives offense to most people who, according to that secret will of the Majesty, have either been left to themselves (relicti), or are obdurate and do not receive him who wills, speaks, does, offers, as John [1, 5.The light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not"; and again [v. 11]: "He came into his own, and his own received him not."
With this incarnate God it is now found (hujus Dei etc. est) that he weeps, laments, sighs over the perishing of the godless, although the will of the Majesty, according to the intention, lets some go and rejects them, so that they perish. And we do not have to inquire why he does so, but God is to be worshipped, who is both able and willing to do so. Nor do I believe that anyone here will dispute (calumniabitur) that that will of which it is said: "How often have I willed" was also offered to the Jews before the incarnation of God, because they are accused of having killed the prophets before Christ and thus resisting His will. For it is known among Christians that everything was directed by the prophets in the name of the future Christ, who was promised that God should become man. Therefore, Christ's will is rightly called everything that has been offered to people from the beginning of the world through the servants of the Word.
But here reason will say, as it is nose-wise and loquacious: this evasion is beautifully invented, that as often as we are cornered by the force of reasons, we take our refuge in that
reverently avoiding (metuendam) the will of the Majesty, and silencing the adversary as soon as he has become troublesome, not unlike the way astrologers avoid all questions about the movement of the whole heavens by finding out the subsidiary circles (epicyclis).
We answer: This is not our invention, but a commandment confirmed by the holy Scriptures.... For so Paul says Rom. 9, 19-21.: "Why then does God consider us guilty? Who can resist his will? Yes, dear man, who are you that you want to be right with God? Has not a potter power?" 2c And before him Isaiah, Cap. 58, 2: "They seek me one day after another, and want to know my ways, as a people who have already done justice. They demand righteous judgments from me and want to come close to God." I think that by these words it is sufficiently indicated that men must not inquire into the will of the Majesty. Furthermore, this matter is of such a nature that it is primarily in it that perverse people pursue that will which is to be reverently avoided, therefore it is especially in the place to admonish them there to silence and reverence. In other matters, where such things are done whose reason can be stated, and where we are commanded to state the reason, we do not do so. Now, if someone continues to investigate the reason of that will and does not give room to our memory, we will let him go and fight with God in the manner of the giants and see what victory such a one will achieve. We are sure that he will not interfere with our cause and that he will not further his own. For this will remain certain: he will either prove that free will is able to do everything, or the scriptural passages cited will argue against him. Whichever of the two may happen, he is defeated and we are victorious.
The second passage is the word Matth. 19, 17: "'If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments'. How could it be said to him who has no free will: Will you?" Thus the diatribe.
To this we answer: According to this word of Christ, then, is the will free? But you wanted
prove that the free will cannot will anything good and necessarily serves sin if grace is not there. How dare you make the will completely free?
The same must be said of Proverbs 1): "Will you be perfect"; "Will anyone follow me"; "Whoever will preserve his life"; "Do you love me"; "If you abide in me." (Finally, as I have said, all the connective words "if" and all the commanding words can also be brought together to help the diatribe at least in the accumulation [numero] of words). "All these commandments (she says) are ineffective if nothing is attached to the human will. How badly the connective word if rhymes with mere necessity."
We answer: If they are invalid, they are invalid through your fault; indeed, they are nothing, since you assert that nothing is attributed to the human will, representing free will in such a way that it cannot will the good; and again, you represent it here in such a way that it can will everything that is good. But perhaps the same words are both hot and cold with you, 2) since they assert everything and deny everything at the same time. And I wonder why it has pleased the author to repeat the same thing so often, although he is constantly unaware of what he has undertaken. Perhaps he has despaired of the matter and wanted to win the victory by the greatness of the book or to tire the opponent by the weariness and arduousness of reading. By what inference, I beg you, can it happen that the will and the ability must soon be there, as often as it is said: If you want, If someone wants. Will you? Do we not very often rather designate the inability and the impossibility with such speeches? E.G.: If you want to equal Virgil in writing (canendo), dear Mävius, 3) then you must write differently; if you want to surpass Cicero, Scotus, then instead of your subtleties you must use the
1) Diatribe § 12.
2) aräsiit 6t trlA6nt, 'i.e. exceedingly important and quite useless.
3) A bad poet at the time of Birgil.
If you want to be compared with David, you must also make such psalms. Here, what is impossible for one's own strength is clearly expressed, even though everything is possible through divine strength. This is also the case in the Scriptures, that through such words is shown what can happen in us through the power of God, but which we are not able to do.
Furthermore, if such things were said, which are quite impossible to do, so that even God would never do them, then it would be rightly said that they [the words] were either ineffective or ridiculous, because they were spoken in vain. But now they are said in such a way that not only is the incapacity of free will shown, for the sake of which none of this happens, but also it is expressed that all this will one day take place and be accomplished, but through foreign power, namely the divine power, if we want to allow that in such words it is somehow expressed what is to be done and what is possible. And, if someone so interprets: If thou wilt keep the commandments, that is, if once thou shalt have the will to keep the commandments (but thou shalt not have it of thyself, but of GOtte, who offereth it to whomsoever he will), they also will sustain thee. Or, to speak more broadly of it, those words, especially the obligatory ones (conjunctiva), also seem to be set for the sake of God's provision (praeäestinätionsm) and to include the same as one unknown to us, as if they wanted to say so: If thou wilt, wilt thou, that is, if thou art such a man with God that he should esteem thee worthy of this will to keep the commandments, then thou shalt be preserved. By this way of speaking (tropo) both are given to understand, namely, both that we are not able to do anything, and that when we do something to Him, God works in us. This is what I would say to those who would not be satisfied with saying that these words only indicate our inability, but would claim that they also prove a certain power and ability to do what is commanded. Then it would be true at the same time,
that we are not able to do any of the things that are commanded, and at the same time we are able to do all things; in that the former is of our strength, the latter of grace.
God is attributed.
Thirdly, the Diatribe 1) is also angry about this: "Where so often," she says, "good and evil works are mentioned, and where the reward is thought of, I do not see how a mere necessity can take place; neither nature," she says, "nor necessity has any merit."
Truly, I do not understand this either, except that this acceptable opinion asserts a mere necessity by saying that free will cannot want anything good, and yet it also attributes a merit to it here. So much is the free will advanced at the same time with the growth of the book and the discussion of the diatribe, that it now not only has an effort and its own endeavor, yet from outside forces, yes, not only wills and does in the right way (bene), but also deserves eternal life, since Christ says, 2) Matth. 5, 12: "Be glad and of good cheer, because your reward in heaven is great." "Yours," that is, ^the reward] of free will, for so the Diatribe understands this passage, so that Christ and the Spirit of God are nothing. For what need would we have of these, if we have good works and merit by free will? I say this so that we may see that it is not uncommon for excellent people of high intellect to be blind in a matter that is obvious even to a grossly unlearned head, and how weak is a ground of proof in divine matters that is based on human reputation, for in this only divine reputation is valid.
Two things must be said here: first, about the commandments of the New Testament; second, about merit. We want to deal with both briefly here, because we have talked about them more extensively elsewhere. The New Testament actually consists of promises and exhortations, as the Old actually consists of laws and threats. For in the New Testament the gospel is preached, which is nothing else than the sermon,
1) § 12.
2) Diatribe § 12.
through which we are offered the Spirit and grace for the forgiveness of sins, which was acquired for us through Christ crucified for us, and that for nothing and only through the mercy of God the Father, which is granted to us, even though we are unworthy and deserve condemnation more than anything else. Then follow the exhortations, which are to provoke those who have already been justified and have obtained mercy to be valiant in the fruits of the righteousness given and of the Spirit, and to practice love in good works, and to endure steadfastly the cross and all the other tribulations of the world. This is the sum of the whole New Testament. How little the diatribe understands of this is sufficiently shown by the fact that it does not know how to distinguish between the Old and the New Testaments, for it sees in both almost nothing but laws and commandments by which men are trained to a good life. But what is the rebirth, the renewal of mind and spirit, and the entire effectiveness of the Holy Spirit, she sees absolutely nothing of that, so that it is an astonishment and a wonder to me that a man who has worked so long with such diligence in it, knows nothing at all in the Holy Scriptures.
So that word, "Be glad and of good cheer, for your reward in heaven is great," fits free will as well as light rhymes with darkness. For Christ is not exhorting free will, but the apostles, who were not only in a state of grace and righteousness beyond free will, but also in the ministry of the word, that is, on the highest level of grace, that they should endure the tribulations of the world. But we especially argue about the free will without grace, that it is guided by laws and threats or by the Old Testament to the knowledge of itself, so that it may run to the promises offered by the New Testament.
But the merit or the reward held out, what is it but a promise? But by this it is not proved that we are able to do something, since by it nothing else is indicated than when someone does this, that is, when he does that.
or that, then he shall have the reward. But our question is not in what way or what kind of reward is given, but whether we can do such things for which the reward is given. For this should be proved. Would this not be a ridiculous conclusion: To all who run in the ranks [1 Cor. 9:24] the jewel is held out, so all can run and obtain it? If the emperor overcomes the Turk, he will seize the kingdom of Syria, so the emperor can defeat the Turk, and he overcomes him? If free will overcomes sin, it will be holy before the Lord, so is free will holy before the Lord? But let us leave aside these very crude and palpably inconsistent things; only it is quite fitting that free will should be proved on such beautiful grounds. Let us rather speak of the fact that necessity has neither merit nor reward. If we speak of the necessity of constraint, it is true; if we speak of the necessity of immutability, it is false. For who would give a reward to one who works against his will, or credit it to him as merit? But to those who do good or evil by will (volontier), even if they cannot change this will by their powers, the reward or the punishment follows naturally and necessarily, as it is written [Rom. 2, 6.]: "You will give to each one according to his works." It follows naturally: If you sink into the water, you will be suffocated; if you swim out, you will remain alive:
And, to speak briefly, the merit or the reward is either the worthiness or the consequence. If you look at worthiness, there is no merit, no reward. For if free will alone cannot will the good, but by grace alone wills the good (for we speak of free will to the exclusion of grace, and ask what each of them is actually capable of), who does not see that to grace alone belongs that good will, merit, and reward? And here the diatribe is again at odds with itself, in that from the merit it excludes the free will.
The author concludes that the free will is a matter of will, and she is in the same condemnation with me, against whom she argues, namely, because it argues against herself that there is a merit, that there is a reward, that there is freedom, since she claimed above that the free will does not want anything good, and had taken it upon herself to prove this. .
If you look at the result, there is nothing, good or bad, that does not have its reward. And the error comes from the fact that in the case of merits and rewards we trouble ourselves with useless thoughts and questions about the worthiness that is not there, since only the consequence should be discussed. For the wicked face hell and the judgment of God as a necessary consequence, although they themselves neither desire nor think of such a reward for their sins; indeed, they strongly detest it and, as Peter [2 Ep. 2, 11] says, blaspheme it. Thus the kingdom is imminent for the godly, although they neither seek it nor are anxious for it, because it has been prepared for them by their Father, not only before they themselves were, but before the beginning of the world [Matth. 25, 34].
Yes, if they did good in order to attain the kingdom, they would never get it and would rather belong to the godless, because with a mischievous, reward-seeking eye they also sought their own in God. The children of God, however, do good for nothing with a cheerful will, seek no reward, but only the honor and the will of the Father, ready to do good even if - to set the impossible case - neither the kingdom nor hell would be. This, I believe, is sufficiently proved from the one saying of Christ, which I have just quoted, Matth. 25, 34: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." How should they deserve that which is already theirs and prepared for them before they became? so that we might more correctly say that the kingdom of God rather deserves us, its possessors, and we must put the merit where those put the reward, and the reward where those put the merit. For the kingdom is not prepared, but it is prepared; the children of the
But the children of the kingdom are prepared, not they prepare the kingdom, that is, the kingdom earns the children, not the children the kingdom. Thus also hell rather earns and prepares its children, since Christ says [Matth. 25, 41.]: "Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels."
Why do the words that promise the kingdom threaten hell? Why is the word "reward" repeated so often in the whole scripture? "Thy work (says it [2 Chron. 15, 7.]) hath its reward"; [Gen. 15, 1.:] "I am thy very great reward"; likewise [Rom. 2, 6.]: "Which shall give to every man according to his works"; and Paul, Rom. 2, 7.: "Who with patience in good works seek eternal life," and many similar passages. To this is to be answered: By all this nothing is proved but the consequence of the reward, and by no means the worthiness of the merit, namely, that those who do good do it not from a servile and reward-seeking disposition for the sake of eternal life, but seek eternal life, that is, they are on the way by which they attain to eternal life and find it; so that "to seek" is to strive diligently for it, and to strive with unceasing effort for that which tends to follow a good life. But it is announced in the Scriptures that this [reward or punishment] will occur and follow after a good or evil life, so that men may be instructed, awakened, provoked and frightened. For as through the law comes knowledge of sin and the remembrance of our inability, but from this it does not follow that we are able to do anything: so also through these promises and threats a remembrance takes place, by which we are instructed what follows from sin and from our inability, which has been shown to us through the law; but by these no worthiness is ascribed to our merits.
Therefore, just as the words of the law serve for instruction and enlightenment, to teach us what we owe, then also what we are not able to do, so the words of the reward, by indicating what will happen, serve for exhortation and threat, thereby
the godly are provoked, comforted and raised up to continue, persevere and overcome in doing good and enduring evil, so that they do not become weary or broken, as Paul exhorts his Corinthians, saying [1 Cor. 16:13, 15:58]: "Be manly"; "Know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord." Thus God raises up Abraham, saying [Gen. 15:1], "I am your very great reward." Not differently than if you comforted someone in this way, that you indicated to him that his works surely pleased GOtte well. This kind of comfort is not infrequently used in Scripture, and it is no small comfort to know that one pleases God, even if nothing else follows; although this is impossible.
Here belongs everything that is said about hope and waiting, that what we hope for will certainly come to pass, even though the godly do not hope for it or seek it for their own sake. Thus the ungodly are frightened and humbled by the words of the threat and the judgment to come, so that they may cease and desist from evil, so that they may not be puffed up, become secure, and rise up in their sins. . Now if reason should turn up its nose here and say: Why should God want this to be done by words, since nothing is accomplished by words, nor can the will turn to either side; why does he not do what he does without speaking the word (tacito verbo), since he could do everything without the word? and yet the will, by its own power, is not able or does more after it has heard the word, if the Spirit is absent, which inwardly impels, nor would it be able or do less, although the word had been withheld, if the Spirit were there, since everything depends on the power and action of the Holy Spirit: Then shall we say, Thus it pleased God, that he would not give the Spirit without the word, but by the word, that he might have us to be his fellow-laborers, speaking outwardly that which he alone inwardly giveth (spirat), whithersoever he will. He could still do this without the word, but he does not want to. Who are we now?
that we should search for the cause of the divine will? It is enough to know that God wills it this way, and it behooves us to honor, love and worship this will and to restrain the presumption of reason. Thus He could nourish us without bread and indeed gives the power of nourishment without bread, as He says Matth. 4, 4: "Man does not live by bread alone, but by the word of God." He is pleased to nourish us through the bread and with the outwardly applied bread inwardly through the word.
It is certain, then, that merit is not proved from reward, at least in Scripture; furthermore, that free will is not proved from merit, much less such free will as the diatribe has undertaken to prove, namely, which by itself can will no good thing. For if you also admitted the merit, you would, as usual, add these similes and inferences of reason, namely, it is commanded in vain. In vain the reward promised, in vain the threats used, if the will were not free. If this, I say, proves anything, it proves that free will alone can do everything. For if it is not able to do everything by itself alone, then the conclusion of reason remains: therefore commands are given in vain, promises are made in vain, threats are used in vain. Thus the diatribe constantly disputes against itself, while it disputes against us. But God alone works in us by his Spirit both merit and reward, both of which he makes known and known to the whole world by his outward word, so that even among the ungodly and unbelieving and ignorant his power and glory and our inability and shame may be proclaimed, though only the godly take it to heart, and the faithful hold it fast, but others despise it.
But it would be too tedious to repeat all the individual commanding words that the Diatribe lists from the New Testament, always appending its conclusions and claiming that what is said is futile, superfluous, by virtue of
ridiculous, nothing, if the will were not free. For we have already said again and again, to the greatest weariness, how nothing is established by such words, and if anything is proved, then the whole free will is proved. But this would be nothing else than to overthrow the whole diatribe, since it has taken it upon itself to prove such a free will, which is not capable of anything good and serves sin, but instead proves such a free will, which is capable of everything, in that it constantly knows nothing about itself and forgets itself. These are mere sophisms, since she speaks thus 1): "By their fruits, says the Lord, you will know them. The fruits he calls works, and these he calls our works: but how can they be our works, if all is done by necessity?"
I ask you, do we not rightly call our own also that which we did not do ourselves, but which we received from others? Why, then, should the works that God has given us through the Spirit not be called ours? Or should we not call Christ ours because we did not make Him, but only received Him? Again, if we make what is called ours, we have made our own eyes, we have made our own hands, and we have made our own feet, or they ought not to be called our eyes, hands, and feet. Yea [1 Cor. 4:7.], what have we that we have not received? saith Paul. Shall we say, then, that it is either not ours, or that it is of our own making? Now imagine that the fruits are called ours because we have done them; where then is the grace and the Spirit? For he does not say, "From the fruits, which are yours in a very small part, you will know them. Rather, these are ridiculous, superfluous, futile, powerless, even foolish and hateful sophisms, by which the holy words of God are defiled and desecrated.
Thus also that word of Christ on the cross is mocked [Luc. 23, 34.]: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what
1) Diatribe §12.
they do." While one should expect a statement there, which would like to justify the free will, so she ^the diatribe] goes again to inferences 1): "With how much better right," she says, "he would have excused them, "because they have no free will, nor can they act otherwise, even if they wanted to." But even by this inference is not proved that free will which can will no good thing, about which it is a question, but that which is able to do all things, about which no one acts, and which all deny, with the exception of the Pelagians. Yes, since Christ publicly says that they do not know what they are doing, does he not thereby also testify at the same time that they cannot will what is good? For how can you want what you do not know? Surely no one desires what is unknown. What can be said more strongly against free will than that it is so nothing, that it not only does not want what is good, but does not even know how great evil it does and what is good? Or is there a darkness here in any words: they know not what they do? What is left in Scripture that could not, through the action of the diatribe, confirm free will, since the exceedingly clear word of Christ, which is completely opposed to it, confirms it? It would be just as easy for someone to say that free will is also confirmed by that passage: "But the earth was desolate and empty," or by that: "God rested on the seventh day," or a similar one. But then the Scripture will become doubtful and dark, yes, will be at the same time everything and nothing. But to be so bold and to treat the divine words in such a way indicates a spirit that disgracefully despises God and man, that does not deserve patience at all.
And that word Joh. 1, 12: "He has given them power to become God's children", captures them like this 2): "How is power given to them to become children of God, if our will has no freedom?" And this passage is a hammer against free will, as is almost the whole Gospel of John; yet it is drawn for free will. Let us watch, I pray you. John does not speak of any work of man-
The new man is neither a big nor a small man, but just the renewal and change of the old man, who is a child of the devil, to a new man, who is a child of God. Here man behaves purely suffering (passive, as they say), does not do anything either, but "becomes" completely. For it is of becoming that John speaks, he says, that they become God's children, by the power given to us by God, not by the power of free will that lies within us.
But our diatribe deduces from this that free will is capable of so much that it makes children of God, or is ready to declare that John's word is ridiculous and powerless. But who has ever so exalted free will as to attribute to it the power to make God's children, especially such a one as cannot will the good as the diatribe has assumed? But this may go with the other conclusions so often repeated, by which nothing is proved, if anything at all, but what the diatribe denies, namely, that free will is capable of everything. John wants this: Since Christ came into the world through the. Since Christ came into the world through the gospel, by which grace is offered and no work is required, all men are given the opportunity, and a glorious one at that, to be God's children, if they will believe. By the way, just as free will has never known nor thought of this willing, this believing in His name before, so much less can it do so from its powers. For how should reason think that faith in Jesus, the Son of God and of man, is necessary, since it cannot grasp or believe even today, although all creatures proclaim that there is a person who is both God and man? Rather, she is annoyed by such talk, as Paul says 1 Cor. 1, 23. So much is lacking that she would or could believe.
Therefore, John praises the riches of the kingdom of God, which have been offered to the world through the gospel, but not the powers of free will, and at the same time indicates how few there are who accept him.
The free will, which has no other power than to reject the grace and the spirit that could fulfill the law, since the devil rules over it. Such is the power of his effort and endeavor to fulfill the law. But later we will say more extensively what a thunderbolt this passage of John is against free will. I am not a little moved, however, that such clear passages, which are so strongly against free will, are attracted by the diatribe for free will, whose obtuseness is so great that it makes absolutely no distinction between the words of the promise and those of the law; for after it has established free will in a quite ludicrous manner by the words of the law, it then seeks to confirm it in the most insincere manner by the words of the gospel. But this inconsistency is easily recognized according to its reason, if one considers how little the diatribe is with her heart in the discussion of this matter and how she despises it; for she cares nothing whether grace stands or falls, whether free will lies or sits, only [therefore she is concerned] that by vain words hatred be cast upon the matter and the tyrants be served.
Hereupon one also comes to Paul, the most obstinate enemy of free will, and also he is forced to establish free will, 1) Rom. 2, 4: "Do you despise the riches of goodness, patience and long-suffering? Do you not know that God's goodness leads you to repentance?" "How," she says, "can contempt of the commandment be imputed where there is no free will? How can God entice to repentance, since He is the author of impenitence? How can condemnation be just, where the judge compels wrongdoing?"
I answer: With regard to these questions, may the Diatribe watch. What do they concern us? For they said, according to the acceptable opinion, that the free will cannot will the good and is forced by necessity to the service of sin. How, then, can the contempt of the commandment be imputed to him if he does not want the good?
1) Diatribe § 13.
How can God entice to repentance, since he is the author, that he does not repent by leaving him or by not giving him grace? How can God entice to repentance, since he is the author, that he does not repent by leaving him or by not granting him grace, since he alone cannot want the good? How can condemnation be just, when the judge, by withdrawing his help, compels the wicked to remain in iniquity, since by his power he cannot do otherwise? Everything falls back on the head of the diatribe, or if it proves anything (as I have said), it proves that free will is capable of everything, which has been denied by it and by all. These conclusions of reason plague the diatribe in all the sayings of Scripture, that it seems ridiculous and useless to urge and drive men with such vehement words where there is no one to do it, while the apostle's purpose is to bring the ungodly and proud to a knowledge of themselves and their inability by these threats, so that he may prepare for grace those who have been humbled by the knowledge of sin.
And why is it necessary to list individually everything that is drawn from Paul, since it collects nothing but commanding or obligatory words, or those by which Paul exhorts Christians to the fruit of faith? But the diatribe, by its added inferences, supposes that the power of free will is such and so great that it can do without grace all that Paul prescribes in his exhortations. Christians are not driven by free will, but by the Spirit of God, Rom. 8, 14. To be driven is not to work, but to be carried away, like a saw or an axe is driven by a carpenter. And so that no one doubts here that Luther says such inconsistent things, the Diatribe 2) cites his words. These I truly acknowledge, for I confess that that article of the Wiclef (that everything happens by necessity 3) of the elen-
2) § 14.
3) In the Jena edition it is added here: "that is, by the unchangeable will of God and that our [will], though not forced, is of itself incapable of good.".
The diatribe itself defends the same with me by claiming that free will cannot will anything good of its own strength and is necessarily a slave to sin. Yes, the diatribe itself defends it with me by claiming that free will cannot will anything good from its own powers and is necessarily the servant of sin, even though it absolutely states the opposite under the evidence.
b. Against the second part of the Diatribe, by which Erasmus thought to overturn Luther's reasons. 1)
This may be enough against the first part of the diatribe, by which it wanted to establish free will. Now let us look at the second part, by which ours is refuted, that is, that by which free will is abolished. Here you will see what the smoke of a man is able to do against the lightnings and thunderclaps of God.
First, after having cited innumerable passages of Scripture in favor of free will, as it were an exceedingly fearful army (to make the witnesses [Confessoro] and martyrs and all the saints of free will, men and women [Sanctos et Sanctas], stout-hearted, on the other hand, to make all those deniers and sinners against free will cowardly and trembling), it invents a contemptible heap against free will, and even leaves only 2) "two passages which are clearer than the others" on this side, and is of course only ready for slaughter, and that without much effort, one of which is 2 Mos. 9, 12. is: "The Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart", the other Mal. 1, 2. 3. "Jacob I love, but Esau I hate." But since Paul interprets both passages more extensively in his letter to the Romans, it is to be wondered at how hateful and useless a discussion he has undertaken, according to the judgment of the Diatribe. But if the Holy Spirit were not also a little versed in the art of oratory, it would have been to be feared that he, bowed down by so great an art of feigned contempt, would have despaired of the matter altogether, and would have been in despair of the matter.
1) This superscription is found in the translation of Justus Jonas, but not in Latin.
2) Diatribe § 15.
The first one is the one who, at the beginning of the battle, concedes the palm of victory to the free will. But I will, strengthened by those two passages, show below also our troops, although, where the battle can be decided in such a way (tatis 68t PUANL6 fortuna) that one can drive ten thousand into flight, no troops are necessary. Because if one place has overcome the free will, also innumerable multitudes will be of no use to him.
Now here the diatribe has invented a new trick to escape the clearest passages, namely, that she thinks that in the simplest, clearest words there is a figurative speech, so that, as above she made a mockery of the commanding and obligatory words of the law by attached inferences and parables, Now, when she wants to act against us, she twists all the words of promise and divine promise by the little thread of figurative speech (per tropum repertum), wherever one may look. Thus it is everywhere a Proteus, which one cannot grasp. Yes, just that it demands with great seriousness that it must be allowed by us, because we likewise, if we were driven into a corner, would escape by finding figurative speech, as there 3): "'Reach out to whom you will', that is, grace will stretch out your hand to what it will; 'Make you a new heart', that is, the grace of God will make you a new heart", and the like. It seems unreasonable, therefore, if Luther should be at liberty to give such a forcible and forced explanation, and not much more be permitted to follow the explanations of the most approved teachers. So you see here that it is not about the text itself, also no longer about inferences and parables, but about figurative speeches and interpretations. When, then, will we be able to find any simple and pure text for free will or against free will without figurative speeches and inferences? Does the Scripture have such texts nowhere, and will the matter of free will always be doubtful, since it is confirmed by no certain text, but only by inferences.
3) Diatribe § 22, something after the middle.
and figurative speeches, which are introduced by people who disagree among themselves, is moved back and forth like a reed by the wind?
Rather, we want to keep it this way, that in no place of the Scriptures neither an inference nor a figurative speech should be admitted, if this is not forced by the clear conditions under which the words are spoken (eireuw8tLntia vsrdoruln eviäsns), and the inconsistency of an obvious thing, which violates some article of faith; but everywhere one must adhere to the simple, pure and natural meaning of the words which the linguistic doctrine and usage (usus loqusnäi) that God has created in man entails. Now, if each one should be free to invent inferences and figurative speeches in the Scriptures according to his liking, what would become of the whole Scripture but a reed moved to and fro by the wind, or a kind of Vertumnus? 1) Then, in truth, in no article of faith could anything certain be either established or proved that could not be made a mockery of by some figurative manner of speaking. On the contrary, every figurative way of speaking that is not enforced by Scripture itself must be avoided as the most effective poison.
See how Origen, who spoke figuratively (tropoIogo), fared in his interpretation of Scripture, how he gave the blasphemer Porphyrius good cause, so that Jerome also thinks that those who defended Origen do little. What happened to the Arians with the figurative speech, by which they made Christ an adopted (muwupativum) GOtte? What happened in our time to these new prophets with the words of Christ: "This is my body", where one assumes figurative speech with the pronoun "this", another with the tense word "is", another with the noun "body"? I have observed that all heresies and errors in the Scriptures have not come from the simple words, as is proclaimed almost in the whole world,
1) Changing god, god of the seasons.
but from the neglect of the simple words and from the figurative speeches or inferences contrived from one's own head.
For example, "Reach out to whom you will," I have never (as far as I remember) given this forcible interpretation, that I said: Grace will stretch out your hand to whatsoever it will; "Make you a new heart," that is, grace will make you a new heart, and the like, though the diatribe so pervades me in a public book, namely, because it is occupied with figurative speeches and inferences, and by the same is deafened, that it sees not what it speaks of any one, but thus I have said: 2) ."Stretch out your hand" 2c, if Mail takes the words simply as they are, excluding figurative speeches and inferences, nothing else is expressed than that the stretching out of the hand is demanded of us, and thereby indicated what we are to do, as it is the manner of a commanding word among the grammarians and according to the usage of language.
The diatribe, however, does not accept this simple meaning of the word, but interprets it by inferences and forcibly figurative speeches: "Stretch out your hand," that is, you can stretch out your hand by your own strength; "Make a new heart," that is, you can make a new heart; "Believe in Christ," that is, you can believe: so that it is the same to her whether it is spoken commandingly or according to reality (inäwativo), otherwise she is ready to declare that the Scripture is ridiculous and vain. And these interpretations, which no teacher of language can bear, must not be called violent and contrived in the theologians, but they are those of the most approved teachers, which have been accepted for so many centuries.
But it is easy for the diatribe to allow and accept figurative speeches at this point, since it does not care whether what is said is certain or uncertain; indeed, it assumes that everything should be uncertain, since it gives the advice to abandon the doctrines of free will rather than to er-
2) Sir. 15,16. according to the Vulgate.
research. Therefore, it was enough for her to nullify in every possible way the sayings by which, as she well realizes, she is driven into a corner. But we, for whom this is a serious matter, and who seek the most certain truth in order to firmly base consciences on it, must proceed quite differently. To us, I say, it is not sufficient if you say that there can be a figurative speech here, but that is the question whether there should and must be a figurative speech here. If you cannot now show that there is necessarily a figurative speech in it, then you are definitely not making a point. There is the word of God [Ex. 7, 3]: "I will harden Pharaoh's heart. If you say it must be understood this way or can be understood this way: I will suffer it to be hardened; I hear indeed that it may be so understood; I hear that this figurative speech is common in popular language, as: I have corrupted you because I did not chastise you immediately when you were absent. But this proof does not take place here; it is not the question whether this figurative speech is in use, it is not the question whether someone could claim the same in this passage of Paul, but this is the question whether it is certain and certain that it is used in the right way in this passage and whether Paul wants to use it; it is not the question which is the foreign use of the reader, but what is the use of the author himself, Paul.
What wilt thou do with a conscience which thus asks, Behold, God, as the writer, says, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart." The meaning of the word "harden" is evident and known; but a person reading this tells me, "Harden" in this passage means: to give cause for hardening by not immediately chastising the sinner. By what reputation, by what counsel, by what necessity is that natural meaning of the word thus perverted to me? How if the reader and interpreter were mistaken? By what is it proved that this twisting of the word must happen in this place? It is dangerous, yes, ungodly, to twist God's word without necessity, without justification (autoritate). Can
Do you then advise the poor suffering soul: Origen thought this way or that way; refrain from investigating such things, since they are impertinent and superfluous? But she will answer: Moses and Paul should have been reminded of this before they wrote, yes, even God Himself. Why do they plague us with rash and superfluous writings?
Therefore, the diatribe does not help this miserable evasion, that they are figurative speeches, but here our Proteus must be bravely held that he must make us quite sure about the figurative speech of this passage, and that with quite clear scriptural passages or by apparent miracles. That it means so, even with the aid of what has been brought about by the diligence of all times (oonsentieats omnium 866ulorum inäu8tria), we believe nothing, but continue and insist that there can be no figurative speech here, but that the speech of God must be understood simply as the words read. For it is not in our arbitrariness (as the diatribe persuades itself) to invent and rewrite the words of God according to our liking; otherwise, what would remain in all of Scripture that would not come out of the philosophy of Anaxagoras 1) so that everything arbitrary would become everything arbitrary? For I could say: "God created heaven and earth", that is, He ordered them, but He did not create them from nothing; or: He created heaven and earth, that is, angels and devils, or the righteous and the wicked. Who then, I pray thee, would not immediately, as he opens the book, be a theologian? If, then, this is certain and certain, the Diatribe, if it cannot prove that there is a figurative speech in these passages of ours, which invalidates it, is forced to admit to us that the words must be understood as they are, though it should prove that otherwise the same figurative speech is quite common in all passages of Scripture and in all writers. And by this, everything we said that the diatribe wanted to refute, is defended once and for all, and clearly at the
1) This Greek philosopher, among others, dealt with such arguments: "The snow is water, the water is black, therefore the snow is black."
The first day, the second day, the third day, the third day, the third day, the third day.
Therefore, when the word of Moses: "I will harden Pharaoh's heart" is interpreted in this way: My gentleness, with which I bear him that sinneth, bringeth others to repentance, but it will make Pharaoh more obstinate in his wickedness, is beautifully said, but it is not proved that it must be so said; but we, not content that it should only be said, demand the proof.
Likewise that word of Paul [Rom. 9, 18.]: "He has mercy on whom He wills, and He reproves whom He wills", is interpreted plausibly: that is, God reproves where He does not immediately chastise the sinner; He has mercy where He soon drives to repentance through tribulations; but by what is this interpretation proved?
Likewise that word of Isaiah [63:17], "Why hast thou caused us, O Lord, to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts, that we fear thee not?" Granted that Jerome, following Origen, interprets it thus: of whom it is said that he deceives who does not immediately call back from error; who makes us certain that Jerome and Origen interpret correctly? Finally, our agreement is that we do not want to fight by appealing to (autoritate) any teacher, but only to Scripture. What, then, does the diatribe, which has forgotten the agreement, hold against us people like Origen and Jerome? since among the church teachers there are almost no writers who have treated the sacred Scriptures more tastelessly and inconsistently than Origen and Jerome.
And, to put it in a word, this arbitrariness in interpretation amounts to confusing everything by a new and outrageous linguistic doctrine, so that when God says: I will harden Pharaoh's heart, the persons are interchanged, and you must understand it thus, Pharaoh hardens himself by my leniency; GOd hardens our heart, that is, we ourselves harden ourselves, in that GOd postpones the punishments; You, O Lord, have made us err, that is, we have made ourselves err, since You did not chasten. So when it says that God has mercy, it no longer means that He has mercy, but that He has mercy.
It does not say that he bestows or shows mercy, remits or justifies sin, or frees from evil, but it says that he inflicts evil and chastises.
Through these figurative speeches you will finally be able to say that God had mercy on the children of Israel by sending them to Assyria and Babylon, because there he chastised the sinners, there he lured them to repentance through tribulations; again, when he brought them back and freed them, he did not have mercy, but hardened them, that is, he gave them cause to harden themselves through his gentleness and mercy. So when it is said that he sent Christ as Savior into the world, it is not said that this was God's mercy, but hardening, because through this mercy he gave men cause to harden themselves. But when He has laid waste Jerusalem and rejected the Jews (perdidit) until this day, He has mercy on them because He chastises those who have sinned and invites them to repentance. When he takes the saints to heaven on the day of judgment, he will not do so to have mercy on them, but to harden them, because he will give them the opportunity to abuse his goodness; but when he pushes the wicked to hell, he will have mercy on them, because he chastises the sinners. I ask you, who has ever heard of such mercy and wrath of God?
It may well be that the good are made better both by the gentleness and the severity of God, but since we speak of good and evil at the same time, these figurative speeches will make wrath out of God's mercy and mercy out of wrath, by speaking in an entirely twisted way, since they call it wrath when God is benevolent and mercy when he punishes. But if it is to be said that God hardens when He pleases and deceives, but has mercy when He strikes and chastises, why is it said that He hardened Pharaoh more than the children of Israel, or even the whole world? Or hath he not done good unto the children of Israel? doth he not do good unto the whole world? doth he not bear the wicked? doth he not send rain upon the good and upon the evil? Why is it said that he is more pleased with the children of Israel than with the whole world?
Did he not strike the children of Israel in Egypt and in the desert? It may be that some misuse God's goodness and wrath, while others use it rightly. But you interpret this as follows: to harden is as much as to have forbearance against the wicked out of kindness and goodness, but to have mercy is not to have forbearance, but to afflict and punish. Therefore, as far as God is concerned, with constant kindness he does nothing but harden, with constant punishment he does nothing but show mercy.
But this is by far the most beautiful thing: It is said of God that He is obdurate when He is lenient with sinners through His leniency, but He is merciful when He visits and strikes, inviting repentance through His severity. What, I pray you, has God omitted to strike, to chastise, to call Pharaoh to repentance? Are not ten plagues enumerated there? If your explanation stands that "to have mercy" is to chastise and call the sinner immediately, then surely God had mercy on Pharaoh. Why, then, does God not say, "I will have mercy on Pharaoh," but says, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart"? [Ex. 7, 3.] For precisely by having mercy on him, that is, as you say, smiting and chastening him, He says: I will harden him, that is, as you say, I will do him good and carry him. What more monstrous thing could you hear? Where are your figurative speeches now? where Origen? where Jerome? where the most proven teachers, whom one man, Luther, presumptuously contradicts? But the imprudence of the flesh forces to talk like this, playing with God's words and not believing that they are serious.
So this text of Moses itself irrefutably shows that those figurative speeches are fictitious and do not belong to this passage at all, and that by those words: "I will harden Pharaoh's heart" something far different and much greater is meant than benevolence and visitation and chastisement, since we cannot deny that both were tried on Pharaoh with the greatest zeal and the greatest care. For how could the wrath and chastening be more severe?
How could Pharaoh be more shocked than by being struck with so many signs, with so many plagues, that even Moses himself testified that such things had never happened? Yes, even Pharaoh himself is repeatedly shaken by them, so that he seems to come to his senses, but he is not thoroughly moved and does not persevere. How can there be greater gentleness and goodness than when God so easily takes away the plagues and so often forgives the sin, so often shows good again, so often takes away the evil? Nevertheless, neither of these things does any good, yet he says: "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh. I will harden Pharaoh's heart." So you see, although we willingly admit your hardening and your mercy (that is, according to your interpretation and your figurative speech), both as far as the use of the word is concerned and as far as that example is concerned, as can be seen in Pharaoh, nevertheless the hardening is certain, and the one Moses speaks of must necessarily be a different [hardening] than the one you dream of.
But since we are struggling with people who bring up fabrications and with larvae, let us also make a larva and fabricate and make the impossible case that the figurative speech, which the diatribe dreams up, is valid at this point, in order to see how it wants to escape this, so that it is not forced to confess that everything happens solely by God's will, but on our part out of necessity, and how it wants to excuse God that he is not the author and the cause of our hardening. If it is true that it is said of God that he hardens when he bears by his leniency and does not punish immediately, then both of these things still stand firm. First, that man is nevertheless necessarily the servant of sin. For since it has been admitted that free will cannot will anything good (which the diatribe has undertaken to prove), it becomes nothing better through the goodness of God, who carries it, but necessarily worse, unless the spirit is given to it by God, who has mercy; therefore everything still happens on our part out of necessity.
Secondly, that God seems to be equally cruel when, by His leniency.
than when he, as is thought to be preached by us, hardens himself by his willing according to his inscrutable will. For since he sees that free will cannot will the good, and is made worse by the leniency of him who bears it, he seems to be exceedingly cruel on account of this leniency, and to delight in our evil, though he could cure it if he would, and could not bear it if he would, yea, could not bear it if he would not; for who would compel him against his will? Since now that will is established, without which nothing happens, and it has been admitted that free will cannot will anything good, what is said to excuse God and to accuse free will is said in vain. For free will always says: I cannot, and God will not; what shall I do? Of course, he may take pity on me by chastising me; I have no use for that, but must inevitably become worse if he does not give me the spirit. But this he does not give me; but he would give it if he wanted to; therefore it is certain that he does not want to give it.
Also the attached parables serve nothing to the matter, since it is said 1): "Just as by the same rays of the sun the dung becomes hard and the wax soft, and by the same downpour a cultivated land bears fruit, an uncultivated one thorns, so by the same gentleness of God some are hardened, others converted."
For we do not divide the free will into two different kinds according to the nature (ingenia,) that the one is like dung, the other like wax, or the one a cultivated land, the other an uncultivated land, but we speak of One, who is in all men in the same way incapable, who is only dung, only uncultivated land, so that he cannot will the good. 2) Therefore, just as the dung becomes harder and harder, and the uncultivated land becomes more and more dormant, so the
1) Diatribe § 15.
2) Here the following words are inserted in the Jena edition: "Paul also does not say that God, as the potter, makes one cask to honor, the other to dishonor, out of different clay, but out of the same clay (he says) he makes 2c"
free will is always made worse, both by the leniency of the sun, which hardens, and by the softening downpour. If, then, in all men there is a free will that can only be interpreted in one way and has the same incapacity in itself, then no account can be given as to why the one attains to grace and the other does not, if nothing else is preached than the gentleness of the sustaining and the chastening of the merciful God. For a free will is placed in all men, which is described in the same way, that it cannot will anything good. Then 3) also God cannot choose anyone and there remains no place for the choice, but only the freedom of the will, which either accepts or rejects the gentleness and the anger. If God is thus deprived of the power and wisdom of election, what else will he be but an idol of fate, by whose power (numine) everything happens by chance? And finally it will come about that men will be blessed or damned without God knowing it, since He has made no distinction between those who are to be blessed and those who are to be damned through a certain (certa) election, but has left it up to men, through the general sustaining and hardening leniency offered to all, and then also through the chastening and punishing mercy, whether they want to be blessed or damned. In the meantime, he himself may have gone to a banquet with the Moors, as Homer says.
Aristotle also depicted such a God, namely, who sleeps and lets all who want to use and abuse his goodness and chastisement. And reason cannot judge him differently than the diatribe does here. For as it snores and despises divine things, so it judges of God as if he snores, does not use his wisdom, his will, his omnipresence to choose, to discern, to give [the Holy Spirit], and to give men this laborious and troublesome task.
3) If only the gentleness of the sustaining and the chastening of the merciful God is preached.
I have entrusted to you the difficult work of accepting and rejecting His leniency and wrath. This is what happens when we want to measure and excuse God according to human reason, when we do not want to venerate the mysteries of God, but rather penetrate them in an inquiring manner, so that we, overwhelmed by the desire for fame, instead of making one excuse, utter a thousand blasphemies, not even remembering ourselves, but at the same time speaking against God and against ourselves, as nonsensical people do, when we want to speak in great wisdom for God and for ourselves. For here you see what this figurative speech and interpretation (glossa) of the diatribe makes of God; then also how finely it agrees with itself, since it previously made free will the same and the same for all men by means of an explanation (definitione), but now, under the discussion of its own explanation, it forgets to make the one a cultivated one, the other an uncultivated one, making, according to the difference of works and way of life (morum), also different free wills of men, one who does good, another who does not, out of his powers before grace, although she had previously stated (definierat) in the explanation that he could not will good out of these powers. Thus it happens that, not granting to the will of God alone the will and the power to harden and to have mercy and to do everything, we attribute to free will itself that it can do everything without grace, although we have denied that it can do anything good without grace.
Therefore the simile of the sun and the downpour does not fit here at all; a Christian would rather use this simile in such a way that he calls the gospel the sun and the downpour, as the 19th Psalm [v. 5, 6] and the Epistle to the Hebrews, Cap. 6, 7, but the cultivated land the elect, the uncultivated the rejected; for those are built up by the word and become better, these are vexed and become worse; otherwise free will is in itself in all men 1) the kingdom of the devil.
1) In the Jena edition, the following is inserted here: "the undeveloped land and".
Let us also consider the reasons for which a figurative speech was invented in this passage. "It seems inconsistent (says the Diatribe2) ) that God, who is not only just but also good, should be said to harden a man's heart so that he might glorify his power through his wickedness." Therefore, it goes back to Origen, "who confesses that God gave occasion for the hardening, yet he blames Pharaoh." Furthermore, the same (Origen) noted that the Lord said: Just for this purpose I raised you up, he does not say, just for this purpose I made you. Otherwise Pharaoh would not have been ungodly, if God had so created him, who looked at all his works, and behold, they were very good." So much for the diatribe.
So the inconsistency is one of the main causes that the words of Moses and Paul are not to be understood simply? But against what article of faith does this inconsistency offend? or who is offended by it? Human reason is annoyed, which, although it is blind, deaf, foolish, godless and blasphemous in all the words and works of God, is brought in as a judge of the words and works of God in this place. By the same token, you could deny all articles of faith and say] that it is the most absurd thing and, as Paul says [1 Cor. 1:23], "foolishness to the Gentiles and an offense to the Jews" that God is man, the Son of a virgin, crucified, seated at the right hand of the Father. It is inconsistent (I say) to believe such. So let us invent some figurative speeches with the Arians, so that Christ is not simply God. Let us invent some figurative speeches with the Manichaeans, so that he is not true man, but a ghost, which passed through the virgin, like a ray through the glass, and was crucified. This is how beautifully we will treat the Scriptures [if we follow reason].
But the figurative speeches do not help after all, nor does it avoid the inconsistency.
2) § 15.
For it remains inconsistent (according to the judgment of reason) that the just and good God should demand impossible things from your free will, and since free will cannot will the good and necessarily serves sin, he should nevertheless impute it to it. And by not bestowing the spirit, that he would then act no more kindly or graciously than if he were obdurate, or allowed them to be obdurate. Of these things reason will say that they do not belong to a good and gracious God. They are too much beyond its comprehension, and it cannot allow itself to be captivated into believing that God is good, who does and judges such things, but, setting aside faith, it wants to feel and see and comprehend how he is good and not cruel. But she would then understand him if it were said in this way with regard to God: He hardens no one, he condemns no one, but he has mercy on all, he makes all blessed, so that, after hell has been destroyed and the fear of death has been laid down, there would be no future punishment to fear. That is why it is so heated and strains to excuse and defend God as a just and good one. But faith and the spirit judge differently, since they believe that God is good, even though he would push all people into ruin (porderot). And what good is it that we struggle with these thoughts, that we lay the blame of hardening on free will; free will may do what it can in the whole world and with all its powers, but it will not produce an example by which it can avoid being hardened if God does not give the Spirit, or by which it can show that it can deserve mercy if it has been left to its own powers. For what does it matter whether he is hardened or whether he deserves to be hardened, since hardening necessarily lies in him as long as that incapacity is in him according to which he cannot will the good, as the diatribe itself testifies. Since these figurative speeches do not take away the inconsistency, or, if they are taken away, greater inconsistencies are added, and the free man is not able to understand them.
If everything is attributed to God's will, then let the useless and deceptive figurative speeches pass away and let us hold on to the pure and simple words of God.
The other cause is, 1) that what God has made is very good, and God has not said: Just for this I have made you, but, just for this I have raised you.
First, we say that this was said before the fall of man, where what God had made was very good. But soon, in the third chapter, it follows how man became evil, abandoned by God and left to himself. From this thus corrupted man all the wicked were born, even Pharaoh, as Paul says [Eph. 2, 3.], "We were all children of wrath by nature, even as the rest." God therefore created (condidit) Pharaoh as an ungodly one, that is, from an ungodly and corrupt seed, as it is said in the Proverbs of Solomon [16, 4.]: "The Lord makes everything for its own sake, even the ungodly to be evil days." 2) Now it does not follow from this, God created the ungodly, therefore he is not ungodly; for how should he who comes from ungodly seed not be ungodly? as the 51st Psalm [v. 7.] says, "Behold, I am conceived in sins," and Job [14, 4. 3): "Who can make a clean person out of him who is conceived from unclean seed?" For although God does not make sin, yet He does not cease to form and multiply the nature, which is corrupted by sin, after the spirit is taken away, as if an artist were making image columns out of corrupted wood. Therefore, whatever the natural nature (natura) is, the people become such, since God creates and forms them from such a nature. Secondly, I say: If you want the words "it was very good" to be understood of the works of God after the fall, you must note that this is not said by us, but by God. For it is not said: Man looked at what God had done, and it was very good.
1) Diatribe § 15.
2) The Jena edition has here in parenthesis: (indeed not by creating wickedness in him, but by forming and ruling him from evil seed).
3) According to the Vulgate.
good. Many things seem and are very good before God, which seem and are very bad to us. Thus the visitations, evils, errors, hell. Yes, all the best works of God are very bad and damnable before the world. What is better than Christ and the gospel? but what is more cursed for the world? Therefore, how that can be good in the sight of God, what is evil for us, only God knows, and those who see with the eyes of God, that is, who have the Spirit. But such a sharp discussion is not yet necessary; the previous answer is sufficient for the time being.
The question may be raised as to how God can be said to work evil in us, as hardening, giving over to lusts, misleading, and the like. One should truly be satisfied with the words of God and believe what they say, since the works of God are quite unspeakable, but in order to please reason, that is, human foolishness, we want to be childish and foolish and slanderously try to see if we can do something about it.
First. Reason and diatribe also admit that God works all things in all [1 Cor. 12, 6] and that without Him nothing happens nor is effective, for He is omnipotent, and this belongs to His omnipotence, as Paul says to the Ephesians [1. 19]. Now the devil and man, fallen and abandoned by God, cannot want the good, that is, what pleases God or what God wants, but they are constantly intent on their lusts, so that they cannot but seek what is their own. This will and nature of theirs, thus turned away from God, is not nothing, for neither the devil nor the godless man is nothing, or has no nature or will, even though they have a corrupt nature turned away [from God]. Therefore, all that remains is that we say: the natural being (naturae) in the ungodly and the devil, as it is a creature and work of God, is no less subject to the omnipotence and divine action than all other creatures and works of God.
Since God moves and works everything in everyone, He also necessarily moves and works in the devil and in the ungodly.
But he works in them in such a way as they themselves are constituted and what he finds them, that is, since they are turned away [from GOtte] and evil and are driven by the movement (motu) of the divine omnipotence, so they do only, what is contrary (aversa) and evil to [GOtte], as if a rider leads (agit) a horse that has only three or only two [sound] legs, but he leads it in such a way as the horse is, that is, the horse goes along badly. But what should the rider do? He leads such a horse at the same time as healthy ones, the former in a bad way, the latter in a good way; he cannot do otherwise unless the horse becomes healthy. Here you see that God, since He works in evil and through evil, allows evil to happen, but that God nevertheless cannot act evil, although He works evil through evil, because He Himself, as the Good, cannot act evil, yet He uses evil tools, which cannot escape the impulse (raptum) and the movement (motum) of His power. The fault lies in the tools, which God does not allow to be idle, so that evil happens by God Himself moving (movente), not unlike when a carpenter hacks evil with a rough, rough axe. Hence it is that an ungodly man must always err and sin, because, being moved by the impulse of divine power, he is not permitted to be inactive, but must will, desire, and do in such a way as he himself is constituted.
This is certain and certain if we believe that God is omnipotent, then also that the ungodly is God's creature, but, turned away [from God] and left to himself, can neither will nor do good without the spirit of God. God's omnipotence means that the ungodly cannot escape God's movement and action, but obeys it as one who is necessarily subject to it. But his corruption or the turning away of his [person] from God makes it impossible for him to be moved and driven in a good way. God cannot make His omnipotence stand for the sake of turning away from Him, but the wicked cannot change his turning away. Thus it happens that he constantly and inevitably sins and errs,
until he is corrected by the spirit of God. In all this, however, the devil still reigns in peace and possesses his palace in peace under this effect (motu) of the divine omnipotence. But after that follows the trade of hardening, which is like this: The ungodly (as we have said) as well as his prince, the devil, is entirely turned toward himself and his own; he does not seek God, nor does he care for what is God's; his treasures, his glory, his works, his wisdom, his wealth (posse), and in general his kingdom he seeks and wants to enjoy these things in peace. Now if someone resists him, or wants to diminish any of these things from him, he is also moved and indignant by the same [averted from God's] attitude according to which he seeks those things, and rages against his adversary. And no more can he refrain from raging than he can refrain from desiring and seeking [his own], and no more can he cease to desire than he can cease to be, since he is a creature of God, though a corrupt one.
This is the raging of the world against the gospel of God, because through the gospel comes that stronger one who wants to overcome the calm owner of the palace and condemns these lusts of honor, wealth, wisdom and his own righteousness and everything in which he trusts. This very irritation of the wicked, that God says or does the opposite of what they wanted, is their hardening and anger (ingravatio). For since they are turned away [from God] by themselves through the corruption of nature, they are then turned away much more and become angry when their turning away is resisted or spoken of in a diminutive way. Thus God provoked the godless Pharaoh, wanting to snatch his dominion from him, and hardened and hardened his heart more and more by attacking him through the word of Moses, as if he wanted to take his kingdom from him and withdraw the people from his dominion, and did not give him the spirit inwardly, but allowed his godless corruption to be angry under the dominion of the devil, to rise up proudly, to rage and to continue in great security and contempt.
Therefore, let no one think that when God is said to harden or work evil in us (for to harden is to do evil), He is acting as if He were creating evil in us all over again, as if you thought that a wicked gift-giver, who is himself evil, poured or mixed poison into a non-evil vessel, the vessel itself doing nothing but receiving or suffering the wickedness of the poisoner. For this is how they seem to imagine that man, who in himself would be good or not evil, would suffer an evil work from God, when they hear that it is said of us that God works good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God, who works, by a necessity in which we behave purely passively (mera necessitate passiva), in that they do not sufficiently mean how restless God works in all his creatures, and that he leaves none idle. Rather, whoever wants to understand such things in any way, that God works evil in us, that is, through us, must think in such a way that this does not happen through God's fault, but through our fault. For since we are evil by nature, but God is good, and since He drives us by His effect (rapiens) according to the nature of His omnipotence, He can do nothing else than that He, who is good Himself, does evil through the evil instrument, although according to His wisdom He uses this evil for His glory and for our salvation.
Thus, he also finds the will of the devil to be evil, but he did not create it that way; rather, since God left him and the devil sinned, he became evil. He drives him by his effect and moves him to what he wants, although this will does not cease to be evil by this very movement of God. In this way David said of Shimei in 2 Sam. 16, 11: "Let him curse, for the Lord has commanded him" to curse David. How could God command to curse, which is such a poisonous and evil work? Such an outward commandment was nowhere to be found. Therefore, David has in mind that the Almighty God spoke, and it happened thus, that is, He does everything through the eternal Word. The divine action (actio) and omnipotence thus drives (rapit) the man with all his limbs.
already evil will of Shimei, which had already burned against David before, since David came in his way at an opportune time, as he then deserved such blasphemy, and the good God himself commands through an evil and blasphemous instrument, that is, he speaks and does through the word, namely through the drive of his action (raptu actionis suae), this blasphemy.
Thus, he hardens Pharaoh by holding up to his ungodly and evil will a word and work that he hates, namely out of innate error and natural corruption. And since God through the Spirit does not change him inwardly, but rather continues to offer him [His words and works] and to impress them upon him, but Pharaoh looks at His powers, riches and might and trusts in them according to the same natural fault, it happens that he becomes puffed up and arrogant on this side through the conceit of his things, but on the other side through the lowliness of Moses, and because the word of God comes in a contemptible form, a proud despiser and in this way becomes hardened; then, that the more Moses persists and threatens, the more he becomes irritated and hardened. This evil will of his would not be moved or hardened by itself, but since the almighty actor drives (agat) him with inevitable movement, like the rest of the creatures, it is necessary that he wants something. Then, at the same time, he opposes him outwardly with what irritates and annoys him according to his nature. Thus it comes that Pharaoh cannot avoid his hardening, just as he can neither avoid the effect of the divine omnipotence, nor the turning away [from God] or the malice of his will. Therefore, the hardening of Pharaoh by GOtte is accomplished in such a way that he outwardly opposes to his wickedness that which the latter hates by nature; then he also inwardly does not cease to move the wicked will (as he found it then wicked) by omnipotent impulse (motu), and the latter, according to the wickedness of his will, cannot avoid hastening that which is repugnant to him and trusting in his powers. He becomes obdurate, so that he neither hears nor has insight, but is carried away as one possessed by the devil, as it were senseless and mad.
If we have presented this in a convincing manner, we have won in this matter, and since the figurative speeches and interpretations of men have been abandoned, we take the words of God simply, so that it is not necessary to excuse God or to accuse Him of unreasonableness. For when he says, I will harden Pharaoh's heart, he speaks simply, as if he said, I will cause Pharaoh's heart to be hardened, or that by my working and doing it will be hardened. How this happens we have heard, namely: inwardly I will move the evil will by the general drive (motu), so that it continues in its effort and its course of wanting; I will neither stop moving it nor can I do otherwise. Outwardly, however, I will hold word and work before him, against which that evil effort will resist, since he is capable of nothing but wanting evil, in that I set evil in motion through the power of omnipotence.
Thus God was quite certain and pronounced it in the most certain way that Pharaoh should be hardened, since he was quite certain that Pharaoh's will could neither resist the impulse (motui) of omnipotence, nor give up its wickedness, nor even yield to the adversary presented to him, Moses, but that, since his evil will remained, he would inevitably become angrier, harder and prouder by opposing in his course and with his effort what he did not want and what he despised by trusting in his ability. So you see here that even by this word it is confirmed that the free will is only able to do evil, since God, who does not err out of ignorance, nor lie out of malice, so surely foreshadows the hardening of Pharaoh, namely, since he is sure that the evil will can only want evil and by the fact that the good that is opposed to it is offered to it, it cannot help but become angrier.
Now it remains here that someone would like to ask why God does not take mass from this impulse of omnipotence, by which the will of the wicked is moved, so that it continues to be evil and to become worse. To this is to be answered: That is to wish,
that God may cease to be God for the sake of the wicked, in that such a one desires that His power and effect cease, namely, that He may cease to be good, so that they may not become angry. But why does he not at the same time change the evil will which he moves? This belongs to the mysteries of the Majesty, where his judgments are incomprehensible. And it is not for us to inquire into this, but to worship these mysteries. Now, if flesh and blood should grumble here in anger, it may grumble after all, but it will do nothing, God will not become different because of it. And even if the angry wicked should go away in however large numbers, the elect will still remain. The same must be said to those who ask: Why did he allow Adam to fall, and why does he allow us all to be born infected with the same sin, when he could have preserved that one, and could have created us elsewhere or only from purified seed? He is God, for whose will there is no cause nor reason that could be prescribed to him as a rule and standard, since nothing is equal or superior to him, but he himself [the will of God] is the rule for everything. For if there were any rule or standard for him, or any cause or reason, it could no longer be God's will. For what he wills is not right because he must or had to will it that way, but on the contrary, because he wills it that way, what happens must be right. Cause and reason are prescribed for the will of the creature, but not for the will of the Creator, unless you want to put another Creator above him.
Hereby, I believe, the figurative diatribe with its figurative speech is sufficiently refuted; but let us come to the text itself to see how this and the figurative speech fit to each other. For it is the way of all those who escape the grounds of proof with figurative speeches that they bravely despise the text itself and direct their efforts solely to it, that they twist some extracted word with figurative speech and crucify it according to their sense, taking no account either of the circumlocution or of the meaning.
The diatribe does not care about what Moses is talking about or what his purpose is. Thus, at this point, the diatribe cares nothing about what Moses is talking about or what his speech intends, and tears this little word "I will harden" (at which she is annoyed) out of the text and writes all sorts of things as she pleases. Meanwhile, she does not even think about how it [the speech] could be reinserted and adapted so that it rhymes with the whole of the text. And this is the reason why the Scripture is not sufficiently clear in so many proven and learned men in so many centuries; it is also not to be wondered at, since also the sun would not be able to shine if it were treated with such artifices.
But, to go over what I have shown above, it is not rightly said that Pharaoh was hardened because God bore him with gentleness and did not punish him immediately, since he was chastised with so many plagues; Why was it necessary for God to promise so often that He would harden Pharaoh's heart when the signs occurred, since even before the signs and before this hardening, Pharaoh was in such a condition that, carried by divine leniency and not punished, he inflicted so much evil on the children of Israel, puffed up by happy success and power, when to harden means to carry in divine leniency and not to punish immediately? Do you see, then, that this figurative way of speaking in this passage serves absolutely in nothing to the point? for this [inauthentic speech] refers quite generally to all who sin, borne by divine leniency. For in this way we could say that all men would be hardened, since everyone sins, but no one would sin if he were not supported by divine mildness. Therefore, the hardening of Pharaoh is something quite different from the general toleration on the part of divine gentleness.
Rather, Moses is not so much preaching Pharaoh's wickedness as the truthfulness and mercy of God, so that the children of Israel will not mistrust the promises of God,
since he promised that he would deliver them. Since this was a very great thing, he tells them the difficulty beforehand, so that they would not waver in faith, knowing that all this had been foretold and was to be done by decree of the one who had promised it, as if he were saying: I will indeed deliver you, but you will hardly believe this, so much will Pharaoh resist and delay the matter; but trust nevertheless, even all this, that he drags it out, is done by my working, so that I may do the more and greater miracles to establish you in the faith and to show my power, so that afterwards you may believe me the more in all other things. In the same way, Christ, at the institution of Holy Communion, foretold to his disciples many difficulties, his own death, and many tribulations that would befall them, so that when it happened, they would believe all the more.
And Moses does not give us this meaning in a dark way, since he says [2 Mos. 3, 19. 20.]: "But Pharaoh will not let you go, so that many miracles will happen in Egypt", and again [2 Mos. 9, 16.]: "And that is why I have raised you up, that my power may appear in you, and my name be proclaimed in all lands." You see here that Pharaoh is hardened for the sake of it, so that he resists God and delays the redemption, whereby cause is given for many miracles and for the proof of the power of God, so that this is proclaimed and believed in him in all lands. What is this but that all this is said and done to strengthen the faith and to comfort the weak, so that they should believe God as a true, faithful, powerful and merciful one? as if it were said to little children in a very caressing way: Do not be frightened by Pharaoh's harshness. For I also work them and have them in my hand, I who deliver you. I will only use them to perform many miracles and to make my majesty known for the sake of your faith.
This is why Moses repeats almost after every single plague: "And Pharaoh's heart was hardened, so that he would not let the people go.
as the Lord had said [Ex. 9:12, 4:21]. What does this: "As the Lord had said", other than that the Lord should appear to be true, since he had predicted that he would be hardened? If there had been any possibility of change or freedom of will in Pharaoh, which could have turned to either side, God could not have predicted the hardening of him with such certainty. Now, however, since it is promised by Him who can neither lack nor lie, it must necessarily and certainly happen that he would be hardened; this could not have happened if the hardening were not entirely outside of man's powers and solely in God's control, in the way we said above, namely, that God was certain that He would not allow the general effect of omnipotence in Pharaoh, or for Pharaoh's sake, to continue, since He cannot refrain from it.
Furthermore, it was equally certain that the will of Pharaoh, which was evil by nature and [turned away from God], could not agree with the word and work of God, which was contrary to it. Therefore, by the effort (impetu) of the will in Pharaoh, which was obtained by the omnipotence of God, and by the opposing of the contrary word and work, which was outwardly held against him, nothing else could happen but annoyance and hardening of the heart in Pharaoh. For if God had refrained from the effect of His omnipotence on Pharaoh, at the time when the word of Moses reproached him with what was repugnant, and it was imagined that Pharaoh's will alone had acted out of His power, then perhaps there would still have been room for dispute as to which of the two he could have leaned toward. Now, however, since he is driven and carried away (rapiatur) to will, no violence happens to his will, because he is not forced against his will, but is driven by the natural effect of God to will naturally, just as he is constituted (but he is evil), therefore he cannot but push against the word and thus become hardened. Thus we see that this passage strongly argues against free will, in
In the sense that God, who promises, cannot lie, but if he does not lie, then Pharaoh's hardening cannot fail.
But let us also look at Paul who takes this passage from Moses Rom. 9, 17. How miserably the diatribe writhes in this passage! So that it does not lose its free will, it turns in all directions. Soon it says, 1) it is a necessity of the consequence, but not of what follows; soon, it is an ordered or revealed will (voluntas signi), which can be resisted, [soon] it is a will, of the [hidden] counsel (voluntas placiti), which cannot be resisted. At one time the passages drawn from Paul do not serve as proof, do not speak of man's blessedness; at another time the foreknowledge of God imposes necessity, at another time no necessity; at another time grace precedes the will so that it will, accompanies it on its way, gives a happy outcome, at another time it does everything as the main cause, at another time it works through secondary causes and keeps itself quiet. With these and similar games with words, it accomplishes nothing, except that it brings time and in the meantime takes the matter out of our sight and draws it elsewhere. It considers us to be so dull and unintelligent, or thinks that we are so little touched by the matter as it assumes to be, or [acts] after the manner of little children who, where they are afraid or playing, cover their eyes with their hands, and then think that they are then seen by no one, because they themselves see no one. This is what the diatribe does in every way. Because it cannot bear the rays, yes, the flashes of the clearest words, it pretends that it does not see what it is about, and at the same time also wants to persuade us that we also should not see with covered eyes. But all these things are signs of a spirit that is convicted and sacrilegiously opposes the unconquerable truth.
That little argument about the necessity of the consequence and what follows has been refuted above. The diatribe may write poetry and um-
1) Diatribe § 17.
If God knew beforehand that Judas would be the betrayer, then Judas necessarily became the betrayer, and it was not in the hands of Judas or any creature to do otherwise or to change the will, although he did not force himself to do so, but that will was the work of God, 2) which moved His omnipotence, as well as everything else. For the saying is insurmountable and clear [Hebr. 6, 18]: "God does not lie" and is not missing. Here are not dark or doubtful words, although the most learned men of all centuries should have been all blind, so that they thought and said otherwise. And even if you make many excuses, your conscience and the conscience of all will be convicted, forced to say thus: If God is not lacking in what he foreknows, it is necessary that precisely what is foreknown should come to pass, for otherwise who could believe his promises, who could fear his threats, if what he promises or threatens does not necessarily follow, or how should he promise or threaten if his foreknowledge is deceptive or can be hindered by our mutability? This exceedingly bright light of certain truth completely clogs the mouths of all, resolves all questions, and has gained the victory against all sophistical evasions.
We know, of course, that the foreknowledge of men is wrong, we know that a solar eclipse does not come for the sake of it, 3) because it is foreknown, but that it is foreknown because it will come. What have we to do with this foreknowledge? We dispute about the foreknowledge of God; if you do not ascribe to it that what is foreknown is necessarily effected (necessarium effectum praesciti), then you have already taken away the faith and fear of God, have made all divine promises and threats shaky, and have even denied the Godhead itself. But even the diatribe itself, after struggling for a long time and trying everything
2) In the Jena edition: "was his work, which GOtt excited by his omnipotence."
3) Diatribe § 15, at the end.
had, finally, driven by the power of truth, confesses our opinion and speaks: 1)
"The question of the will and purpose (destinatione) of God is even more difficult. For God wills precisely what He knows beforehand. And this is what Paul [Rom. 9, 19. 18.] gives to understand: 'Who can resist his will, if he have mercy on which he will, and if he harden which he will?' For if there were a king who 2) could bring forth whatever he willed, and whom no one could resist, he would be said to do whatever he willed. Thus the will of God, because it is the main cause of everything that happens, seems to interpret a necessity to our will." So far those.
And finally once we can thank GOtte for the healthy conception (sensu) of the diatribe. So where is the free will now? But again this eel slips away and suddenly says:
But "Paul does not resolve this question, "but gives a rebuke to the one who wants to discuss such things: 'O man, who are you that you want to be right with God?'"
O a beautiful evasion! Does this mean that the divine Scriptures are being acted upon, when one makes such a statement out of one's own power, out of one's own head, without Scripture, without miracles, yes, falsifies the clearest words of God? Paul does not solve this question? What does he do? (She says) he gives the disputant a reprimand. Is not this reprimand the most perfect solution? For what was asked in this question about the will of God? But whether he interpreted a necessity to our will? But Paul (Rom. 9, 18.answers that it is so: "So he 'has mercy' on whom he wills (he says), and hardens whom he wills." [Rom. 9, 16.:] "So then it is not up to anyone's willing or running, but up to God's mercy." And not satisfied with the fact that he has given the solution, he introduces moreover those talking who murmur and chatter for free will against this solution, then there would be no merit and we would be without our guilt ver-
1) Diatribe § 16.
2) In the Erlangen edition yui is missing here, which we have added from the Diatribe.
and the like, that he might subdue their murmuring and indignation by speaking [Rom. 9:19. according to the Vulgate]:
"So you say to me, 'What then does he complain about?' Who can resist his will?" Do you see that he introduces other persons speaking (prosopopoeiam)? Those, having heard that the will of God lays out a necessity for us, murmur blasphemously and say, "What else does he complain about?" that is, why does God insist, urge, demand, and complain like this? What does he accuse us of? What does he accuse us of? as if we humans could do what he demands if we wanted to. He has no just cause for this complaint; rather, let him accuse his will, let him complain, let him urge. For who can resist his will? Who can obtain mercy if he does not will? Who can become soft when he wants to harden? It is not in our hands to change his will, much less to resist the [will] that wants us as hardened, since we are forced by that will to be hardened, we may want or not.
If Paul had not solved this question, or if he had not declared in a definite way that a necessity is imposed on us by divine foreknowledge, why would it have been necessary to introduce such people who grumble and argue that one cannot resist his will? For who would grumble or be indignant if he did not think that this necessity was expressed in a certain way? The words are not obscure in which he speaks of resisting the will of God. Or is it doubtful what resisting is, what the will is, or of whom he speaks, since he speaks of God's will? Admittedly, countless thousands of the most proven teachers may be blind here, and may invent that the Scriptures are not clear, and fear the question as a difficult one. We have the very clear words: "He has mercy on whom he wills, he hardens whom he wills"; likewise: "So you say to me: What does he complain about? Who can resist his will?"
It is also not a difficult question, yes, nothing easier even for the healthy person
as that this conclusion is certain, firm and true: If God foreknows, then this necessarily comes true, if this is assumed from Scripture as a prerequisite that God neither errs nor lacks. I admit that it is a difficult, even an impossible question, if you want to establish both at the same time, both the foreknowledge of God and the freedom of man. For what is more difficult, indeed more impossible, than that you assert that contradictory or opposing things do not conflict with each other, or that any number is ten and the same number is also nine? There is no difficulty in our question, but the same is sought and brought in, not otherwise than as ambiguity and obscurity are sought and forcibly brought in in the Scriptures. He therefore subdues the ungodly, who were annoyed by these very clear words, because they realized that God's will is fulfilled by our being subject to necessity, and realized that it had been pronounced certain that nothing was left to them in terms of freedom or free will, but that everything was based solely on God's will. But he subdues them in such a way that he commands them to be silent and to worship the glory of God's power and will, against which we have no right; but he has full right against us to do what he wills, and we are not wronged, since he owes us nothing, has received nothing from us, has promised nothing, except as much as he willed and pleased him.
Here, then, is the place, here the time, not to worship those Corycian caves, 1) but the true Majesty in her terrifying marvels and in her incomprehensible judgments, and to say, "Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven." But we are nowhere more irreverent and presumptuous than when we attack and punish these very unsearchable mysteries and judgments. Meanwhile, we impute to ourselves an unbelievable reverence in researching the holy Scriptures, which God commanded to be researched. Here we do not investigate, but there, where He has forbidden to
1) Diatribe, slightly before the middle of § 2.
we do nothing but research with constant presumption, not to say blasphemy. But this is not inquiring, if we sacrilegiously (temere) direct our efforts to rhyme the completely free foreknowledge of God with our freedom. Here, we are always ready to break God's foreknowledge if he does not leave us free; or if he interprets the necessity to speak to the grumbling and blaspheming: "Why does he still complain? Who can resist his will?" Where is God, who is the most gracious according to his nature? Where is He who does not want the death of the sinner? Did He create us for the purpose of taking pleasure in the torment of men? and similar things that will be howled at those in hell and the damned for eternity.
But that the living and true God must be of such a nature that he must impose necessity on us through his freedom, even natural reason must admit, namely, because that would be a ridiculous God, or more correctly, an idol who foresaw future things in an uncertain way, or was deceived in the events, since even the pagans attributed an inevitable determination of fate (fatum) to their gods. He would be equally ridiculous if he could not do everything or if anything happened without him. But if one admits the foreknowledge and the omnipotence, then it follows naturally with irrefutable conclusion: That we are not made by ourselves, nor live, nor do anything, but by his omnipotence. But since he knew beforehand that we would be of such a nature, and now makes us such, and drives and governs us as such, I beg you, how can it still be pretended that anything is free in us and happens in a different way than he knew beforehand or does now.
Therefore, the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God is virtually contrary to our free will; for either God will be mistaken in foreknowledge and also mistaken in action (which is impossible), or we will act and be driven according to His foreknowledge and action. The omnipotence of God, however, I do not call that ability according to which-
chem he does not do many things which he can, but the power which is active (actualem), by which he powerfully works all things in all, as the Scripture calls him omnipotent. This omnipotence, I say, and the foreknowledge of God abolish the doctrine of free will from the ground up. And here no obscurity of the Scriptures or difficulty of the matter can be pleaded. The words are quite clear, known even to children; the matter is clear and easy, proven also by the common natural judgment of reason, so that no matter how great a series of centuries, times, and persons who write and teach otherwise, it is of no avail.
Of course, this is most annoying to the common sense or natural reason, that God alone, according to His will, abandons, hardens, condemns people, as if He delights in the sins and in such great and eternal torments of the wretched, while it is praised of Him that He is of such great mercy and goodness. To have such an opinion of God, that seemed unreasonable, that seemed cruel, that seemed intolerable; at this also so many and so great men have been vexed in so many centuries. And who should not be annoyed by it? I myself have often been offended by it to such an extent that I almost fell into the deep abyss of despair, so that I also wished I had never been made into a man before I knew how salutary this despair would be and how close to grace. That is why one has tried and tried so hard to excuse the goodness of God, to accuse the will of man. Here one has invented the distinctions between the ordered (ordinata) will of God and the will of God in itself (absoluta); full of the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of what follows, and many similar things. But with this nothing has been accomplished, except that unlearned people have been deceived by trivial words and by holding up a science falsely so called. Nevertheless, the sting always remained in the innermost heart, both of the unlearned and of the learned, when it came to the point of seriousness that they realized that there was necessity on our side.
The people believed in the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God.
And even natural reason, which is annoyed by this necessity and tries so much to get rid of it, is forced to admit it, convicted by its own judgment, even if there were no scripture. For all men find this opinion written in their hearts, recognize it, and approve of it (however unwillingly) when they hear it presented: First, that God is omnipotent, not only in power, but also in working (actione) (as I have said), otherwise He would be a ridiculous God; second, that He knows and foreknows all things, and can neither err nor fail. Since these two things are admitted by the hearts and minds of all, they are immediately forced by unavoidable inference to admit that we do not become by our will, but by necessity, and that we therefore do not do everything arbitrarily out of what free will is able to do (pro jure liberi arbitrii), but as God has foreknown and casts it, according to his infallible and unchangeable counsel and power. Therefore, at the same time, it is found written in all hearts that free will is nothing, although this is obscured by so many arguments to the contrary and so great a reputation of so many men who have taught otherwise for so many centuries, just as every other law (as Paul [Rom. 2:15] testifies) that is written in our hearts is recognized when it is rightly acted upon, but is obscured when it is wrongly treated by godless teachers or mastered by other opinions.
I will come back to Paul. If he does not solve the question in Rom. 9, 20. 21. and does not conclude from God's foreknowledge and will that we, for our part, are under the necessity, why did he need to introduce the simile of the potter who makes one vessel out of the same clay for honor, the other for dishonor? Does not a work say to its master, "Why do I make this? For he speaks of men, whom he compares to clay, and God to a potter. This, of course, is dull,
yes, the simile is ludicrous and introduced in vain, if he does not hold that our freedom is not [Freihei]. Yes, the whole discussion of Paul [Rom. 11] is in vain, with which he upholds (tuetur) grace. For the whole letter is concerned with showing that we are not able to do anything, even when we seem to do well, as he says there [Rom. 9:31] that Israel, being inferior to righteousness, did not attain righteousness, but [v. 30] the Gentiles, not being inferior to it, attained it. I will speak more extensively about this when I present our troops.
But the diatribe pretends not to see the whole main point of Paul's discussion and where Paul is aiming at, and consoles itself with [some] picked out and twisted words. Also, it does not help the diatribe that Paul afterwards admonishes Rom. 11, 20. again and says: "You stand by faith, see that you are not proud"; likewise [v. 23?: "also those, if they should believe, will be grafted in" 2c For there he says nothing about the powers of men, but brings commanding and obliging words; what is directed by them is sufficiently said above. And Paul himself in this place precedes those who boast of free will, and does not say that those can believe, but God is able, he says, to graft them in. In short, the Diatribe proceeds so timidly and hesitatingly in her treatment of those passages of Paul, that one sees that she holds differently in her conscience than her words do. For when she should most have continued and proved, she almost always breaks off the speech, saying 1): "Let this be enough of it"; likewise, "Now I will not examine that"; likewise, "It is not my purpose here"; likewise, "Those would say so", and many similar things, and has left the matter undecided, so that you cannot know whether she speaks for free will, or whether she wants to be regarded as only wanting to slip away from Paul with vain words, and that according to her right.
1) Diatribe § 18. § 17. § 18.
and custom, because she is not serious about this matter. But we must not be so cold-headed, not walk on eggshells or be moved like a reed by the wind, but assert with certainty, steadfastly and fierily, then also prove in a well-founded way and skillfully and abundantly what we teach.
But now, how beautifully she maintains freedom at the same time as necessity, by saying 2): "Not even every necessity excludes free will, as God the Father necessarily begets the Son, and yet begets the same willingly and freely, because he was not forced to do so."
I ask you, are we now discussing compulsion and force? Have we not testified through so many books that we speak of the necessity of immutability? We know that the Father willingly testifies that Judas willingly betrayed Christ, but we say that this willingness must have happened in Judas himself certainly and infallibly, if God had foreknown. Or if what I say is not yet understood, let us refer the one necessity, which compels by force (violentam), to the work, and the other necessity, according to which something infallibly comes to pass (infallibilem), to time. Whoever hears us may understand that we speak of the latter, not of the former, that is, we do not dispute whether Judas became a traitor against his will or with his will, but whether it had to happen infallibly at the time predetermined by God that Judas betrayed Christ with his will (volendo).
But see what the diatribe 3) says here: "If you look at the infallible foreknowledge of God, then Judas had to practice the betrayal with necessity, and yet Judas could change his will." Do you also understand, dear Diatribe, what you are talking about? To pass over the fact that the will can only will evil, as has been proven above. How could Judas change his will, since the infallible foreknowledge of God is at hand? Could he change God's foreknowledge and make it one that can be absent (fallibilem)?
2) Diatribe § 17.
3) § 17.
Here the diatribe succumbs, abandons the flags, throws away the weapons and leaves the battlefield by throwing the disputation away to the scholastic quibbles full of the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of what follows, as if it did not want to pursue these quibbles. Certainly, it is quite prudent, after you have brought the matter into the fiercest battle, and now a disputator is most needed, that you just then break away (terga vsrras) and leave to others the task of answering and bringing the matter to an end (definisnäi). You should have followed this advice from the very beginning and abstained from writing altogether, according to the words: He who does not know how to fight, abstains from fighting in the tournament. For this was not expected of Erasmus, that he should set in motion (movsrsr) that difficulty, as God certainly foreknew, and yet ours might, might not (aoMinZonter) happen; this difficulty was in the world long before the Diatribe; but it was expected that he should answer it and give the decision. But he uses an oratorical transition and drags us, who are ignorant of the art of oratory, along with him, as if nothing of the matter were being dealt with here and only certain mere quibbles were there, and bravely plunges out of the midst of the melee, crowned with epheum and laurel.
But not so, dear brother, no oratory is so great that it could deceive a true conscience; the sting of conscience is stronger than all the powers and images of eloquence. We will not suffer here that the speaker should pass over it and dissemble; here is not now the place for that artifice. Here one demands the center and the main point of the trade. And here either free will will be destroyed, or it will completely win the day. But you, realizing the danger, yes, the certain victory against free will, stand as if you noticed nothing but sophistry. Does this mean acting as befits a faithful divine scholar? Should the matter move you seriously, since in such a way you both leave the listeners in suspense, and the discussion, after it has come to the most serious point, is not yet finished?
How can you let go of the argument that has come to the point (pserturbatam) and has been carried to extremes (exaspöratam), but nevertheless want to appear as if you have honestly satisfied and won the victory? This deviousness and cunning can be endured in worldly matters: in a theological matter, where the simple and clear truth is sought, it is worthy of the greatest hatred and unbearable.
The Sophists, too, felt the insurmountable and irresistible force of this reason of proof, therefore they invented the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of what follows (nsoessitarem oon86HU6MM6 60N86gu6Mi8); but we have taught above how nothing at all this little thread accomplishes, namely, they, too, pay no attention to what they say and how much they, against themselves, allow. If one admits the necessity of the consequence, then free will is defeated and laid low, and it does not help in the least, neither the necessity, nor the contingency (conttnZtzntia) of what follows. What is it to me if free will is not forced, but does with will (volsmer) what it does? It is enough for me that you admit that it will inevitably happen that he does what he does with will, and he cannot behave differently if God has foreknown it that way. If God foreknew that Judas would commit treason or that he would change his will to betray, whichever of the two he foreknew would necessarily come to pass, or God would be lacking in foreknowledge and prediction, which is impossible. For this brings about the necessity of the consequence, that is, if God foreknows, it necessarily happens. That is, the free. Will is nothing. This necessity of the consequence is not obscure nor doubtful, so that even if the teachers of all centuries should be blind, they are nevertheless forced to admit it, since it is so obvious and certain that it can be grasped with the hands.
But the necessity of what follows, with which they comfort themselves, is a mere figment of the imagination (pbanta8ma), and virtually argues against the necessity of the consequence. For example, it is a necessity of the consequence,
If I say: God knows beforehand that Judas will be the betrayer, then it will certainly and infallibly happen that Judas is the betrayer. Against this necessity and consequence you console yourself thus: But because Judas can change the will to betray, therefore it is not the necessity of what follows. I ask you, how can those two pieces rhyme: Judas cannot "will to betray"; and: "it is necessary that Judas will betray"? Doesn't this contradict and conflict with each other? He will (you say) not be forced to betray against his will. What does that matter? You said about the necessity of what follows, namely, that it is not caused by the necessity of the consequence; you said nothing about the compulsion of what follows. The answer should have been given about the necessity of what follows, and you give an example of the necessity of what follows. I ask about one thing, and you give information about another. This brings about that to and fro wavering, for the sake of which no attention is paid to how nothing at all that little question about the necessity of what follows.
This about the first passage, which dealt with the hardening of Pharaoh, which however comprehends all passages and many troops in itself, and indeed insurmountable ones. Now we want to look at the other one of Jacob and Esau, of series, since they were not yet born, it was said [Gen. 25, 23.]: "The greater will serve the lesser." The diatribe 1) escapes from this passage in such a way "that it does not actually concern man's blessedness, for God can will that a man be a servant and poor, he may or may not, but that he nevertheless not be excluded from eternal blessedness."
Dear, see how many byways and evasions a slippery spirit seeks, which flees the truth, yet cannot escape it. It may be admitted, after all, that this passage does not refer to the blessedness of man; of this later. For the sake of this, should "Paul, who cites it, do nothing with it? Would we not then find Paul
to make a ridiculous or ludicrous man in such a serious discussion? But this is a saying of Jerome, who several times dares to say with great presumption, but at the same time with a blasphemous mouth: This serves as proof (pugnars) in Paul, which in its original context (suis loeis) proves nothing. This is only to say that by laying the foundations of Christian doctrine, Paul is only falsifying divine Scripture and deceiving the souls of believers by an opinion that has been invented out of his head and forcibly introduced into Scripture. Thus the [Holy] Spirit must be honored in that holy and chosen armor of God, Paul. And although Jerome must be read with [good] judgment, and this saying is to be counted among the ungodly sayings which this man has written in great numbers (for he is so vacillating and obtuse in his understanding of Scripture), the diatribe nevertheless picks it up without judgment and does not think it worth the trouble to soften it even with any interpretation, but judges and interprets the Scripture of God according to it, as if it were a very certain saying from heaven. Thus we accept the ungodly sayings of men as a rule and standard for the holy Scriptures. And then we still wonder that the same becomes dark and ambiguous, and that so many fathers are blind in it, since it [the Scripture] becomes it [dark and uncertain] by this ungodly and blasphemous way.
Cursed therefore be he who says that what Paul proves does not serve as proof in the original context. For this is only spoken, but not proven; but it is spoken by those who understand neither Paul nor the passages he cites, but go astray by understanding the words according to their, that is, according to an ungodly opinion. For even if this passage Gen. 25, 23. is to be understood only from a temporal bondage (which is not true), it is nevertheless correctly and effectively used by Paul [Rom. 9, 12.], since he proves by it that not for the sake of Jacob's or Esau's merit, but by grace of the caller to
Rebekah 1) had been said, "The greater will serve the lesser."
Paul disputes whether they came to what is said of them by power or merit of free will, and proves that this is not the case, but that Jacob came to what Esau did not come to only by the grace of the caller. But he proves this by insurmountable words of Scripture, namely, that they were not yet born, likewise, had done nothing good or evil. And in this proof lies the main weight of the matter, this is what this matter is about. But the diatribe passes over all this with excellent eloquence, pretends not to see it, and disputes nothing of your merit, which she had nevertheless taken upon herself to do and which Paul's exposition demanded, but makes an empty talk of temporal bondage, as if this belonged to the matter, only so that it would not seem as if she were defeated by Paul's exceedingly powerful words. For what else could she deliver against Paul for free will? What would free will have helped Jacob? What harm did it do to Esau? For already, by the foreknowledge and determination of God, it had been determined to each of them, when they were not yet born and had not yet done anything, what they were to receive, namely, that the one was to serve, the other to rule. The reward is determined before the laborers are born and work. Here the diatribe should have given an answer; Paul urges that they had not yet done anything good, not yet done anything evil, and yet by the divine saying the one is determined to be master, the other to be servant. It is not asked whether this servitude belongs to salvation, but by what merit is it imposed on the one who did not deserve it? But it is very vexatious to argue with those who have the ungodly endeavor to pervert the Scriptures and escape from them.
Furthermore, that Moses does not deal with the bondage of those alone, and Paul is also right in this, that he understands it of eternal blessedness (although this is not at all very
1) In the Erlangen edition aü Lärmn.
I will not suffer Paul to be defiled by the slanders of the wicked) is convincingly demonstrated by the text itself. For this is the divine revelation in Moses Mos. 25, 23]: "Two nations shall be separated out of thy womb; and one nation shall be superior to another, and the greater shall serve the lesser." Here two peoples are obviously distinguished, the one is taken up into the grace of God, namely the lesser, so that it may overcome the greater, admittedly not by [its own] strength, but by God's assistance, for how else could the lesser overcome the greater if God were not with it? Therefore, because the lesser will be God's people, not only the external dominion or bondage is treated there, but everything that belongs to God's people, that is, blessing, word, spirit, Christ's promise and eternal kingdom, which Scripture also confirms quite extensively afterwards, since it describes how Jacob was blessed and received the promises and the kingdom. All this Paul briefly indicates, since he says that the greater will serve the lesser, pointing us to Moses, who treats this more expansively, so that you can say, against the ungodly opinion of Jerome and the Diatribe, that this has stronger evidential force (pugnet) in its original context than in Paul, whatever he attracts. This is true not only with respect to Paul, but also with respect to all the apostles who cite scriptural passages as witnesses and corroborators of their preaching. But it would be ridiculous to cite as testimony that which testified nothing and served no purpose. For if among philosophers those are considered ridiculous who prove something unknown by something still more unknown or by something not belonging to it, how could we be so impudent as to ascribe this to the highest leaders and originators of Christian doctrine, on which the salvation of souls rests, especially where they teach what are the chief things of faith? But this is proper for those who are not seriously moved by the divine Scriptures.
But the saying of Malachi [1, 2. 3.], which Paul added [Rom. 9, 13:]
"Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated", she twists 1) with diligence in three ways. The first is: "If one wants to press the letter (she says), God does not love as we love, nor does he hate anyone, because such movements of the mind do not come to God."
What do I hear? Is the question how God loves and hates, and not rather why He loves and hates? It is a question of what merit on our part He loves or hates. We know very well that God does not love or hate like us, since we love and hate in a variable way. He loves and hates with an eternal and unchanging nature, and thus coincidences and movements of mind do not occur with Him.
And it is precisely this that compellingly proves that free will is nothing, because love is eternal and unchanging, and God's hatred of men eternal, before the world came into being, not only before the merits and works of free will, and that with us everything happens with necessity, according to the fact that he either loves or does not love from eternity: so that not only the love of God, but also the way of loving implies a necessity for us. And so you see how the diatribe's evasions serve to make her run everywhere the more she tries to escape; so much so that she does not succeed in resisting the truth. But let the figurative speech be permitted to you, that the love of God is the effect of love, and the hatred of God is the effect of hatred; do these effects happen without and against the will of God? Or will you also say here that God does not will as we do, that the affectum of the will does not take place with Him? So, if those effects happen, they happen only through the willing God. But what God wants, he either loves or hates. Answer therefore: for what merit is Jacob loved and Esau hated before they are born and before they do a work? Therefore Paul stands firm, who introduces Malachi in the best way for the opinion of Moses, namely, that for the sake of
1) Diatribe § 19.
He called Jacob before he was born because he loved him, not because he was first loved by Jacob, or because he was moved by any merit of Jacob, so that Jacob and Esau might show what our free will is capable of.
The second way [how the diatribe twists the saying Mal. 1, 2. 3.] is 2): "Malachi seems not to speak of hatred, whereby we shall be damned for ever, but of a temporal plague, for those are rebuked who would reban Edom."
This again is spoken to the shame of Paul, as if he had done violence to the Scriptures. So let us not be afraid of the majesty of the Holy Spirit, if only we can raise up our own. But for the time being, let us endure this dishonor and see what it proves. Malachi speaks of temporal plague. What follows from this? Or what does it serve to do? Paul proves from Malachi that this plague was imposed on Esau without merit and solely through the hatred of God, in order to conclude from it that free will is nothing. Here you are cornered, here you should have answered. We discuss merit, you talk about reward and talk in such a way that you do not escape what you wanted; yes, by talking about reward you admit the merit, but pretend not to see it. Say therefore, what was the cause with God, that he loved Jacob, and hated Esau, when they were not yet? But this also is false, that Malachi alone speaks of temporal plague, nor has he to do with the desolation of Edom, and with this [second] way thou pervertest the mind of the prophet altogether. The prophet indicates adequately in the clearest words what he wants, namely, he reproaches the Israelites for their ingratitude, that since he loved them, they in turn neither love him as a father, nor fear him as a lord. But that he loved them, he proves both by scripture and by deed, namely, that since Jacob and Esau were brothers, as Moses writes in the first book Cap. 25, he loved Jacob.
2) Diatribe § 19.
and chose him before he was born, as was said shortly before, but hated Esau in such a way that he made his land a wasteland, then also hated him with such persistence and continued to do so, that while he brought Jacob back from captivity and reinstated him, he did not allow the Edomites to be reinstated, but even though they said they wanted to rebuild, he threatened them with destruction. If the very clear text of the prophet does not contain this in itself, let the whole world call me a liar. So it is not the presumption of the Edomites that is reproached, but (as I have said) the ingratitude of the children of Jacob, who do not see what he bestows upon them, and takes away from their brethren the Edomites, for no [other] cause than because he hates here, loves there.
How can it be that the prophet speaks of a temporal plague? Since he testifies with perfectly clear words that he speaks of two peoples that were born of two patriarchs; the one was accepted and preserved as a vain people, but the other was abandoned and finally destroyed. To be accepted as a people and not to be accepted as a people does not only concern temporal good or evil, but refers to everything. For our God is not only a God of temporal things, but of all things. He does not want to be a God to you or to be worshipped in such a way that it only happens halfway or with a limp [1 Kings 18:21], but with all his strength and with all his heart, that he may be a God to you both here and in the life to come, and in all things, cases, times and works.
The third way is that according to the opinion of the figurative way of speaking he [God] neither loves all Gentiles, nor hates all Jews, but from both people some. "By this figurative way of speaking it is effected that this testimony (says it1 ) does not fight anything to prove the necessity, but [serves] to put a stop to the arrogance of the Jews." After this path has been taken, the diatribe slips out: it is said of God that he hated those who were not yet born.
1) Diatribe § 19.
because he knows in advance that they would do what is worthy of hatred; and so the hatred and love of God does not stand in the way of Wilson's freedom. Finally, it concludes that the Jews were cut off from the olive tree by what they earned with their unbelief, and that the Gentiles were grafted in by the merit of faith, according to Paul, and he gives hope to those who were cut off that they might be grafted in again, and arouses fear in those who were grafted in that they might be cut off.
I want to be of the death, if the diatribe itself understands what it speaks. But perhaps also here is a rhetorical trick, which teaches to make the sense dark, because a danger threatens, you might be seized at the" word. For we do not see any figurative speeches at this point, which the diatribe is dreaming up, but not proving. Therefore it is no wonder that for them the testimony of Malachi in a figurative sense proves nothing, because it is not there. Furthermore, we do not discuss cutting and grafting, which Paul speaks of in his exhortation. We know that people are grafted in by faith and cut out by unbelief, and that they should be exhorted to believe so that they will not be cut out. But it does not follow, nor is it proved, that they can believe or not believe by virtue of free will, which is what we are talking about. We do not dispute which are the believers and which are not, which are the Jews and which are the Gentiles, what follows believers and unbelievers; that belongs to an exhorter. But by what merit, by what work they come to faith, by which they are grafted in, or to unbelief, by which they are cut off. This comes to a teacher; this merit describe us. Paul teaches that this is not granted by any work on our part, but only by the love and hatred of God; but to those who are granted it, he exhorts them to persevere, so that they will not be cut off. But an exhortation does not prove what we are able to do, but what we owe. I am forced to fight the enemy almost with more
He must hold fast to the words, so that he does not, by letting the matter go, digress elsewhere than by using words to deal with] the matter itself. And yet, if I could hold him firmly to the matter, I would already have gained the victory: so clear and insurmountable are the words; and that is why he has almost nothing else to do than to avoid it and withdraw from sight, and to undertake something else than he had intended.
The third passage she takes 1) from Is. 45, 9.: "Does the clay also say to its potter, what are you doing?" and Jer. 18, 6.: "As the clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand." Again, she says that these passages prove more in Paul than in the prophets from which they are taken, because in the prophets they read of temporal tribulation, but Paul [Rom. 9:20.] uses them to prove eternal election and reprobation, to strike a blow at Paul's presumption or ignorance.
But before we see how it proves that both passages do not exclude free will, I will first say that it does not seem as if Paul took this passage from the prophets, nor does the diatribe prove this. For Paul is wont to give the name of the author, or to testify that he is bringing something from Scripture; but here he does neither. Therefore, it is more correct that Paul, by this general simile that others use for other things, himself uses it in his own spirit for his own cause, as he does with the simile: "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump of dough," which he applies to 1 Cor. 5, 6. to the morals that are easily corrupted, in other places he holds it against those who lead God's word falsely [Gal. 5, 9.], just as Christ [Marc. 8, 15.] calls the leaven of Herod and the Pharisees. May the prophets therefore speak especially of temporal tribulation, of which I do not want to say anything now, so that I am not so often occupied with distant questions and thus delayed, Paul nevertheless uses his spirit against free will. That
1) Diatribe § 20.
But if the will is not deprived of its freedom, if we are like clay to God, who is at home, I do not know where this belongs, or why the diatribe claims this, since there is no doubt that the tribulations come from God without our will, and bring with them the necessity to bear them, whether we want to or not, and it is not in our hands to avert them, even if we are admonished to bear them willingly.
But it is worth the trouble to listen to the sophistry of the diatribe, how Paul's speech does not exclude free will by this similitude. For she accuses him of two inconsistencies; one she takes from Scripture, the other from reason. From the Scriptures she concludes thus: 2)
Paul would have said so, 2 Tim. 2, 20. 21., in a large house are golden, silver, wooden and earthen vessels, some to honor, others to dishonor, but soon joined to them: If therefore any man purge himself from such men, he shall be a vessel unto honors 2c Then the diatribe thus concludes, "What would be more foolish than for a man to say to an earthen vessel, if thou purge thyself, thou shalt be a vessel unto honors? But this is rightly said to a vessel endowed with reason, which, when remembered, is able to do the will of the Lord." By this she thinks she has proved that the likeness does not rhyme with the matter in all respects, and that it is so removed that it can prove nothing.
I answer, not to take this up, that Paul saws not: If any man purge himself "from his filthiness," but "from such men," that is, from the vessels of dishonor, that the mind may be: If anyone remains separate and does not mix with ungodly teachers, he will be a vessel of honor 2c We will also admit that this passage of Paul completely proves (facere) what the diatribe wants, that is, that the similitude is not striking (non efficacem); how will it prove that Paul wants the same thing in that passage, Rom. 9, 20. f., of which we are discussing? Is it enough, then, to use another passage
2) Diatribe § 20.
and not to care at all whether it proves the same or something quite different? In the treatment of Scripture, no error is more easily made, nor is any more frequent, than to combine passages of different kinds from Scripture as if they were the same, as I have often shown, so that the comparison of the passages with which the diatribe is emblazoned proves less than this passage of ours, which refutes it. But not to be quarrelsome, let us admit that both passages of Paul want the same thing, and, what is quite indisputably true, that a similitude does not always and in all pieces fit the thing, otherwise it would not be a similitude, nor a transferred thing (translatio), but the thing itself, according to the proverb: A similitude limps and does not always walk on four legs.
But in this the diatribe errs and is lacking, that it disregards the cause of the parable, on which most must be seen, and quarrelsomely takes up the words. For Hilarius says that understanding is to be taken from the causes of speech, not from the words alone; so also the efficacy of a parable depends on the cause of the parable. Why then does the diatribe pass over that for whose sake Paul uses this simile, and takes up that which he does not say with reference to the cause of the simile? Namely, this belongs to exhortation, that he says, "If any man purify himself"; but that belongs to doctrine, that he says, "In a great house are vessels," 2c so that you may understand from all the circumstances of Paul's words and opinion that he is speaking of the diversity and use of the vessels, so that the meaning is: since so many depart from the faith, we have no other comfort than to be sure [2 Tim. 2:19], "The firm foundation of God standeth, and hath this seal: The Lord knoweth them that are his, and from unrighteousness passeth every one that calleth on the name of the Lord." So far goes the cause and the evidence (efficacia) of the parable, namely, that the Lord knows his own. Then follows the similitude, namely, that there are different vessels, some for honor, others for dishonor. Hereby the doctrine is completed (absolvitur) that the vessels do not prepare themselves.
but the Lord. This is also the intention of Rom. 9, 21, that a potter has power 2c Thus Paul's equation is quite conclusive that the freedom of the will is nothing before God.
After this follows the exhortation, "If any man purify himself from such men. "2c What this contains in itself is sufficiently known from what has been said above. For it does not follow: therefore they can purify themselves; indeed, if anything is proved, it is proved that free will can purify itself without grace, since it is not said if grace purifies someone, but if he purifies himself. But words of command and obligation have been superfluously spoken, and a similitude is not presented with words of obligation, but with such as indicate the reality (indicativis): as there are elect and reprobate, so there are vessels of honor and dishonor. In short, if this evasion (elusio) were to hold, Paul's whole discussion would have no value, for in vain would he introduce those who grumbled against the potter, God, if it seemed to be the fault of the vessel and not of the potter; for who would grumble if he heard that someone worthy of damnation was condemned?
The second inconsistency [which she imposes on the equation] she takes from the so-called human woman's reason, namely, that not the vessel but the potter is to be blamed, especially since it is such a potter who also creates and prepares the clay himself. "This vessel" (says the diatribe "is thrown into the eternal fire, because it deserves nothing, only because it is not its own master."
Nowhere does the diatribe reveal itself more clearly than in this passage. For you hear that here, though in other words, yet in the same sense, is said what Paul puts into the mouths of the ungodly [Rom. 9:19. "What then does he owe us? Who can resist his will?" This is what reason can neither grasp nor suffer, this is what annoys so many men distinguished by spiritual gifts, to whom so many centuries of-
1) § 20.
and followed throughout the ages (receptos). Here they demand that God act according to human rights and do what seems right to them, or he should cease to be God. The mysteries of majesty can avail him nothing, he give an account of why he is God, or why he wills or does what has no appearance of righteousness, as if you were to ask a cobbler or a bagman to stand trial. The flesh does not consider God worthy of such great honor that it should believe him to be just and good when he speaks and does something higher or beyond what the book of Justinian's Law or the fifth book of Aristotle's Moral Doctrine has established. The Majesty, who created all things, gives way to a yeast of her creature, and that Corycian cave, by reversing the thing, is afraid of her beholders. It is therefore inconsistent that he should condemn him who cannot avoid the merit of damnation, and because of this inconsistency it must be wrong for God to have mercy on whom he wills and to harden whom he wills [Rom. 9:18], but he must be brought back to order, and laws must be prescribed for him so that he condemns no one unless he deserves it according to our judgment. Thus enough has happened to Paul with his parable, namely, that he revokes it and does not allow anything to be valid, but shapes it in such a way that the potter here (as the Diatribe interprets it) makes a vessel for dishonor, because of the preceding merits, just as he rejects some Jews because of their unbelief, but accepts the Gentiles because of their faith. But if God works in such a way that He looks at the merits, why do those murmur and confront Him? Why do they say: what does he owe us? who can resist his will? Why did Paul have to silence those? Because who is surprised, I don't want to say indignant, or confronts when someone who deserves it is condemned? Furthermore, where is the power of the potter to do what he wants, if one subjects him to merits and laws and does not let him do what he wants, but demands of him that he should do what he must? For the prestige of merit is in conflict with the power and freedom of the potter.
The father of the house, who held up the freedom of will with respect to his goods to the grumbling workers who demanded their rights, proves this. This shows that the interpretation of the diatribe is inadmissible.
But, dear one, if we assume that God must be of such a nature that He sees the merits in those who are to be condemned, will we not insist in the same way and admit that He also sees the merits in those who are to be blessed? If we are to follow reason, it is as unreasonable that such as are not worthy should be crowned, as that such as are not worthy should be punished. Therefore, we must conclude that God must justify for the sake of the preceding merits, or we will declare Him to be unreasonable because He takes pleasure in evil and godless people and challenges and crowns their godlessness with rewards. But then woe to us poor with such a god! For who could be saved? Behold, therefore, the wickedness of the human heart: when God makes blessed the unworthy without merit, yes, justifies the wicked, who have deserved it by many other things, it does not accuse him of inequity, it does not question him as to why he wants this, although in his judgment it is quite inequitable; but because it is advantageous to him and comes easily, he judges it to be just and good. But since he condemns those who do not deserve it: because this is inconvenient to him, this is unreasonable, this is offensive, here [God] is confronted, here there is grumbling, here there is blasphemy.
So you see that the diatribe does not judge with her own in this matter according to fairness, but according to her selfish attitude. For if she were to look at equity, she would likewise be right with God when He crowns those who are not worthy of it, just as she would be right with Him when He condemns those who have not earned it. Likewise, she would also praise and glorify God when He condemns those who do not deserve it, as she does when He makes the unworthy blessed. For there is equal inequity on both sides, if you look at our minds. It would certainly be the same
It would be unfair for you to praise Cain for his murder and make him king, as if you wanted to imprison or kill the innocent Abel. Therefore, because reason praises God by making the unworthy blessed, but accuses him by condemning those who do not deserve it, it is convicted that it does not praise God as God, but as one who serves its own advantage, that is, it seeks and praises in God itself and its own, not God or what is God. But if God pleases you by crowning the unworthy, he must not displease you by condemning those who do not deserve it; if he is just there, why should he not be just here? There he showers grace and mercy on the unworthy, here he showers wrath and severity on those who do not deserve it. On both sides he does too much and is unjust before men, but just and true with himself. For how this is just, that he crowns the unworthy, is now incomprehensible, but we shall see it when we come to where we no longer believe, but see with unveiled face. Likewise, how this is just, that he condemns those who do not deserve it, is incomprehensible now, but we will believe it until the Son of Man is revealed.
The diatribe, however, vehemently annoyed by this parable of the potter and the clay, is somewhat indignant that it is so much cornered by it, and finally comes back to the fact that, after various passages from Scripture have been brought forward, some of which seem to attribute everything to man, others everything to grace, it resentfully asserts that both passages must be understood according to a sound interpretation and not simply accepted. Otherwise, if we insist on this equality, she is again ready to corner us with those commanding and obligatory passages, especially with that of Paul [2 Tim. 2:21]: "If any man therefore purge himself from such men"; here 1) she contradicts Paul with herself and lets him attribute everything to man.
1) Diatribe § 20, towards the end.
The same is true of the likeness of grace. If now here the interpretation is admitted that grace is left room, why then should the parable of the potter not also admit an interpretation that there is room for free will. Why should the parable of the potter not also permit an interpretation that there is room for free will?
I answer: I do not care; you can take it simply, twice or a hundred times? I say this, that by this healthy interpretation nothing is aligned nor proven, which is in question. For it must be proved that free will cannot will anything good. But in that passage, "If any man therefore purge himself from such men," because it is an obligatory discourse, neither nothing nor anything is proved; Paul only exhorts. Or if you want to add the conclusion of the diatribe and say: he exhorts in vain, if he cannot purify himself, then it is proved that free will is able to do everything without grace, and so the diatribe proves against itself.
So we still expect some passage of Scripture that teaches this interpretation; we do not believe those who invent it out of their heads, for we deny that there is any passage that attributes anything to man. We also deny that Paul contradicts himself when he says, "If any man therefore purge himself from such men," but we say that both the contradiction is invented in Paul, and the interpretation is devised which forces it [the diatribe] out, and that neither can be proved. This we freely admit, if the Scripture may be multiplied by the inferences and additions of the Diatribe: "In vain is commanded, if we are not able to do that which is commanded"; then Paul in truth argues against himself and the whole Scripture, because then the Scripture would be another than it has been; then it also proves that free will is able to do everything. But what would be surprising if it then also argued against what it says elsewhere, that God alone does everything. But the Scripture thus amplified does not argue against us alone, but also against the diatribe, which declared that free will could not will anything good. Let it therefore first free itself, and say how these two
Pieces agree with Paul: Free will cannot will anything good, and: If someone purifies himself, he can purify himself, or it is said in vain. So you see that the diatribe is in distress and defeated by that parable of the potter and only deals with it so that it may escape from it, and in the meantime does not consider how much the interpretation harms the cause that it has taken upon itself, and how it refutes itself and makes a mockery of it.
We, however, as we have said, have never contrived an interpretation, nor have we said: Stretch out your hand, that is, grace will stretch out. All this the diatribe invents from us for the benefit of its cause. But we have said that there is no contradiction in the statements of Scripture, and that no interpretation is necessary to untie the knot. But the very teachers of free will seek difficulties that do not exist, and dream up contradictions. For example, this does not contradict each other: "If anyone purifies himself," and: "God works all things in all." It is not necessary, in order to untie the knot, to say: Some things God does, some things man does, because the first saying contains in itself an obligatory speech, which does not at all assert or deny a work or a power in man, but prescribes what works or powers should be in man. Here is nothing figurative, nothing that needs interpretation; it is simple words, it is a simple sense, only may you not attach inferences and corrupting additions after the manner of the diatribe, for then an unsound sense would arise, but not through the fault of the words, but through the fault of the corrupter.
The latter passage, however, "God works all things in all," is a speech that indicates reality and asserts that all works, all power, are in God. How, then, should the two passages argue against each other, since the one deals with nothing of man's power and the other ascribes everything to God, and not rather agree with each other in the best possible way? But the diatribe is so drowned, suffocated and corrupted by the opinion of that carnal thought, "impossible things would be lost.
It is a fact that she cannot control herself, but rather, as often as she hears a commanding or obliging word, she immediately adds her conclusions that it is in reality so (indicativas), namely: Something is commanded, therefore we can do it and do it, otherwise it would be commanded in a foolish way. Based on this, it breaks out and boasts of victory everywhere, as if it had proved that these conclusions were confirmed with its thinking as if they were of divine standing. Based on this, she surely proclaims that in some passages of Scripture everything is attributed to man, therefore there is a contradiction there and an interpretation is necessary. And she does not see that all this is an invention of her head, which is nowhere confirmed in Scripture by a little bag, then also of such a kind that, if it were admitted, it would refute no one more strongly than herself, since she proves with it, if she proves anything, that free will is capable of everything of which she has undertaken to prove the opposite.
So she also repeats so often 1): "If a man does nothing, there is no merit; where there is no merit, there can be neither punishments nor rewards."
Again, she does not see how by these carnal grounds she refutes herself more than she refutes us. For what do these conclusions prove but that all merit is with free will? Where then can there be room for grace? Further, if free will deserves very little, but the rest is merited by grace, why does free will receive the whole reward? Or do we want to impute even a very small reward to it? If merits take place, so that rewards can take place, then the merit must also be as great as the reward. But what am I wasting words and time on a thing that is nothing? Now, even if all that the diatribe imposes were true, and it were partly man's and partly God's work that we deserve, they cannot indicate the work itself, what it is, how it is, and how great it is, therefore this is a dispute about nothing.
1) Diatribe § 22, middle.
But since she cannot prove anything of what she says, neither the contradiction, nor the interpretation, nor the passage which ascribes everything to man, but all these things are figments of her thought, Paul's similitude of the potter and the clay stands untouched and unconquerable, that it is not in our will as to what kind of vessels we are formed. But Paul's exhortations, "If any man purify himself," and the like, are forms according to which we are to be formed, but not testimonies of our work or endeavor. This may be enough about those passages of Pharaoh's hardening, of Esau, and of the potter.
Other part of this book: defense of the attracted sayings. 1)
Finally, Diatribe 2) comes to the passages that Luther cited against free will and also wants to refute them. The first of these is the saying Gen. 6:3 [according to the Vulgate]: "My spirit shall not dwell among men, for they are flesh." This passage refutes them in several ways. First, flesh does not mean here the ungodly inclination, but a weakness; secondly, it adds to the text of Moses that his saying refers only to the people of that time, not to the whole human race, therefore be said: In the Hebrew this saying is different, namely of goodness, not of severity of God, according to the process (autors) of Jerome, perhaps wanting to persuade us that, since this saying does not refer to Noah, but to the ungodly, to Noah belongs not the goodness, but the severity of God, but to the ungodly belongs the goodness, not the severity.
But let us leave aside these antics of the diatribe, which everywhere announces that it considers the Scriptures to be fables. We are not interested in what Jerome is fooling here; it is certain that he proves nothing, and we are not disputing
1) This superscription is found in the translation of Justus Jonas, but not in Latin.
2.) § 23.
from the opinion of Jerome, but from the understanding of the Scripture. The Scripture twister may invent that "the Spirit of God" signifies "indignation" (indignationem). We say that he cannot prove two things; first, that he cannot produce a passage of Scripture in which the Spirit of God is taken for indignation, since, on the contrary, the Spirit is everywhere said to be kind and loving; second, if he could prove that it is everywhere taken for indignation, he cannot immediately prove that it necessarily follows that it must be so taken in this passage also. So he may invent that "flesh" is taken for "weakness," but he proves nothing in the same way. For when Paul calls the Corinthians "carnal" [1 Cor. 3:1, 3, 4], he is certainly not referring to weakness, but to ungodliness (vitium), since he is punishing them because there are sects and mobs among them, which is not weakness or an inability for stronger doctrinal food, but wickedness and the old leaven, which he commands to be interpreted. Now let us look at the Hebrew.
"My spirit will not judge among men forever, for they are flesh"; for so it is written from word to word in Moses. And if we let our dreams go, the words there (I mean) are clear and plain enough. But that they are words of the angry God is sufficiently shown by the preceding and following together with the effect, the flood. For the cause of speaking thus was that the children [God] took the daughters] 3) of men to wives out of mere lust of the flesh, then also oppressed the land with tyranny, so that they forced the angry God to hasten the Flood and to postpone it only another hundred and twenty years, whereas otherwise he would never have let it come. Read Moses with care, and you will clearly see that this is his opinion. But what is it to wonder that the holy scripture is dark, or that from it you establish not only a free will, but even a divine will, if one
3) The words bracketed here are missing in Latin; they are found in Jonas.
may play his game with it as if you were looking for scraps 1) from Virgil in it? Namely, this means to untie knots and to eliminate questions by interpretation. But Jerome and his Origen have filled the whole world with these antics and have been the originators of this pernicious example that one did not direct one's effort to simple treatment (simplicitati) of Scripture.
It has been enough for me to prove from this passage that God's word calls men flesh, and so much flesh that the spirit of God could not remain among them, but had to be taken from them at the appointed time. For the fact that God says that His Spirit will not judge among men forever, He declares soon afterwards by fixing a hundred and twenty years in which He will still judge. But he opposes the spirit to the flesh, that men, being flesh, do not admit the spirit, but he, being the spirit, cannot put up with the flesh; so that after a hundred and twenty years he must be taken from them. Therefore, the passage in Moses must be understood thus: My Spirit, which is in Noah and other holy men, punishes those ungodly by the word of preaching and the life of the godly (for "to judge among men" Means, by the ministry of the word, to act among them, to punish, to rebuke, to plead urgently, in time or out of time), but in vain. For those who are blinded and hardened by the flesh become all the more angry the more they are judged, as is always the case when the Word of God comes into the world, namely that they become all the more angry the more they are instructed. And this cause has caused the wrath to be accelerated, just as the flood of sin has been accelerated there, since now not only sin is despised, but also the grace of God, and, as Christ says [John 3:19]: When the light came, men hated the light.
Since men are flesh, as God Himself testifies, they cannot do otherwise than
1) Here, too, the reading oentonas instead of 66Ntori68 is found, as in the explanation of Luther's third thesis 'Dom Ablaß. Cf. above, Col. 107.
They have to be carnally minded, therefore the free will can only have the ability to sin. Since they also become more and more angry when the spirit of God calls and teaches among them, what should they do when they are left to themselves without the spirit of God? And here it does not matter that Moses speaks only of the people at that time. The same concerns all men, since all are flesh, as Christ says, John 3:6: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." What a grave [moral] infirmity (vitium) this is, he himself teaches just there, since he says that no one can enter God's kingdom unless he is born again. A Christian should therefore know that Origen and Jerome with all their followers are corruptly mistaken, since they deny that by flesh in these passages the ungodly disposition (affectu) is to be understood. For also the saying 1 Cor. 3:3, "Ye are yet carnal," goes to ungodliness. For Paul's opinion is that there are still ungodly among them, but then also the godly, as long as they are carnally minded, are carnal, even though they are justified by the Spirit.
In short, you may pay attention to this in the Scriptures, wherever the flesh is spoken of in contrast to the Spirit, you can understand by flesh approximately everything that is contrary to the Spirit, as in the passage [John 6:63]: "The flesh is of no use." But where it is used for itself alone (absolute), you should know that it means the constitution and nature of the body, like [Matth. 19, 5.]: "The two will be one flesh"; [Joh. 6, 55.:] "My flesh is the right food"; [Joh. 1, 14.:] "The word became flesh." In these passages, with modification of the Hebrew way of speaking, one could say body instead of flesh, for the Hebrew language denotes by the word flesh that which we express by the two words flesh and body. And I would that it had been so translated with different words all over the Canon of Scripture. So I believe that my passage from Gen. 6, [v. 3] will still stand against free will, if it is proven that the flesh is, of which Paul says Rom. 8, 7. that it also cannot be subject to God, as we will see in that passage.
and the diatribe itself says that it cannot want anything good.
The second passage is Gen. 8, 21: "The thoughts and aspirations of the human heart are inclined to evil from youth"; and Cap. 6, 5: "All thoughts and aspirations of the human heart are inclined to evil forever. She escapes from this saying thus: 1) "The inclination to evil, which is found in most men, does not entirely abolish the freedom of the will."
But, I ask you, does God speak of most people and not rather of all? Since after the flood, as if he were sorry, he promises the remaining and future people that he will not let a flood come again for the sake of man, and gives the cause because man is inclined to evil, as if he wanted to say: If the wickedness of men should be looked upon, the flood of sin should never cease; but I will not henceforth look upon what they deserve 2c Thus you see that both before the flood of sin and after the flood of sin God says of men that they are wicked, and it is therefore nothing that the Diatribe speaks only of most. Furthermore, the Diatribe seems to regard the inclination or inclination to evil as a matter of little concern, as if we could either set it in motion or dampen it by our power, whereas Scripture wants to designate by this inclination that constant pull and urge of the will to evil. Or why did it not consult the Hebrew also here, since Moses says nothing of the inclination, lest you have cause to quibble? For so it is written in the sixth chapter [v. 5]: xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx xx xx xxx, that means: "All poetry
The thoughts of his heart are only evil at all times. He does not say that he is directed or inclined to evil, but that he is absolutely evil, and that in the whole of his life nothing else is thought of or aspired to but evil. The essence of his wickedness is described, that he neither does nor is able to do anything else, because he is evil. For, as Christ testifies [Matth. 7, 17], an evil man is not evil.
1) Diatribe § 23.
Tree also can not bring other than poor fruit.
But that the diatribe 2) asks: "Why was a time limit given for repentance, if no part of the change of mind depends on our will, but everything is governed by necessity?" I answer: The same you might say with all the commandments of God, why he commands, if everything happens by necessity? He commands in order to instruct and remind, so that they [men], humbled by the knowledge of their wickedness, may come to grace, as is said superfluously enough. Thus, even this passage still stands unconquered against the freedom of the will.
The third passage 3) is the saying Is. 40, 2.: "She has received double from the hand of the Lord for all her sin." "Jerome (says she) interprets this of the divine punishments, not of the grace which God bestows on men for iniquities."
I hear Jerome say so, so it is true. I dispute about Isaiah, who speaks with the clearest words, and Jerome is held against me, not to say too harshly, a man without judgment and care. Where is that promise by which we made the agreement that we would deal with the Scriptures themselves, not with the interpretations of men? The whole chapter of Isaiah, according to the testimony of the evangelists, speaks of the forgiveness of sins proclaimed through the gospel, since they say that "the voice of the preacher" [Is. 40, 3] refers to John the Baptist [Matth. 3, 3]. And we are to tolerate that Jerome, according to his way, imposes on us Jewish fairy tales sprung from blindness as a historical understanding, and his fool's antics as a spiritual interpretation, so that we are to understand, with complete reversal of the linguistic doctrine, the passage which speaks of forgiveness as of punishment? I pray you, what is this punishment which is fulfilled by the preaching of Christ? But let us see the words themselves in Hebrew.
2) § 23.
3) Diatribe § 34.
It says [Isa. 40, 1.]: Comfort, comfort, O my people, or comfort, comfort my people (populum), says your God. I believe that he who commands to comfort will not press for punishment. It follows [Isa. 40:2], "Speak to the heart of Jerusalem and preach to her." It is a Hebrew way of speaking "into the heart", that is, to speak good, sweet things, caresses, as Gen. 34, 3. Sichem speaks into the heart of Dina, whom he had violated, that is, he gave the soothing balm of caresses to the mourner, as our translator has interpreted. But what good, sweet things these are, which by God's command are to be preached for her consolation, he explains by saying: "For her knighthood has an end in that her iniquity is forgiven, for she has received double from the hand of the Lord for all her sin."
The "knighthood" (militia), for which our books 1) corruptly have "malice" (malitia), seems to the foolish Jewish teachers of language to denote the appointed time, for so they understand the word Job 7, 1.: "The life of man on earth is a knighthood", that is, the time is appointed to him. I hold that it is simply called, as grammar teaches, a knighthood, so that Isaiah is to be understood as speaking of the toil and labor of the people under the law, as they struggle, as it were, in the barriers. For so Paul likes to compare both the preachers and the hearers of the word "fighters" (militibus), as where he [2 Tim. 2, 3.] commands Timothy as a good fighter [1 Tim. 6, 12.] also to fight a good fight, and of the Corinthians he speaks [1 Cor. 9, 24.] as of such as run in the stocks; likewise [2 Tim. 2, 5.], No man is crowned, he fights but rightly; the Ephesians [6, 13. f.] and Thessalonians [1 Ep. 5, 8.] he arms with weapons, and boasts [2 Tim. 4, 7.], he fought a good fight, and similar things elsewhere. So also 1 Sam. 2, 22. is written in Hebrew that the sons of Eli slept with the women who practiced knighthood 2) at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation,
1) The Vulgate has Isa. 40, 2. malitia; in Heb.
2) Heb: MXIXN; Luther: served.
whose knighthood Moses also remembers in the 2nd book [Cap. 38, 8.], and therefore the God of this people is called the Lord of hosts, that is, the Lord of warfare or of the hosts.
Isaiah thus announces that the knighthood of the people of the law, because they were plagued under the law, as it were, with vain unbearable burdens, as Peter testifies in the Acts of the Apostles, Cap. 15, 10, shall come to an end, and that those freed from the law shall be transferred into the new knighthood of the spirit. Furthermore, this end of the exceedingly hard knighthood and the following new, completely free knighthood will not be given to them out of their merit, since they were not able to bear that either, but rather out of their unmerit, because their knighthood will be ended in such a way that their iniquity will be forgiven them in vain. Here are not dark or doubtful words. Their knighthood shall have an end, he says, because the iniquity of it is forgiven, by which he clearly indicates that the strivers under the law have not fulfilled the law, nor could they have fulfilled it, but that they have exercised the knighthood of sin and that the strivers have been sinners; as if God wanted to say: I am compelled to forgive their sins, if I will that the law be fulfilled by them, yea, at the same time to help up the law, because I see that they cannot but sin, especially when they exercise their knighthood, that is, endeavor to fulfill the law out of their strength. For the Hebrew word [xxxx] "the iniquity is forgiven" signifies that something is given freely out of [free] good pleasure. And therefore the iniquity is forgiven without any merit, yea, with unmerit. And this is what he adds:
"For she received double from the hand of the Lord for all her sin." This, as I have said, is not only the forgiveness of sins, but also the end of knighthood. This is nothing else than, after the law was abolished, which was the power of sin, and sin was given, which was the sting of death, they should
1882 V. v. L. vii, 2S4-M6. XII. Luther's dispute with Erasmus. W. xvni, WW-WM. 1883
reign in twofold liberty through the victory of JESUS Christ; this is what Isaiah says, "By the hand of the Lord." For it is not by their powers or merits that they have obtained this, but by Christ the Victor and Giver they have received it. "In all sins" is spoken after the Hebrew manner, which German is said "for," or "because of sins," as Hosea 12:13: Jacob served in a woman, that is, for a woman's sake; and Psalm 17:9: They have compassed me about in my soul, that is, for my soul's sake. Thus our merits, by which we obtain that twofold freedom, that both the knighthood of the law is ended and sins are forgiven, Isaiah paints in such a way that they were nothing but sins and all sins.
Should we now suffer that this very beautiful and insurmountable place against free will should be so defiled by the Jewish filth brought by Jerome and the Diatribe? Let that be far away! But my dear Isaiah stands as the victor against free will and states that grace is not given to the merits or efforts of free will, but to sins and undeservings, and that free will can exercise nothing else from its powers but the knighthood of sin, so much so that even the law, which is thought to have been given to help him, has been intolerable to him and has only made him more of a sinner while he served under it.
But that the Diatribe 1) disputes: "Although sin has become powerful through the law, and where sin has become powerful, grace also becomes powerful, it does not follow from this that man, before he becomes partaker of the grace that makes him pleasurable, cannot, under divine assistance, prepare himself for divine grace by morally good works."
It would be wonderful if the diatribe spoke this from her head and did not pick it out of some note which was sent to her from somewhere else or which she received from somewhere else and inserted it into her book. For she neither sees nor hears,
1) § 24.
what their words say. If sin is powerful through the law, how is it possible that man could prepare himself for divine grace through moral works? How can works avail, since the law does not avail? Or what is it but that by the law sin is made powerful, and that the works which are done according to the law are sins? But what does it say that man, under divine assistance, can prepare himself by moral works? Are we discussing divine assistance or free will? For what should not be possible by divine assistance? But it is what I have said: the diatribe despises the thing that leads it, therefore it snores so and yawns in speech.
But it cites 2) the centurion Cornelius as an example, whose prayer and almsgiving [Apost. 10, 4.] had been well-pleasing before he was still baptized and filled with the Holy Spirit.
I have also read Lucas in the Acts of the Apostles, but I have not found that only one syllable indicates that the works of Cornelius were morally good without the Holy Spirit, as the Diatribe dreams, but I find the opposite, that he was righteous and God-fearing, for so Lucas calls him; but that he is called righteous and God-fearing without the Holy Spirit is the same as if Belial were called Christ. Then the whole discussion there is about Cornelius being pure in the sight of God, as witnessed by the face sent down from heaven to Peter, which punished him; indeed, with such great words and things the righteousness and faith of Cornelius are praised by Lucas. Nevertheless, the diatribe with its sophists is blind with open eyes in the brightest light of words and in palpably clear things, and they see the opposite; so little trouble do they take to read and pay attention to the holy Scriptures, which must then be desecrated as dark and ambiguous. Admittedly, he had not yet been baptized and had not yet heard the word of Christ's resurrection.
2) Diatribe § 24.
that he was without the Holy Spirit? So you could also say that John the Baptist with his parents, then also the mother of Christ and Simeon were without the Holy Spirit. But away with such a gross darkness.
The fourth passage 1) from the same chapter of Isaiah [40, 6. 7.]: "All flesh is hay, and all his goodness is like a flower of grass. The hay is withered, the flower withered, for the Spirit of the Lord blows in it," 2c, "seems" to my diatribe 2) "to be too forcibly drawn to grace and free will." Why this, I ask? "Because Jerome (says it) takes the spirit for unwillingness (indignationem), the flesh for the weak constitution of man, which can do nothing against God." Again, Jerome's antics are brought before me instead of Isaiah's. I have to fight more strongly against the disgust by which the diatribe torments me with such great indelicacy (not to say something harsher) than against the diatribe itself. But we have shortly before pronounced our judgment on Jerome's opinion.
But, I beseech you, let us compare the Diatribe with itself: "the flesh (it says) is the weak constitution of man, but the spirit the divine unwillingness."
The divine will, then, has nothing else to wither (exsiccet, 3) but that miserable and weak condition of man, which it should rather help up?
But this is even more beautiful 4): "the flower of the grass is the glory which comes from pretenses in bodily things. The Jews "boasted of their temple, their circumcision, their sacrifices, the Greeks of their wisdom." So the flower of the grass and the glory of the flesh is the righteousness of works and the wisdom of the world. Now how can righteousness and wisdom be called fleshly things in the diatribe? How
1) Diatribe § 24.
2) In Latin, as follows from the corresponding passage in the Diatribe, the punctum before viNetur must be deleted and instead of Niatrike men - Niatrikae raemo must be read. Erasmus says there: "victetur rruki"; this miki is rendered here by üiatribuo vaoao.
3) With reference to Isa. 40, 7.
4) Diatribe z 24.
rhymes then to Isaiah himself, who interprets himself with his own words, saying, "Verily, the people is the, hay," he does not say, Verily, the hay is the weak condition of man, but the people, and asserts this with an oath. But what is the people? Is it only the weak nature of man? Whether Jerome understands the weak condition (conditionem) of man to mean the nature of man himself (creationem), or the miserable lot and the miserable condition of man, I do not know. But whichever of these two it is, then the divine will certainly wins praise and a rich booty by withering the wretched creature or unfortunate man, and not rather [Luc. 1, 51. ff.] scattering the hopeful and pushing the mighty from their seats and leaving the rich empty, as Mary sings.
But let us leave such empty things (larvis) and follow Isaiah. The people (he says) is grass. But the people is not the mere flesh or the weak constitution of human nature, but includes all that is in the people, namely rich, wise, righteous, holy, unless someone wanted to say that the Pharisees, elders, princes, noble people, rich 2c did not belong to the people of the Jews. The flower of the grass is quite correctly called the glory, namely, that they boasted of their kingdom, their regiment, but especially of the law, of God, of their righteousness and wisdom, as Paul discusses Rom. 2. 3. and 9. So since Isaiah says: all flesh, what is that different from all grass, or all people? For he does not simply say: flesh, but all flesh. But to the people belong soul, body, mind, reason, judgment lind everything that can be called and found in a man only as the most excellent. For he excludes no one who says that all flesh is grass, but the spirit that withers. Nor does he leave out anything that says the grass is the people. Admit, then, that free will, admit that whatever may be considered the highest and the lowest among the people, that all these are called flesh and grass by Isaiah. For these three
Names, flesh, grass [or hay] and people have the same meaning in this passage according to the own interpretation of him who is the author of the book.
Further, you yourself affirm that the wisdom of the Greeks and the righteousness of the Jews, which have withered away through the gospel, are the grass or the flower of the grass. Or do you think that the wisdom of the Greeks was not the most glorious thing they had, and the righteousness of the Jews was not the most glorious thing they could have? Teach thou something more glorious. Where, then, is thy confidence, with which thou didst even (I think, mock Philip 1), saying 2).
"If anyone would assert that what is most excellent in human nature is nothing but flesh, that is, that it is ungodly, I will easily agree with him if he proves what he asserts with testimonies from the Holy Scriptures"?
Here you have Isaiah proclaiming the people, who are without the Spirit of the Lord, as flesh with a loud voice, although you do not hear it so. You have your own confession, since you (perhaps carelessly) call the wisdom of the Greeks grass, or the glory of the grass, which is the same as calling it flesh, if you do not want to claim that the wisdom of the Greeks does not belong to reason or xxxxxxxxx, as you say, that is, to the most important part of man. Listen, I beg you, if you despise us, at least you, even where you, caught by the power of truth, speak right. You have read John [3, 6.]: What is born of the flesh is flesh, what is born of the spirit is spirit. In this passage, which evidently proves that what is not born of the Spirit is flesh, for otherwise the division of Christ, who divides all men into two parts, flesh and spirit, would have no validity; in this passage, then, as if it did not teach you what you desire, you bravely pass by and, after your own fashion, go elsewhere, meanwhile arguing that John says that those who believe are born of God and are children of God.
1) Melanchthon.
2) Diatribe § 24.
Gods and a new creature. You do not care what conclusion the division brings with it, but instruct us with idle words who are those who belong to the one part of this division, trusting in your art of speech, as if there were no one who would pay attention to this going over and such a cunning dissimulation, as if you did not see it.
It is hard not to believe that you do not act deceitfully and treacherously at this point, for he who treats the Scriptures with such mischievousness and hypocrisy as you do, can certainly say of himself that he is not yet proved by the Scriptures, but wants to be taught, while he wants nothing less and only prates this to the dishonor of the exceedingly bright light in the Scriptures and to adorn his obstinacy. Thus the Jews say to this day that the Scriptures do not prove what Christ, the apostles and the whole church have taught. The heretics cannot be instructed in anything by the Scriptures, the papists are not yet convicted by the Scriptures, although even the stones cry out the truth. Perhaps you expect a passage from the Scriptures consisting of these letters and syllables: The chief part of man is flesh, or that which is most excellent in man is flesh, otherwise you will be an insurmountable victor, just as if the Jews demanded that a saying from the prophets be taught consisting of these letters: Jesus, the carpenter's son, born of the virgin Mary in Bethlehem, is the Messiah and the Son of God.
Here, where you are overcome by the clear sense [of Scripture], you prescribe the letters and syllables which we are to teach; elsewhere, where you are overcome both by the letters and by the sense, you have figurative speeches, knots and sound interpretations. Everywhere you find something to say against the Scriptures, and this is not to be wondered at, because you deal with nothing else but that you fumble what you may say against it. Sometimes you run to the interpretations of the ancients, sometimes to the inconsistencies before reason; where
neither of them helps you, you discuss distant and near things, only so that you may not be held down by the present passage of Scripture. What shall I say? Proteus is not Proteus if he is compared with you; nevertheless, you cannot escape even in this way. How great victories boasted the Arians, because these syllables and letters
ύμοαύσως were not contained in the Scriptures, and did not care that by other words the same was most powerfully proved. But whether this is the way of a good, I do not want to say a godly heart, even godlessness and injustice could give a verdict.
Therefore have victory, we confess as the defeated that these signs and syllables "the most excellent thing in man is nothing but flesh" are not found in the holy scriptures. But you see of what nature your victory is, since we prove that it is found abundantly in Scripture that not one part, even the most excellent or principal part of man, is flesh, but that the whole man is flesh, and not only that, but that the whole race is flesh, and even this is not enough, but that the whole human race is flesh. For Christ says [Joh.
3, 6.]: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." You untie knots, invent figurative speeches, follow the interpretations of the ancients, or else recite verses about the Trojan War, only not to see and hear the present passage. We do not believe, but see and experience that the whole human race is born of the flesh. Therefore, we are forced to believe what we do not see, namely, that the whole human race is flesh, since Christ teaches it. Now whether the chief part (hegemonica pars) in man is comprehended in the whole man, in the whole people, in the whole human race, we leave to the sophists to doubt and dispute; I know that "in the whole human race" is comprehended body and soul with all powers and works, with all vices and virtues, with all wisdom and folly, with all righteousness and unrighteousness. All of this is flesh, because in all of this the
The mind is set on the flesh (sapiunt carnem), that is, on their own, and they lack the glory they should have in God and the Spirit of God, as Paul says, Rom. 3:23.
That you therefore say 1): "Not every inclination of man is flesh, but there is one part which is called the soul, there is another which is called the spirit, by which we strive for that which is honorable, as the worldly wise have striven, who taught that one must wish to die a thousand times rather than commit a shameful act, though we knew that no man would experience it, and that God would forgive the same":
So I answer: To him who believes nothing for certain, it is easy to believe and to say anything. Not I, but your Lucian may ask you, whether you can point out in the whole human race even one (be he twice or seven times even a Socrates), who has done this, what you say here and write that they have taught it? What do you fable with empty words? They should strive for respectability, who did not even know what respectable would be? You may call it honorable, if I shall give an excellent example, that they went to death for the fatherland, for wives and children, for their parents, or that they did not speak lies or become traitors, endured selected tortures, as Mncius 2) Scävola, Marcus Regulus and Aridere were people of such kind. But what can you show in all these other than only the outward appearance of the works? Have you seen their heart? Yes, by the outward appearance of the work it has become evident at the same time that they did all this for the sake of their honor, so that they were not ashamed to confess and boast that they sought their own honor. For it was only out of ardent ambition that the Romans, as they themselves testify, did what they did in virtue, as did the Greeks, as did the Jews, as did the whole human race.
1) Diatribe § 24.
2) In Latin Q - Huintus.
But even though this may be something honorable before men, there is nothing more dishonorable before God, indeed, it is the most ungodly and the highest blasphemy, namely, that they did not act for the sake of God's honor, nor did they praise Him as God, but, by taking away God's honor through the most ungodly robbery, and by taking it for themselves, they were never more dishonorable and shameful than while they were shining in their highest virtues. But how could they have acted to God's glory, since they did not know God and His glory; not that the same did not appear, but that the flesh did not permit them to see God's glory, because they were mad and senseless at their own glory. Now here you have that ruling (titzA6vaoniouin) spirit, the main part of man that strives for what is honorable, that is, the robber of divine honor and the one that strives for divine majesty, especially when people are most honorable and shine the most by their highest virtues. Now deny that these are flesh and corrupt by their ungodly inclination.
I do not think that the Diatribe would be so much annoyed at this speech, that man is called flesh or spirit, if the Latin said: Man is carnal or spiritual. For it must be admitted that this, as well as many other things in the Hebrew language, e.g. when it is said: Man is flesh or spirit, means the same as when we say: Man is flesh or spiritual, as the Latins say 1): Something sad is the wolf to the stables; something sweet is the moisture to the seeds, or when they say: This man is crime and wickedness itself. So also the holy scripture, for the sake of emphasis, calls man "flesh", as it were the carnality itself, because he lives and weaves (sapiat) all too much and in nothing else than in that which is of the flesh; and "spirit", because he lives and weaves, seeks, acts and endures in nothing else than in that which is of the spirit.
Perhaps someone here would still like to ask: If the whole person and the pre-
1) Virgil, LuwLea, Ldogs III, 80. 82.
If the most acceptable thing in man is called flesh, does it immediately follow that everything that is flesh must also be called ungodly? We say that he is ungodly who is without the Spirit of God. For this reason the Scripture says that the Spirit is given to justify the ungodly. But since Christ distinguishes the spirit from the flesh" by saying [Joh. 3, 6. 7.]: That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and adds that that which is born of the flesh cannot see the kingdom of God, it evidently follows: Everything that is flesh is also ungodly and under the wrath of God and does not belong to the kingdom of God, but if it does not belong to the kingdom of God and cannot have the spirit of God, then it follows with necessity that it is under the kingdom and spirit of the devil, since there is no intermediate realm between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the devil, which constantly fight each other. This is what proves that the highest virtues of the pagans, the best of the worldly wise, the most excellent of men, are indeed called honorable and good before the world and also appear so, but that all this is flesh before God and serves the kingdom of the devil, that is, that it is ungodly and unholy and evil in every respect.
But, beloved, let us suppose that the opinion of the Diatribe holds good, that not every inclination is flesh, that is, ungodly, but such as is called spirit, honorable and wholesome: behold, how many inconsistencies follow from this, not indeed before human reason, but in the whole Christian religion, and in the highest articles of faith! For if the most excellent thing in man is not ungodly, nor depraved or damned, but only flesh, that is, coarser and lower inclinations, I pray thee, what kind of a Saviour would we make of Christ? Do we want to make the value of his blood so low that he only redeemed what is the least in man, but the most excellent in man was able to do something by itself (valeat) and did not need Christ's work? so that we henceforth preach Christ as a redeemer, not of the whole man, but of his worst part, namely the flesh, but man himself.
be his own redeemer according to his better part.
Choose which of the two you want, if the better part of man is healthy, then he does not need Christ the Redeemer. If he does not need Christ, he has greater honor than Christ and triumphs over him, because he provides for himself as the better part, while Christ provides only for the worse. Furthermore, the kingdom of the devil will be nothing, since it rules only over the worse part of man, but is dominated by the better part. Thus, by this doctrine of the chief part of man, man will be elevated above Christ and the devil, that is, he will become a god above gods and a lord above lords. Where is now that acceptable opinion which said that the free will could not want anything good, but here claims that it is a most essential and indeed a healthy and honorable part, which does not even need Christ, but is more capable than God himself and than the devil?
I say this so that you may see again how dangerous it is to approach holy and divine things without the Spirit of God, with the presumption of human reason. If Christ is the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world, it follows that the whole world is under sin, damnation and the devil, and the distinction between the principal and the nonprincipal parts is of no use, for the world refers to people who live and weave in the worldly in all respects.
"If the whole man (she says1) ), even the one born again by faith, is nothing but flesh, where is the Spirit, born of the Spirit? where the child of God? where the new creature? On this I would like to be instructed." Thus the diatribe.
Where? Where, my dearest Diatribe, what do you dream? Do you desire to be taught how the spirit is born of the spirit of flesh? With how cheerful and sure victory you defy us, the conquered, as if it were impossible for us to exist here!
1) Diatribe § 24.
In the meantime, you want to abuse the reputation of the ancients, who teach that certain germs (semina) of the honorable are implanted in the minds of men. First of all, if you so wish, you are free on our account to use or abuse the reputation of the ancients; you will be recognized for what you believe, since you believe people who speak their own without the word of God. And perhaps, in your concern for religion, you are not much troubled by what someone believes, since you so easily believe people, and you do not care whether what they say is certain or uncertain. And we would like: to be instructed about it, when we have ever taught what you so freely and publicly burden us with? Who should be so nonsensical as to say that he who is born of the spirit is nothing but flesh?
We clearly separate flesh and spirit as contending things, and say with divine revelation that the man who is not born again by faith is flesh. Then we say that the one who is born again is not flesh any more than there are remnants of the flesh which contend against the firstfruits of the Spirit received. Nor do I believe that you intended to invent this in order to arouse spite against us; otherwise what more shameful thing could you have laid upon us? But either you do not understand anything about our things, or you do not seem to be equal to the greatness of the matter, by which you are perhaps so depressed and confused that you are not fully aware of what you are saying both against us and for yourself. . For that you believe, according to the reputation of the ancients, that certain germs of respectability are implanted in the minds of men, you say again with a certain forgetfulness, since you asserted above that free will can will nothing good. But I do not know how "not being able to will anything good" can suffer certain germs of respectability in itself. Thus I am constantly forced to remind you of the main thing that you have taken upon yourself, from which you digress in constant forgetfulness and act differently than you had intended.
Another passage is Jer. 10:23: "I know, O Lord, that man's doings are not in his power, and are in no man's hands.
Power, how he walks or directs his course." "This passage (she says1 ) concerns more the outcome of pleasing circumstances than the faculty of free will."
Here the diatribe again confidently brings an interpretation, as it seemed to her, as if the scripture was completely under her control. But that he should look at the meaning and the absehen of the prophet, why did a man of such great reputation need that? It is enough, Erasmus says it, so it is so. If the opponents are allowed this arbitrariness to make interpretations, what is left that they do not want to obtain it? Let him therefore prove this interpretation from the context of the same speech, so we want to believe. But we teach from the context itself that the prophet, seeing that he teaches the wicked in vain with such great perseverance, at the same time gives to understand that his word is not able to do anything unless God teaches within, and therefore it is not in the power of man to hear and to will good. When he perceives this judgment of God, he asks him, frightened, that he may chastise him with measures, if he is to be punished at all, and that he may not be subjected to the wrath of God along with the wicked, whom God allows to become hardened and remain unbelieving.
But we still want to imagine that this passage is understood by the outcome of pleasant and sad circumstances; how then, if just this interpretation most strongly embraces the free will? This new evasion is invented, so that unlearned and sleepy [readers], deceived, should believe that enough has happened, just as they do with the evasion of the necessity of the consequence. For they do not see that, as they are rather entangled and caught by these evasions, so also they are made to turn aside by these new words. If now the outcome of these things is not in our power, which are temporal and over which man, Genesis 1, has been appointed lord, I pray you, how then can that heavenly thing, the grace of God, be in our power, which alone is based on
1) Diatribe § 25.
is based on the will of God? Can the effort of free will attain eternal bliss, which cannot hold a penny, not even a hair on its head? We do not have the ability to attain the created, and should have the ability to attain the Creator? What are we racing for? Now this belongs especially to the outcome (eventus) that a man strives after good or evil, because there he errs more on both sides and has less freedom than by striving for money, or honor, or pleasure. How beautiful, then, is this interpretation (glossa) escaped, which denies the freedom of man in regard to what end a thing goes out to, in small and created things, and preaches the same in the highest and divine things, as if you said: Codrus cannot pay a stater, but he can pay innumerable thousands of gold florins. And I am surprised that the Diatribe, which has so strongly persecuted the statement of Wiclef that all things happen in a necessary way, now itself admits that the outcome of things for us is a necessary one.
Furthermore, she says 2): "If one wants to force this on free will, then everyone must confess that it is in no one's power to walk rightly without the grace of God. Nevertheless, we ourselves also strive to the best of our ability, for we pray daily: Lord, my God, direct my path before you; he who asks for help does not cease from his efforts."
The diatribe thinks that it doesn't matter what she answers, if she only doesn't keep silent and says something. Then she wants to be respected for having done enough; that's how much she trusts in her reputation. It should have been proven whether we strive from our strength, and she proves that the one who prays strives for something. I ask you, is she mocking us or is she mocking the papists? He who prays prays through the Spirit, yes, the Spirit Himself prays in us, Rom. 8:15. How, then, through the effort of the Holy Spirit does the
2) Diatribe § 25.
What is the capacity of the free will? Are free will and the Holy Spirit one and the same in the diatribe? Are we now discussing what the spirit is able to do? The diatribe thus leaves the passage of Jeremiah untouched and unconquered and only brings out of its head this little bell: We also strive with [our] strength. And Luther should be forced to believe this, if he only wanted to!
Likewise the saying, 1) Sprüchw. 16, 1: "A man sets it before him in his heart, but from the Lord comes what the tongue should speak"; of this it says that it also refers to the outcome of things.
As if by this own statement of hers, without any other reason and proof, enough had happened to us. And it makes it truly enough, because in admitting the opinion of the outcome of things, we have completely won, according to what we have just said, that since the freedom of the will is nothing in our affairs and works, rather there is none in divine things and works.
But see their perspicacity 2): "But what about the fact that a man imagines something in his heart, since Luther claims that everything is guided by necessity?"
I answer: Since the outcome of things is not in our power, as you say, how can it come to a man to direct things? What you would have answered me, now accept as answered you. Yes, therefore especially must one act, because everything future is uncertain to us, as Ecclesiastes [11, 6.] says: "Early sow thy seed, and in the evening let not thine hand depart: for thou knowest not whether this or that shall come to pass." To us, I say, it is uncertain, according to our knowledge, but necessary according to the outcome (eventu). Necessity instills in us the fear of God, lest we decay and be secure; but uncertainty gives birth to confidence, lest we despair.
But she returns to her old ditty, 3) that in the book of proverbs many things for
1) Diatribe § 26.
2) Diatribe § 26.
3) Diatrrbe § 26.
the free will is said; the kind is [Prov. 16, 3.]: "Command the Lord thy works"; "hearest thou," says she, "thy works"?
Namely, because in this book there are many commanding and obliging words, also pronouns of the second person, because by these basics the freedom of the will is proved, like: "Command", so you can command your works, so you do them. Thus the word: "I am your God" [Deut. 5, 6] you must understand in this way: that is, you make me your God. "Your faith has helped you" [Matth. 9, 22.]: do you hear? "Thy"; interpret it thus: thou makest faith: then thou hast proved free will. Here I am not mocking, but showing the diatribe that it is not serious in this matter.
The word in the same chapter [Prov. 16, 4.]: "The Lord makes everything for His own sake, even the wicked for the evil day", models them 4) also by their words, and excuses God that He created no creature evil.
As if I were talking about creation and not rather about that constant effect of God in the created things. Through this effect, God drives even the wicked, as we said above about Pharaoh. 5)
Also the word from the 21. 6) chapter [v. 1.] seems to prove nothing to her: "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord; he inclines it whithersoever he will." "He does not immediately compel who inclines "[something]," she says.
As if we were talking about compulsion and not rather about the necessity of immutability. This is signified by the inclination of God, which is not such a sleepy and lazy thing, as the diatribe invents, but it is that exceedingly active working of God, which he [man] cannot avoid and cannot change, but through which he must necessarily change such willing.
4) Diatribe? 26.
5) In the Jena edition this is added: But he creates the wicked, not by creating wickedness or a wicked creature, which is impossible, but from corrupt seed; while GOtt works, the wicked man or is created [as a wicked^, not through the fault of him who makes rhn, but through the corruption (vitio) of the substance ("nmtsria") sden he works on^.. .
6) In the diatribe? 27: 6x eapits 20th, which has passed m the Latin editions in our place.
as God has given it to him, and as He [God] carries him away by His impulse [motu]; as I said above.
Furthermore, since Solomon speaks of the heart of the king, the Diatribe thinks 1) "that this passage is not rightly made into a generally valid sentence, but wants to say the same thing that Job says in another way [Job 34:30]: 'He makes a hypocrite reign over them because of the sins of the people'." Finally, it admits "that a king of GOtte is also directed to evil, but in such a way that he allows the king to be driven by evil lusts to chastise the people."
I answer: If God allows or directs, this very allowing or directing does not happen without the will and the effect of God, because the king's will cannot escape the action of the almighty God, because the will of all is torn to will and do, may it be good or evil. But that we have made a general proposition out of the particular will of the king, that. I think we have done neither clumsily nor unlearnedly. For, if the heart of the king, which, as you can see, is most free and rules over others, nevertheless cannot will otherwise than where God inclines it, how much less can any other man! And this conclusion would apply not only to the will of the king, but also to that of any other man. For if a man, however lowly his position (quantumlibet privatus), can will nothing else before God than where God inclines him, this can also be said of all men. Thus, the fact that Balaam could not speak what he wanted is the clearest justification in Scripture for the fact that a person has neither free choice nor free action under his control, otherwise the examples in Scripture would have no validity.
After she had said hereupon, 2) "that such testimonies as Luther would have collected from this book could be brought together in great numbers, but that they are
. 2) Diatribe § 27.
by a skilful interpretation both for and against free will", she finally cites 3) "Luther's Achilles' sword, his irresistible weapon, John 15:5: 'Without me you can do nothing'" etc.
I also praise him who advocates free will with splendid eloquence, who teaches to model the testimonies of Scripture by clever interpretations, as seems good to him, so that they really stand for free will, that is, prove, not what they should, but what we like. After that, he may well pretend that he fears the One Sword of Achilles so much that an incomprehending reader, after this [main] saying has been defeated, may think the others all too contemptible. But I want to watch the boastful and heroic Diatribe to see with what strength she could overcome my Achilles, since she has not yet beaten a common soldier, not even a Thersites 4), but has made herself miserable with her own weapons.
Now she takes up this little word "nothing", chokes it with many words and many examples and stretches it to the point that "nothing" can be the same as something small and imperfect, namely by expressing in other words what the sophists have taught so far in this place in the following way: Without me you can do nothing, namely in a perfect way. She makes this long outdated and rusty gloss into a new one by the power of oratory, and insists on it as if she were the first to bring it forward and it had never been heard before, as if she wanted to present it to us instead of a miracle. In the meantime, however, she is quite sure and does not even think of the text itself, not of what precedes or follows, from which, after all, understanding must be taken. I am silent about the fact that she proves with so many words and examples that the word "nothing" can be taken at this point for something small and imperfect, as if we were discussing the possibility of taking something, while it is to be proved that the word "nothing" can be taken for something small and imperfect.
3) Diatribe § 28.
4) The ugliest, in body and mind, among the warriors before Troy; Achilles slew him because he blasphemed him. Lom H. II, 217.
whether it must be taken in this way, so that this whole great interpretation accomplishes nothing, if it accomplishes anything at all, but that this whole passage of John becomes uncertain and ambiguous. And this is not to be wondered at, since the only thing the diatribe wants is that the Scripture of God is everywhere ambiguous, so that it is not forced to use it, but the sayings of the ancients are certain, so that it is free to misuse the Scripture. This is really a strange worship of God, that the words of God should be useless, but the words of men useful.
But this is very beautiful to see how well she agrees with herself: "Nothing can be taken for a little thing, and "in this sense (she says1 )) it is very true that we can do nothing without Christ, for he speaks of the evangelical fruits, of which others are not made partakers, but those who abide in the vine, that is, in Christ. "2c
Here she herself confesses that the fruits are not given to others, but only to those who remain on the vine, and this she does in the skillful interpretation by which she proves that "nothing" is the same as something small and imperfect. But perhaps this subordinate word "not" must also be interpreted in the same way, that it indicates that the evangelical fruits can also be given to someone apart from Christ to some extent, or that a small and imperfect fruit can be given to someone, so that we might preach that even the ungodly without Christ, who, since Satan rules in them, also fight against Christ, 2) are able to bring forth something in fruits for life, that is, that the enemies of Christ work for Christ; but we will leave this aside.
Here I would like to be taught a way in which to resist the heretics, who are everywhere in Scripture
1) Diatribe § 28.
2) We assume that instead of puZnants - puZnant is to be read, and have translated accordingly. This change is due to: 1) the fact that qui is not followed by verburu ünituru; 2) the fact that gui contra 6tiristuiu pusnant is immediately followed by: bostes OUristi.
would like to apply this law and claim that "nothing" and "not" is to be taken for something imperfect, e.g. [Joh. 1, 3.]: "Without the same nothing is made", that is, a little. [Ps. 14, 1: "The Thor says in his heart, God is not," that is, God is imperfect. [Ps. 100, 3.:] "He made us, and not we ourselves," that is, a little we have made ourselves. And who can count the places in Scripture where "nothing" and "not" are written? Shall we say here that one must look to a fitting interpretation? But there is no heretic to whom his interpretation is not suitable. Yes,' does that mean to untie knots, if one opens the gate to corrupt hearts and deceitful spirits for such a great arbitrariness? I believe that to you, who do not respect the certainty of the Scriptures, such an arbitrary interpretation would be quite acceptable, but for us, who strive to fortify consciences, there can be nothing more unskillful, nothing more harmful, nothing more pernicious than this skilful interpretation (commoditate). Hear therefore, great victor over Luther's Achilles: If you do not prove that "nothing" in this passage not only can be taken for a little, but that it must also be taken for a little, you have accomplished nothing with so great a quantity of words and examples, but that you have fought with barren stubble against flames. What do we have to do with your "can", since it is demanded of you that you prove the "must"? If you do not manage to do this, we will stick to the natural and linguistic meaning of the word and ridicule both your armies and your triumphs.
Where is now your acceptable opinion, which stated that the free will can want nothing good? But perhaps here at last comes the clever interpretation that "nothing good" means "something good" according to a completely outrageous linguistic doctrine and art of inference, that "nothing" is the same as "something," which would be impossible with the dialecticians, since they are contradictory things. Where is it also that we believe that the devil is the prince of the world, who rules, as Christ [Joh. 14, 30.] and Paul [2 Tim. 2, 26. Eph. 2, 2.1 testify, in the will and heart of men-.
who are his prisoners and serve him? He, namely the roaring lion, the implacable and restless enemy of the grace of God and the salvation of mankind, should let it happen that man, a servant and part of his kingdom, should strive with any movement or impulse for the good, by which he would like to escape his tyranny, and should he not rather provoke and urge him to want and do with all his strength what is contrary to grace? Even the righteous and those who work in the spirit of God can hardly resist this and want to do good, so he rages against them.
You, who invent that the human will is something that is in a free middle state and is left to itself, can easily invent at the same time that it is an endeavor of the will on both sides, because you also invent that both God and the devil are far away, as it were only spectators of that variable and free will; but you do not believe that they drive and move the imprisoned (servae1) ) will, since they are in the fiercest struggle with each other. If this alone is believed, our opinion is sufficiently established, and free will lies prostrate, as we have also taught above. For either the kingdom of the devil in man can be nothing, and then Christ would be lying; or if its kingdom is of such a kind as Christ describes [Luc. 11, 18. ff.], then free will is nothing but a captive beast of burden of the devil, which cannot be freed unless the devil is first cast out by the finger of God.
From this, I believe, you understand sufficiently, dear Diatribe, what this is and how much it applies, that your author, who detests the persistence of Luther's assertion, is wont to say, namely, that Luther penetrates the matter very much with passages of Scripture, which could nevertheless be resolved with a single word. For who does not know that all Scripture can be dissolved with a single word? We knew this quite well, even before we heard the name of Erasmus. But this is the question: whether this is enough, if with one word all Scripture can be dissolved.
1) Thus Luther himself translates in "Grund und Ursach", article 36. Walch, old edition, vol. XV, 1859, p 235.
Is the Scripture being dissolved? Whether it is resolved correctly or whether it must be resolved in this way? This is the subject of dispute. Let him look here, and he will see how easy it is to dissolve Scripture, and how detestable Luther's persistence is. But he will not only see that those little words do nothing, but also not all the gates of hell.
Therefore, what the diatribe does not allow for its affirmative position (affirmativa), although we are not obliged to prove our "no" (negativam), we nevertheless want to do, and to wrest from it by the force of the reasons of proof that "nothing" in this place not only can be taken, but also must be taken, not for something small, but for what the word means according to its nature (natura); but we want to do this, and still above it to that insurmountable reason by which we have already won. We will add the following, namely, that words must be kept in the natural use of their meaning unless the opposite has been proved, which the diatribe has neither done nor can do. But we want first to force this from her by the nature of the thing itself, namely, that it has been shown by scriptural passages, which are neither ambiguous nor obscure, that the devil is by far the most powerful and cunning prince of the world (as we have said), under whose rule the human will, now not free, nor its own master, but the servant of sin and of the devil, can will only what that prince of his wants. But he will not allow the will to want anything good; even though, if the devil did not rule over him, even sin, of which man is the servant, would make him burden enough that he could not want the good.
Furthermore, the context of the speech, which the diatribe bravely despises, although I would have indicated it sufficiently in many words in my "Assertion" (Assertionibus2) ), is also denied to her. For Christ continues Joh. 15, 6: "Whoever does not abide in me is thrown away like a branch and withers, and they gather them and throw them away.
2) Cf. the note to § 14 of the Diatribe.
it into the fire, and must burn." This, I say, the diatribe has passed over with the most beautiful oratory, and hoped that the Lutherans, who were so unlearned, would not notice this passing over. But you see that here Christ himself, as the interpreter of his parable of the branch and the vine, explains clearly enough what he wants to be understood by the word "nothing," namely, that the man who is apart from Christ is thrown away and withers. But what else can be cast away and wither than to be given over to the devil and to become worse all the time? But to become worse is not to be able to do something or to strive for something. The withering vine becomes more and more ready for the fire the more it withers. If Christ himself had not so extended and applied this simile, no one would have dared to so extend and apply it. Therefore it is certain that "nothing" must actually be taken in this place, as the nature of the word entails.
Now let us also consider the examples by which she proves that "nothing" is taken anywhere for something small, so that we also prove in this piece that the diatribe is nothing and achieves nothing. Even if it were really something in this, it would still accomplish nothing, since the diatribe is nothing in all things and in every way.
"In general (she says1) ) one is wont to say of him that he does nothing who does not get over what he desires, and yet he who strives is often advanced by a significant amount."
I answer: I have never heard that one generally speaks in this way: you invent it in this way, according to the liberty you take. The words must be considered (as they say) according to the thing it is about (secundum materiam subjectam) unb ηαφ ber ) and according to the intention of the speaker. Now no one calls "nothing" what someone strives for with his doing. He who speaks of "nothing" does not speak of the effort, but of the effect; for this is what he has in mind who says, "This one does nothing, or he does nothing," that is, he has not achieved it, he has not
1) Diatribe § 28.
attained. Then, even if the example were valid, which is of no value, it would serve us better. For this is what we assert and want to show, that free will does many things that are nothing in the sight of God. What can it profit him that he strives, if he does not attain what he strives for? Therefore, wherever the diatribe may turn, it runs up and refutes itself, as it is wont to do to those who lead a bad cause.
Thus it also evilly cites this example from Paul [1 Cor. 3:7: "So then neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but God who gives the flourishing." "That in which there is little interest, and which in itself is useless (says she2) ), He calls nothing."
Who? You, O Diatribe, say that the ministry of the word is in itself useless and of very little importance, while Paul praises it everywhere with such great exaltations and especially 2 Cor. 3, 7, where he calls it a ministry of life and clarity? Again, you do not look at the thing it is about, nor even the intention of the speaker. To give flourishing, to this he who plants and he who waters is nothing, but to planting and watering he is something significant, since teaching and exhorting is the highest work of the Spirit in the church of God. This is Paul's opinion and the words obviously bring this along. But granted that this clumsy example is also valid, the same will again serve our cause. For by this we deal that free will is nothing, that is, useless, in itself, as you interpret it, before GOtte, for of this kind of being (essendi) we speak, knowing very well that an ungodly will is a something and not a mere nothing.
Likewise the word 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I did not have love, I would be nothing." Why she gives this example, I do not see, if she did not only look for a large number and crowd, or if she was of the opinion that we lack weapons with which we could put an end to her. For really and actually he is nothing before God who is without love. So teach
2) Diatribe § 28.
we also from the free will. Therefore, this example also stands for us, against the diatribe, unless the diatribe might not yet know what we are fighting for. For we do not speak of the being of the natural being, but of the being of grace (as it is called) (non de esse naturae, sed de esse gratiae). We know that free will does something in the natural being, as eating, drinking, begetting, governing, so that it does not laugh at us with that madness, as if it were a shrewd little finger, 1) "that one could not even sin without Christ, if we wanted to insist so strongly on the word 'nothing,' since Luther admitted that free will is not capable of anything except sinning; To penetrate such exceedingly inconsistent things in this serious matter, the Diatribe has been pleased. For we say that man, apart from the grace of God, nevertheless remains under the general omnipotence of God, who does everything, moves everything, drives everything, with necessary and infallible course, but that what man thus driven does is nothing, that is, is good for nothing before God and is to be regarded as nothing but sin. Thus he who is without love is "nothing" in grace. Why, then, does the diatribe, even though it itself confesses that we are dealing in this passage with the evangelical fruits, of which one cannot become partaker without Christ, here immediately completely divert from the matter, begin another little song, and make sophistical speeches about natural works and human fruits? But how could it be otherwise than that he who is deprived of the truth nowhere agrees with himself?
So also the passage Joh. 3, 27.: "A man can take nothing, except it be given him from heaven."
John speaks of the man, who was already something, and says that he can take nothing, namely, not the spirit with its gifts; because of this he spoke, not of the natural being. He also did not need the diatribe as a teacher, so that she would teach him that man already has eyes, nose, ears, mouth, hands, mind, will, reason and everything that is of the natural being.
1) Diatribe § 28.
is a man, if the diatribe does not believe that the Baptist was so mad that, when he called man, he thought of the primordial matter (chaos) of Plato, or of the emptiness of Leucippus, or of the infinite (infinitum) of Aristotle, or of some other nothing, which would only become a something by a gift from heaven: yes, that is to cite examples from Scripture, if one plays his game in such a manner in such a great matter.
To what end, then, does this great multitude [of words] serve to teach us that 2) the fire, the fleeing of that which is harmful, the striving after that which is useful, and other things come from heaven, as if anyone did not know or deny this? We speak of grace and, as she herself said, of Christ and the evangelical fruits; but meanwhile she prattles on about the natural being, spends time and drags the matter out, and makes a haze to the unintelligent reader. In the meantime, not only does she not give an example where "nothing" is taken for a little thing, as she had intended, but she also clearly betrays that she understands nothing about it and cares nothing about what Christ or grace is, or how grace is something different from the natural being, since even the most unlearned sophists have known this and have made this distinction commonplace in their schools through extremely frequent use; and at the same time she does not recognize that all her examples serve for us and against her. For this is proved by the word of the Baptist, that man can take nothing, except it be given him from heaven, that free will may be nothing. Thus my Achilles is defeated, in that the weapons are presented to him by the diatribe, by which she, who is weaponless and defenseless, is defeated. Thus, with a single word, the scriptural passages are dissolved, with which the persistent assertor, Luther, so strongly assails her.
After that, she gives many parables, by which she accomplishes nothing, except that, according to her habit, she diverts a foolish reader to distant things and, in the meantime, the
2) Diatribe § 28.
The main thing is that God maintains the ship, but the shipman brings it into the harbor, therefore the shipman does something. This equation attributes to both a different work, namely, that of preserving to God, and that of steering to the shipman. Thus, if it proves anything, it proves that the whole work of preserving belongs to GOtte, the whole work of directing to the shipman, and yet it is a beautiful and fitting simile.
Thus the plowman brings in the fruits, GOtt has given them. Here again different works are attributed to God and man, if it does not make the husbandman at the same time the creator who gave the fruits. But even if nan admits that God and man did the same works, what would these parables prove? Nothing else than that the creature cooperates with God, who works. But are we now talking about the cooperation and not rather about the own power and effect of the free will? Where then does that orator flee, who wanted to speak of the palm tree and now speaks of nothing but the pumpkin? One began to make a barrel, why has it now become a pitcher?
Also we know that Paul is God's co-worker in teaching the Corinthians [1 Ep. 3, 9.], preaching outwardly and teaching God inwardly, also in a different work. Similarly, when he speaks in the spirit of GOt, he also works with GOt in the same work. For this we assert and defend, that when GOtt works without the grace of the Spirit, He works everything in -all, even in the ungodly, since He moves, drives, and carries away everything that He alone has created, also alone, by the movement of His omnipotence, which those [created things] can neither avoid nor change, but necessarily follow and obey, each according to the nature of its endowment (virtutis) given to it by GOtt, and thus everything, even the ungodly, works with Him. Furthermore, when he works through the Spirit of grace in those whom he has justified, that is, in his kingdom, he drives and moves them in the same way, and they, as they are a new creature.
follow and participate, or rather, as Paul says [Rom. 8, 14], they are driven. But this was not the place for this; we are not discussing what we are able to do through the action of God, but what we are able to do, namely, whether we, who are already created from nothing, can make ourselves into something, or through that general movement of omnipotence can strive to be born into a new creature of the spirit; here the diatribe should have given an answer, and not diverted to something else. For here we answer thus: Just as man, before he is created, does nothing to become a man, or strives for something by which he becomes a creature, so afterwards, as one who has become and been created, he does nothing or strives by which he remains a creature, but both take place solely through the will of the almighty power and goodness of God, who creates and sustains us without us. But he does not work in us without us, since he created and preserved us for this purpose, so that he would like to work in us and we would like to work with him, whether this happens outside of his kingdom through the general omnipotence, or within his kingdom through the special power of his spirit.
So we further say: Man, before he is renewed into a new creature in the realm of the spirit, does nothing, strives for nothing, by which he is born into this renewal and this realm, then also when he is born again, he does nothing, strives for nothing, by which he could persist in this realm, but both does only the spirit in us, which without us again gives birth to us and keeps us as born again, as also Jacobus [1, 18.He has begotten us according to his will by the word of his truth, 1) that we might be the firstfruits of his creatures"; he is talking about the regenerated creature. But he does not work without us, since he has reborn us and keeps us for this very purpose, so that he may work in us and we may work with him. Thus he preaches through us, has mercy on the poor, comforts the afflicted; but what is thereby attributed to free will? Yes, what is
1) In Latin, probably only by mistake, virtutis instead of veritatis.
left him with only "nothing" and truly "nothing".
Therefore, read the Diatribe here through five or six leaves, where it does nothing else with such parables, then also with the most beautiful passages and parables drawn from the Gospel and Paul, than that it teaches us that innumerable passages are found in Scripture (as it says, 1) that teach of the cooperation and assistance of God. If I conclude from this: "Man can do nothing without the assistance of divine grace, therefore no work of man is good," she concludes with an oratorical turn as follows: "Rather, (she says) man can do everything with the assistance of the grace of God, therefore all works of man can be good. Accordingly, as many passages as there are in the Holy Scriptures, which think of the assistance, there are also as many passages, which assert the free will, but they are innumerable. Therefore, if we judge the matter by the number of testimonies, I have won." So those. Do you think the diatribe was quite sober or in her right mind when she wrote this? For I would not ascribe this to her malice and unworthiness; perhaps she wished to torment me half to death by these things constantly repeated to excess (perpetuo taedio), in that, remaining everywhere the same, she always treats other things than those she has set before herself. But if she has found pleasure in being inconsistent in such a great matter, we also want to find pleasure in going through her deliberate inconsistencies publicly.
First of all, we do not dispute, nor is it unknown to us, that all the works of man can be good if they are done with the assistance of divine grace, then also that man is able to do everything through the assistance of God's grace. But we cannot be surprised enough at your carelessness that, since you had intended to write about the power of free will, you write about the power of God's grace as if all men were blocks and stones,
1) Diatribe § 33, at the end.
you dare to say publicly that free will is asserted by passages of Scripture that praise the assistance of God's grace. And not only do you dare to do so, but you also sing a victory song as a pompous victor and triumphator. But now I know, just from this saying and doing of yours, what free will is and is able to do, namely, to be nonsensical. I ask you, what can be in you that speaks in such a way, if it is not free will itself?
But hear your conclusions: The Scripture praises the grace of God, therefore it proves free will; it praises the assistance of the grace of God, therefore it teaches free will. Why not the opposite: grace is praised, therefore free will is annulled; the assistance of grace is praised, therefore free will is destroyed? For to what end is grace bestowed? Is it so that the pride of free will, which is strong enough in itself, may play with grace, as it were with a superfluous ornament, on days of exuberant pleasure? Therefore I, too, will reverse your conclusion, even though I am not an orator, but with a more reliable oratory than you: As many passages as there are in the holy scriptures that commemorate the assistance, as many there are that abrogate the free will. And they are innumerable. Therefore, if the matter is estimated according to the number of testimonies, I have won. For this is why grace is necessary, why the assistance of grace is bestowed, because free will of itself is incapable of anything, and, as she herself said, according to that acceptable opinion, cannot will the good. Thus, by praising grace and preaching the assistance of grace, the incapacity of free will is preached at the same time. This is a sound conclusion and an established inference that even the gates of hell cannot overturn.
Here we will stop defending ours against the refutations of the Diatribe, so that the book does not become excessively large; the other things, which are worthy of it, will be treated in the assertion of ours. For what Erasmus says in his conclusion
(Epilogo1 ) repeats that if our opinion were fixed, then so many commandments, so many threats, so many promises would be in vain, neither merits nor demerits, nor rewards, nor punishments would be left room; Then it would also be difficult to defend the mercy, yes, the justice of God, 2) if God condemned those who sinned with necessity, and also other clumsy things would follow from this, at which the greatest men would have been so offended, 3) that they would also have fallen over it. We have given an account of all this above. We neither tolerate nor accept that middle position which I believe he urges upon us out of good opinion, namely, that we should grant free will a very little, so that the conflicting passages of Scripture and the aforementioned clumsy things might be all the more easily lifted, for by this middle position nothing is helped, nor anything proved. For if you do not want to ascribe the whole and everything to free will, as the Pelagians do, nevertheless the contradiction of Scripture remains, merit and reward are nullified, the mercy and justice of God are nullified, and all the annoying things remain, which we want to avoid by assuming a very small and ineffective faculty of free will, as we have sufficiently shown. Therefore one must go to the extreme of denying free will altogether and ascribing everything to God. In this way Scripture will not argue with itself, and the inconvenient things, if not abolished, will at least be borne.
But this I ask of you, dear Erasmus, that you do not believe that I am conducting this matter more in blind zeal than with proper consideration. I do not suffer to be accused of such hypocrisy, as if I had a different opinion from the one I wrote, and I have not only been made to think so by the heat of the defense (as you write about me4) ).
1) Diatribe § 34.
2) Diatribe § 35.
3) Diatribe § 36.
4) Diatribe § 36, after the center.
I have been carried away to the point that only now I completely abolish free will, whereas before I would have granted it some property. You will not be able to prove this anywhere in my books, I know that. My propositions (themata) and theses (problemata) are still there, in which I have constantly maintained up to this hour that free will is nothing and a thing (this is the word I used at that time) in name only. 5) Defeated by the truth and challenged and forced by the dispute, I have held and written like this. But that I have acted so violently, in this I confess my guilt, if it is a guilt, yes, I rejoice with all my heart that in the cause of God this testimony is given to me in the world. And yet God wanted that God Himself also confirmed such a testimony on the last day. For who would then be more blessed than Luther, who is praised by such a powerful testimony of his contemporaries (sui seculi), that he did not pursue the cause of truth sluggishly nor deceitfully, but rather fiercely, or rather too fiercely? Then I shall blessedly escape the words of Jeremiah [48:10], "Cursed be he that doeth the work of the Lord unadvisedly."
But if it seems that I am too harsh against your diatribe, you will forgive me, for I am not doing this out of malice, but I was moved by the fact that you have brought this cause of Christ into great harm by your reputation, even though you have done nothing by scholarship and in the cause itself. For who can keep his pen in check everywhere so that it does not even get warm? Although you are almost cold in this book out of a desire for restraint, you sometimes hurl fiery and bitter arrows, so that you seem to be poisonous if the reader is not very patient and kind. But that is not part of the matter. We must gladly give each other credit for such things, since we are human beings and everything about us is human.
5) In the ^886rtio in the 36th article: renr äs 8olo titulo. Germanized by Luther himself in "Grund und Ursach" 2c; "a vain name."
The third part, that everything is done by God's grace and not by free will. 1)
Now we come to the last part of this book, in which we have to present our troops against free will, as we promised. But we cannot let them all advance, for who could do that in a small booklet, since the whole of Scripture is on our side with all its individual jumbles and letters? Nor is this necessary, both because free will has already been defeated and laid low by a twofold victory - the one, since we prove that all that stands against it of which it [the diatribe] thought that it served for it, the other, since we prove that that which it wanted to refute still remains unconquered - and also because enough has already been accomplished, although it would not yet be defeated if it were laid low by one or the other projectile. For what need is there to pierce the enemy, who has been killed by some projectile, with many other weapons after he is dead? Therefore, if the matter suffers, we will now act very briefly and bring two commanders with some of their armies from such a large number of armies, namely Paul and the evangelist John.
Paul in the letter to the Romans begins his discussion against free will for the grace of God in this way [Rom. 1, 18.]: "For the wrath of God from heaven (he says) is revealed against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold out the truth in unrighteousness." You hear here a general saying about all men that they are under the wrath of God; what is this but that they are worthy of wrath and punishment? He designates the cause of the wrath, that they do only such things as are worthy of wrath and punishment, namely, that all are ungodly and unrighteous, and hold out the truth in unrighteousness. Now where is the power of free will that strives for any good? Paul indicates that it is worthy of God's wrath, and judges it to be ungodly and unjust. But what deserves wrath and is ungodly, that strives for
1) This superscription is in the translation by Justus Jonas, not in Latin.
and is able to do something against grace, but not for grace.
Here Luther's sleepiness will be ridiculed because he did not look at Paul properly, and someone might say: Paul does not speak of all men, nor of all their aspirations, but only of those who are ungodly and unrighteous, and, as the words read, of those who endure the truth in unrighteousness; from this it does not follow that all are of this kind. Here I say: with Paul it is the same whether it is said: about all ungodly beings of men, or whether it is said: about the ungodly beings of all men. For Paul speaks almost everywhere after the manner of the Hebrew language, so that the meaning is: All men are ungodly and unrighteous and hold up the truth in unrighteousness, therefore all are worthy of wrath. Further, in the Greek, not [as in the Vulgate] is the referring pronoun put "of those [men] who (the truth)," but the article, in this way: God's wrath is revealed against the ungodly nature and unrighteousness of men, "those who hold out the truth in unrighteousness," so that this is, as it were, a word (epithowii) attached to all men, "that they hold out the truth in unrighteousness," as that is an epithet (opitlloton) when one says, Our Father, "who art in heaven," which otherwise would be expressed, Our "heavenly" Father, or "in heaven." For it is said for the distinction of those who believe and are godly.
But it shall be void and vain, if it does not force and convict of it Paul's discussion itself. For Paul had said before [v. 16.], "The gospel is a power of God, which maketh blessed them that believe on it, the Jews chiefly, and also the Greeks." Here are not obscure or ambiguous words; to the Jews and the Greeks, that is, to all men, the gospel of the power of God is necessary, that they may believe and be saved from the wrath revealed. I beseech thee, he that setteth forth the Jews, who were strong in righteousness, in the law of God, and in the faculty of free will, without distinction, so that they might
are empty and in need of God's power, so that they might be saved by it from the revealed wrath, and shows this power to be necessary for them, should he not consider that they are under the wrath? What kind of people would you then be able to point out who would not be subject to the wrath of God, since you are forced to believe that the highest people in the world, namely the Jews and the Greeks, are of such a nature? Furthermore, which, even among the Jews and Greeks, can you single out, since Paul, without any distinction, sums them all up in one word and subjects them all to the same judgment? Is it to be believed, then, that among these two eminently excellent peoples there were not men who would have been zealous of respectability? or should none have endeavored according to the powers of free will? But Paul cares not for this, but casts all under wrath, proclaiming all to be ungodly and unrighteous. Must we not believe that in the same way the other apostles, with the same preaching, also cast all the other Gentiles, each in his own district, 1) under this wrath?
Therefore, this passage of Paul's is quite firm and strongly insists that free will, or the most excellent thing in people, no matter how excellently endowed with law, justice, wisdom and all virtues, is ungodly, unjust and worthy of God's wrath. Otherwise, Paul's argument would have no force; but if it has force, his division does not allow for a middle state, according to which he assigns blessedness to those who believe the gospel, wrath to all others, shows the believers as righteous, the non-believers as ungodly, unrighteous and subject to wrath. For he wants to say this much: The righteousness that is valid before God is revealed in the Gospel, that it is of faith, therefore all men are ungodly and unrighteous. For God would be foolish if He revealed to men a righteousness that they either already knew or had the germs of. But since he is not foolish, and yet reveals to them the righteousness for salvation, it is in the day that the free
1) sort6 8U", not korto 8UÄ, as the Erl. Ausg. has.
The will, even in the highest men, not only has nothing or is not able, but does not even know what righteousness is before God; unless the righteousness that is valid before God is not revealed to those highest men, but only to the least; while Paul boasts that he is a debtor to this [righteousness] [Rom. 1, 14.] of the Jews and the Greeks, of the wise and the unwise, of the educated and the uneducated. Therefore, in this passage, Paul definitely groups all men together in one heap and concludes that all are ungodly, unrighteous, and ignorant of righteousness and faith; so much is lacking in them that they want or can do anything good. And this conclusion is firm because God, sitting in ignorance and darkness, reveals to them the righteousness of salvation; so they know nothing about it from themselves. But those who do not know the righteousness of salvation are certainly under wrath and condemnation, and because of their ignorance, they cannot work their way out, nor can they strive to come out. For how could you strive if you do not know what, where, how, or in what way to strive?
With this conclusion the thing itself and the experience agree. For show me one person in the whole human race, even if he is the holiest and most righteous of all, to whom it has ever occurred that this is the way to righteousness and salvation, namely, to believe in him who is both God and man, died for the sins of men and was raised again and seated at the right hand of the Father, or who would have let himself dream of this wrath of God, of which Paul says here that it will be revealed from heaven. Look at the highest worldly wise men who have given an opinion about God, which they have handed down to us in their writings about the future wrath. Behold the Jews, who have been persistently taught by so many signs, by so many prophets, what they have thought of this way; not only have they not accepted it, but they have hated it so much that no nation on earth has accepted Christ.
The people have been persecuted more cruelly up to the present day. But who would dare to say that in such a great people there was not a single one who upheld free will and strove in its power? How is it, then, that all strive in different directions, and that which was most excellent in the most excellent of men not only did not uphold this way of righteousness, not only did not know it, but also, after it had been made known and revealed, rejected it and wanted to eradicate it? so that Paul says in 1 Cor. 1:23 that this way is an offense to the Jews and foolishness to the Gentiles.
Since he calls Jews and Gentiles without distinction, and it is certain that Jews and Gentiles are the most important peoples on earth, it is certain at the same time that free will is nothing other than the highest enemy of justice and the blessedness of men, since it was impossible that some 1) among the Jews and Gentiles should not have acted and striven with the highest power of free will, and yet just by this only waged war against grace. Now you only go and say that free will strives for good, since good (bonitas - goodness) itself and justice are a nuisance and foolishness to it. Nor can you say that this concerns only some, not all. Paul speaks of all without distinction when he says: to the Gentiles a foolishness and to the Jews an affliction, and excludes no one except the believers. To us (he says), that is, to the called and the saints, it is [1 Cor. 1:18] the power and wisdom of God. He does not say: some Gentiles, some Jews, but simply, Jews and Gentiles (he says), who are not of us, by clearly dividing the believers from the unbelievers and leaving no middle. But we speak of the Gentiles, who act without grace; to them, says Paul, the righteousness of God is a foolishness, which they abhor; and this is the praiseworthy effort of the free will for good.
1) aliquot, not aliquoä, as the Erl. Ausg. has.
Furthermore, see if he does not himself cite the highest people among the Greeks, since he says [Rom. 1:21] that they had become foolish and darkened the hearts of those who were the wiser among them; likewise they had become vain [that is, foolish] in their sharpest thoughts (xxxxxxxxxxx), that is, in their sophistical disputations.
I ask you, does he not touch here that highest and most excellent of the educated (Graecis) people by touching their sharpest considerations? For these have been their highest and best thoughts and opinions, which they have considered to be right constant wisdom. But as elsewhere he calls this wisdom foolishness, so here he says it was vain in them, and by striving for many things came to be worse, and at last in darkened hearts they offered up idols [Rom. 1:23], and committed the abominations which he mentions hereafter [v. 24]. If therefore the best endeavor and work among the best of the Gentiles is evil and ungodly, what wilt thou think of the rest of the great multitude, as it were the worse Gentiles? For here also he makes no distinction among the best, since he condemns the endeavor of their wisdom without regard to the person. But since the work itself, or even the endeavor, is condemned, so are those condemned, however many they may be, who have endeavored, although they have acted from the highest power of free will. Even of their best effort, I say, it is said to be sinful; how much more of those who also put it into action.
So he also soon after [Rom. 2, 28. 29.] rejects the Jews without any distinction, who are Jews according to the letter, but not according to the spirit. You (he says), who are under the letter and circumcision, disgrace God [v. 27, 23]; likewise [v. 28, 29]: For not he is a Jew who is a Jew by heart, but he who is a Jew in secret.
What is clearer than this division? A Jew who is by heart is a transgressor of the law. But how many Jews, do you think, are exceedingly wise without the faith, learned in the law?
have been knowledgeable, honorable people, who have striven for justice and truth with the highest effort? How he often gives them the testimony that they are zealous for God [Rom. 10, 2. 9, 31.], that they follow the law of righteousness, that they strive day and night to become blessed, that they live without blame; and yet they are transgressors of the law, because they are not Jews in spirit, but rather stubbornly resist the righteousness of faith. What remains, therefore, but that free will, when it is at its best, is at its worst, and the more it strives, the angrier it becomes and behaves [the worse]? The words are clear, the division is certain; nothing can be said against it.
But we want to hear Paul himself as his own interpreter. In the third chapter he makes as it were the conclusion (epilogum) and speaks [v. 9]: "What do we say now? Have we any merit? None at all." For we have proved above that both Jews and Greeks are all under sin.
Now where is free will? All (he says), Jews and Greeks are under sin. Are there figurative speeches or knots here? What can the interpretation of the whole world do against this very clear statement? He excludes no one, since he says "all", he leaves nothing good, since he declares that they are under sin, that is. Servants of sin. But where did he state this cause, that all, Jews and Gentiles were under sin? Nowhere but where we have indicated it, namely, when he says [Rom. 1:18], "God's wrath from heaven is revealed against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." And he then proves this by the experience that they, as ingrates against God, were subject to so many vices, convicted, as it were, by the fruits of their ungodliness, that they wanted and did nothing but evil. Then he judges the Jews in particular, since he says that the Jew is a transgressor under the letter, and proves this likewise by the fruits and experience by saying [Rom. 2, 21. f.]: "You preach that one should not steal, and you steal, you abhor before idols and rob God of what is his.
Spirit. And here is no opportunity for you to make an excuse and say: Though they be under sin, yet the best in them hath the good endeavor. For if there be any good endeavor left, it is wrong for him to say that they are under sin. For since he calls Jews and Gentiles, he includes here at the same time all that is in the Gentiles and Jews, if you do not want to turn Paul around and say that he wrote thus: The flesh of all the Jews and Gentiles (that is), their grosser inclinations are under sin; but the wrath from heaven revealed against them will condemn them entirely, unless they are justified by the Spirit, which would not happen if they were not entirely under sin.
But we want to see how Paul proves his opinion from the holy scriptures, whether perhaps the words have stronger evidential power in Paul than in their original place. [Rom. 3, 10-12: "As it is written" (he says [Ps. 14, 3]): "There is not one who is righteous, not one; there is not one who understands, not one who asks after God; they have all gone astray and have all become unfit; there is not one who does good, not one" etc.
Here, let whoever can give me a skillful interpretation; create figurative speeches, pretend that the words are doubtful and dark, and defend free will against these condemnatory judgments, whoever dares to do so. Then I, too, will gladly give way and recant, and then I, too, will be a confessor and assertor of free will. It is certain that this is said in relation to all people. For the prophet introduces God as he looks upon all men and passes this judgment upon all. For it is said in Ps. 14, 2: "The Lord looks down from heaven on the children of men, to see if any are wise and ask after God; but they are all gone astray." 2c And lest the Jews think that this does not concern them, Paul preempts this by claiming that this concerns them the most.
"We know" (he says [Rom. 3, 19.]) "that what the law says, that it says to those who are under the law." Here he wanted to express the same as when he spoke [Rom.
2, 9.]: "Of the Jews in particular and also of the Greeks."
You hear, then, that all the children of men, all those who are under the law, that is, both Gentiles and Jews, receive such a judgment before God that they are unrighteous, not wise, do not ask after God, not even one, but all deviate and are unfit. But I believe that among the children of men and those who are under the law, there are also counted those who are the best and most honorable, who by the power of free will strive for what is righteous and good, and of whom the diatribe boasts that they possess the mind and the germs of honorableness as implanted in them; if perhaps it does not want to claim that those are the children of angels.
How, then, can those strive for the good who all together do not know God, nor care about God, nor ask about Him? How can they have the power that is capable of goodness, since they all deviate from goodness and are completely incapable? Or do we not know what it means not to know God, not to be wise, not to ask about God, not to fear God, to deviate and be unfit? Are these not exceedingly clear words, and do they teach that all people both do not know God and despise God, and then also deviate to evil and are unfit for good? For here it is "not a question of ignorance in the acquisition of subsistence or of contempt for money, but of ignorance and contempt for religion and godliness. But such ignorance and contempt are undoubtedly found not in the flesh and the lower and coarser inclinations, but in those highest and most excellent powers of man in which righteousness, godliness, knowledge and worship of God should reign, namely in reason and will, and even in the power of free will itself, in the germ of respectability itself, or in the most excellent thing that is in man.
Where are you now, my diatribe, since you promised above that you would gladly agree that the most excellent thing in man is flesh, that is, ungodly, if this were proven with Scripture?
Agree, then, when you hear that the most excellent thing in all men is not only ungodly, but does not know God, despises God, is turned to evil and is incapable of good. For what is being unjust but that the will (which is one of the most excellent things) is unjust? What is not knowing God and the good but that reason (which is another of these most excellent things) does not know God and the good, that is, is blind in the knowledge of godliness? What else does it mean to be deviant and incompetent, but that men, according to none of their parts, and especially according to their most excellent parts, are completely and utterly incapable of doing good, but only of doing evil? What does not fear God mean other than that people are despisers of God in all their parts, especially in their most excellent parts? But to be despisers of God means at the same time to be despisers of all things that are God's, namely the words, the works, the laws, the commandments, the will of God. Now what right should reason prescribe, which is blind and ignorant? What good should the will choose, which is evil and incompetent? Yes, whom should the will follow, to which reason prescribes nothing but the darkness of its blindness and ignorance? Since reason is therefore in error and the will is turned away, what good can man do or strive to do?
But perhaps someone would presume to raise quibbles: Although the will deviates and reason is ignorant, nevertheless the will by its doing 1) can strive for something, and reason can know something from its powers, since we are able to do many things that we do not do; namely, we argue about the power of the faculty, not about doing.
I answer: The words of the prophet include both the doing and the ability; and it is the same to say, Man asketh not after GOtte, as if
1) It seems to us that the comma after aotu should be deleted and placed before aetu. After that we have translated.
It was said: Man cannot ask for God. You can infer this from the fact that if there were in man the faculty or the power to want the good, since he is not permitted by the impulse of divine omnipotence to be idle or to lie still (feriari), as we have explained above, it would be impossible that this [faculty and power for the good] should not stir in something, or at least in some man, and come into use and exercise in some way. But this does not happen, for God looks down from heaven and does not see anyone who asks or makes an effort; therefore it follows that this power, which makes an effort or wants to ask for Him, is nowhere, but rather all deviate. Further, if Paul were not at the same time to be understood of inability, his discussion would be of no avail. For Paul's intention is entirely to make grace necessary for all men. But if they could do anything by themselves, grace would not be necessary for them. Thus you see that free will is fundamentally abolished in this passage, and that nothing good or honorable is left for it either, since the declaration is made about it that it is unrighteous, does not know God, despises God, has turned away from God and is unfit before God, and the prophet proves strongly enough, both in the original passage and in Paul, who cites it.
And it is not a small thing when it is said of man that he does not know God and despises God, thinking that these are the sources of all shameful deeds, the den of sins, yes, the hell of evil. What evil should not be there, where there is ignorance and contempt of God? In short, the kingdom of the devil in people could not have been described in shorter words, nor even in more powerful words, than calling them such people who do not know God and despise God. There is unbelief, there is disobedience, there is taking from God what is his, there is blasphemy against God, there is cruelty, there is unmercifulness against one's neighbor, there is selfishness in all divine and human things. There you have the glory and the faculty of free will.
But Paul goes on and testifies that he speaks of all men, and especially of the best and most excellent, saying [Rom. 3:19 f.], "That every mouth may be stopped up, and all the world may be guilty unto God, because by the works of the law no flesh can be justified in his sight."
I ask you, how should the mouth of all be stopped up, if there is still a power left by which we are able to do something? For one might say to God: Here is not absolutely nothing, but something that you cannot condemn, since you yourself have given some ability; this at least will not be silent, nor will it be punishable before you. For if that power of free will is a healthy one and capable of something, it is wrong for the whole world to be delinquent or guilty before God, since that power, which does not need to have its mouth plugged, is not a small thing or in a small part of the world, but the most excellent and the most general in the whole world; or if its mouth must be plugged, it is necessary for it to be delinquent and guilty before God with the whole world. But with what right can something be called guilty if it is not unjust and ungodly, that is, worthy of punishment and vengeance?
I would like to see, dear one, by what interpretation that power of man could be absolved from the guilt in which the whole world is entangled against God, or by what artifice it could be exempted that it should not be included in the whole world. Great thunderclaps and piercing lightnings and truly the hammer that breaks rocks (as Jeremiah [23, 29.] says) are these words of Paul [Rom. 3, 12. 19. 10.]: "They have all gone astray"; "all the world is guilty"; "there is none righteous", [thunderbolts] by which everything that exists is shattered, not only in one man, or in some, or in any part of them, but also in the whole world, in all, absolutely without any exception, so that the whole world should tremble, be terrified and flee at these words. For what could be said that is more powerful and stronger than: The whole world is guilty, all human kin-
who are deviated and unfit, none fears God, there is none who is not unrighteous, there is none who is understanding, there is none who asks about God. Nevertheless, the hardness and unreasonable (insensata) stubbornness of our heart was and is so great that we neither heard nor felt these thunderbolts and lightnings, and in the meantime raised and erected the free will and its powers against all this, so that in truth we have fulfilled the word Mal. 1, 4. fulfilled: "They build, I will demolish."
The apostle also speaks powerfully in this passage [Rom. 3:20]: "No flesh shall be justified in his sight by the works of the law. A mighty word is "by the works of the law", as also that "the whole world", or that "all the children of men". For it must be observed that Paul introduces no persons, and thinks only of their endeavors, namely, that he may include all persons, and all that is most excellent in them. For if he had said that the little people among the Jews, or the Pharisees, or some of the ungodly are not justified, it might have seemed as if he had left some who, by virtue of the power of free will and by virtue of the assistance of the law, were not altogether unjustified. But since he himself condemns the works of the law and makes them ungodly in the sight of God, it is evident that he condemns all who have been exceedingly diligent in law and works. But only the best and most excellent directed their efforts to the law and the works, and that only with their best and most excellent gifts (partibus), namely, with their reason and their will.
If, then, those who with the highest zeal and effort, both of reason and will, that is, with all the power of free will, exercised themselves in the law and works, were then also supported, instructed, and provoked by the law itself as with divine aid, if, I say, these are condemned for ungodliness, so that they are not justified, but are declared by them to be flesh before God, what then remains in the whole human race that is not flesh and
would be ungodly? For all are equally condemned who deal with the works of the law, whether they have practiced the law with the greatest, or with mediocre, or with no zeal at all, there is nothing in it. All could do nothing but works of the law, but works of the law do not justify; if they do not justify, they accuse those who do them as ungodly and leave them so. But the ungodly are guilty and worthy of the wrath of God. This is so clear that no one can even protest against it.
But they use to slip and escape Paul here in such a way that they call the works of the law works of outward worship (ceremonialia,) which are to be death-dealing after the death of Christ.'
I answer: This is Jerome's error and lack of understanding, which Augustine, of course, strongly resisted, but since God withdrew his hand and the devil retained the upper hand, it went out into the whole world and has remained to this day. That is why it was impossible to understand Paul and the knowledge of Christ had to be obscured. Moreover, if there had been no error in the church, this one would have been pernicious and powerful enough to suppress the gospel. By this error Jerome, if God's special grace did not intervene, deserved hell rather than heaven, so far is it from my mind that I would dare to declare him a saint or to say that he was a saint. Therefore, it is not true that Paul speaks only of works of outward worship; otherwise, how could his argument stand, by which he concludes that all are unrighteous and in need of grace? For someone might say, Admittedly, from works of outward worship we are not justified, but someone might be justified (ex moralibus) from the works of the holy ten commandments concerning the moral life? Therefore, you have not proved by your conclusion (syllogismo) that grace is necessary for these [works of the holy ten commandments]. What would be the use [in this case] of that grace, which only exempts us from works of the external.
God's service, which are the easiest of all and can already be extorted by fear or selfishness?
Now it is also erroneous that the works of outward worship are deadly and unlawful after the death of Christ. Paul never said this, but he says that they do not justify and are of no use to man in the sight of God, that he thereby becomes free from ungodliness. This means that someone can do them and still not do anything unlawful, just as eating and drinking are works that do not justify and do not make us pleasing before God, but therefore he who eats and drinks does not do anything unlawful.
They also err in not recognizing that the works of outward worship were commanded and required in the old law in the same way as the holy ten commandments, and that these therefore applied neither less nor more than the latter. But to the Jews Paul speaks primarily, as he says Rom. 2, 9. Therefore let no one doubt that by the works of the law all the works of the whole law are understood. For they cannot even be called works of the law if the law is abolished and deadly, for an abolished law is already no longer a law. This Paul knew very well, therefore he does not speak of the abolished law when he mentions the works of the law, but of a valid and ruling law. How easily he could have said otherwise: The law itself is already abolished! That would then have been clearly and plainly spoken. But we want to cite Paul himself, who interprets himself best, since he says Gal. 3, 10: "Those who deal with the works of the law are under the curse. For it is written: Cursed be every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them." You see here that Paul, where he does the same thing as [in the letter] to the Romans and with the same words, as often as he remembers the works of the law, speaks of all the laws that are written in the book of the law.
And what is even more wonderful, he himself cites Moses, who curses those who are not in the
He preaches that those who do the works of the law are cursed, citing a contrary passage for a contrary opinion, since that passage is negative and this one is affirmative. But he does this because the matter before God is that those who are most diligent in the works of the law fulfill the law the least, because they do not have the spirit that is the fulfiller of the law. They may apply themselves to the law with their powers, but they cannot accomplish anything. So both are true, that, according to Moses, those are cursed who do not remain, and, according to Paul, those are cursed who deal with the works of the law. For both require the Spirit, without which the works of the law, however many they may be, do not justify, as Paul says; therefore they do not abide in all that is written, as Moses says.
In sum, Paul's division confirms what we have said, for he divides those who labor under the law into two parts; of some he says that they labor in the spirit, of others that they labor according to the flesh, and leaves no middle ground. For he says thus [Rom. 3:20], "No flesh can be justified by works of the law." What does this mean other than that those without the Spirit labor in the law, since they are flesh, that is, ungodly and do not know God, so that these works are of no use to them. So he applies Gal. 3, 2 [the same division] and says: "Have you received the Spirit by works of the law, or by the preaching of faith?" And again [Rom. 3:21], "Now without the law the righteousness that is before God is manifested"; and again [Rom. 3:28], "So then we had it that a man might be justified without works of the law, through faith alone." By all this it is clear and evident that in Paul the Spirit is contrasted with the works of the law, not unlike all other non-spiritual things and all powers and relations (nowivibu8) of the flesh, so that it is certain that Paul's opinion is the same as that expressed by Christ Jn. 3:6, that whatever is not born of the Spirit is flesh, it is
Even the most beautiful works of the divine law may be done with great powers, no matter how beautiful, holy, or excellent they may be. For Christ's Spirit is necessary, without which everything is nothing, and only damnable. Therefore, it is to be taken for granted that Paul does not understand by works of the law those of outward worship, but all the works of the whole law. At the same time it will also be established that in the works of the law everything is condemned that is without the Spirit. But without the Spirit, that power of free will, for of this we are discussing, is the most excellent, namely, in man. For "to deal with the works of the law" is the most glorious thing that can be said of a man; for he does not say those who deal with sins and ungodliness against the law, but those who deal with the works of the law, that is, the best and those who make use of the law, that is, those who still have the assistance of the law above free will, that is, those who have been instructed and exercised in it.
Therefore, if free will, which has been supported by the law and has dealt with the law to the utmost of its ability, helps nothing and does not justify, but remains in godlessness and in the flesh, what is to be believed that it can do on its own without the law?
"Through the law (he says [Rom. 3, 20.]) comes knowledge of sin." Here he shows how much and how far the law is of use, namely, that free will by itself is so blind that it does not even recognize sin, but needs the law as a teacher. But whoever does not know sin, what can he do to take away sin? Certainly that he will not consider sin to be sin and that which is not sin to be sin. This is sufficiently shown by experience, how the world, through those whom it considers the best and most zealous in righteousness and piety, hates and persecutes the righteousness of God, which is preached through the gospel, and reviles it as heresy, error, and by other exceedingly shameful names. However, their works and deeds, which are truly sin and error
He praises them and spends them for righteousness and wisdom. Therefore, Paul blocks the mouth of the free will with this word, teaching that sin is shown to him by the law, as to one who does not know his sin. So much is lacking that he should grant him any power to strive for the good.
And here the question of the diatribe is solved, which is repeated so often in the book: If we are not able to do anything, what is the use of so many laws, so many commandments, so many threats, so many promises? Here Paul answers, "Through the law comes knowledge of sin." He answers this question quite differently than man or free will thinks. He says: "Free will is not proven by the law, it does not contribute to righteousness, because through the law does not come righteousness, but knowledge of sin. For this is the fruit, this the work, this the office of the law, that it is a light to the ignorant and blind, but such a light that shows the sickness, the sin, the evil, the death, the hell, the wrath of God, but it does not help, nor does it deliver from it, but is content that it has shown such. After man has recognized the disease of sin, he becomes distressed, anxious, yes, he despairs; the law does not help, much less can he help himself. But another light is needed to show the remedy. This is the voice of the gospel, which shows Christ as the deliverer from all this. This is not shown by reason or free will, and how could it show it, since it is darkness itself and needs the light of the law to show it the disease, which it does not see by its own light, but thinks it is health?
So he also treats the same question in the letter to the Galatians and says [Gal. 3, 19.]: "What then is the law for?" But he does not answer after the manner of the diatribe, concluding that it is a free will, but says thus, "It came to be for the sake of transgressions, until the seed should come to whom the promise was made." For the sake of the transgressions (he says), and not to limit them, as Jerome dreams, since Paul discusses.
1932 L. v. n. vii, 337 f. 68. That free will is nothing. W. xvm, 2433-2136. 1933
that this is promised to the future seed, that he takes away sin and restricts it by his given righteousness, but to increase the transgressions, as he says Rom. 5:20: "The law came in beside, that sin might be made more powerful"; not as if without the law the sins did not happen or were not powerful, but because they were not recognized as transgressions, or as such powerful sins, but the most and greatest were taken for righteousness. But where sins are not recognized, there is neither opportunity nor hope for healing, because they do not suffer the hand of the Savior, since they consider themselves healthy and think they have no need of the physician. Therefore the law is necessary to make sin known, so that the proud man, who thinks he is healthy, may be humbled by the knowledge of the shamefulness and greatness of sin, and long and groan for the grace that is held out to him in Christ.
See, then, how simple the speech is: "Through the law of God comes knowledge of sin," and yet it alone is powerful enough to overthrow and destroy free will. For if it is true that he does not know of himself what sin and evil are, as he says here and in Rom. 7:7: "I did not know that evil desire was sin, when the law had not said, 'Do not lust'"; how could he ever know what righteousness and good are? If he does not know righteousness, how can he strive for it? The sin in which we are born, in which we live, weave, and are, yea, which lives, drives, and rules in us, we know not. And how should we know the righteousness which reigns apart from us, in heaven? These sayings make that miserable free will nothing, nothing at all.
Since this is so, Paul proclaims with full confidence and emphasis (autoritate) what he says [Rom. 3, 21-25.]: "But now without the law the righteousness that is before God is revealed and testified by the law and the prophets. But I speak of such righteousness before God as comes through faith in Jesus Christ to all and to all who believe in him.
For there is no distinction here; they are all sinners and lack the glory they should have in God, and are justified without merit by His grace, through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus, whom God presented as a mercy seat, by faith in His blood. "2c
Here Paul speaks loud flashes against the free will. First (he says) "the righteousness that is before God is revealed without the law"; he separates the righteousness of God from the righteousness of the law, because the righteousness of faith comes from grace, without the law. This, that he says without the law, can be nothing else than that Christian righteousness exists without the works of the law, so that the works of the law are not able for it or do anything to obtain it. As he says soon after [Rom. 3:28.], "We hold it therefore that a man is justified without works of the law, by faith alone"; and, as he said before [Gal. 2:16.], "By works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight." From all this it is quite clear that the effort or endeavor of the free will is quite nothing; for if righteousness before God exists without the law, and without works of the law, how should it not much more exist without the free will? since this is the highest endeavor of the free will, when it exercises itself in moral righteousness, or in works of the law, whereby its blindness and inability are supported. This word "without" cancels moral good works, it cancels moral righteousness, it cancels all preparation for grace; finally, compose whatever you can that free will should be able to do, so Paul will stand firm and say, Without such does righteousness exist before God. And although I will concede that the free will could be promoted somewhat by its efforts, namely to good works or to the righteousness of the civil or moral law, it does not come closer to the righteousness that is valid before God, and God does not consider in any respect the efforts it makes to attain its righteousness, saying that its righteousness is valid without the law. But if he does not promote
If a man is righteous in the sight of God, what good would it do him if by works and efforts (if it were possible) he also progressed to the holiness of the angels? I believe that there are no obscure or ambiguous words here, nor is there any room left for any figurative speeches, because Paul clearly distinguishes two kinds of righteousness, one of which he attributes to the law, the other to grace, and the latter is given without it and without the works of it, but the latter without it does not justify and is not able to do anything. Therefore I would like to see how free will could stand and be defended against it.
The second lightning is that he says "that the righteousness which is before God should be revealed and come to all and upon all who believe in Christ, and there should be no distinction" [Rom. 3:22-24].
Again, in very clear words, he divides the whole human race into two parts: to the believers he gives the righteousness that is valid before God, to those who do not believe, he takes it away. Therefore, no one can be so foolish as to doubt that the power of free will is something other than faith in Jesus Christ. But Paul says that everything that is outside of this faith is not righteous before God. If it is not righteous before God, it must necessarily be sin. For with God there is no middle between righteousness and sin that is neither (neutrum - neutral), as it were neither righteousness nor sin. Otherwise, Paul's entire discussion, which emerges from this division, would be in vain: that which happens or is done among men is either righteousness or sin before God; righteousness if faith is present, sin if faith is not present. Among men, of course, there are intermediate things (media) and indifferent things (neutralia), in which men neither owe each other anything nor perform anything. But against God the wicked sins, whether he eats or drinks or does anything else, because he abuses God's creature in constant wickedness and ingratitude, and does not give God his honor even for a moment from the heart.
Also this is not a small flash that
He says [Rom. 3:23], "They are all sinners and lack the glory they should have in God, and there is no difference here."
I ask you, what could be said more clearly? Point out one who works in free will (operarium liberi arbitrii), and answer whether he also sins with that effort of his? If he does not sin, why does Paul not exclude him, but includes him without distinction? Surely he who says "all" excludes no one, in any place, at any time, in any work, in any endeavor. For if you were to exclude any man in any work or endeavor, you would make Paulum a false teacher (falsum). For even he who works and strives in free will is included among "all" and in "all," and Paul should have looked out for him and not so freely and generally numbered him among sinners. So also the word that he says, "They lack the glory which they should have in God." 1) "The glory of God" could be taken here in a twofold way, in an active and in a suffering way (active et passive). 2) This comes from Paul's Hebrew way of speaking, which he often uses. In an active way, the glory of God is that by which He boasts before us; in a passive way, that by which we boast before God. However, it seems to me now to be taken passively, for "the faith of Christ" according to Latin expresses the faith which Christ has, but among the Hebrews "the faith of Christ" is understood of the faith which one has in Christ. Thus, "the righteousness of God" in Latin means that which God has, but among the Hebrews it is understood of that which one has from God and before God. Thus, we take the glory of God not according to Latin, but according to Hebrew, the one we have in God and before God, and it could be called the glory in God.
1) In the Vulgate: iLAont Aorta Del - They lack the glory of God.
2) According to the grammatical terminology now in use, we would say: vst can be either "Oenitivu", sudjsotivus or Osnitivus odjsottvus.
For he boasts in God who knows for certain that God is gracious to him and honors him with His gracious sight, so that what he does is pleasing in His sight, or that what is not pleasing in his sight is forgiven and borne in his sight.
Therefore, if the effort or endeavor of the free will is not sin, but something good in the sight of God, he can certainly boast and confidently speak in this glory: this pleases God well, God is gracious to him, he puts up with it and accepts it, or at least God bears and forgives it. For this is the glory of the faithful in God; those who do not have it are rather disgraced before God. But Paul says no to this here and says that they definitely lack this glory. And this is also proven by experience. Ask me of all those who strive in free will, whether you will be able to point out one who can sincerely and from the heart say about any of his efforts and endeavors: This, I know, pleases God. If I am overcome, I will grant you the palm of victory, but I know that none will be found. But if this glory is not there, so that the conscience cannot dare to know and trust for certain, this pleases GOtte, it is certain that it does not please GOtte. For as he believes, so happens to him, for he does not believe that he is certainly pleasing, which is necessary, since this is the very sin of unbelief, to doubt the mercy of God, who wants one to believe with the firmest confidence that he is merciful. Thus we convict them with the testimony of their own conscience that free will, because it has no glory in God, is constantly guilty of the sin of unbelief with all its powers, efforts and endeavors.
But what do the protectors of free will want to say about what follows [Rom. 3:24]: "And are justified without merit by his grace"? What is this "without merit"? What is "by his grace"? How do effort and merit agree with righteousness given freely? Perhaps they will say here that they attached extremely little to free will, kei
nally a complete merit (moritum condignum). But these are empty words. For this is sought by free will, that there is room for merit. For so the diatribe has constantly pretended and asserted 1):
"If there is no freedom of will, how can merit take place? If no merits can take place, how can rewards take place? To whom can anything be credited if justice is done without merit?"
Here Paul answers that there is absolutely no merit, but all, as much as they are justified, are justified without merit, and this is attributed to no one but the grace of God. But after righteousness has been given, the kingdom and eternal life have been given at the same time. Where is the effort now? where the endeavor? where the works? where the merits of the free will? What is the benefit of these? Darkness and ambiguity you cannot pretend; the things and the words are quite clear and simple. For though they ascribe only a very small thing to free will, yet they teach that by this very small thing we can obtain righteousness and grace. For with no other reason do they resolve this question: Why does God justify this one and abandon that one? other than by establishing free will, namely, that this one has made an effort, that one has not made an effort, and God looks upon this one graciously for the sake of his effort, but despises that one, so that he would not be unjust if he did otherwise.
And although they pretend orally and in writing that they do not obtain grace through complete merit (condigno merito), nor do they call it complete merit, yet they fool us with the word and nevertheless hold the matter. For how can the excuse be valid that they do not call it a complete merit and yet ascribe to it everything that is due to a complete merit, namely, that he who strives obtains grace with God, but he who does not strive does not obtain it?
1) e.g. Diatribe § 8, at the end; §10; §12 and others.
Is this not clearly what is due to complete merit? Do they not make God one who looks at works, merits and persons? Namely, that the one, through his fault, lacks grace because he did not strive, but this one obtains grace because he strived, but would not have obtained it if he had not striven. If this is not complete merit, I would like to be taught what could then be called complete merit. In this way you could play your game with all words and say: It is not a complete merit, but it does what the complete merit does; the briar is not an evil tree, but only does what an evil tree does; the fig tree is not a good tree, but does what a good tree does; the diatribe is not godless, but it speaks and does only what a godless one does.
To these protectors of the free will happens what the proverb says: Some want to run away from the rain and fall completely into the water. 1) For out of the desire to have a different opinion than the Pelagians, they began to deny the complete merit, and just by denying it, they raise it all the more. In word and writing they deny it, in the matter itself and in the heart they establish it, and in two respects they are worse than the Pelagians. First, because the Pelagians simply, sincerely, and straightforwardly confess and assert complete merit, call every thing by its right name, and teach what is their opinion. But our people, while holding and teaching the same [as the Pelagians], yet mock us with lying words and false pretenses, as if they were at variance with the Pelagians, when this is not at all the case, so that, looking at hypocrisy, we might be considered the bitterest enemies of the Pelagians, but looking at the matter and the heart, we are two-faced Pelagians. Secondly, because through this hypocrisy, we have far exceeded the grace of God.
1) Thus Hai Jonas very appropriately reproduced the well-known saying: Inoiäit In LoMarn, äurn vult vitars
and hold it in lower esteem than the Pelagians. For these say that it is not something very little in us by which we obtain grace, but whole, complete, perfect, great, and many endeavors and works; but our people say that it is something very little and almost nothing by which we merit grace.
If, then, they are to err, they err more honestly and less arrogantly, because they say that the grace of God is highly valued, and hold it dear and precious, than those who teach that it is cheap and amounts to very little, and hold it trifling and contemptible. But Paul casts both into one lump by one word, saying, "All are justified without merit;" likewise, "That they may be justified without the law, without the works of the law." For he who asserts that justification takes place without merit in all who are justified, leaves none that can work, merit, and prepare, and leaves no work that could be called a congruum or condiguum, and crushes with the one thunderbolt of this lightning both the Pelagians with all their merit and the Sophists with their very tiny merit. The justification without merit does not suffer that you put people who work it out (operarios), because that obviously contradicts "to be given in vain" and "to be acquired by some work". Furthermore, "being justified by grace" does not suffer you to attach any worthiness to the person of any man, as he also says later in II Cap. [v. 6.] "But if it is by grace, it is not by merit of works, else grace would not be grace; as he also says Cap. 4, 4. Says, "But to him that dealeth in works the reward is not imputed by grace, but by duty." Therefore my Paul stands firm, as an unconquered wicked man of free will, laying low two armies with one word. For if we are justified without works, all works are condemned, whether they be very small or great, for
he excludes none, but flashes against all in the same way.
And here see the sleepiness of all of us and what it helps if someone relies on the old fathers who have been approved through a series of so many centuries. Have they not likewise all been equally blind, and even left aside the very clear and plain words of Paul? I pray thee, what can be clearly said for grace against free will, if Paul's speech be not clear and plain? In a comparative manner (per contentionem) he proceeds to extol grace against works; then, using the clearest and simplest words, he says that we are justified without merit, and that grace would not be grace if it were acquired with works, most clearly excluding all works in the transaction of justification, in order to establish grace alone and justification without merit. And we still seek darkness in this light, and since we cannot ascribe to ourselves anything great and everything, we strive to ascribe to ourselves very tiny and small things, only in order to obtain that justification by the grace of God is not without merit and without works, as if he who denies us the greater and everything, did not rather also say no, that what is mine and small would be conducive to our attaining justification, since he has decreed that we shall be justified by his grace alone, without any works, and even without the help of the law, in which all works are included, great and small, inadequate and complete. Go now and boast of the reputation of the ancients, and rely on their sayings, of which you see that they all with one another despised Paulum, the brightest and clearest teacher, and as it were with diligence fled the morning star, even this sun, namely, because they were caught in the carnal opinion that it seemed inconsistent that no room was left for merit.
Now we want to give the example that Paul introduces in the sequel [Rom. 4, 2. f.] of Abraham. "If Abraham (he says) is justified by works, he has well
Glory, but not before God. What does the Scripture say? Abraham believed God, and this is counted to him for righteousness."
Note, I beg you, also here the division of Paul, who states a twofold righteousness of Abraham. One is from works, that is, moral and civil, but he denies that he is justified before God by this, although he is justified before men by it. Then he has glory before men, but through this righteousness he also has no glory before God. And there is no reason for anyone to say that the works of the law or of outward worship are condemned here because Abraham lived so many years before the law. Paul is simply talking about the works of Abraham and only his best. For it would be ridiculous for anyone to argue about being justified by evil works. Therefore, if Abraham is not justified by any works, but is not clothed with another righteousness, that of faith, both he himself and all his works are left under ungodliness. It is obvious that no man contributes anything to righteousness by his works, then also that no works, no endeavors, no efforts of free will are any good before God, but that they are all condemned as ungodly, unrighteous and evil. For if he himself is not righteous, neither are his works or endeavors; but if they are not righteous, they are damnable and worthy of wrath. The other is the righteousness of faith, which does not consist in any works, but in the fact that God is gracious and reckons according to His grace. And yet see how Paul bases himself on the word "reckon", how he insists on it, repeats it and inculcates it.
"But to him who works (Rom. 4:4 ff.) the reward is not reckoned by grace, but by duty. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness," according to the purpose of God's grace. Then he introduces David, who speaks of the reckoning of the faith to righteousness.
Grace says [Ps. 32, 2.]: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord does not impute iniquity" 2c
He repeats the word "impute" ten times in this chapter. In short, Paul contrasts the one who works with the one who does not, leaving no middle ground between the two; he denies that righteousness is imputed to the one who works, but claims that righteousness is imputed to the one who does not work, if only he believes. Here is nothing by which free will can escape or slip away by its effort or endeavor. For he will either be reckoned to those who deal in works, or to those who do not; if to those who deal in works, you hear here that righteousness is not reckoned to him; if to those who do not deal in works, yet GOtte believes, righteousness is reckoned to him. But then there will no longer be any power of free will, but a creature renewed by faith; but if righteousness is not imputed to him who deals in works, it will be evident that his works are nothing but sins, evil and ungodly in the sight of God.
And here no sophist can be so bold as to say that, though man be evil, yet his work cannot be evil. For Paul here makes reference to man, not par excellence, but as one who deals in works, in order to declare in a very clear word that even the works and endeavors of man are condemned, of whatever kind they may be, and with whatever name or appearance they may be endowed. But he is speaking of good works, because he is speaking of being just and deserving. And since he speaks of him who deals with works, he speaks in general of all who deal with works and of all their works, but especially he speaks of good and honorable works, otherwise his division of those who deal with works and those who do not deal with works would not hold.
I pass over here the very strong evidence
There are no reasons that come from the purpose of grace, from the promise, from the power of the law, from the original sin, from the election of God, of which there is none that does not by itself fundamentally abolish free will. For if grace comes from purpose [Eph. 1:11] or predestination, it comes by necessity, not by our effort or endeavor, as we have shown above. Likewise, since God promised grace before the law, as Paul concludes here and in the letter to the Galatians [Gal. 3:17, 18], it does not come from works or the law, otherwise the promise would be nothing. So also faith would be nothing [Rom. 4, 14] (by which Abraham was justified before the law), if the works were able to do something. Likewise, since the law is the power of sin [1 Cor. 15:56], the
If the law only shows sin, but does not take it away, it makes the conscience guilty before God and threatens wrath. This is what he says, Rom. 4, 15: "The law causes wrath." How, then, would it be possible that righteousness should be obtained through the law? But if we are not helped by the law, how could we be helped by the power of the will alone?
Likewise [Rom. 5, 12.], since by the One offense (delicto) of the One Adam we are all under sin and condemnation, how then can we do anything that is not sin and condemnation? For since he says "all," he excludes no one, not even the power of free will, not even any operarium, whether he does or does not do works, whether he strives or does not strive, under "all" he is necessarily included with the others. And we would not sin or be condemned by Adam's one offense if it were not our offense; for who should ever be condemned for another's offense, especially before God? But ours will not be by imitation or by doing, since this could not be Adam's one offense, since it was not he but we who committed it; but ours will be by imitation or by doing, since this could not be Adam's one offense, since it was not he but we who committed it.
through birth. But this must be discussed elsewhere. Therefore, even original sin allows free will to do nothing but 1) sin and be damned.
These reasons of proof, I say, I pass over because they are quite obvious and very strong, then also because we have already said something about them above. If we now wanted to cite everything that overthrows free will in Paul alone, we could do nothing better than to treat the whole of Paul in a continuous commentary and show that almost in every single word the so highly praised power of free will is refuted, as I have already done in the third and fourth chapters. I have treated these mainly for the sake of showing the drowsiness of all of us who read Paul in such a way that we read nothing less in these quite clear passages than these exceedingly strong grounds of proof against free will; and in order to show that confidence, which is based on the reputation and writings of the old teachers, to be a foolish one; at the same time I wanted to leave it to be considered what those quite obvious grounds of proof would accomplish if they were treated with care and right judgment.
I say of myself, I am very surprised that although Paul so often uses those general words: all, none, not, nowhere, without, like [Rom. 3, 12.]: "They have all gone astray"; [Rom. 3, 10.] "there is none righteous"; [Rom. 3, 12.] "there is none that doeth good, not even one"; [Rom. 5, 12.] "all are sinners and condemned through one man's sin"; [Rom. 3, 21. 28.] "by faith without the law; without works we are justified"; so that if any man would speak otherwise, yet he could not speak it more clearly and distinctly; I wonder, I say, how it could happen that contrary, yea, contradictory, expressions could have arisen against these general expressions and sayings, namely, Some are not departed, not unjust, not wicked, not sinners, not condemned; there is something in man that is good, and after good.
1) In Latin, yuaria is missing here, probably only by oversight.
as if the man who strives for the good, whoever he may be, were not included in this word all, none, not. I would have nothing, even if I wanted to, what I could hold against Paul or answer, but would be forced to include the power of my free will together with his effort among those all and none, of which Paul speaks, if a new linguistic doctrine or a new use of language were not introduced.
And one could perhaps assume a figurative speech and twist out words, if he used such a designation only once or in one place. But now he uses them constantly, then also simultaneously in affirmative and negative sentences, and everywhere holds the opinion of the general expressions (partium) in comparative and dividing speech (per contentionem et partitionem) in such a way that not only the nature of the expressions and the speech itself, but also the following, the preceding, the secondary circumstances, the intention and just the core (corpus) of the whole discussion convince the common sense that Paul's opinion is that apart from faith in Christ there is only sin and damnation. And we promised that we would refute free will in such a way that all opponents could not resist. I believe to have fulfilled this, even if the defeated should not agree with our opinion or remain silent. For that is not in our power, that is a gift of the spirit of God.
But before we listen to the evangelist John, we want to add to the resolution (coronidem) of Paul and are ready, if this should not suffice, to let the whole Paul enter the field with a continuous explanation against free will. In Rom. 8, 5, where he divides the human race into two parts, into flesh and spirit, as Christ does Joh. 3, 6, he says: "Those who are carnal are carnally minded, but those who are spiritual are spiritually minded. That Paul here calls all carnal who are not spiritual is evident both from the division itself and the contrast of spirit and flesh, and from the words of Paul himself, where it follows [v. 9], "But ye are
not carnal, but spiritual, otherwise God's Spirit dwells in you. But he that hath not Christ's Spirit is not his." For what else does he mean here, when he says: "You are not carnal if God's Spirit is in you", but that those are necessarily carnal who do not have the Spirit? And whoever is not of Christ, what is he but of the devil? Therefore it is certain that those who do not have the Spirit are carnal and under the devil.
Now let us see what he thinks of the effort and the power of the free will of those who are carnal [Rom. 8:8]: "Those who are carnal may not please God"; and again [v. 6]: "To be carnally minded is death"; and again [v. 7]: "To be carnally minded is enmity against God"; likewise [v. 7]: "It is not subject to the law of God, for neither is it able." Here may a protector of free will answer me, how can that strive for good which is death, which is not pleasing to GOtte, which is enmity against GOtte, disobedient to GOtte, and cannot obey? For he did not mean to say: To be carnally minded is dead or an enemy of God, but death itself, enmity itself, to which it is impossible to be subject to the law of God or to please God, as he had also said shortly before [Rom. 8,3.For what was impossible for the law (because it was weakened by the flesh), that God did." 2c I am also familiar with Origen's fable of a threefold direction of the mind (affectu), one of which he calls flesh, the other soul, the third spirit; but the soul is that middle thing which can be turned to either side, either of the flesh or of the spirit. But these are his dreams, he only says them, but does not prove them. Paul here calls flesh all that is without the Spirit, as we have shown. Therefore, the highest virtues of the best people are carnal, that is, dead and hostile to God, not subject to God's law, not able to be subject, and not pleasing to God. For Paul not only says that they are not subject, but also that they are not able to be subject. So also Christ says Matth. 7, 18: "An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit.
and Cap. 12:34: "How can ye speak good, being evil?" Here you see that we not only speak evil, but also cannot speak good.
And although he says elsewhere [Matth. 7, 11.] that we, even though we are bad, can still give good gifts to our children, he still denies that we do good, even in the giving of good gifts, because the creature of God is good, which we give: nevertheless we ourselves are not good, nor do we give those good gifts in a good way. But He speaks to all, even to His disciples, so that this twofold judgment of Paul is established: "The righteous lives by faith" [Gal. 3:11], and [Rom. 14:23]: "Whatever does not come from faith is sin." The latter follows from the former. For if there is nothing by which we are justified except faith, it is evident that those who are without faith are not yet justified; but those who are not justified are sinners; but sinners are evil trees, and can do nothing but sin and bring forth evil fruit. Therefore, free will is nothing but a servant of sin, death and the devil, does nothing and can do nothing but evil.
Take the example in the 10th chapter [Rom. 10, 20.], which is drawn from Isaiah: "I am found of them that sought me not, and am appeared unto them that asked not for me." This he says of the Gentiles, that it was given to them to hear and know Christ, since they could not even have a thought of Christ before, much less seek him or prepare for him with the power of free will. By this example it is sufficiently clear that grace comes so completely without merit that not even a thought of it, let alone an effort or endeavor, precedes it. So also Paul; when he was still a Saul, what did he do with that supreme power of free will? Surely he had in his heart the best and most honorable thing in view of reason. But behold, by what effort did he find grace? Not only does he not seek it, but he even receives it while he was still raging against it. On the other hand, of the Jews he says
in the 9th chapter [Rom. 9, 30. f.]: "The Gentiles, who have not stood after righteousness, have obtained the righteousness that comes by faith. But Israel hath walked after the law of righteousness, and hath not obtained the law of righteousness." What can any protector of free will murmur against this? The Gentiles, at the time when they are filled with ungodliness and all vices, attain righteousness without merit from God's mercy; the Jews lack it, while they apply themselves to righteousness with the highest effort and endeavor. Is this not so much as saying that the effort of the free will is in vain while it strives for the best, and is it not indicated that it rather grows worse and goes back? Nor can anyone say that they did not strive with the highest power of free will. Even Paul gives them the testimony in the 10th chapter [Rom. 10,2], "that they strive for God, but with lack of understanding". Therefore, the Jews lack nothing that is attributed to free will, and yet they attain nothing, but the opposite happens. With the Gentiles there is nothing that is attributed to free will, and yet the righteousness of God follows. What is this but that by the very clear example of both peoples [Jews and Gentiles], then also by the very clear testimony of Paul, it is confirmed that grace is given in vain to those who have not earned it and are not worthy of it at all, and that it is also not "attained" by any efforts, endeavors, tiny or great, even of the best and most honorable people who seek righteousness with burning zeal and follow it.
Now let us also come to John, who also with many words and violently puts down free will. Right at the beginning he ascribes to free will such a great blindness that it does not even see the light of truth; so much is lacking in it that it could strive for the same. For he says thus [John 1:5]: "The light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not"; and soon after [v. 10:III]: "It was in the world, and the world knew it.
not. He came into his own, and his own did not receive him."
What do you think he means by the world? Can you exclude any other person from this name than the one who is born again through the Holy Spirit? And in this apostle there is a peculiar use of this word "world"; he understands by it the whole human race. Therefore, everything he says about the world must be understood from the point of view of free will, since this is the most excellent thing about man. Therefore the world does not germinate the light of truth [Joh. 1, 10.]; the world hates Christ and His own [Joh. 15, 19.]; the world does not know and see the Holy Spirit [Joh. 14, 17.]; the whole world is in trouble [1 Joh. 5, 19.All that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the life of hope; do not love the world [1 Joh. 2, 16. 15.]; you are of the world (He says [Joh. 8, 23.]); the world cannot hate you, but it hates me, because I testify of it that its works are evil [Joh. 7, 7.].
All these and many similar things are loud testimonies (praeconia) of the free will, namely about the most important part, which rules in the world under the devil's kingdom. For John also speaks of the world in contrast [to the Holy Spirit, so that the world is what has not been brought to the Spirit by the world, as he says to the apostles [Joh. 15, 19. 16.2c Now if there were some in the world who by virtue of free will strove for good, as there should be if free will were capable of anything, John would rightly have used a milder expression (wmpsrassot vsrbuiv) out of consideration for them, lest by the general word he should also include them among so much evil of which he accuses the world. Since he does not do this, it is evident that he makes free will guilty in every respect, as well as the world, for whatever the world may do, it does by the power of free will, that is, by reason and will, the most excellent parts of it. It follows [John 1:12, 13]:
"But as many as would receive him, to them gave
he power to become God's children who believe in His name. Who are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."
By this perfect separation, he rejects from the kingdom of Christ the blood, the will of the flesh, the will of the man. The blood, I believe, are the Jews, that is, those who wanted to be children of the kingdom because they were children of Abraham and the fathers, namely, by boasting of the blood. By the will of the flesh I mean the efforts of the people by which they practiced the law and works. For flesh here means carnal people without the spirit, who have the will and the effort, but have it in a carnal way because the spirit is not there. By the will of man I understand in general the efforts of all, whether they be in the law or without the law, namely of the Gentiles and of any people, so that the opinion is: neither from the birth of the flesh, nor from efforts in the law, nor by any other human effort children of God are born, but only by divine birth. If, then, they are not born of the flesh, nor raised by the law, nor prepared by any discipline of man, but are born again of God, it is evident that free will can do nothing here. For I believe that "man" in this place is taken according to the Hebrew way for any arbitrary one or rather for any one, as "flesh", for the sake of contrast, must be taken for the people without the Spirit; "will", however, for the highest power in man, namely, for the most important part of free will.
But even if we do not understand all the individual words, the main part (summa) of the matter itself is quite clear, because John, by this division, rejects everything that is not divine birth (generatio), saying that God's children do not become other than by birth from God, which, as he himself interprets it, happens by believing in His name. Under this rejection, the will of man, or free will, is necessary.
way included, since it is neither a birth from God, nor also faith. But if free will were capable of anything, John should not have rejected the will of man, nor should he have withdrawn men from it, and should have referred only to faith and regeneration, lest the word of Isaiah, Cap. 5, 20, be said to him: "Woe to you who call good evil. But now that he likewise rejects the blood, the will of the flesh, the will of the man, it is certain that the will of the man is no more able to make God's children than the blood or the fleshly birth. But there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the birth of the flesh does not make children of God, as Paul also says in Romans 9:8: "These are not the children of God who are children according to the flesh," and he proves this by the example of Ishmael and Esau.
The same John introduces the Baptist, who speaks of Christ as follows [John 1:16.], "From His fullness we have all taken grace for grace."
He says that we have received grace from the fullness of Christ, but for what merit or effort? For grace (he says), namely of Christ, as Paul also says Rom. 5:15: "God's grace and gift abounded to many through the grace of the one man JEsu Christ." Where is now the effort of the free will, by which grace is acquired? Here John says that grace is not received by no effort on our part alone, but even by foreign grace or foreign merit, namely of the one man JEsu Christ. So it is either wrong that we receive our grace by a foreign grace, or it is obvious that free will is nothing, because both cannot exist at the same time, that the grace of God is so small that it is obtained in general and everywhere by a tiny effort of some man, and again so dear that it is given to us in the grace and by the grace of this one so great man.
At the same time, through this passage, I would like to have reminded the protectors of free will that
they should know that they are deniers of Christ when they claim free will. For, if I obtain the grace of God through my efforts, what do I need Christ's grace for in order to receive my grace? Or what do I lack if I have the grace of God? But the Diatribe said, and all the Sophists also say, that we obtain the grace of God by our efforts, and prepare ourselves to receive it, not completely (de condigno), but to some extent (de congruo), that is, completely denying Christ, for whose grace we receive grace, as here the Baptist testifies. For I have refuted that "in a complete way" and "to some extent" above, and have shown that they are empty words, but that in fact they hold the opinion that it is a complete merit, and that in greater impiety than the Pelagians, as we have said. Thus it comes about that the godless sophists, together with the diatribe, deny the Lord Jesus Christ, who bought us, more than the Pelagians or any heretics have ever denied him, so that grace does not suffer any part or any power of free will beside itself. But that the protectors of free will deny Christ is proved not only by this scripture, but also by their own lives. For this reason they have no longer made Christ a lovely mediator, but a terrible judge, whom they strive to appease through the intercession of the mother [Christ] and the saints, then also through many self-invented works, customs, services, vows, with all of which they strive to appease Christ and to obtain grace from him; but they do not believe that he represents them to God [Rom. 8, 34.] and obtains grace for them through his blood, and grace (as it says here) for grace. And as they believe, so it happens to them, because Christ is in truth and rightly an inexorable judge for them, since they leave him as their mediator and most gracious Savior and regard his blood and his grace less than the efforts and endeavors of free will.
Now let us also hear an example of free will. Namely Nicodemus is a
Man in whom no deficiency can be found with regard to what free will is able to do, for what has this man omitted in endeavor or effort? He confesses [Joh. 3, 1. ff.] that Christ is true and has come from God, he praises the signs, he comes at night to hear and discuss the rest. Does one not see that by the power of his free will he has sought that which pertains to godliness and blessedness? But look how he starts when he hears that the true way to blessedness is taught by Christ through regeneration; does he acknowledge it or does he confess that he has ever sought it? Yes, he so abhors it and becomes so confused that he not only says he does not understand it, but also turns away from it as from something impossible. How (he says) can this happen? And this is really not to be wondered at, for who has ever heard that man must be born again of water and the Spirit unto blessedness? Who has ever thought that the Son of God had to be exalted so that all who believe in Him might not perish but have eternal life? Have the most perceptive and best worldly wise men ever thought of this? Have the most distinguished in this world ever recognized this wisdom (scientiam)? Has the free will of any man ever striven for it? Does not Paul confess [Rom. 16, 25. f. 1 Cor. 2, 7.] that this wisdom is hidden in secret, foretold through the prophets, but revealed through the gospel, so that it has been hidden from eternity and unknown to the world?
What do you want me to say? Let us consult experience. Even the whole world, even human reason, even free will, is forced to confess that it did not know or hear of Christ before the gospel came into the world. But if he did not know Him, much less did he seek Him, or seek Him, or strive for Him. But Christ is the way, the truth, the life and the blessedness [Joh. 14, 6.]. So he confesses, willingly or unwillingly, that he could neither know nor seek that which is the way, the truth, and the blessedness.
Nevertheless, we are nonsensical against this confession itself and our own experience, and argue with empty words that there is such a great power left in us that knows and can apply itself to that which concerns blessedness; This is nothing else than saying that Christ, the Son of God, is exalted for us, although no one could ever have known or taken it into consideration, yet even this ignorance is not ignorance, but knowledge of Christ, that is, of the things that belong to blessedness. Do you not yet see and grasp with your hands that the assertors of free will are quite nonsensical, since they call that knowledge of which they themselves confess that it is ignorance? Does this not call darkness light? Is. 5, 20. Namely, God blocks the mouth of free will so violently by his own confession and experience; yet even so he cannot remain silent and give glory to God.
Further, since Christ is called the way, the truth, and the life, and in such opposition that all that is not Christ is neither a way but error, nor truth but a lie, nor life but death, free will, because it is neither Christ nor in Christ, must consist in error, in falsehood, and in death. Where, then, and whence, is that middle and indifferent thing (neutrum == neutral), namely, that power of free will, which, though it is not Christ (that is, the way, the truth, and the life), nor error, nor lie, nor death, yet is supposed to exist? For if all that is said of Christ and grace were not spoken in contrast, so that it is opposed to the opposite, namely, that all that is apart from Christ is nothing but the devil, which is outside grace, nothing but wrath, which is outside light, nothing but darkness, which is outside the way, nothing but error, which is outside the truth, nothing but lies, which is outside life, nothing but death, what, I pray thee, would all the preaching of the apostles and all the Scriptures accomplish? Certainly everything would be said in vain, since it would not prove compellingly that Christ is necessary,
They would then find a middle thing, which in itself would be neither evil nor good, neither Christ's nor the devil's. It would be neither true nor false, neither living nor dead. This would be called the most excellent and highest thing in the whole human race.
Therefore, choose whichever of the two you like. If you admit that Scripture speaks in opposition, then you will only be able to say of free will what is opposed to Christ, namely, that error, death, the devil and all evil reign in it. If you do not admit that it speaks in opposition, you invalidate Scripture so that it can do nothing, nor prove that Christ is necessary, and so you empty Christ and corrupt the whole of Scripture by establishing free will. Furthermore, when you pretend in words that you confess Christ, you deny him in fact and in your heart, for if the power of the free will is not entirely erroneous and also not damnable, but looks to what is honorable and good, and to that which concerns salvation, and wants the same, then it is healthy and has no need of Christ as a physician Matth. 9, 12], nor has Christ redeemed that part of man, for what need is there of light and life where there is light and life?
But if it [the power of free will) is not redeemed by Christ, then the best in man is not redeemed, but is good and unharmed by itself. Then God is also unjust when he condemns any man, because he condemns what is best and healthy in man, that is, an innocent man, because there is no man who does not have free will. And even though an evil man abuses it, it is taught that the power itself is not extinguished by it, that it does not and could not strive for the good. But if it is of this nature, it is undoubtedly good, holy and just; therefore it must not be condemned, but separated from the man to be condemned. But this cannot happen, and if it could happen, then man would now, without free will, no longer even be a man, could neither be
He could neither be damned nor saved and would be completely an unreasonable animal and no longer immortal. Therefore, it only remains that God is unjust, who condemns that good, righteous, holy power that does not need Christ in man, even if it is connected with an evil man.
But let us continue in John: "He that believeth on him (saith he [Cap. 3, 18.]) is not judged; but he that believeth not is judged already, because he believeth not the name of the only begotten Son of God."
Answer whether free will is to be counted as a believer or not. If he is, then he has no need of grace, because he believes in Christ through himself, whom he neither knows nor thinks of in himself. If he is not [to be counted among the faithful], then he is already judged; what is that but that he is condemned before God? But GOt condemns only the ungodly, so he is ungodly. But what godly thing should the ungodly strive for? Nor do I believe that the power of free will can be exempted, since he speaks of the whole man, of whom he says that he will be damned. Then unbelief is not a gross inclination (affectus), but the highest, which sits and reigns in the castle of the will and reason, as well as the opposite [disposition] to it, namely faith. But to disbelieve is to deny God and to make Him a liar, 1 John 5:10: "If we do not believe, we make God a liar." Now how can that power, which sets itself against God and makes Him a liar, strive for good? If that force were not unbelieving and godless, he should not have said of the whole man, "He is already judged," but thus: man according to his gross inclinations is already judged, but according to what is best and most excellent in him he is not judged, because he strives for faith, or rather he is already believing.
So, where the Scripture so often says [Ps. 116, 11.]: "All men are liars", we will say for the sake of the reputation of free will: On the contrary, rather the Scripture lies, because man according to his best part is not a liar.
Liar, that is, according to reason and will, but only according to the flesh, blood and marrow, so that that whole, from which man has his name, namely reason and will, is sound and holy. Likewise also the word of the Baptist [Joh. 3, 36. f.]: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him," must be understood thus: "on him," that is, on the gross inclinations of man abideth the wrath of God, but on that power of the free will, namely the will and the reason, abideth grace and everlasting life. In this way, in order for free will to exist, one would like to draw everything that is said in Scripture against the ungodly, by assuming the whole to be said for one part (per synecdoche), only to the animal part of man, so that the part endowed with reason and truly human would remain unharmed. Then I would be able to give thanks to the assertors of free will, "sin" with confidence, and be sure that reason and will, or free will, could not be condemned, because it is never extinguished, but remains constantly healthy, just, and holy. But where will and reason are blessed, I shall rejoice that the shameful and animal flesh is separated from it and condemned; so much so that I would not wish Christ to be a redeemer for it. You see where the doctrine of free will takes us, that it denies everything divine and human, temporal and eternal, and makes a mockery of itself with so many monstrosities.
Likewise, the Baptist says [John 3:27], "A man can take nothing, except it be given him from heaven."
Here the diatribe may only stop boasting of its great store, since it lists everything we have from heaven. We are not talking about nature, but about grace, and the question is not what we are like on earth, but what we are like in heaven before God. We know that man is made Lord over the things that are under him, over which he has right and free will, that they should obey him and do what he himself does.
wants and thinks. But this is the question whether he has free will against God, that he must obey and do what man wants, or rather whether God has free will over man, that he must want and do what God wants, and can do nothing but what he wants and does. Here the Baptist says that he can take nothing but what is given to him from heaven; therefore free will must be nothing.
Likewise [John 3:31], "He that is of the earth is of the earth, and speaketh of the earth. He who comes from heaven is above all."
Here again he makes all earthly, and says that those are earthly minded and speak, who are not Christ's, does not leave some in a middle position. But free will is definitely not that which comes from heaven, therefore it must be from earth and must necessarily be earthly-minded and speak earthly. Now if any power in man, at any time, in any place, or in any work, were not earthly-minded, the Baptist would have had to exclude it, and not say in general of all who are apart from Christ: they are of the earth, they speak of the earth.
So Christ also says afterwards in the 8th Cap. V. 23: "You are of this world, I am not of this world; you are from below, I am from above.
But those to whom he spoke had free will, namely reason and will, and yet he says they are of the world. What new thing would he say to them if he said that they were of the world according to the flesh and the gross inclinations? Did not the whole world know this before? Furthermore, what need would there be to say that men are of the world according to the part in which they are animal, since in this way also the animals are of the world?
Furthermore the word where Christ Joh. 6, 44. says: "No one can come to me unless my Father draws him", what does it leave to the free will? For He says that it is necessary for someone to hear and learn from the Father Himself, then also [v. 45] that all must be taught by God. Here he teaches
Truly, not only that the works and efforts of the free will are in vain, but also that even the word of the gospel itself (which is spoken of in this passage) is heard in vain, unless the Father Himself speaks, teaches and draws within. No one can, no one can (he says) come, that is, of that power by which man could strive for Christ in anything, that is, for that which serves for blessedness, it is claimed that it is nothing. And it is of no use to free will what the diatribe from Augustine adduces in order to remove this quite clear and exceedingly powerful passage, namely, that God draws, just as we lure a sheep by holding out a twig. By this similitude, she thinks, it is proved that in us resides the power to follow the course of God. But this similitude has no power here, because God does not only hold out one good, but all His goods, and then even His own Son Christ, and yet no man follows if the Father does not hold out and draw inwardly in another way; indeed, the whole world pursues the Son whom He holds out. This simile fits the godly very well, who are already sheep and know God, their shepherd. They live in the spirit and follow the impulse of it wherever God wants and whatever He may hold before them. But the ungodly does not come, even if he has heard the word, unless the Father draws him within and teaches him; this he does by giving the spirit. There is a different pull than that which happens outwardly, there Christ is held out by the illumination of the Spirit, by virtue of which man is drawn to Christ by the sweetest impulse (raptu), or rather God (Deum), who draws him and speaks to him as a teacher, suffers, 1) than that man himself should seek and run.
We want to cite another passage from John, where he says Cap. 16, 9. "The Spirit will punish the world for sin, because they do not believe in me."
Here you see that it is sin not to believe
1) i.e. he behaves suffering against God, not active.
in Christ. But this sin is not attached to skin or hair, but is in the reason and the will itself. But since he makes the whole world guilty of this sin, and since it is known by experience that this sin was just as unknown to the world as it was to Christ, since it is revealed by the punishment of the spirit, it is clear that the free will with its will and its reason is caught in this sin and is considered condemned before God. Therefore, as long as he does not know Christ, nor even believes in him, he cannot want anything good nor strive for it, but inevitably serves sin where he [Christ] is unknown. In short, because Scripture everywhere preaches Christ in opposition and contrast (as I have said), that it subjects everything that is without Christ's Spirit to the devil, to ungodliness, to error, to darkness, to sin, to death, and to the wrath of God, so also all the testimonies, however many they are, which speak of Christ, will fight against free will, but they are innumerable, indeed, all Scripture. Therefore, if we submit the matter to the judgment of the holy Scriptures, we have won the victory in every respect, so that there is not a single letter or tittle left that does not condemn the doctrine of free will.
But that the Scriptures preach Christ in opposition and contrast, this all Christians know and confess in general, although the great theologians and protectors of free will do not know this, or pretend not to know it. They know, I say, that there are two kingdoms in the world, which oppose each other most fiercely, and that in the one the devil rules, who is called the prince of this world by Christ [John 12:31] and the god of this world by Paul [2 Corinthians 4:4].], who holds all captive according to his will, who are not snatched away from him by the Spirit of Christ, as Paul [2 Tim. 2, 26.] also testifies, and does not allow them to be snatched away by any power, except by the Spirit of God, as Christ testifies [Luc. 11, 21.] in the likeness of the strong man who keeps his palace in peace. In the other, Christ reigns. This one contends ceaselessly with the devil's kingdom and against
We are placed in it not by our own strength, but by the grace of God [Col. 1, 13], through which we are delivered from this evil world and saved from the authority of darkness. The recognition and confession of these two kingdoms, which constantly fight each other with such great strength and zeal, would alone be sufficient to refute the doctrine of free will, because we are forced to be servants in the devil's kingdom if we are not pulled out by God's power. This, I say, the common people know, and also confess it abundantly by proverbs, prayers, aspirations and by their whole life.
I pass over the saying that is truly my Achilles, which the diatribe has bravely passed by without touching, namely, that Paul teaches Rom. 7:15 and Gal. 5:17 that there is such a mighty battle of the spirit and the flesh in the saints and the godly that they cannot do what they will. From this I have drawn the conclusion: If the nature of man is so evil that in those who have been born again through the Spirit it not only does not strive for good, but also fights against it and is hostile, how should there be an effort for good in those who, not yet born again, are slaves in the old man under the devil? For Paul does not speak there only of the gross inclinations, through which the diatribe, as it were, is wont to escape from all scriptural passages by a practicable (commune) evasion, but he reckons among the works of the flesh heresy, idolatry, strife and discord, which prevail without fail in those highest powers, namely in reason and the will. Therefore, if the flesh fights against the Spirit in the saints through these impulses (affectibus), it will fight much more against God in the ungodly and in free will. Therefore he calls the same Rom. 8, 7. an enmity against God. This reason, I say, I would like to see refuted, and that free will would be defended against it.
I truly confess of myself, even if it could happen, I would not want a free will to be given to me, or that
I would not be left with anything in my hands by which I could strive for salvation, not only because I could not stand up to so many adversities and dangers, then also against so many attempts of the devils, and would not be able to keep it, since a devil is more powerful than all men and also no man could become blessed, but because, even if there were no dangers, no adversities, no devils, I would still be forced to constantly toil in the unknown and to make strokes of the air, because even my conscience, even if I lived and worked forever, would never become certain and sure how much it would have to do in order to do enough for God. For with every perfect work there would still remain the fear of conscience, whether it would please God, or whether he would still demand something beyond that, as the experience of all work drivers proves and I have learned enough to my great detriment in fo many years.
But now that God has taken my blessedness from my will (arbitrium) and placed it in His own, and has promised that He will preserve me not by my working and running, but by His grace and mercy, I am sure and certain that He is faithful and will not lie to me, then also so mighty and great that no devils, no adversities can overpower Him or snatch me from Him. "No one" (he says) "will snatch them out of my hand, because the Father who gave them to me is greater than all" [John 10:28, 29]. Thus it comes to pass that, though not all, yet some and many will be saved, whereas by the power of free will no one at all would be saved, but we would all be lost altogether. Then we are also sure and certain that we please God, not by the merit of our work, but by the grace of his mercy, which is promised to us, and that he does not impute to us if we have done too little or too badly, but fatherly forgives and corrects. This is the glory of all the saints in their God.
But if you find it difficult to defend God's goodness and justice, because He condemns those who do not deserve it, that is, those who are so ungodly that they are born in ungodliness.
cannot advise themselves in any way that they should not be godless, remain and be condemned, and be forced by the necessity of their nature to sin and be lost, as Paul says: "We were all children of wrath, just as the others were," since they were created as such by God Himself from the seed that was corrupted by the sin of the one Adam:
Thus, God is to be honored and feared as the most gracious (reverendus) in those whom he justifies and makes blessed as completely unworthy, and at least something of his divine wisdom is to be conceded, so that one believes that he is just, even where he seems to us to be unjust. For if his justice were of such a nature that it could be declared just by human comprehension, it would not be divine at all, and would differ in nothing from human justice. But since He is the true and only God, then also completely incomprehensible and inaccessible to human reason, it is reasonable, even necessary, that His justice is also incomprehensible, as Paul exclaims in Romans 11:33, saying: "O what depth of wisdom and knowledge of God! How utterly incomprehensible are his judgments and inscrutable his ways!" But they would not be incomprehensible if we were able to understand in all things why they are just. What is man compared to God? How much is our power compared to his power? What is our strength compared to His powers? What is our knowledge compared to His wisdom? What is our essence (substantia) compared to his essence? In short, what is everything that is ours versus everything that is his?
If, therefore, we confess, as nature teaches us, that human power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, essence, and all that is ours, is nothing at all, if it is held against divine power, strength, wisdom, knowledge, and essence, how great is our folly, that we alone find fault (vexemus) with the justice and judgment of God, and arrogate to our judgment such greatness as to apprehend, judge, and estimate the judgment of God? Why do we not say
Similarly, here too: Our judgment is nothing if it is compared with God's judgment? Consult even reason, whether it be not convicted and forced to confess itself foolish and presumptuous, that it does not let the judgment of God be incomprehensible, since it confesses that all other divine things are incomprehensible. Namely, in all other things we concede divine majesty to God, but in judgment we are ready to deny it, nor can we believe so much that he is just, although he has promised us that it will happen when he reveals his glory, that we shall then see and grasp with our hands that he has been just and is just.
I will give an example to strengthen this belief and to enlighten the ungodly eye (ad consolandum) that suspects God of unrighteousness. Behold, God so rules this fleshly world in outward things that if you look at the judgment of human reason and follow it, you are forced to say either there is no God, or God is unjust, as that poet says: "Often I am sorely tempted to think that there is no God. For behold, how exceedingly well the wicked fare, and how exceedingly ill the good, as the proverbs testify, and the experience from which the proverbs come: The greater the evil, the better the fortune. "The tabernacles of the wicked (says Job [12:6]) have abundance"; and the 73rd Psalm [v. 12] laments that sinners have great riches in the world. I pray thee, is it not quite unreasonable in the judgment of all, that the wicked prosper, and the good suffer misfortune? But this is the way of the world. Here even the best minds have fallen in such a way that they deny that God is, and invent that fate arranges everything by chance, like the Epicureans and Pliny. Then Aristotle also holds that his highest being (primum Ens), in order to free it from all misery, sees nothing of all things but itself, because he believes that it would be very annoying for him to see so much evil and so much injustice.
But the prophets who believed that God is, are challenged even more because of the unrighteousness of God, like Jeremiah,
Job, David, Assaph and others. What do you think Demosthenes and Cicero thought, since they had done everything they could and received such a reward that they perished miserably? And yet this injustice of God, which is very evident to reason (probabilis) and is demonstrated by such reasons of proof that no reason nor light of nature can resist, is very easily overruled by the light of the gospel and the knowledge of grace, by which we are taught that the wicked live well in body, but are lost in soul. And this is the short solution of this whole insoluble question in one word, namely, that there is a life after this life, in which everything that has not been punished and rewarded here will be punished and rewarded there, since this life is nothing else than the forerunner or rather the beginning of the life to come.
If, therefore, the light of the gospel, which alone stands in the word and faith, does so much that this question, which at all times has been treated and never solved, is so easily resolved and settled, what do you suppose will happen when the light of the word and faith cease, and the matter itself and the divine majesty as it is will be revealed? Do you not think that then the light of glory can most easily resolve the question which is insoluble in the light of the word or grace, since the light of grace so easily resolves the question which is insoluble in the light of nature? Grant me a threefold light: the light of nature, the light of grace, and the light of glory, as is commonly and well distinguished. In the light of nature it is insoluble that this should be just, that the good should be afflicted, and that the evil should prosper. But the light of grace resolves this.
In the light of grace, it is insoluble how God can condemn him who, by his own powers, can do nothing but sin and be guilty; here both the light of nature and the light of grace decide that the guilt lies not in the wretched man but in the unjust God, for they can
not judge God differently, who bestows the crown of victory (coronat) on one godless man for nothing, without merit, and not on another, but condemns him, even though he may be less godless or at least no longer godless. But the light of glory decides otherwise, and will hereafter show that God, whose judgment is now made according to an incomprehensible justice, is of an entirely just and manifest justice - that we should believe this for the time being, reminded and fortified by the example of the light of grace, which performs a similar miracle with respect to the light of nature.
Conclusion of the whole book. 1)
Here I will conclude this booklet, and I am ready, if it should be necessary, to treat this matter even more extensively, although I believe that here the godly [reader], who wants to give room to the truth without stubbornness, is amply satisfied. For if we believe that it is true that God foreknows and predestines everything, then also that in his foreknowledge and predestination he cannot be lacking or hindered, and that nothing happens except by his will, which even reason must admit, then at the same time, according to the testimony of reason itself, there can be no free will, neither in man, nor in an angel, nor in any creature. Thus, if we believe that the devil is the prince of the world, who constantly lies in wait for Christ's kingdom with all his strength and fights it in order not to let go of the captive people, unless he is driven to it by the divine power of the spirit, then it is again obvious that there can be no free will.
So also, if we believe that original sin has so corrupted us that even those who are driven by the spirit find it exceedingly difficult to cope with it, because it fights strongly against what is good, it is clear that in the man who does not have the spirit there is nothing that can turn to good, but only to evil. In the same way, if the Jews, who by all their strength were opposed to righteousness, were rather in unrighteousness, they would not be able to do good.
1) This translation can be found at Justus Jonas
If we believe that Christ overthrew mankind by his blood, and that the Gentiles, chasing after ungodliness, attained to righteousness in vain and without delay, it is likewise evident, even from work and experience, that without grace man can desire nothing but evil. But in short, if we believe that Christ redeemed men by his blood, we are forced to confess that the whole man was corrupt, otherwise we would either make Christ superfluous or a redeemer of the worst part [of man], which would be blasphemous, and rob God of what is his.
Now, dear Erasmus, I ask you for the sake of Christ, that you will now also keep what you have promised. But you promised that you would give way to the one who taught you better. Let the reputation of the persons go. I confess that you are a great man, adorned with many and splendid gifts from God, to say nothing of other things than your sharp mind, your erudition and your eloquence bordering on the miraculous. But I have nothing and am nothing, except that I would almost boast of being a Christian. Then I also praise and extol this about you very much, that you alone have attacked the matter itself before all, that is, the brief epitome of the matter, and have not tired me with distant (alienis) things about the pontificate, purgatory, indulgences and similar things, which are rather posies than things, with which almost all have hounded me so far, though in vain. But you have recognized the main point and put the knife to my throat, for which I thank you from the bottom of my heart, because I like to deal with this matter as much as time and leisure allow. If those who have attacked me so far had also done this, and if those who now boast of a new spirit and new revelations would still do it, we would have less turmoil and mobs and more peace and harmony. But God has thus punished our ingratitude through the devil. But if you cannot do this thing differently than you have done in this diatribe, I would very much like you, satisfied with your gift, to continue the sciences and languages, as you have hitherto done with great benefit and honor.
thau, you nurtured, adorned and promoted. With this effort you have also served me not a little, so that I confess that I owe you much, and in this respect I hold you high and look up to you with a sincere heart. God has not yet willed that you should be equal to this cause of ours, nor has He given it to you. I beg you not to think that this is said out of presumption, but I pray that the Lord will soon make you as great and as much higher than me in this matter as you are superior to me in all other things. For it is not something new that God instructs Moses through a Jethro and teaches Paul through an Ananias. For that you say that this is far from the mark, if you do not know Christ, I believe that you yourself see how it stands. For that is why not all will err, even if we, you or I, err. God is the one who is praised for his miracles.
The saints who are farthest from holiness are considered to be saints. For it can easily happen that you, being a man, neither understand correctly nor pay enough attention to passages of Scripture or sayings of the Fathers, by whose guidance you think you hit the mark. That word is a sufficient indication of this, that you write that you do not want to assert anything, but only hold it against each other. He does not write in this way who sees through a matter completely and understands it correctly. But in this book I have not held one against the other, but assert and assert, and do not want the judgment to stand with anyone, but advise all that they may follow. But the Lord, whose this thing is, enlighten thee, and make thee a vessel unto honor and glory. Amen.
End.