5. The Communication of Attributes.

5. The Communication of Attributes.

(De communicatione idiomatum.) There has been much debate within the Christian church about the communication of attributes of both the union of God and man to one Person. When Luther begins the lament "that the loving and blessed joy" (in the Incarnation of the Son of God) "must be prevented and spoiled", he thinks primarily of the disputes over the communication of attributes. 7° Some preliminary remarks are in order here. First of all, it is necessary to recall what is, has been and still is understood by the term "attributes" (idiomata). By " attributes" we do not only mean attributes in the narrower sense of what divine and human nature are in their essence: eternal—temporal, infinite—finite, etc., but also everything that the natures do in their essence and suffer according to them (actiones et passiones), 1.e.: to create—to be created, to give life—to lay down life, etc. The Formula of Concord also precedes its argument about the communication of attributes by an explanation of what it understands by " attributes ": "We believe, teach and confess that to be omnipotent, eternal, infinite, everywhere, especially, natural, that is, to be present for oneself according to the nature and its natural essence, to know all things are essential attributes of the divine nature, which will never again become essential attributes of the human nature in eternity. On the other hand: to be a bodily creature or creature, to be flesh and blood, to be finite and, to paraphrase, to suffer, to die, to go up and down, from a

place to which others move, hunger, thirst, frost, heat and the like are characteristics of human nature, which never become characteristics of divine nature. °°) Above all, however, it must be remembered here again that the communication of attributes does not constitute a separate doctrinal article. One has spoken of the communication of the attributes as the "outermost point" of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. But this is not factually correct. Like the doctrine of the communion of natures, the doctrine of communion or communication of attributes does not go beyond the doctrine of the unio personalis, and the propositiones idiomaticae, that is, the sentences which express the communication of attributes, are completely identical in fact to the propositiones idiomaticae, that is, to the sentences which describe the unio personalis, for example, "God is man" and "man is God". Luther rightly reminds us of this point again and again when he speaks of the communicatio idiomatum. The matter stands as it is: If the Son of God is a man, and not a mere pretence, a phantasm, but a real man endowed with human attributes, then with His being human He also has the whole range of human attributes, that is, everything that human nature is, does and happens to, that is, being a creature, in which time is born, suffers, dies, rises, sits at the right hand of God, returns visibly, etc. This is also where the clear statements of Scripture are to be found. Just as the Scripture says about the Son of God being human, oapé éyéveto, so also the human attributes, human birth and human submission to the Law, yevépevoc ek yvvatKoc, YEVOLEVOS v16 voLOV, suffering and death, tov Kdplov THs 66ENs éotavpwoav, o Sivatoc Tov viov Tov Tov Ysov. 7°) Whoever maintains that these human attributes do not really and truly belong to the Son of God,

Trigl. 819, Epit., VII, 7-8]. Quenstedt: Sumitur vox Id1mpatov vel stricte pro ipsis proprietatibus naturalibus vel late, quatenus ipsas etiam operationes, per quas proprietates proprie dictae sese exserunt, comprehendit. Hoc loco in latiori significatu accipiuntur propria sive idiomata, ita ut praeter proprietates stricte sic dictas etiam actiones et passiones, evepynuata Kai amotedéopata ambitu suo comprehendat, quia idiomata per évepysiac et anotedéopata se exserunt. (II, 134.)

but finds here a mere figure of speech (praedicatio verbalis), he must either make out of the Man Christ a mere illusory man without human attributes or take the Man Christ out of the personal relationship with the Son of God, that is, dissolve the unio personalis. Thus the propositiones idiomaticae, which say human attributes of the Son of God, coincide objectively with the propositionio personalis: "God is man. The same situation comes before our eyes when we pay attention to the statements of Scripture in which divine attributes are expressed of the Man Christ. If the Son of Man is not merely a merely in name God but God in the essential, God in the essential, metaphysical sense of the Word, then he—the Son of Man—is also endowed with the whole range of divine attributes, that is, eternity, divine power, divine knowledge, divine presence, divine honor, etc., along with the divine nature. There again are the clear statements of Scripture. As the Scripture says about the Son of Man being God, 5 vidc tov Cavtos Sov, and the divine nature, 5 ov ent mavtwv $e," so also the divine attributes such as eternity, GvaPaivev Smov hv to mpdtepov, the birth from the Father, LOVvoyEvi s ape matpdc,"® the divine power and presence, 'E560n poi nica éCovoia Ev OVPAVA Kai Emi Tis Yijc... Ey@ pE8’ Dudv sipt Tdoas Ths NUEpaAs EWS Tis OvvTEAEiAs TOD aidvos, [AII power is given unto Me... Iam with you alway.] 7°?) Whoever wanted to assert that these divine attributes do not really and truly belong to the Son of Man would either have to make the Son of God a God in name only who has no divine being and no divine attributes at all, or else take the Son of God out of the unio personalis, that is, dissolve the unio personalis. But, why explain something so self-evident in more detail and even—as the Formula of Concord does *°°—talk about three kinds of communication of attributes? This is because the following strange things have happened within the Christian Church: a. It has been admitted that the Son of God became man, that is, the unio personalis and the doctrine of two natures have been conceded, but nevertheless separated the Son

Decl., VIII, 36 ff.] of God from the characteristics of his human nature, for example from the birth from Mary and the suffering and death, with the assertion that it is impossible, even blasphemous, to let the Son of God really (realiter) participate in these human attributes. So Nestorius, Zwingli, etc. b. Although it has been admitted that the Son of Man is the essential Son of God, that is, that he is the unio personalis of God and man, and that he is also granted the communion of human nature with the divine Person of the Son of God, the Son of Mary has been separated from the divine attributes of the Son of God, with the assertion that human nature is not at all capable of this participation, for example in divine power or even in divine presence. So say the Reformed and Roman theologians. Therefore, they c. also denied that the divine and human nature work together in a God-hman act what is peculiar to them. For example, it has been claimed that the man Christ performed miracles no differently than did the prophets and apostles. Since from these contradictory positions very strong attacks have been and are still being made on the doctrine of Sacred Scripture,*° there is unfortunately a need to insert into a textbook of dogma a more detailed treatise on the communication of attributes. Indeed, all those who administer the public ministry in the Christian Church should be able not only to present the right doctrine, but also Tous avtiéyovtac éAéyyetw and émiotopiCer. [convince the gainsayers... Whose mouths must be stopped i 302) The three ways [Genera] of the Communication the Attributes. The Formula of Concord and, according to its pattern, the majority of Lutheran dogmatists distinguish three types (tria genera) of communication of attributes. This tripartition has been criticized as unnecessary and confusing, at least as cumbersome. *) We have also always regretted that it had to be introduced. But it is not arbitrary, but historical and therefore factual, as will be seen more clearly in the following. Incidentally, the Lutheran

Komp. d. Dogmatik, 10th ed., p. 209 Zéckler, Handbuch II, p. 129. teachers did not insist on the triple number as recent accounts of dogmatic history would have it, and it should not be credited to Brochmand as a proof of independence that he dared to speak of a fourth genus. >) Quenstedt not only refers to the fact that Lutheran teachers counted two, three and four ways of communicating the attributes, but also explains that the different counting is indifferent, and that it is only a different method of teaching. Similarly, Quenstedt points out that among the Lutheran teachers who are divided into three, without any difference in doctrine, there is a different external order of the three genera. *°© It certainly does not matter in how many classes one arranges the scriptural statements that express the communication of the attributes externally. But everything depends on leaving the statements of Scripture as they are and not under the pretence that the attributes do not fit the subject, on pointing to human opinion by exchanging subjects and by changing subject and predicate (Nestorius, Zwingli). One could also take genus in the communication of the attributes by saying: The Scriptures ascribe to the wonderful

Quia vero quaestio de numero graduum vel generum communicationis idiomatum non ad fidem eiusque constitutionem, sed ad tponov naideiacg et methodum docendi pertinet, hinc alii duo, alii tria, alii quatuor idiomatum genera constituunt. B. Menzero in Anti-Marcionio, p. 10 sq., placet_bimembris divisio. Tubingenses, ut Hafenrefferus, Itemque Brochnmnnus et alii, idiomata ad quaternarium numerum redigunt, propositiones primi generis in duas classes distinguentes.... Plerisque tamen nostris theologis ternarius arridet numerus...... [Google]

communicationis idiomatum generibus, theologi nostri variant; alii sequuntur ordinem doctrinae, alii ordinem naturae. Ordinem doctrinae sequuntur D. Chemnitius, Formula Concordiae, et D. Aeg. Hunnius. Hi enim communicationem actionum officii, utpote faciliorem et minus controversam, praeponunt communicationi maiestatis, quae maxime controversa et copiosius explicanda sit. Ordinem vero naturae sequitur B. Gerhardus, aliiqui plurimi, praeponuntque communicationem maiestatis communicationi actionum officii, quia illa hanc natura praecedit, quem ordinem et nos observabimus. In hoc autem naturae ordinfe primas tenet idionotnoic, appropriatio, secundas petanoinoic sive communicatio maiestatis et tertias Kotvomoiyois sive KoIvevia anotedeapatw@v, communicatio actionum officii. [Google] The three ways of the Communication of Attributes. [English ed. ~ 134-135] Person of the God-Man both the whole range of divine and the whole range of human attributes. But one would then again be compelled to make subdivisions, because on closer inspection it turns out that the divine and the human predicates are not expressed in the same way or in the same way by the person of the God-man. The Formula of Concord also draws attention to this when it says: "For propositiones or praedicationes, that is, how one speaks of the person of Christ, of the same natures, do not all have one and the same way, and when they are spoken of without due distinction, doctrine is confused and the simple-minded reader is abundantly misled."*° It cannot often be sufficiently recalled that the doctrine of Scripture has been made difficult and complicated by the communication of attributes only through the rationalistic objections of the Reformed theologians in particular. Although the Scriptures clearly state that the Son of God suffers and dies and attributes to Christ divine attributes given in time according to human nature, the Reformed theologians operate with reasons of impossibility: the Son of God could not suffer and die without the transformation of the Godhead into mankind, and Christ's human nature could not be given divine attributes without the destruction of human nature. Under the Christian semblance of saving the glory of God and the truth of human nature, they fight against Scripture and confuse Christianity. The simple Reformed Christian and also the Reformed theologian, in so far as he is a Christian, believes all three genera communicationis idiomatum of the Formula of Concord and the Lutheran teachers. The Reformed Christian believes the Scripture: "The blood of Jesus Christ, His Son, cleanseth us from all sin."2°8) With this he believes three things:. that the blood of Christ, i.e. the blood of the human nature, is the blood of the Son of God, 2. that the cleansing of sins, i.e. divine power, is due to the blood of Christ, i.e. Christ also according to his human nature, 3. that therefore both natures work together in one God-Man [theanthropic] act. But these are exactly the three ways of communicating the attributes which are described by the Formula of Concord and

the Lutheran teachers (genas idiomaticum, genns maiestaticum, genus apotelesmaticum). God has also made the doctrine of the communication of characteristics simple. But people seek many arts. And it is to these arts that we owe the burden of dogmatics with the following three sections. First genus of communication of Attributes (genus idiomaticum). Nestorius very decidedly separated the Son of God both from being born of the Virgin Mary and from suffering and dying, when he denied Mary the predicate $eotdKoc [Mother of God] and claimed: I cannot worship a God who is born, died and is buried. Nestorius is so serious about this separation that he accuses of pagan doctrine all those who relate the birth from Mary and the suffering and dying to the Son of God, and he puts the anathema on them because they transformed God into a human being. In order to keep the divinity of the Logos intact, he said, one must relate birth from the Virgin and suffering and death not to the Logos himself, but only to humanity, whom the Logos used as dwelling place. 3!° Zwingli is Nestorius redivivus. He too separates the Son of God from suffering and death, and demands that suffering and death be related to human nature alone. Admittedly, Scripture speaks in such a way that it ascribes suffering and death to the whole person (Christ, Son of Man, Son of God); but these scriptural statements, according to Zwingli, must be "sent into the right sense" by adopting the figure of speech "all6osis," in such a way that one makes an substitution

dixerit et non potius nobiscum Deum, left to right. inhabitasse eam quae secundum nos est naturam per id quod unitus est massae nostrae, quam de Maria' virgine suscepit; matrem etiam Dei Verbi et non potius ejus, qui Emmanuel est, sanctam virginem nuncupaverit ipsumque Dei verbum in carnem versum essense (this is Nestorius' conclusion), quam accepit ad ostentationem deitatis suae, ut habitu inveniretur ut homo, anathema sit. VII: Si quis hominem, qui de virgine creatus est, hunc esse dixerit unigenitum, qui ex utero Patris ante luciferum natus est... s. X.: Si quis illud in principio.verbum pontificem et apostolum confessionis nostrae factum esse seque ipsum obtulisse pro nobis dicat et non Emmanuelis esse apostolatum potius dixerit... Deo (piae Dei sunt, et homini quae sunt hominis non deputans, a. s. [Google] The three ways of the Communication of Attributes. [English ed. ~ 136-137] of the subject to suit its predicate. If the predicate is suffering and death, only human nature must be used in the subject for "Christ" or "Son of Man" or "Son of God". If the predicate is "giving life", "right food" (as in the words of Jn 6:55: H odo pov GAnb'dc EoT1 Bpwotc), then one must substitute for flesh the divine nature. According to Zwingli, this exchange must be made "or else we would be caught up in the greatest heresies that have ever been". Zwingli gives Luther, who did not want to accept these permutations, the following private lesson: Don’t you see, my dear Luther, how the most precious words pertaining to the eternal deity and true humanity of Jesus Christ must be interpreted according to their right meaning by figures and tropes so that they do not violate the faith? and addressing the large audience, Zwingli continues: "Pious Christian, do not let yourself be seduced by such superstition!" (Luther’s) They [Zwingli’s opponents] are word warriors, whose nobility is easily broken, if one gets to the bottom of the truth and looks at the right sense and keeps well the art of figurative speech and the tropology."2!) In the same way, in Calvin's work there is a complete separation

Luther's Werke, St. Louis Ed. XX, 1192 ff. Zwingli says here about the alloeosis and its application: "Know that the figure called alloeosis (counter-exchange may be rather translated for us) is innumerably used by Christ himself; and is the figure, as much as it serves here, an exchange or counter-exchange of two natures which are in one person, but since one calls one and understands the other, or calls what they both are, and yet only understands them as one". As an example Zwingli mentions: "When Christ says Luke 24:26: Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into His glory?; here Christ is taken for human nature alone, which may suffer and die, but not the divine nature... And Matt. 20: "And the Son of Man is given to the priests and scribes" etc. Here the Son of Man is actually taken for human nature, for the latter may be given and killed, but the divine not at all... Joh. 1: 'The Word became flesh' or 'God became man' is to be understood correctly by the counter- exchange, that is: If God may become nothing at all, or he would be imperfect, then this Word may not be understood at first sight, but must have the meaning: Man has become God, that is, that what is said of the Godhead, that He has become man, should be understood by mankind through the reciprocal exchange. In his Amica exegesis Zwingli speaks about alloeosis in this way: Est dAAoiwoic, quantum huc attinet, desultus vel transitus ille axxt si mavis permutatio, qua de altera in Christo natura loquentes alterius vocibus utimur. Ut cum Christus ait: of the Son of God from the suffering and dying of human nature when he says that Christ's merit as the merit of a human being has no value in itself, but acquires its value through the fact that Christ was predestined to be Savior. 3'?) Also the later Reformed theologians, as will be shown below, come back again and again to Zwingli's alloeosis in their "explanations" of the scriptural statements in which suffering and death are attributed to the Son of God. Against this separation of the Son of God from what is due to him according to his human nature, that is, from the birth of Mary and from suffering and dying, the Christian Church must protest with the greatest firmness. What Nestorius and Zwingli reject is, after all, the truth of Scripture. It is not human speculation, but Scripture tells of the Son of God as human birth (yevOpévoc ek yvvatkéc),*!» so suffering and death (tov KUpLov THs S6ENs EotavpmMcav, o Iavatos Tov vlov' Yor). 7'4) But Scripture is the Word of God. It speaks always and in all places completely correctly. Nor can it be broken in a single word. 3!>) The Christian Church must therefore a priori refuse to criticize or condemn any way of the speaking of Scripture, as it does in all other doctrines, including the doctrine of the Person of Christ. The statements of Scripture are not in need of this, that they should first be "sent by men into the right sense", as Zwingli says, but men must send their sense into the statements of Scripture. So if Scripture calls the birth Caro mea vere est cibiis, caro proprie est humanae in illo naturae, attamen per commutationem hoc loco pro divina ponitur natura. Qua ratione en Filius Dei est, ea ratione est animae cilnis...., Rursus cum perhibet filium familias a colonis trucidandum, cum filius familias divinitatis ejus nomen sit, per humana tamen natura accipit, secundum enim istam mori potuit, secundum divinam minime. [Google] (Opp. Il, 525. reproduced in German by Zwingli in response to Luther's confession of the Lord's Supper, St. L. XX, 1310).

opponere vellet judicio Dei, non fore merito locum: quia non reperietur in homine dignitas, quae possit Deum promereri; imo ut verissime Augustinus scribit, clarissimum lumen praedestinationis et gratiae ipse est salvator homo Christus Iesus. [Google]

139] from Mary and ascribes suffering and death under Pontius Pilate to the Son of God, Nestorius, Zwingli and all other people have to let this stand. When people allow themselves to use "human nature" for the "Son of God" in order to escape a supposed false doctrine, this is a real apostasy from the truth that the word of the Scriptures is not the word of man, but the word of the God who always speaks the truth. This is the point to which Luther first and foremost puts his finger in this trade. When Zwingli, in the relevant scriptural statements, wants to use human nature for the Son of God by virtue of his alloeosis, so Luther counters him: "As if the apostles had been mad and foolish, that they did not want to speak of the Godhead, they had to name humanity, and otherwise."*!® This is what Luther always did in his sermons. Thus he says in his sermons on the Gospel of St. John: "While St. Paul and the Holy Scriptures say that the Son of God and the King of Honor is crucified, we should speak and believe without timidity, and whoever believes this book of the Holy Scriptures will not be averse to it."3! Likewise, Lutheran dogmatists emphasize the absurdities that Nestorius' and Zwingli's wisdom finds in the suffering and death of the Son of God, simply the principle of the Scriptures. *!®) But does not the Scripture really teach that God cannot suffer and die? Certainly! Scripture teaches God's inability to suffer in a very powerful way. It not only gives him the predicates 6 pakdptoc and 0 p6voc syo@v abavaciay, but also expressly adds that God dwells in a light inaccessible to human beings, (> Oikav ampdottov, so that no human eye can see him, much less a human hand can grasp him and subject him to suffering. *! The heavens cannot be stormed by human beings. Neither the Jews nor Pontius Pilate could approach the Son of God in his divinity or heavenly glory. So those wow who claim that the predicates "born of the Virgin Mary", "suffered under

id ipsimet S. Scripturae impingunt. Ipsius enim Scripturae assertio est ac thesis: Deum et Filium Dei esse passum et mortuum. [Google] (II, 226.)

Pontius Pilate, crucified, died and was buried" does not fit the subject "Son of God", and that one must therefore proceed with Nestorius and Zwingli to send the scriptural statements of the suffering of the Son of God, mediated by alloeosis, "into the right sense, which is inviolable to faith"! Here we again encounter human folly, which does not fully accept God's Word, but uses a Series of scriptural statements in order to fight against and reject another series. Scripture does not just say that God is inaccessible, invisible and inviolable to human beings, but it also teaches—and this is its real scopus—that the Son of God became a man, and that he became a man in such a way that he took a human nature from a woman and made it into His own Person and became like another Man. Through this incarnation the Son of God stepped out of the light inaccessible to all human beings and became visible and tangible to them. And it is according to this human nature, assumed into the divine Person, not according to the divine nature, that the Scriptures speak of the Son of God as the birth from Mary, so suffering and death: yevOusevoc ék onéppatos Aavid katé cépKa,* Savatwmdeic capxt. 72) These more detailed explanations of Scripture, not human thoughts of their own, therefore reflect the Formula of Concord, Luther and the Lutheran teachers, when they say, with reference to the Scriptural statements in which suffering and death are attributed to the Son of God: The Son of God suffered, not nominally, but really and truly, but in the assumed human nature. This suffering in the assumed human nature is, however, the suffering of the Son of God, because human nature does not exist in its own right, but belongs to the Person of the Son of God, "propter hanc hypostaticam unionem", "for the sake of this personal union"*? Luther, as is well known, expresses this in this way to the alloeosis of Zwingli: "Whether the old weather-witch, Madam Reason, the grandmother of alloeosis, would say here: Yes, the Godhead cannot suffer nor die, you shall answer: That is true; but nevertheless, because Godhead and humanity in Christ is one Person, Scripture, for the sake of such personal union, also gives to the Godhead everything that happens to humanity, and again. And is therefore also in the

Decl., VUI, 20] 141] reality. The person (meaning Christ) suffers, dies; now the Person is true God; therefore it is rightly said: The Son of God suffers; for though the one part (that I speak thus), as the Godhead, does not suffer, yet the Person who is God suffers in the other part, as in mankind. *?°) Admittedly, it remains unexplained for human understanding how the Son of God, incapable of suffering in his divine personality, could really and truly come into the fellowship of suffering of his human nature. It is clearly evident how the church teachers here wrestle with the expression We need only recall Cyril's paradox éna9wc exaSev, "without suffering, the Son of God has suffered". 374) That sounds like yes and no at the same time. But Cyril obviously wants to express a threefold point: 1) According to Scripture, the Son of God is in himself incapable of suffering. 2 According to Scripture, the Son of God really suffered in his human nature. 3 But for a more detailed explanation of the how is to be dispensed with. And we need not be greatly surprised that any more detailed explanation of how fails here. Because it remains and must remain unexplained how the Son of God became man, that is to say, how God and man could form one I or a person, it also remains unexplained how the Son of God could really and truly suffer. One mystery stands and falls with another. Yes, both mysteries are only one mystery. But just as we recognize the mystery of the personal unity of God and man as a fact, without being able to prove the possibility of this personal unity for human understanding, so too the real communion of the Son of God with the suffering of his human nature must be recognized as a fact on the basis of the statements of Scripture, even though we are not able to clarify how the Son of God, who is in himself incapable of suffering, could really and truly share in the suffering of his human nature. We therefore say with the old Lutheran teachers: As real as the fact that the Son of God became man is, despite its incomprehensibility, so real is the fact that the Son of God suffered and died, despite its incomprehensibility. °°) And the Holy

they contain errors. One calms down with Cyril's daa9ac exaSev or with the factually equivalent determination of the Scripture not only testifies to the fact of the suffering of the Son of God, but it also leads to this fact, that is, to the fact that not a mere man, but the Son of God dogmatists: The Son of God has suffered, not na8ytiKac Kai GAAOLMTw; but vrootatikas. The adequate expression is and remains: The Son of God suffered personally, that is, through the unio personalis with a human nature according to which he could suffer and indeed suffered. It has been tried with other definitions. It has been said: because the Son of God is in himself incapable of suffering, participation in suffering can only be "of a moral nature". (Baumgarten, Streitigk. II, 74.) A similar approach To explain how Frank takes it when he wants to "recognize out of Christ's suffering" such "moments which are suitable for a participation of the divine nature". Frank thinks of the "ethical activities" of love which this sacrifice brought, etc. (Theol. d. IT 0. II, 252 ff.) But "ethical" can also mean the participation with which Christ takes care of the suffering of all his faithful, even though they do not form a person with him, Acts 9:5 Therefore, the question of how the Son of God is to suffer should be answered in a comprehensive way, even if it is not explained in detail: vtootatikac, propter unionem personalem. Thus the Formula of Concord (678, 20 [Trigl. 1021, F. C., Sol. Decl., VIII:20f.]): On account of this personal union (propter unionem personalem), which cannot be thought of nor exist without such a true communion of natures, not the mere human nature, whose property it is to suffer and die, has suffered for the sins of the world, but the Son of God Himself truly suffered; however, according to the assumed human nature, and... truly died, although the divine nature can neither suffer nor die.. Other more detailed provisions, such as Bovantikoos, évepyntikac etc., are not coordinated with the "personal", but rather subordinated to it. So Chemnitz, De duab. natura, p. 85: Quando Christus humana sua natura patitur, hoc fit cum communione alterius naturae, non ut divina natura etiam in sese patiatur, hoc enim naturae humanae proprium est, sed quia divina Christi natura adest personaliter naturae patienti, [Google] which wants suffering, gives strength, etc. Similarly, Quenstedt finds only in the "personaliter" the adequate expression for the participation of the Son of God in suffering. He says (II, 226): Tribuitur passio Filio Dei non nadntiKds Kou dAdoidtos, quasi in ipsa essentia divina passus sit, neque solum pnuatixacs seu verbaliter et tropice, quasi nullo modo vere et realiter passus sit, neque solum Aoyiatixds, quod suas reputet passiones carnis, quomodo fidelium perpessiones Christus pro suis reputat, Act. 9:4, neque solum BovdAntixac, per divinam ovvevdoxiay, in passionem consentiendo, Ps. 49:9, et ovyyapytixds, permittendo et ad passionem carnis quiescendo, ut de Aoyy loquitur Irenaeus 1. III. adv. haeres., c. 21, vel etiam owotikds, conservando et sustentando carnem in passionibus, itemque evepyntikac, pondus addendo passioni, ut esset iodpponov Avtpov et passiones salutares reddendo, ut loquitur Damascenus 1. III. O. F., c. 15, nec denique solum oxetixads objective, blasphemias et op; probria ferendo, quibus aeterna Deitas eius petita fuit, Joh. 10, 33 [Google]: 143] suffered, the redemptive value of Christ's suffering when they say that we are reconciled to God through the death of His Son, etc. *°° Luther therefore warns against Zwingli's separation of the Son of God from the suffering of human nature with the well-known words: "Beware, beware, I say, of Alleosi! It is the mask of the devil, for it is the last one to inflict such a Christianity, according to which I did not want to be a Christian, namely, that Christ no longer be, nor do with his suffering and death, any more than another bad saint. For if I believe this, that human nature alone has suffered for me, then Christ is a bad savior to me; he himself needs a savior. Summa, it is unspeakable what the Devil seeks with the Alleosi." >? The result of the above is as follows: The Christian Church holds on the basis of Scripture, on the one hand, that the Son of God was not merely nominally, but really and truly born of Mary and suffered; on the other hand, it adds—also on the basis of Scripture—the nearer definition that these predicates are due to the Son of God not according to divine but according to human nature. In this way, she defends herself against a double error that has arisen in her midst: the error of Nestorius, which destroys the unity of the Person, and the error of Eutyches, which abolishes the essential difference of natures. And it is to ward off this double error that the so-called first genus of the communication of the attributes is established. The listing of this genus is not to be attributed to boredom or theological sophistry, but has the very practical purpose of remaining with Scripture, which attributes suffering and death not only to the human nature of Christ, but to the Son of God, and thus—also on the basis of Scripture—to preserve the infinite redemptive value of Christ's action and suffering. The first Matt. 26:63, sed passus insuper est Filius Dei, tum vaootatikovc, quod caro, in qua passus est, ipsa Filii Dei hypostasi subsistat eandemque cum ipsa personam constituat, tum idionomtuKds, giiia Filius Dei, appropriando sibi carnem, appropriavit etiam sibi carnis passiones. Ut quam vere caro propria est Filio Dei per personalem unionem, tam vere etiam passiones carnis ipsi sunt propriae per communicationem. [Google]

way of communicating the attributes can be described like this: * Because the divine and the human nature in Christ form one Person, the attributes which essentially belong to only one nature always belong to the whole person, but the divine attributes according to the divine nature, the human attributes according to the human nature (GENUS IDIOMATICUM) *2°) It does

since in Christ two distinct natures exist and remain unchanged and unconfused in their natural essence and properties, and yet of both natures there is only one person, hence, that which is, indeed, an attribute of only one nature is ascribed not to that nature alone, as separate, but to the entire person, which is at the same time God and man (whether it is called God or man). 37] But in hoc genere, that is, in this mode of speaking, it does not follow that what is ascribed to the person is at the same time a property of both natures, but it is distinctively explained what nature it is according to which anything is ascribed to the person. Thus the Son of God was born of the seed of David according to the flesh, Rom. 1:3. Also: Christ was put to death according to the flesh, and hath suffered for us in, or according to, the flesh, 1 Pet. 3:18;4:1." (M. 681, 3-4 [FC VIII, 36-37; Trigl. 1027, 36-37]) — Quenstedt: Est primum hoc communicationis genus, quando propria modo divinae.modo humanae naturae personae tov Adyov in concreto sive duabus naturis constanti et modo ab utraque modo ab alterutra denominatae per et propter personalem unionem, et personae tovrotyta vere realiterque sine tropo tribuuntur, ita tamen, ut propria per particulas dlaxpitiK0c, sive pytac additas sive intellectas, suis simul vindicentur naturis. [Google] (Syst. II, 140.) — About the different names of the first genus_Hollaz says: Vocatur hoc primum genus a Damasceno dvtidooic, alternatio, tpdmoc¢ aviddcEas, modus alternationis, quia de persona Christi ovviétaw alternatim divina et humana praedicari possunt, v. g.': Christus est ab aeterno genitus a Patre, Christus est in tempore a Maria virgine genitus. A Theodoreto appellatur evaddayy Kai Koivevia ovoniata@v, permutatio et communicatio nominum, non nude verbalis, sed realis, quia nomina sunt signa rerum. A Cyrillo nuncupatur idtonotia Kat idionoinots, appropriatio, quia illud, quod uni naturae proprium est, tota persona, quae Deus et homo est, sibi vindicat et proprium facit. Vocatur etiam a Damasceno dddoiwoic, qua de una eademque persona ovv0éta et divina et humana idiomata realiter praedicantur, kat’ addo tamen Kau ad)o, quia particulae distinctivae ostendunt, secundum quam naturam unumquodque idioma de persona praedicetur. Sed accurate distinguendum est inter GAdoiwot determinativam et distinctivam, et inter dAdoiwoiv segregativam et exclusivam, v. g. [Google]: Deus passus est kat' ado, i. e. Deus vere et realiter passus est secundum assumptam humanitatem, ibi particula xat' adho determinat humanam naturam, cui passio formaliter competit, eamque a natura divina distinguit, non autem segregat, quippe cui passio appropriatur. Sed si sic exponas: Deus passus est xat' addo, i. e. sola humana

no difference whether the person is named a) according to the divine nature (Son of God, Lord of glory: concretum naturae divinae) or b) according to the human nature (Son of Man, David's son: concretum naturae humanae) or c) according to both natures (Christ, Immanuel: concretum personae), since under each denomination one person always has two natures among himself, clothed with all his own affairs. >?) Thus Christ is natura est passa, particula xat' dAdo est separativa, non distinctiva, quia per illam expositionem Deus a communicatione passionis excluditur. [Google] (Examen, de pers. Christi, qu. 39.) — With regard to the fact that the termini in the doctrine of the communication of attributes are not always used in the same sense, Chemnitz says: Ego de vocabulis, si modo rebus ipsis non struantur insidiae, cum nemine litigabo. (De duab. nat., p. 65 sq.)

statements in which the Son of Man is human or the Incarnate Son of God is divine or Christ is divine and human. (Cf. Baier III, 50 ff.) Also in these statements the communication of the attributes is expressed, because in the subject under every designation the whole person always stands, and under every designation both series of attributes, the divine and the human, are expressed by the subject. One might object that the statement: "The Son of Man suffers and dies" does not contain anything extraordinary, but that the predicate rather fits the subject quite well, and that therefore no communication of the attributes is indicated. Suffering and dying is the general human lot. The objection would apply if the Son of Man were only the "ideal man" or "the flower of mankind" or some other mere human being. But because according to Scripture the Son of Man is at the same time vtdc tov Sot Tov Cevtoc (Matt. 16:13-16), that is, a person who is not only man but also God, a communication of the attributes is stated, and the predicate is only essentially due to one nature, the human nature. The same is true when divine things, for example the birth from the father (0 Lovoyevijs AOyos Tapa matpdc, Joh. 1:14), are testified by the Son of God who appeared in the flesh or the mapé evoapkog In this case, too, the whole person, encompassing Godhead and humanity, is in the subject, and the predicate is due to the subject only according to the one nature, the divine. This is also the case at last when the concretum personae, Christ, human or divine...is stated, such as: "Christ comes from Israel" (Rom 9:5) and: "Christ created the world" (Eph 3:9). "Christ" is the denomination of the whole person according to both natures, and the human predicates are essential to the person only according to the human nature and the divine predicates only according to the divine nature. Therefore, Scripture also uses the particulae distinctivae in the sentences in which "Christ" is in the subject. As it is said of the Son of God, Rom. 1, 3: born of the seed of David kata odpka, so it is also said of Christ, Rom. 9, 5, that He came from the Israelite fathers both eternal and thirty years old, according to Scripture. *°° Both attributes are equally true to him, the former according to divine nature, the latter according to human nature. Likewise, Christ is both To KaTd GapKa. We therefore have no reason to compile these statements into a special fourth genus. The reason for the special classification has been asserted that Nestorius wanted to put up with the sentence: "Christ has suffered", whereas he rejected the sentence: "The Son of God (the Logos) has suffered". (Gerhard, De pers., § 184.) Only Nestorius' agreement to the first sentence was only illusory. Nor did Nestorius leave "Christ" as the designation of the whole person in the subject, but instead used human nature for this purpose, which the Son of God used only as a dwelling or instrument. Zwingli becomes clearer at this point. In the explanation of his all-oesis he expressly throws away the subject "Christ" and uses human nature for this purpose when he says: "When Christ says Luke 24: 'Was not Christ therefore compelled to suffer? Here Christ alone is taken for human nature, which may suffer and die, but not the divine nature. (St. L. XX, 1195.) Zwingli also has the secure feeling that he cannot leave the subject unaltered in his alloeoosis, even in the case where the Scriptures speak of the Son of Man as suffering and death. He writes: "Matt. 20: ‘And the Son of Man is given to the priests and scribes. Here the Son of Man is actually taken for human nature, for it may be given and killed, but the divine nature is by no means. That's consistent. Whoever denies the communication of the attributes, especially the so-called first kind, according to which the attributes of both natures are given to the whole person, can only do so by triggering the unio personalis. — Among dogmatists, the following division of the first genus is still to be found: Quenstedt II, 140 sq.: Primum hoc genus communicationis idiomatum melioris doctrinae gratia subdividitur in tres species, scil, in dvtidooty, specialius acceptam, Kowoviav tov Aeiov et idtonoinow. Avtidooic, specialius accepta, est, qua tam divina quam humana de Christo ab utraque natura denominato, seu, quod idem est, de concreto personae proprie dicuntur. Koivwvia tov beiwv est, quum de persona Adyov evodpKov ab humana natura denominata divina praedicata proprie enunciantur ob unionem personalem. Té1onoinots est, quum humana de concreto naturae divinae enunciantur. [Google] However, what is said here is already included in the description of the first genus. With regard to the termini, which are not always used in the same sense, Chemnitz’ reminder is: Ex patrum scriptis constat, vocabulum xoivaviac de omnibus ac singulis tribus gradibus usurpari. Non displicet igitur, quod quidam eruditi vocabulo xowwviac addunt peculiares notationes ac gradus ita distinguunt, ut primum genus appelletur communicatio idiomatum, secundum communicatio operationum, tertium communicatio majestatis. Ego de vocabulis, si modo rebus ipsis non struantur insidiae, cum nemine litigabo. [Google (De duab. nat., p. 65 sq.)

147] born of the Father in eternity as well as born in time of the Virgin Mary; 3 both births are equally real to him, the former according to divine nature, the latter according to human nature. Thus it is in relation to the whole series of divine and human characteristics. Christ is equally real: omnipotence and limited power,** omniscience and limited knowledge,*** the essential life and death. ** The former predicates are attributed to him according to the divine nature, the latter according to the human nature, as indicated by the details sometimes added in Scripture itself (katé& o&pKa, capKi). 3°) The assertion that any one of the divine or human predicates mentioned does not really and truly belong to the Person of Christ, but is a mere mode of speech (praedicatio verbalis), contradicts Scripture and, eo ipso, praises the unio personalis of God and man or the doctrine of two natures. Whoever, for example, separates the predicate of eternity or of essential omnipotence from Christ, thereby denies the essential divinity of Christ and the personal union of divinity and humanity that takes place in Christ's person. And whoever, with Nestorius, wants to relate the birth from Mary and the suffering and dying only to human nature and not to the person of the Son of God, must, if he follows an orderly economy of thought, first remove in his thoughts the human nature from the Personal Unity and thus dissolve the unio personalis. The indignation which Nestorius and Zwingli so abundantly express about the fact that the human predicates "born of the Virgin Mary ", "suffered under Pontius Pilate" are related to the Son of God, should consequently begin earlier, namely where the predicate "human" is pronounced by the Son of God'.' But whoever lets the statement: "The Son of God became man" pass unobjected and thus accepts the "two natures doctrine" and afterwards starts a complaint about the fact that the birth from the virgin as well as suffering

13:32.

discretivae, not separativae. and dying does not suit the Son of God, who—to speak to Luther—must be "a very great saint and incomprehensible man. **°) Luther: "If Nestorius thinks it strange that God dies, he should think that it is so strange that God becomes man. For then the immortal God will have to die, suffer and have all human idiomata. Otherwise, what would be the same man with whom God is personally united, if he did not have proper human idiomata? It would have to be a ghost, as the Manicheans had taught before. Again, what we speak of God must be attributed to man. Namely, God created the world and is omnipotent; the man Christ is God, therefore the man Christ created the world and is omnipotent. The ‘cause’ is, for one Person has been made of God and man, therefore the Person has the idiomata of both nature." *3 Assessment of the deniers of the first genus. Luther judges Nestorius relatively mildly. His judgment of Nestorius can be summarized as follows: Nestorius did not want to dissolve the unio personalis, but he spoke in such a way that the Christians who judged him according to his words had to assume that he considered Christ to be a mere man. Nestorius was therefore also rightly condemned as a false teacher. Nestorius is regarded by Luther as a type of people who, in the excitement and bitterness of the struggle, say yes and no at the same time without realizing it. There may be room here for some of Luther's debates on Nestorius.. Luther writes: "If I say: God is crucified by the Jews, he (Nestorius) says: No; for the cross, suffering and dying is not divine but human nature idioma or property. Now when the common Christians hear these things, they cannot think otherwise, for he considers Christ to be a pure man and separates the Person. Which he (Nestorius) does not intend to do without giving the words, as if he did. From this we can see that he was a very great saint and an incomprehensible man. For since he admits that God and man are united and mixed in one Person, he cannot

149] in any way defend that the idiomata of natures should not also be united and mixed. What else would God and man be united in one person?" and in the same context: "It seems terrible to hear him (Nestorius) that God should die. And is this his opinion that Christ is immortal according to the Godhead, but did not have so much understanding that he could have pronounced it.... The coarse, unlearned man did not see that he pretended impossible things, that he seriously considered Christ to be God and man in one Person, and yet he did not want to attribute the idiomata of natures to the same Person. He wants to believe the first to be true, but that is not supposed to be true, which follows from the first. In order that he may show that he himself does not understand what he denies"*** — Z.wingli will have to be judged in a similar way. Zwingli too actually only wanted to reject that Christ could not die according to his divine nature. He says yes to the justification of his alloeosis: "Secundum istam (humanam naturam) mori potuit, secundum divinam minime. [According to this (human nature) he could die, but not according to the divine] °°) One will therefore also have to say of Zwingli: "And is this his opinion that Christ is immortal according to the Godhead, but did not have so much understanding that he could have pronounced it? But wasn't Zwingli otherwise a gifted and understanding man? Certainly! But in judging Zwingli one thing should not be overlooked, which Luther also points out in Nestorius.. In his opinion, Luther was "only an honest Ajax among many Nestor, Ulysses, and Menelaus". This state of mind of Zwingli's clearly illuminates from the beginning of his writing "Ulrich Zwingli's answer that these words: ‘This is my body’ will forever have the old, unified. But I want to show you that you have not recognized the vast, glorious light of the Gospel, for you have forgotten it, and further: "These places" (passages of Scripture) "I have set before your eyes, highly

respected Martin Luther, so that you may see that you are not lost in one place, but in many, and that you may hereafter restrain yourself from the high praise among Christians, because you alone have done everything, which we would like to grant you, if it were so. But you alone are an upright Ajax or Diomedes among many Nestor, Ulysses, and Menelaes. Do not be in haste to learn the little part of which James writes in chapter three." A personal disgruntlement, as expressed in these words, can even easily cause confusion of mind, not realizing the self-contradictions in which one is moving. Zwingli's spiritual forces were so unfavourably influenced by his displeasure towards Luther that in the same writing in which he imperiously demands the conversion of "Son of God" into "human nature" he not only repeatedly uses the frowned upon expression but begins his writing with the same one: "Martin Luther wishes Huldrich Zwingli grace and peace’ through Jesus Christ, the living Son of God who suffered death for our salvation."* — One wonders whether Calvin knew what he was writing when he calls Christ's merit the merit of a mere man and thus dissolves the unio personalis. In Calvin's case it is possible to consider that his doctrine of election, detached from Christ's merit and the means of grace, is the all-determining center for him. Thus for him the incarnation of the Son of God and the incarnate Son of God's work have only secondary importance. Luther attaches the weight of the Godhead to the suffering of Christ when he says: "Where God is not in the balance and gives weight, we sink with our bowl. This is what I mean: where it should not say: God died for us, but only a man, we are lost."**9) Calvin attaches to the suffering of Christ the weight of predestination, as can be seen from the words already mentioned above. * Even the later Reformed theologians did not, in substance, get away from Zwingli's alloeosis. It is true that there is a recognizable effort to convince themselves and others that in the predicates

Luther with means of dubious quality. (Dogmengesch. II, 307)

"suffer" and "die" they leave the Person of Christ standing in the subject. But as soon as they begin to set forth the meaning in which they attribute suffering and dying to the Son of God, they come back completely to Zwingli's alloeosis, that is, they use mere human nature for the Son of God. When the Neustadt Admonition says that God has really suffered (realiter) in so far as he is a human being, but only in name (nominetenus) in so far as he is God,**°) this denies that the Son of God has really suffered. And when Danaeus writes against Chemnitz, Christ's suffering is attributed to the Son of God only by means of a thought operation, without any real communication (praedicatione dialectica absque ulla reali communicatione [dialectical expression without any real communication]), we have in this debate the complete objective separation of the Son of God from the suffering of his human nature. Furthermore, when Beza, at the Montbeliard Colloquium, says: *4) We interpret this saying, by which suffering is testified by God, as saying: "God has suffered, that is, the flesh, which is united to the Godhead, has suffered", then Beza, just like Zwingli and before him Nestorius, allows himself a substitution of subjects. With the same result other Reformed theologians assert that in the sentence "The Son of God has suffered" there is a synecdoche: the whole person is indeed mentioned in the subject, but only a part, namely human nature, is meant. *4°) So it is clearly evident that the Reformed theologians in their theological statements always come back to Zwingli's Alloeosis in a factual way. There is a point, however, where the Reformed theologians themselves are thwarted by the alloeosis and by all their tortuous declarations about the suffering of the Son of God. This is the point where they declare that the Son of God with his divine nature has given infinite value to the suffering of his human nature. *4) This bestowal of value, proceeding from the divine nature, implies

caro Christi est passa. Hic est synecdoche integri, quia integra pprsoma nominatur et sola altera illius pars videlicet caro seu humana natura assumta intelligitur. (Quenstedt II, 224.)

that the Son of God has not only a nominal but a real communion with the suffering of human nature. Thus, in Christian doctrine, the demands of practical Christianity often correct the false theories of theologians. This is also happening at this point. By admitting that divine nature communicates infinite value to the suffering of human nature, the Reformed theologians themselves thwart all the tropes and figures which they have endeavoured to place in the sweat of their brow at the first enjoyment of the communication of attributes. Thus, where Hodge speaks of the intrinsic value of Christ's satisfaction, he emphatically distances himself from Zwingli when he writes: "Christ is but one person with two distinct natures, and therefore, whatever can be predicated of either nature, may be predicated of one person. An indignity offered to a man’s body is offered to himself. If this principle be not correct, there was no greater crime in the crucifixion of Christ than in unjustly inflicting death on an ordinary man. The principle in question, however, is clearly recognized in Scripture, and therefore the sacred writers do not hesitate to say that God purchased the Church with His blood; and that the Lord of glory was crucified. Hence such expressions as Dei mors, Dei sanguis, Dei passio have the sanction of Scriptural as well as of Church usage. It follows from this that the satisfaction of Christ has all the value which belongs to the obedience and sufferings of the eternal Son of God, and His righteousness, as well active as passive, is infinitely meritorious. This is what the apostle clearly teaches in Hebrews 9:13. 14: ‘For if the blood of bulls and of goats... sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through (or with) an eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?’ The superior efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ is thus referred to the infinitely superior dignity of His person. °° Of course, Hodge is all the more energetic in his campaign against the genus maiestaticum, that is, against the participation of human nature in the attributes of divine nature. But in his concession that the divine nature gives infinite value to the actions and sufferings of the human nature,

152] also his fight against the genus maestaticum becomes senseless and pointless, as will be explained in more detail later. The abstract ways of speaking in the first way of communicating the Attributes. The abstract phrases such as: "The Godhead has suffered" instead of: "The Son of God has suffered" are avoided by most Lutheran theologians in order to cut off the accusation that they refer to the suffering of the Son of God according to his divine nature. *!’ Meanwhile, Lutheran teachers have also occasionally used the abstract phrases, but with a simultaneous rejection of the idea that the deity suffered on or after the deity.

Godhead cannot suffer and die" and: "God in his nature cannot die", and on the other hand: "Because Godhead and humanity in Christ is one person, Scripture for the sake of such personal unity also gives to the Godhead everything that is against humanity, and again", put the closer explanation: "Although the one piece that I speak in such a way as the Godhead does not suffer, the person who is God nevertheless suffers in the other piece as against humanity. °°) From the attached declaration it is clear that when the abstract term "deity" is used here, it is not the deity in itself that is meant, but the "deity in the flesh" or according to the assumed human nature. Hase was also right to point this out. 3°) The same can be said of the Fathers of the Church when they use the sentences: "The Son of God suffered" and: "The Godhead suffered in the assumed flesh" promiscue. So Augustine. >> There is therefore no factual difference.